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Stellingen 
1. Het kanaalonderhoud is een betere indikator voor de wijze waarop 
een irrigatiesysteem wordt beheerd dan de waterverdeling. (Dit 
proef-schrift.) 
2. Het overdragen van kanaalonderhoud aan de watergebruikers moet 
niet gezien worden als het opzadelen van boeren met een last maar 
als een mogelijkheid voor boeren zieh het kanaalstelsel toe te 
eigenen. (Dit proefschrift.) 
3 . De produktie in Mexico van hoogwaardige exportgewassen voor de 
Noordamerikaanse markt vervuilt het milieu, verzwakt boerenorga-
nisaties die de export-risiko's dragen, en speelt de tussenhandel en 
de Amerikaanse konsument in de kaart. (Dit proefschrift; zie ook 
Heijdra, 1988.) 
4. Een irrigatiesysteem dat boeren relatief vrij laat, zal een komplex 
distributiesysteem hebben. Toch kan in een dergelijk systeem een 
hoge efficientie bereikt worden. (Dit proefschrift; vgl. Horst, 1983, 
1984, 1990.) 
5. Een waterverdeler (canalero) denkt voor drie. (Dit proefschrift; 
van der Klei, 1989, Stelling 11.) 
6. Instituties die er zijn om boeren-organisaties te versterken moeten 
zelf goed georganiseerd zijn. 
7. Een spread-sheet computerprogramma is maar iets minder analy-
tisch dan Uphoffs drie-dimensionele raamwerk. (Zie Uphoff et al., 
1985; vgl. Chambers, 1988:46.) 
8. Het op-de-kop houden van organogrammen is een manier om de 
verhoudingen in een organisatie beter te begrijpen. 
9. In de sociologie is er een wet die lijkt op Heisenberg's onzeker-
heidsrelatie uit de quantummechanica: als je de mens in beeld hebt 
vervaagt zijn struktuurgebondenheid, en zodra je een struktuur be-
schrijft raakt de mens uit het zieht. 
10. Studies van praktijken van mensen die betrokken zijn bij rurale 
ontwikkeling verklaren meer dan veel ontwikkelingstheorieen. 
11. Als interdisciplinair onderzoeker heb je de mazzel in het veld van 
twee walletjes te mögen eten. Ondertussen dreig je op de universi-
teit tussen wal en schip te raken. 
12. Het falen van rijstprojekten op katteklei-gronden in de Casamance, 
Senegal (1967-1985) heeft te maken met de geringe kennis die 
westerse landbouwkundigen hebben van lokale koncepten voor zout 
en zuur. 
13. De technologie van waterpompen is niet de zwakke schakel in 
drinkwaterprojekten op het Ugandese platteland. 
14. Als een Mexicaan zegt dat hij zieh 'gesandwiched' voelt, is dat niet 
omdat er aan de Mexicaanse keuken geen metafoor te ontlenen zou 
zijn. 
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Preface 
How is the social dynamic surrounding an irrigation system intertwined with its physical 
infrastructure? This question has intrigued me ever since I read Edmund Leach's (1961) 
study of Pul Eliya. The present study tries to tackle this question on the basis of 
empirical research conducted in a 'modern', medium-scale, government-managed 
irrigation system, called El Operado, in El Grullo, Western Mexico. The study sets out 
to assess how the infrastructural context directs the action of people, and vice versa, 
how the actions of people make the irrigation system work. El Operado lends itself to 
such a study, since it is a comparatively successful system. Hence it is not yet another 
'disaster' story on irrigation. The research, of course, is critical on the subject. 
Wherever in the present text I point to weaknesses in irrigation organisation, it is 
because I mink mat organisation could be improved. But on the whole, the El Operado 
system could be an example for other irrigation systems in the world. 
The present study was potentially able to address the technical, social and 
organisational dimensions in one irrigation system, for it formed part of a wider 
research project of Wageningen Agricultural University and the Colegio de Jalisco, 
Guadalajara, entitled 'Contrasting patterns of irrigation organisation, peasant strategies 
and planned intervention: comparative studies in Western Mexico', directed by Norman 
Long and funded by the Ford Foundation and the Netherlands Foundation for the 
Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO). The research team included six social 
scientists who looked at different topics in the same subregion, namely households, 
women's organisations, agricultural labourers, agricultural export companies, 
government agencies and sugar cane growers' organisations. All these investigations 
shed new light on different aspects of the irrigation system under study. I myself am an 
irrigation engineer, who received an 'on the job' training in sociology. 
During the fieldwork in Mexico, from February 1987 to April 1989, and later 
during the writing up phase at the Department of Irrigation and Soil and Water 
Conservation, Wageningen Agricultural University, I received support from many sides. 
First and foremost, I wish to express my gratitude for the hospitality with which the 
people of the Autlan-El Grullo valley welcomed me. I feel, and my Mexican friends 
surely know that I am, privileged to have had the opportunity to work in Mexico, which 
made it possible to become acquainted with people whom I now may call friends. A few 
I would like to single out here. I thank Oscar and Raquel Martfnez for their generous 
hospitality, Don Chico Dfaz and Cesareo Duehas for teaching me farming, and the latter 
for many things besides, and Jestis Lomelf, Salvador Buenrostro, and Alejandro Salazar 
for inspiring me during fieldwork. I thank Teresa Gervacio for the meticulous work she 
did, and express my admiration for the way she pursues her own project. I am indebted 
to Everard and Gloria van Zoelen, for friendship, for the weekends in Guadalajara, but 
also for valuable discussions and new insights. 
xii Preface 
Then come all the farmers who agreed to be interviewed, which cost mem much of 
their time. These talks I much enjoyed, and they thoroughly influenced my thinking. I 
am grateful to the farmer representatives of the Asotiaciôn de Usuarios, who gave me 
access to their meetings, and with whom I had many fruitful discussions. I wish their 
organisation all the best. I owe much to the personnel of the El Grullo Rural 
Development District, who were extremely helpful. I wish to thank Engineer Gomez 
Diaz and Engineer Cobian for their kind cooperation. The group of canaleros are a 
special lot. Engineers may have overlooked them, but they did not overlook me, and 
they plunged me into the valley's reality. I thank them for that and for their generosity, 
patience and wit. 
The discussions in the research team were often inspiring. I thank the team members 
for it: Dorien Brunt, Humberto Gonzalez, Eisa Guzman, Magda Villarreal, Gabriel 
Torres, and Alberto Arce. This was only the core. Others, who during longer or shorter 
periods participated in the team effort, were Mili Figueroa, Pedro Silva, Lex Hoefsloot, 
Hans Heijdra, Jikke Verhulst, Horacia Fajardo, Monique Nuijten, Gregorio Rivera, and 
Gerard Verschoor. I experienced Ann Long's critical thinking, warmth and support as 
essential contributions to the project, and to my work, for which I am grateful. I 
furthermore enjoyed the inspiring presence of M.Sc. students who worked specifically 
on irrigation and shed new light: Angel BaMzar, Michael de Bont, Wilma van Esch, 
Michiel Kuijk, Piet Sijbrandij, and Annemieke Vos. 
I thank the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research 
(WOTRO) for the scholarship, and Renée van Kessel-Hagesteijn for her kind support. 
I am grateful to my supervisors at Wageningen Agricultural University, Professor 
Norman Long of the Department of Sociology of Rural Development and Professor 
Lucas Horst of the Department of Irrigation and Soil and Water Conservation, for their 
enthusiasm, their valuable suggestions and critique. I wish to thank Norman Long also 
for the new horizons he helped me to explore. I must admit that it was not always easy 
for me to effectively 'interface' with both professors, who represent two different 
disciplines. At times, they must have thought I was neither meat nor fish. The person 
who assisted me in this interdisciplinary endeavour was Jan Ubels, who stood at the 
conception of the project and who was also there at the birth of this thesis. He knows 
how much I owe to him. 
I would also like to mention those five persons who, prior to the Mexican 
experience, have influenced my thinking on irrigation most: Jan van der Laan, Piet Jan 
Zijlstra, Jacques Slabbers, Jos van der Klei and Jan Douwe van der Ploeg. 
Andrew Long had a tough job in editing the text. I also value the suggestions he 
gave for improving its content. Elias Michel and Frans van Ernst drew most of the 
figures. 
My parents critically followed my work, for which I am grateful. They have actively 
contributed to the final shape of this thesis. 
Without Marlou Bijlsma, the whole effort would have been fruitless. Together, we 
thank Pedro, Mili, Ahui and Naxi. Because of them, Mexico is always in our minds. 
Wageningen, December 1991 
Chapter 1 
Irrigation and interaction: an introduction 
It was hot, and the crops were in need of water, when a fellow researcher and I made our first field 
trip to the El Operado irrigation system in April, 1987. Surprisingly, we came across a pump along 
the main canal, something you do not expect to find in a gravity irrigated scheme. We decided to 
follow the pumped water and 200 metres from the pump met Flavio busy irrigating his maize crop. 
He saw us walking towards his plot, and, leaning on his spade, put his sombrero straight to await 
us. He did not show any surprise to see strangers getting their feet muddy, in the heat o f the day. 
We exchanged greetings and told him we were visiting the valley and were interested in irrigated 
agriculture. He began simply by telling us his name was Flavio, that he was an ejidatario, and that 
he did not own the plot he was working but share-cropped it with a fellow ejidatario. When asked 
about the pump in the main canal, Flavio explained that it was 'legal', since this part of the system 
had been irrigated before its construction in the 1950s. The new canal infrastructure had disrupted 
the old canals and now water had to be pumped out of the main canal. We asked what, according 
to him, were the main problems water users faced in El Operado. On this rented plot there were no 
problems, he answered, but on his own two hectare ejido plot, a kilometre away, he experienced 
problems obtaining water for his maize. The plot is surrounded by sugar cane fields which are soon 
to be cut, he explained. Sugar cane has to be left dry for 6 weeks before cutting, denying his maize 
water. Flavio had applied for an 'irrigation turn' several times, but the water guard (canalero) had 
turned down his requests, arguing that irrigating his plot would also mean the adjoining plots would 
get wet, as the irrigation ditches leaked. Despite this, and seeing his maize crop wilt, Flavio decided 
to simply take the water. Unfortunately the water guard caught him and he was fined 5,000 pesos 
(US$ 5) . He had not yet presented himself at the Rural Development District's office to pay the fine, 
and was worried that if he didn't pay they would deny him any future allocations of water. 
There is little special about the story of Flavio. Any irrigation system of scale entails 
people facing similar situations. Why then start a thesis with such an insignificant 
meeting between a farmer and two researchers? The story highlights the different 
aspects intertwined in irrigation situations. Firstly, Flavio explains an historical aspect 
relating to why he is allowed to use a pump in the main canal. Secondly, the problems 
he faces in his own ejido plot uncover a technical dimension; if the field ditches had 
been properly constructed and field drains existed then he would have no problems with 
water distribution. The story also reveals an organisational reality: the important roles 
of both the canalero (a low-placed field officer), and a farmer who has to report 
directly to an engineer at the District headquarters. Apparently, no farmers' 
organisation, such as an irrigator group, exists at canal level to which Flavio could have 
appealed. The story also raises an agricultural issue, of differing irrigation requirements 
for different crops (here maize as against sugar cane), in addition to which there is also 
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an economic antagonism between sugar cane growers and maize farmers. If we would 
take a closer look, underlying this antagonism is a power issue at stake; it appears that 
District officers give preference to specific crops, such as sugar cane, and to specific 
groups of producers. 
Practitioners in the field, farmers and functionaries alike, by experience are well-
acquainted with the multifaceted reality of irrigation situations. For planners, but also 
design engineers and social scientists concerned with irrigation development, however, 
this is not always the case: their specific skills make them value some aspects more than 
others. The present thesis is concerned with such a multifaceted reality, a medium-size 
government managed irrigation system in western Mexico, known as El Operado. It 
addresses a particularly 'hot' issue, that of water users' involvement in management and 
of turn-over to the users by the government of considerable responsibilities with respect 
to the operation and the maintenance of this 8,700 hectares irrigation system. 
By means of a detailed case study, a particular way of looking at irrigation 
organisation will be developed: one that starts from the idea that people's practices 
make an irrigation system work, and that focuses on the interactional patterns between 
social actors. The case will show that this focus provides a way of depicting how, for 
instance, water distribution and canal maintenance is implemented through an interplay 
of actors and canal structures, and thus highlights how in concrete situations the material 
reality and the social processes that emerge influence each other. It will be argued that 
such an interactional approach accounts for the different aspects of organisation 
(economic, historical, formal-juridical, power issues etc.), and helps to understand the 
irrigation organisation in terms of the formal and informal organising processes present. 
Since the organisation of El Operado was in a process of change during the research, 
the present thesis also provides an analysis of recent outside interventions, and how 
local actors responded to them. The analysis throws up a number of ideas concerning 
more effective ways of intervening in the management of irrigation systems. It is 
believed that a case-study, which combines technical and social aspects within one 
analysis, might appeal to both design engineers, social scientists and managers, as well 
as to practitioners in the field. 
1.1 Irrigation and its social dimension 
From the existing body of literature on irrigation, we learn that irrigation studies have 
many faces. Research findings seem to be heavily influenced by the disciplines of the 
various scholars, and thus apparently by the a priori suppositions these scholars have. 
Irrigation engineers predominantly focus on operational and technical problems in 
irrigation systems (Palacios Vêlez 1981, Boman and Hill 1989). Organisation 
consultants stress the inadequacy of institutional arrangements (Bottrall 1981, Sagardoy 
et al. 1982, Huppert 1989), identify a huge gap between farmers and functionaries, and 
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propose ways to bridge it (Freeman and Lowdermilk 1985, Groenfeldt 1988). Political 
scientists find that access to irrigation water and land is differentially distributed, and 
show a growing differentiation among farmers (e.g. Finkler 1974, Konings 1981, Scott 
1985, Weigand and Siordia 1987). Some study in detail meetings between farmers and 
functionaries (Adams 1978, Murray-Rust and Moore 1983), and critically analyse 
irrigation bureaucracies (e.g. Szelcely 1977, Mares 1980, Wade 1982, Cruz Majluf 
1984, Hewitt de Alcantara 1985, and Chambers 1988). Developmentalists will 
emphasise the need to implement new, and better, irrigation projects (Esman and 
Uphoff 1984), or to transform the bureaucracy (Korten and Siy 1989). Economists may 
find that investments in rain-fed agriculture give higher returns. Anthropologists are 
fascinated by the social and cultural content of irrigation (e.g. Leach 1961, Fleuret 
1985). 
It is probably true that these different faces of irrigation are present at any one time 
in a given system. There are after all many issues to consider simultaneously. Few 
irrigation studies, however, have focused on more than one aspect. Still fewer have 
studied the interconnectedness of such issues. Interesting attempts have been made by 
Barnett (1975), Hunt and Hunt (1976), ter Hofstede and van Santbrink (1979), Henao 
(1980), Eilander et al. (1986), Martin (1986), Merrey (1986), Enge and Whiteford 
(1989), and Diemer (1990). One major difficulty with studying irrigation is posed by 
the relationship between its physical infrastructure and its important social dimensions. 
Studies that pair technical insights with social analysis, however, are sparse. 
Large to medium irrigation systems have two basic characteristics which give rise 
to particular social processes. The first is that large scale irrigation normally requires 
huge investments, and that once these are made agricultural productivity rises, and thus, 
those who have access to irrigated land reap extra benefits. The other is that operating 
irrigation systems, encompassing two or more farmers, requires co-ordination. Both 
characteristics come together when the system is in operation, and work simultaneously. 
Below both characteristics are briefly discussed, starting with the latter. 
The physical infrastructure of an irrigation system, including the system of canals, 
drains, dams, and division structures, places certain demands on the farmers and 
government functionaries involved. The synchronisation and coordination of activities 
is required through an institution responsible for water distribution, canal maintenance 
and strategic decision-making. In many cases producers (water users) and nearly always 
non-producers (for example landlords, and the government) will delegate responsibility 
or decision-making powers to individuals in that institution. With the presence of such 
an institution a division of (and thus specialisation of) tasks will exist, often arranged 
along hierarchical lines. 
Constructing irrigation systems normally requires a vast investment, in terms of 
labour, materials, and/or capital. Often it is beyond the capacity of an individual farmer 
to make investments in developing irrigation schemes. The person or institution who 
makes the investment will often control access to the irrigation infrastructure. 
Consequently, it is not normally the farmers (those who till the land) who control direct 
access to the infrastructure and irrigation water. Hence, irrigation in some way or other 
implies the existence of inequalities of power, and different groups of users can be 
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distinguished according to their differential access to resources. These groups relate to 
each other in specific ways, for example through renting contracts, share-cropping, 
wage labour, and water distribution. 
Thus, the need to coordinate activities, and the issue of who made the investment 
and who reaps the benefit from it, implies that in an irrigation system different positions 
and actors can be identified, who will establish particular patterns of interaction. In this 
way an irrigation system influences various social relationships. In a general way then, 
a particular physical infrastructure makes certain authority positions and specific forms 
of representation possible, and inversely, different groups and positions will shape the 
way the irrigation system is used and adapted. The question to address is how to 
empirically study this interplay. 
It is not enough to identify different groups and positions of authority. These 
categories are by no means consistent, but are made up of people who may act 
differently in varying situations. To appreciate fully the dynamic nature of irrigation 
situations, it is necessary to view people as actors, that is as knowledgeable and 
consciously acting beings (Long 1984, 1989), and to analyse their actions vis-a-vis the 
material world and vis-a-vis each other. To study people's actions, I will use four basic 
concepts: practice, social interaction, organisation and intervention, which I discuss in 
the following section. 
Practice 
People's actions have a relationship to both their intentions and to the material and 
physical conditions in which such action takes place. The concept of practice (Bourdieu 
1977:96-97) refers to the visible undertakings of people which can be studied 
empirically through observation. The actions of people take place, and become relevant 
in the context of time and space. 'Time' refers to the fact that the practices of an actor 
are historical in the sense that they relate to former practice and experience. 'Space' is 
understood as the material-physical environment (including irrigation infrastructure) in 
which action takes place. Both these contexts are important because they shape the 
practices of people. 
Compare for example the irrigation practices of a tail-end farmer with those of a 
head-end farmer. It will appear that their differing spatial position in the irrigation 
system results in different practices. The tail-end farmer will need to mobilise labour 
to control feeder canals and division-structures when s/he irrigates, or when s/he also 
chooses other crops. With respect to time, the practices of the tail-end farmer will be 
the result of his/her former experiences with upstream farmers who may 'steal' 
irrigation water. Hence, practice implies a history of experiences and cannot be fully 
understood without an appreciation of the spatial and temporal context in which it takes 
place. 
The concept of practice enables us to assess how a particular type of irrigation 
infrastructure is related to particular actions of people. It also enables us to root our 
analysis in the problems and constructs utilised by the people we study (Bourdieu 
1977:91). In this way we can better understand the irrigation situation not only from the 
perspective of formal concepts, but also in relation to the 'folk' concepts used by the 
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actors themselves. For instance, according to Flavio's own account, he did not steal the 
irrigation water, he simply took it. Through observation, the concept of practice gives 
us an initial focus on how human activities shape the functioning of irrigation systems 
and how the irrigation system provokes particular activities. 
Social interaction 
Social interaction is a particular case of practice. By the concept of 'social interaction' 
we mean the processes which ensue when people come together and exchange goods, 
words, or share experiences. Social interaction, more than practice, is a dynamic 
concept since it acknowledges that when people come together a middle-ground emerges 
which cannot be wholly reduced to the constituent parts of the interaction. Social 
interactions thus have an emergent nature (Long 1989; cf. Sayer 1984:113). Outcomes 
of interactions consequently may be unexpected. 
A related concept, that of 'interface', is used in those situations where contacts and 
negotiations between social actors who differ in terms of access to resources, social 
relationships and cultural background, take place (Long 1989).1 In irrigation systems 
different social groups are involved, such as head- and tail-end farmers, bureaucrats, 
tenants, agricultural labourers etc. Such an irrigation system would not function without 
these different actors' interactions. Irrigation systems, then, engender many interface 
situations. 
Studying social interaction may reveal patterns or structures underlying the social 
relationships around irrigation situations without the researcher having postulated 
beforehand what the characteristics of that structure are. 2 Furthermore, the study of 
social interaction may help to uncover the dynamic of these patterns. If one, for instance 
were to study 'the structure of water distribution' in a particular irrigation system, it is 
possible to gather much quantitative data on water flows at different points in the 
irrigation system, out of which patterns would emerge. Yet such an analysis would say 
little about why people deal with the physical system in this way, and why these 
structural features exist, how they emerge and why they are perpetuated. Studying a 
handful of key-actors in the water distribution process, and their social interactions 
associated with that process, would generate further essential information that helps to 
reveal why the distribution pattern is as it is. One important methodological implication 
of taking social interactions seriously is that my own research activity became part of 
the research, since most research material was generated through my interacting with 
people. 
As the following chapters will show, the study of people's practices and social 
interactions in El Operado revealed that particular practices and interactions emerged 
in particular physical settings which I have labelled 'domains', in the practical sense of 
territory. Yet from the material presented it emerges that domains are more than simply 
spatial or physical settings. In a particular domain, people behave in particular ways, 
and also expect particular attitudes of others, and value particular things that in other 
domains might be quite irrelevant. Actors may also derive part of their identity and self-
esteem from the domain to which they feel they belong (cf. Karp 1978:155). Farmers 
in the field, then, behave differently from farmers' leaders in an ejido meeting, and 
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engineers in their offices have developed yet other practices. Engineers control much 
of what is going on in their offices, but on a field trip they often are not capable of 
exerting control over, say, farmers. Reversely, farmers loose confidence when visiting 
an engineer in his office. Moreover, the moment farmers interact with their leaders in 
an ejido meeting, or farmer leaders with engineers, a link is established between 
different domains, which is in fact an interface situation. Such interface situations are 
important for understanding irrigation organisation. 
Organisation 
Organisation is a widely used concept, and can be understood in many different ways 
(Morgan 1986). The concept suggests that an organisation is a clearly bounded entity, 
which it often is not (Long and van der Ploeg 1989). Irrigation organisation in particular 
poses some problems. First, irrigation does not involve a homogenous group of 
interested persons, but rather the organisation of groups of actors who differ markedly 
from each other. This is compounded by the fact that groups normally are not 
exclusively involved in one organisation, but often in other (formal and informal) 
organisations as well. Second, it seems that especially in irrigation systems 
organisational problems abound. This must partly be attributed to the fact that a gap 
exists between the formal organisation and the actual way in which the system is 
managed. I choose to take the field situation as a point of departure. I prefer to speak 
of organising processes, which include those actions and interactions of people that 
actively contribute to the way in which the system is operated. In this thesis, three types 
of activities are studied: water distribution; maintenance of infrastructure; and activities 
concerned with management issues3. These activities can be studied with the concepts 
introduced above. 
Organising processes in irrigation systems often involve power issues. The 
government agency in charge of the system's management tries to control the water 
users, but the latter devise strategies to attain certain goals and may evade certain 
duties. Here also knowledge comes in: actors learn, acquire skills and produce 
knowledge while they cope with situations in which power differences abound. In 
particular, in a situation where the formal organisation is turned up-side down, and 
negotiations between water users' representatives and government functionaries develop 
in order to define new formal arrangements, power issues are at stake. In the 
concluding chapter I will re-examine the way in which power in irrigation organisations 
can best be understood. 
Intervention 
Irrigation development implies outside intervention. The concept of intervention is 
problematic, as it suggests a marked distinction between inside and outside (or local and 
national), and a distinction between pre- and post-project situations. In concrete 
situations such distinctions are not clear cut, if found at all (Long and Van der Ploeg 
1989:4; see also Elwert and Bierschenk 1988). Nevertheless engineers and experts 
continue to make interventions that assume such dichotomised distinctions. Not 
surprisingly, then, our efforts often fall short of expected benefits. 
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In my view, projects and organisations exist through people's practices and their 
interactions. In order to reveal which organisational problems are present and how they 
evolve, it is necessary to shift our focus to concrete processes of social interaction 
which occur in the irrigation system. Intervention should then be understood as a 
process which purposely introduces new criteria around which interactions take place, 
and which may eventually lead to a breach with existing patterns of interaction. 
Interventions, then, involve processes of negotiation and accommodation. Since 
interventions are often aimed at a change in the existing social order, it is important to 
analyse whether these pretensions are met. This can be done through the examination 
of people's practices, since, as Giddens has argued, social change should 'involve 
alterations in the character of day-to-day social practices' (Giddens 1987:139). 
The research question 
This thesis, then, provides a case study of one irrigation system, in which a particular 
way of describing and analysing organising processes is adopted, by using the concepts 
of practice and social interaction. In this way one attempts to analyse how people's 
practices and their interactions relate to the physical infrastructure and the formal 
organisation of El Operado. This research question thus includes formal and informal 
ways of managing the irrigation system, and also accounts for the ways in which both 
the technical and the social aspects influence these processes. Finally, the thesis 
provides an analysis of a series of interventions concerned with handing over part of the 
management tasks of a government agency to a water users' organisation. I will 
examine how the organising processes change over time in face of these interventions. 
This way of viewing irrigation organisation will generates a number of findings, which 
point to a new way of diagnosing irrigation organisations, and provides a number of 
suggestions for how interventions in irrigation organisations can be implemented. 
1.2 The El Operado irrigation system 
It is rewarding, on a day, say in April, to make the trip to the Autlan-El Grullo valley, 
cross the plain, follow some canals and just look around. Travelling to the valley from 
Guadalajara (a three-hour drive by car) means first to experience the beauty of the 
rough, dry and grey landscape of the Sierra Madre Occidental, then to take the many 
sharp bends, decorated with white crosses of remembrance, that the road traverses in 
its descent of the ravine, below which the Rfo Ayuquila meanders, and then to have a 
panoramic view of the lush green valley with the towns of El Grullo and Autlan. Once 
having touched down, you might decide to cross the entire valley taking the 18 
kilometre road that connects Autlan with El Grullo, the main urban centres, situated 
respectively at the western and eastern extremes of the plain (figure 1.1). 
Looking to the hills reveals little; on their dried up slopes you can discern the many 

Irrigation and interaction 9 
cactus trees which will soon blossom with their delicious pitaya. Here and there you 
may see fires; the coamil farmers have started to burn their fields, and with the first 
rains (in two months time, in June) will sow their maize. Along the road from Autlah 
to El Grullo, you cross a lined canal. This canal marks the beginning of the El Operado 
irrigation system. You cannot escape the sight of sugar cane. There are recently cut 
empty fields with scruffy roots left to shoot again, and elsewhere unharvested cane that 
grows three meters high, obscuring your view. The road, in fact, is in pretty bad shape 
and all around you see cane stalks littered on and along the road, the explanation for 
which becomes obvious when you overtake an overloaded trailer, every pothole causing 
the loss of some of its load. 
In some places you will see a huge black column of smoke, and if close-by, you 
would be amazed by the noise with which the fire eats the sugar cane leaves. The heat 
being unbearable you prefer to go on, where you will see the cane cutters, all black 
from the burnt cane, cutting their way through the fields. Some funny looking machines 
are scraping the canes from the ground and loading the trucks which, groaning under 
the heavy load, have difficulty getting out of the uneven fields. The sugar factory you 
will probably smell before you see it. The factory and the numerous trucks parked in 
front waiting to be unloaded, makes an impressive, industrial sight. You will not hang 
around long because of the smell, so you will probably miss both buildings flanking the 
factory, on the right the building of the sugar cane growers organisation affiliated to the 
national peasant union, the Confederacidn Nacional Campesina (CNC), consisting 
mainly of ejidatarios, and on the left, of course, as a counterweight (although much 
smaller), the CNPP building (mainly consisting of the bigger private landowners, 
affiliated to the Confederacidn Nacional de la Pequefla Propiedad). Across the clumsy 
bridge over the Rfo Ayuquila you will discern the town of El Grullo. If you branch off 
the main road and take a dirt-road, you can see many other crops interspersed between 
the dominating cane: maize, beans, green tomatoes, alfalfa, egg plants, courgettes. 
There are many irrigation canals in sight. They have been properly constructed and 
are lined. In fact they seem quite new. Many canals, however, are overgrown by 
weeds, and are partly silted. Very probably, along one such canal you may see a small 
group of farmers, easy to distinguish by their sombreros, gathered around a water 
division structure. You may see some bicycles scattered around, and perhaps one or two 
'pick-ups'. Their owners are waiting for the water guard to come, and will request an 
irrigation turn. Going on, you pass a small hamlet, and at a beautiful spot again you 
cross the river. Nearer to the hills now, a few more kilometres down the road you cross 
the main canal. You are now at the very tail end of the right bank main canal. There 
is a nice view of the valley, in the distance you see the sugar refinery, and beyond, El 
Grullo lying against the slopes of the hills. With some imagination you can also make 
out stretches of the main canal. The concrete canal is skilfully laid out in the landscape, 
as it follows the contours of the lower flanks of the hills in order to embrace as much 
as possible of the valley's plain. So you decide to follow the canal. Its height and curves 
provide unexpected panoramas. If you keep on following the main canal (60 kilometres 
long) you end up not far from where you first entered the valley. Here you find the 
head works of the irrigation system. The diversion dam in the riverbank leads the water 
10 Chapter 1 
into intake structures on both sides of the river, and feeds both main canals. Knowing 
now where the water comes from, you have completed your ""tour del operado'. 
This impressionistic description may serve as a first introduction to the research 
area. I here want to give some additional background information. The Autlan-El Grullo 
irrigation system was constructed in the 1950s, covers some 9,000 hectares or nearly 
half of the valley plain, and is managed by a government agency. Therefore, everybody 
knows the system as EI Operado: that which is being operated, i.e. by the government. 
The relatively high crop yields (sugar cane 90 tons/ha; maize 4-8 tons/ha etc.) make El 
Operado a successful irrigation system. These high yields are in part made possible 
because in most years there is sufficient irrigation water available. In addition, the canal 
infrastructure is presently in good shape, since the primary and secondary canals were 
lined under a rehabilitation project during 1980-1984. The government agency managing 
El Operado is the El Grullo Rural Development District (Distrito de Desarrollo Rural). 
The District is responsible for the water distribution from storage dam to individual 
farm plots, for canal maintenance up to and including the tertiary canals, and for 
decisions concerning water prices, crops to be grown, conflict resolution etc. El 
Operado is a typical centrally-managed irrigation system. However, in 1988 a water 
users' association was formed, which in 1989 took over responsibility for canal 
maintenance and in 1990 gradually became involved in water distribution as well. 
The situation I encountered when conducting field research (February 1987 to April 
1989, completed with a visit to the area in April-May 1990) enabled me to study how 
the formal set-up of El Operado's management contrasted with actual organising 
patterns. Moreover, during field work, relationships between water users and 
government officers gradually changed because of the process of 'handing over' 
management responsibilities to farmers. In conclusion, the field work situation was quite 
appropriate for the research project which I outlined above. 
1.3 The research methodology 
Let us, for a moment, return to Flavio and the small story presented at the outset of this 
chapter. Apart from it telling something about Flavio and the irrigation system, it also 
tells something about the two researchers who are eager to believe what the farmer tells 
them, although they lack any knowledge about the context of that particular situation. 
The way we strangers rush to 'the small farmer' sets one thinking, as does also the way 
Flavio awaited us calmly, with ample time to judge these two foreigners and to think 
over which story he would make us believe. The case shows some of the limitations of 
field material. As researchers we actively helped to shape the story which was told, by 
the way we initially approached Flavio, and by the things we wanted to hear. Moreover, 
the presentation of the story was highly dependant on the way we wrote up our day's 
report. At the time we noted things that we later did not bother to write down; many 
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of the details we did not appreciate until later during the field work. Finally, the small 
story reveals how our positions as researchers differed markedly from that of Flavio. 
He has a problem; we are interested to record it. With him we review briefly some 
possible actions Flavio can take. ,But in the end we are off again, leaving Flavio with 
his problem. 
In any research considerable attention should be given to the presence and place of 
the researcher (Callon and Latour 1981:301). When studying interactions, this is almost 
automatically accounted for, as any interview or other form of communication between 
researcher and researched population already belongs to the interactional domain. I do 
not, therefore, in the following chapters write myself out of the story. Not because of 
some sort of vanity, but rather to give the reader an extra means by which to assess the 
quality and status of the field material presented. 
I myself took part in interface situations (see Long 1984). It is because 'people 
become aware of their culture when they stand at its boundaries' (Cohen 1985:69) that 
I am able to do research in unfamiliar societies in the first place. And this can only be 
a two-way process, since it is equally valid for the people I study. In the dialogues I 
engaged in with the people I studied, both parties changed a bit. Our horizons merged 
slightly (Markus 1986:29), and thus widened. This 'transformation into something 
common' is the emergent quality of social interaction (Gadamer cited in Markus 
1986:29). In our effort to understand each other, we are in fact trying to overcome the 
structural constraints that underlie our thoughts. When I ask my Mexican friend why 
certain things are as they are, in his answer he is trying to externalise the implicit, 
explicate the taken-for-granted state of affairs. In some way, this process comes down 
to a self-investigation of the (impossibilities for changing that state of affairs. It is like 
a test, like a pilot project of possible ways for change. 
When I ask him why there is such a widespread distrust among compatteros, he 
cannot answer other than through local folk sayings, invariably metaphors of the animal 
world. In the dialogue, we can explore each other's boundaries, and thus the 
'impossible' or 'unthinkable' takes shape. I become aware of the structural constraints 
present in that society, and in my own. Hence the dialogue is a forceful tool, not only 
in research but also, and especially, in evaluating possible interventions. Devising 
intervention, therefore, is necessarily a social activity, in which those involved have to 
participate. 
The researcher, then, is also an actor. The subjectivity of the researcher, however, 
is not to be understood as a 'weakness' of the research. On the contrary, all research 
uses subjective observations, even when it is claimed to be as objective as possible. If 
consciously accounted for, subjectivity may thus become a strength of the research (cf. 
Sayer 1984:223). Monitoring of one's own actions emerges as important. This requires 
that the researcher opens up himself for a critique. This provides yet another 
perspective: if I open up, then I may also question the role my discussion partners play. 
Then, dialogues are likely to ensue, and these are the most satisfying for the researcher. 
The study of social interaction and intervention implies that as a researcher you have 
to work with a variety of people, who live in different social worlds. For instance, the 
study of water distribution makes little sense if the combined presence of water users, 
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field officers and engineers is excluded. I had to act strategically therefore, in order to 
create a sufficiently broad social base, and to get accepted not only in the field (among 
farmers), but also in the engineer's office, and among the field personnel. I of course 
only partly succeeded. I think, however, that by the end of the research period I had 
established sufficient contact with a number of people from various social worlds within 
my field of study. My fellow researchers, and the Masters students who undertook their 
own research under my supervision, greatly added to broadening my scope, since they 
created their social bases quite separately from mine. 
Despite the warmth I received from the friends I made, maintaining relationships 
with a wide variety of people was sometimes troublesome. In the quite polarised society 
I plunged into, this meant that I had frequent contact with persons who among 
themselves would never mix. Sometimes, then, I found myself confronted with 
conflicting loyalties. In addition, mixing with certain people stigmatised myself before 
others. Anyway, I tried my best to steer a course in between and act strategically. I also 
tried carefully not to compromise those who had become friends, and never to let my 
research work take precedence over my loyalties to friends. It remains to be said, 
however, that with this kind of actor-centred fieldwork it is sometimes difficult to assess 
where the work ends and one's private life begins. 
I want to mention one major limitation of the social base I enjoyed, and thus of the 
present study: It was clearly male-biased. I attribute this partly to being male, in that 
it is easier for a man to mix with men than with women in the region where we 
worked, and partly by the fact that irrigated agriculture in that region is simply 
dominated by men. Consequently, this thesis does not address explicitly the issue of 
gender in irrigation systems. 
The manufacture of data 
I of course indulged in the usual scramble for 'objective' data, like statistics, water 
discharges, cropping patterns, and also data on projects and programmes.4 However, 
this did not take very much of my time. More important were field trips: observing 
crops, canals, water flows etc. For the chapter on history, I also consulted written 
sources, but most of my time was spent on developing the life histories of a few well-
informed and aged ejidatarios. Obviously, the interviews carried out with these 
fascinating people were unstructured, in order to leave them as much space as possible 
to talk. The interviews were recorded on tape. The ejidatarios did not object. On the 
contrary, they agreed with me that these historic facts should be carefully recorded or 
else would get lost, 'since the younger generations did not bother any more'. 
For the chapters on irrigation activities I used different mixes of the following 
methods. First, observing events in which I could participate, such as canal cleaning, 
formal meetings, informal gatherings etc. Second, unstructured interviews with involved 
people, both in the field, in my car, in a social place, perhaps in my house or in the 
house of the interviewed. Third, with people whom I had gradually established a 
relationship of trust and with whom I could hold dialogues rather than interviews. In 
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these discussions my discussion partner knew that I might use the material for research 
purposes. On a few occasions small group discussions were held with two to five 
people, most of which emerged spontaneously. Twice, however, I purposely organised 
them. In one situation I was allowed to record the lengthy discussion on tape. It should 
be recognised that the mere presence of the researcher often produced interesting 
events, interactions and discussions. I tried always to record carefully such 
circumstances. 
With some persons whom I considered especially crucial informants, or crucial 
actors in El Operado's dynamic, and only if we both liked each other, I held interviews 
and we had discussions at regular intervals over a greater span of time. I joined them 
in their work at various times. With some I conducted over a dozen interviews spread 
over the research period (two and a half years). With these, I not only hoped to capture 
some aspects of an often complex sequence of events, but also to record developments 
in the actors themselves. I wrote a chapter based on one of these friends (the water 
guard). I explained this to him, and gave him a draft version in Spanish. He 
wholeheartedly gave me permission to publish it. 
For another chapter, that on canal maintenance, a survey was conducted by a 
Masters student. The only other 'survey' conducted was on sugar cane distribution. This 
was done mainly on the computer (material came from an archive), and analyses were 
discussed with some extremely well-informed farmers. So, it was not a survey in the 
strict sense of the word. In my view this manner of generating data was time-efficient, 
and more importantly, did not create a row for me with big sugar cane growers, who 
easily could have made my life difficult. 
For yet another chapter I modestly participated in the stream of events. Here I refer 
to the water users association when it was in its formation process. I participated in a 
formally appointed committee of water users, and thus influenced slightly its outcome. 
More important, I think, were discussions with some of the farmers and functionaries 
in informal meetings, where we brainstormed about this new organisation, and reviewed 
possible set-ups and ways to overcome obstacles. In one other way I was a participant 
in these events, in that I gave certain actors information to which they did not have 
access, in much the same way as they provided me with information I did not have 
access to. One report came out of the irrigation research which was purposely written 
for the benefit of the 'research population'. This report was written by Piet Sijbrandij, 
the M.Sc. student studying canal maintenance (Sijbrandij 1989a). It described the actual 
problems of canal maintenance, and gave some suggestions to the newly formed Water 
Users' Association on how to tackle maintenance once it was in place. 
Additional information, and a crucial aid to contextualising my understanding of the 
valley, came from my research colleagues through the many discussions and seminars 
we held. They provided me with certain realities I did not know of: at household level, 
the world of the agricultural labourers and the sugar cane proletariat, and most 
contrastingly, of the opulent horticultural entrepreneurs of the region. In addition, 
several students did field work for their Masters thesis while I was in the research area. 
They performed independent studies, which I merely tried to facilitate. Their findings 
were important sources of information for me, and provided me with new windows on 
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the valley's reality. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis has the following structure. First, the temporal and spatial contours of El 
Operado are examined in two chapters. Then, three chapters are dedicated to the 
practice concerned with water distribution, with canal maintenance and with 
management issues. Subsequently, two chapters deal with three interventions concerned 
with decentralising El Operado's management, and assess how these interventions, in 
the end, resulted in a change of irrigation practice. This structure enables me to build 
an argument on how social practice and the physical irrigation infrastructure are related 
and how social practice changes over time. 
Chapter 2 gives an historical account of the development of the irrigation 
infrastructure. The chapter shows how projects concerning water and land have 
influenced the relationships between three sets of actors; namely, entrepreneurs, 
peasants and government functionaries. This chapter also shows how, in turn, these 
three groups of people have played their part in developing the infrastructural works. 
The chapter reveals three basic themes which will again crop up in the following 
chapters. The first is the tense relationship between insiders (those from the valley) and 
outsiders. The second is the contradiction that exists between small farmers and the 
local elite. The third theme highlights the difficult position that intermediary actors, 
especially farmer organisations, are faced with, because of the awkward, mediatory role 
they play between the farmers and elite. 
In chapter 3, the El Operado irrigation system is introduced through an analysis of 
how the specific lay-out of the canal infrastructure has influenced the way the system 
is being operated, with special emphasis on the access to irrigation water; and how the 
irrigation system relates to access to land. This chapter thus highlights the left-hand side 
of the equation physical infrastructure - social dimension. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the 
necessary contextual information for the subsequent chapters, which describe in more 
detail different irrigation situations. 
Then follow three chapters concerning practices of water distribution, canal 
maintenance and the making of the annual irrigation plan. These chapters provide 
detailed empirical material on how these three types of activities are undertaken. The 
research methods are different from chapter to chapter. Water distribution is described 
in chapter 4 through the case study of the crucial actor in water distribution matters, the 
water guard (catialero). The focal point is the social actor. The specific knowledge the 
water guard has with respect to the canal system is described, as well as the 
relationships he maintains both with water users and his superiors in the District. I also 
describe the strategies he devises to comply with his task. I conclude that the water 
guard forms a crucial link between District functionaries and farmers, and that he is 
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more than simply subordinate; he actively shapes water distribution. 
Chapter 5 starts with problematic situations which emerged because of canals silting 
up. An attempt is made to analyse the actions and interactions which unfold around 
these situations: actions of water users directed at the canals, interactions among water 
users, and interactions between water users and the maintenance department of the 
District. The internal relationships of the department are also examined. A major 
organisational gap is detected between the 'field' and the 'office', which is partly filled 
by the initiative of informal water user groups. 
Chapter 6 concerns the making of the irrigation plan by the operation department of 
the El Grullo District. This chapter gives an institutional chronology of decision-
making, which falls into two parts. The first part follows some District officers in their 
efforts to formulate the annual irrigation plan that defines the crops to be grown during 
the irrigation season, the volumes of irrigation water distributed and the level of water 
fees to be paid by the farmers. The second part deals with how District engineers 'sell' 
the plan to the water users in a meeting of the water users commission. In this chapter 
the various settings of social interaction receive attention, which helps us to appreciate 
certain social situations as arenas of negotiation and struggle. 
The following two chapters are about intervention and change. Chapter 7 analyses 
interventions undertaken with regard to the water users organisation. It starts with an 
intervention by local actors (District engineers) who decided to create a water users 
commission in 1980. The second intervention includes regional actors at State level who 
in 1988 ordered the head engineer of the El Grullo District to form a new water users 
organisation to take charge of canal maintenance. The third intervention concerns a new 
policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) to re-organise 
the Districts, which had quite unexpected and negative implications for the El Grullo 
association. The chapter relates policy measures devised in the political centre to local 
initiatives. It tries to understand the outcome (the water users association) in terms of 
negotiations and institutional networks, both local and extra-local. 
Chapter 8 concentrates on the internal dynamic of the Water Users' Association. 
Crucial was that its organisational set-up was adapted in such a way that the association 
became better articulated with existing (informal) practices of the ordinary fanners. 
Chapters 7 and 8 lead me to conclude that interventions in irrigation organisation, 
especially those aimed at decentralising management, are likely to succeed only if they 
also involve change in social practice. 
Chapter 9, the final chapter, tries to answer how people's practices and their social 
interactions are related to the physical infrastructure of El Operado and its formal 
organisation, and how these practices change over time. It also outlines an intervention 
perspective, while identifying some factors important for the diagnosis of existing 
irrigation organisations. 
Chapter 2 
Crops and commerce, water and works; 
the valley's agricultural development, 1850-1985 
In this chapter I want to relate how the use of two crucial resources, land and water, 
developed in the Autlah-El Grullo valley during the period 1850-1985. The chapter will 
show how struggles over land and water, and struggles over projects1 aimed at 
developing these resources, helped to shape the relations between three groups of actors: 
peasants, entrepreneurs and state functionaries. One of the conclusions is that certain 
patterns of relationships that emerged around 19th century projects, recur in more recent 
projects. This chapter, then, aims to present both the continuities and discontinuities in 
the development of resources. In this way the 'ethnographic present' is not seen as 
unique, but in continuity with the past. Furthermore, part of the material presented in 
this chapter comes from people still living, which helps us understand how they make 
sense of the contemporary through their interpretations of the past. 
I break down the following chronological account into four periods. The first is the 
period between 1850 and 1940, where we see a shift from hacienda to ejido. The 
second period runs until 1968, during which old and new local elites searched for new 
agricultural opportunities. From 1968 until 1975, horticultural production for export 
begins to emerge and dominate the valley's economy. During the last period, from 1975 
to 1985, the valley experiences a demise of horticulture and the new fashionable crop 
becomes sugar cane. 
In the concluding section of this chapter, I briefly discuss how these agricultural 
developments have helped to shape relationships between actors from the valley with 
outsiders, especially state officials; and within the valley's arena, between entrepreneurs 
and peasant farmers. This provides a useful background in which to situate the subject 
of this thesis; namely the El Operado irrigation system (covering nearly half of the 
valley's plain) and the social dynamics that surround it. As an introduction, I first want 
to briefly highlight some of the changes that have occurred in the valley during the last 
100 years. 
The Autlah-El Grullo valley experienced rapid change during this century. Its 
population has quadrupled since 1900,2 and agricultural production has grown even 
faster. The valley's landscape has been transformed; most of the trees that Kelly 
admired during the 1940s have all but disappeared, as farmers have levelled their fields 
and cut them down (cf. Kelly 1945:2-3). More people have access to land now than 
compared to the situation in 1900. This is the direct result of the land reforms which 
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took place during the 1930s and 1940s. By then the bulk of agricultural production was 
rain-fed. During the 1960s and 1970s this situation changed quite sharply, with the 
introduction of El Operado irrigation system in the 1960s, and later the deep-wells 
developed in the vicinity of Autlah during the 1970s. From 1970, production within the 
irrigated areas gradually became more important, not only because more than half of 
all arable land was under irrigation (with two harvests per year), but also since yields 
obtained in these irrigated areas were much higher than in rain-fed areas. 
2.1 From hacienda to ejido (1850-1940) 
As in other parts of rural Mexico, in the 19th century the Autlah-El Grullo valley had 
a dual agricultural system: food production for home consumption by the 'indian' 
population, and commercial agricultural production on the haciendas. The indtgena 
population was engaged in the rain-fed production of food crops, mainly maize, beans, 
chili peppers and pumpkin. Production was on their communally held lands, partly 
situated in the valley, but mainly in the surrounding hills. The gathering of fruits and 
herbs, and hunting hill animals complemented their diet. The indians also produced 
indigo and in particular grana (cochineal, a crimson dye obtained from the crushed 
bodies of the cochineal insects, which are found on cacti). During colonial rule the 
Spanish exacted tribute from the indians in the form of this crimson dye, which was 
very cumbersome to produce.3 
The hacienda lands covered a great portion of the flat alluvial lands of the valley and 
extended into the hills. On average, the 33 haciendas in the Autlah region covered 2,544 
hectares each (Historia de Jalisco, vol.4:108,110). Since normally the owner 
(hacendado) resided in Guadalajara, the man in charge of a hacienda was the 
administrador or mayordomo. Agricultural activities included the production of food 
crops, normally through share-crop arrangements; the production of commercial crops, 
like rice, sugar cane and fruits, directly supervised by the mayordomo; the processing 
of these commercial crops, especially sugar cane; and finally the production of animal 
products, like meat and cheese.4 
This system gave rise to the emergence of two different classes of peasants working 
for the hacienda. One group actually lived on the hacienda, in houses owned by it, and 
were forced to provide labour to the hacienda or else they were thrown out. These 
labourers worked mainly on the commercial crops and in the sugar cane refinery; 
activities directly supervised by the hacienda. During the rainy season, however, they 
also share-cropped produce for consumption. Women participated in agriculture, but 
also had to wash linen and carry out other household work for the mayordomo. This 
group, then, formed the hacienda proletariat. The haciendas generally owned much 
more land than could be worked by the people resident there. Therefore, to meet its 
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demands, the hacienda engaged in share-crop arrangements with other peasants. These 
lived in nearby villages, often comunidades indigenas. These peasants frequently chose 
to engage in share-crop arrangements with the hacendado because they lacked ox drawn 
ploughs, sometimes land, or were short of food. The hacienda provided the seeds, the 
oxen, the land and an advance in kind (often something like 2 hectolitres of maize for 
consumption and also feed for the oxen). In return, the share-croppers provided labour. 
Although the share-cropper was solely responsible for his field, harvesting was often 
carried out jointly by a group of share-croppers. They would go collectively from one 
field to another. The harvest was then divided into two equal parts, one for the share-
cropper and one for the hacienda (often this created rows, because the mayordomo used 
to cheat), and a harvest feast was held, el acabo (the completion). 
Some data suggest that the two groups of peasants developed different 'skills' or 
attitudes, due to their different positions. The hacienda peasants, not being 'free' had 
only one option, to cooperate. They necessarily developed, therefore, a more submissive 
attitude. They also had to endure a continuous ideological harassment by the padre de 
pie, the priest who also lived permanently on the hacienda whose salary was paid by 
the hacendado. In return, the resident peasants enjoyed some social security: guaranteed 
employment, and perhaps some assistance from the mayordomo in the case of an illness. 
The share-croppers, by contrast, enjoyed more freedom, as they had at least two 
options; to work for the hacienda or not. When they chose to do so, they became 
engaged in a commercial agreement, with the effect, according to some, of improved 
entrepreneurial skills. Furthermore, they had less difficulty in openly expressing their 
thoughts among fellowmen. Much later, in the 1920s and onwards, this differentiation 
between both groups of peasants had consequences for the way land reforms took shape. 
One of the pillars of the hacienda system was repression. The system could not 
function without an elaborate system of vigilance. Especially with regards to the lands 
that were share-cropped, the hacendado had to ensure that peasants did not take any 
produce. For this reason, the landscape was adapted. A number of adjoining fields (each 
measuring one yunta or approx. 4 hectares) were enclosed by stone walls, trees and 
cacti, called a potrero. (The fact that to date all farmers still use this concept indicates 
the important impact this ordering of the landscape had and still has.) Their size varied 
greatly, from 20 to as much as 200 hectares. Each potrero had its own name.5 This 
type of taxonomic classification helped people to make sense of the world around them, 
and became references often used in everyday conversations. This taxonomy of the 
landscape was especially important to the functioning of the hacienda administration, 
who supervised and coordinated activities in a dozen of these potreros. 
The potrero often had only one entrance with a gate (some names of potreros still 
refer to this gate: Puertas Cuatas; El Golpe; Puerta con Don Choti) which was guarded 
by someone who was appointed by the mayordomo, the velador. Anyone entering or 
leaving the potrero was thus scrutinised, by a fellow peasant. To share-crop, then, did 
not mean you had free access to the plot you cultivated. At the beginning you could 
freely enter in order to plough the land, sow, cultivate and weed. But soon afterwards, 
the potrero was closed. If you wanted to pick some fresh elotes (corncobs) from your 
field, you had to ask permission from the mayordomo, who would give you a piece of 
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paper with the number of elotes you were allowed to take. At the gate of the potrero 
you had to give this paper to the guard who checked your cache (informants say mat 
if you had picked a few too many, he would report you and take the extra elotes for 
himself). The mayordomo would take note of the number of elotes picked, and would 
settle the account at harvest time. 
The veladores formed part of a group of workers who held intermediate positions 
in the hacienda administration. The mayordomo conceded to them certain privileges and 
responsibilities. This situation created discord among the peasants. The hacendado, 
through the creation of these intermediary positions, was able to exploit those interface 
situations in which people of similar social backgrounds found themselves placed in 
antagonistic roles with each other; like the velador and the share-cropper. These 
intermediate positions, of course, gave rise to abuse and corruption. The bosses had no 
interest in combatting these, and peasants lacked the physical and organisational means 
to do so. 
Competing over water: irrigation and domestic use 
During the 19th century, there were at least six irrigation systems in the Autlan-El 
Grullo valley. All six were in the hands of various hacendados, and invariably used for 
raising commercial crops, particularly sugar cane (table 2.1). Such infrastructure 
involved large investments for the construction of diversion dams and canals, and it was 
common place to find small sugar refineries (trapiches) linked to such structures. In 
some cases, like the Ahuacapah irrigation system, the irrigation canal ran through the 
refinery, where it provided hydropower for the mill (ingenio). Later in this chapter we 
will have a closer look at the irrigation system owned by two haciendas near Ayuquila, 
not far from El Grullo. This was the biggest system, irrigating at least 300 hectares. At 
two points water from the Ayuquila river was diverted into two canals (1800 and 1100 
Table 2.1 19th century irrigation systems in the valley of Autlah-El Grullo 
site hacendado area irrigated crops grown installations 
Ahuacapân Valencia c. 70 ha. sugar cane, fruit trees ingenio 
Ayuquila La Laja c. 50 ha. sugar cane, fruit trees trapiche 
Ayuquila Rivera c. 250 ha. cane, rice, fruit trees trapiche 
Ayutita various c. 50 ha. plantains, vegetables -
Chacaltepec Arias c. 50 ha. rice, sugar cane trapiche 
El Chante Garcia c. 50 ha. fruit trees, maize -
Source: own field data 
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metres long, respectively), each with a discharge capacity of 200 litres per second.6 
The Autldn town water supply: a case of historical continuity 
Apart from its agricultural use, water was crucial for domestic use. Often, conflicts 
emerged between farmers and villagers. The town water supply of Autlah is a case in 
point. Near the town runs a small river, the Arroyo Ayutita. This river was dammed 
to supply drinking water to Autlah. The intake structure in the Ayutita river for drinking 
water dates back to as early as 1775 (Coleceioh.., VI, 1882:337). Since men, the town 
council started several projects to secure enough drinking water, but with little 
success.7 As late as 1979, a new project involving a storage dam was formulated but 
due to insufficient funds was not implemented. 
Ayutita water was not only used by the town, farmers also used it, for irrigation. 
In the 19th century, irrigation water was diverted from the river by 5 hacendados. By 
the second half of the 20th century it was mainly the ejido Ayutita who used the water 
for vegetable production. During the 19th century, various conflicts between the town 
council and these entrepreneurs developed. 
In 1851, the Jalisco Congress issued a decree defining the 'exclusive role of the 
town councils in the administration of the waters' (Coleccidn, II, 234). This decree 
stimulated the Autlah town council to take a stand against the use of water by the 
agricultural entrepreneurs, and safeguard the village's water supply. They elaborated, 
in 1866, the regulations on the controlled use of Ayutita water.8 The farmers opposed 
to the central role that the town council tried to secure for itself, referred to their 
inalienable rights to the use of that water. According to Aldana, the effort of the Jalisco 
Congress to put in some order the 'chaos of water rights', actually had the opposite 
effect, resulting in a fever of claims (denuncias) which enhanced unrest in rural Jalisco 
(Aldana 1986:45). 
Although it seemed that the use of Ayutita water was properly framed by 
administrative rule, in April 1876 a major conflict arose between some farmers of the 
Ayutita valley and the town council of Autlah. The conflict centred around who had the 
right to decide on the use of the water: those private persons holding rights to it, or a 
government authority. The water supply commissioner (comisionado de fuentes) of the 
council with the help of a gang of 10 armed men, put at his disposition by the mayor 
(jefe politico), destroyed some diversion structures in the Ayutita river. This affected 
the farmers' ability to irrigate their crops. One farmer, Sr. Alcaraz, was put in jail for 
opposing the action of the council. Some days later, he wrote a letter containing 7 
points formally accusing the town council of abusing their power and of practising 
double standards. The council's president also owned land along the Ayutita stream, and 
he had been left free to do what he pleased with the water. 
The council gave a lengthy reply, defending the adopted measures with fervour, and 
fiercely attacked the accusations of Sr. Alcaraz. (Colecci6n.., VI, p.309) Alcaraz did 
not accept this, and took the matter to Guadalajara, where the Supreme Government of 
Jalisco decided that the Autlah town council should stop their destructive acts against 
the irrigation infrastructure of the Ayutita landowners (p.325), advising the council to 
take the matter to court, if they thought they had the right to fully dispose of the water. 
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The case was closed, but the Autlah town water supply remained a problem. 
A century later, in April 1979, the ejidatarios of Ayutita wrote a letter to the state 
governor, complaining about the president of the Autlah town council: 
The present town council (...) has taken from us the ENTIRE water right we are entitled to 
(dotacidn), leaving the ejido without water, and our families, the ones who need this liquid most, 
have been forced to carry the water up to one and a half kilometre for their necessities; moreover, 
the lands lay idle because of lacking irrigation water, and worse off are our cattle which are dying 
of thirst (cited in Rivera 1989:5-6). 
This letter put some pressure on the town council, who finally promised to build a dam 
for the ejido. The dam, however, was never constructed. Although the municipality of 
Autlah took most of the Ayutita water for domestic use, the town has still felt severe 
water shortage in recent years.9 
The Ayutita story, then, provides some insights into the often problematic 
relationship between (groups of) private citizens and the local government. Although in 
external affairs the town council and hacendados were united and would defend 
common interests (see the following story on land repartition), in a local dispute over 
water tensions ran high. Individual citizens, especially rich landowners, have difficulty 
in accepting a higher authority; an authority which may lawfully limit their freedom of 
action. Local government seems to think that since it is the authority, it is the one who 
decides. Consequently, it does not feel the need to convince landowners of its decisions. 
Instead, it acts in an authoritarian manner. 
The case also shows continuity in history. For two centuries the Autlah town supply 
problem has cropped up again and again. Compare for instance what in 1987 the 
president of the Autlah town council has to say about the problem with what his 
predecessor in 1828 wrote. 
We want to have this old problem finished, in order that Autlan has the opportunity to grow and 
develop (.. .); water is the crucial basis for the economic take off (despegtte) of our town. (Noticias 
Regionales, 15/2/87) 
stated the mayor in his 1987 annual address. The Autlah mayor of 1828 wrote: 
If it were possible for the town council to appropriate the Ayutita ravine (. . .) , the water will abound 
in this village, and will be one of the greatest and busiest villages. (Colecci6n.., VI, 1882:336) 
The repartition of communal lands, 1850-1880 
Although access to water created conflicts in the 19th century, access to land was also 
the object of struggle. The independent Mexican state (1820) inherited from the 
Spaniards the hacienda system and the laws defining the place of the Indians in society. 
This changed in the second half of the 19th century. In 1849, the Jalisco Congress 
accepted decree no. 121, which ordered the town councils to distribute the communal 
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lands to the individual Indian community members. The new law affected many 
haciendas, which had encroached on much of the Indian lands.1 0 Although the 
programme of land repartition did not work out the way some had hoped, the case is 
nevertheless interesting, because it involved a struggle between State policy and local 
policy, and thus, perhaps for the first time, the discretionary power of the local elite 
was questioned by an outside force. The local elite, probably, felt appalled by the fact 
that an outside bureaucrat, seated behind his desk in Guadalajara, could influence local 
affairs in 'their' valley. Both parties had to define their attitudes towards the other since 
neither exactly knew what the rules were of the new game; called government 
intervention. In the 20th century, government programmes would become more and 
more important in the valley's development, however, experiences gained in the 
repartition of communal land influenced future interventions. 
In Autlah, the problem was that the 'repartition commission' (functioning on behalf 
of the so-called indigenous population of Autlah) claimed lands that had been 
administered by the town council, which were to be redistributed among the Indian 
community. The town council did everything to prevent this from happening. The 
Governor of Jalisco and his staff, however, insisted, and the paper war that ensued 
lasted from 1849 till 1870. When these problems were finally resolved, conflicts within 
the Indian community started to fester. It is surprising to see that during this period, 
functionaries of the Jalisco State seemed to take an interest in the case of land 
repartition, despite important national crises. Mexico and Jalisco lived from one disaster 
to another, resulting from the struggles between conservatives and liberals (1853-1861), 
followed by the French invasion (1862-1867). 
Already in 1851, two members of the repartition commission, Indians themselves, 
had complained about the attitude of the town council. The latter had threatened to 
accuse the former of inciting villagers to disturb public order (Colecci6n.., U, p.380). 
The commission complained of the inability to successfully carry out studies related to 
the land question (on colonial land titles, and the extent of village property), of the 
opposition of some villagers who saw their own interests threatened by the land 
distribution, and of lack of cooperation by others who feared to make themselves hated 
(pdiosos) by the town council. Moreover, the commission expressed surprise that since 
the first demands were put forward (in 1848) the town council had been renewed three 
times, but their attitude had been the same throughout. During some 17 years the town 
council continued to deploy retarding tactics. In 1868, the Jalisco government asked a 
legal expert on land litigations to study the problems in Autlah and to advise the 
government on how to proceed.11 
On the basis of the lawyer's report, the secretary to the Jalisco governor concluded 
that the town council 
is mixing up the properties of the municipality, which they only administer, with private and 
communal (properties), both of the villagers and of the Indians; and being in collusion with the 
former. (Coleccidn.., m, p.303) 
Around 1870 we see that the context of land repartition changed. State government 
officers seemed to have lost interest in the case. Several members of the Indian 
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community of Autlah now accused the repartition commission itself of delaying the 
distribution of lands, of using inappropriate data for the calculation of acreage each 
community member was entitled to (including assessing the value of each plot), and of 
dubious financial management. The complaints were brought before court. As a result, 
in 1882, the Jalisco government ordered the repartition commission to be dissolved, 
accusing them of robbing from the indigenous population. A new commission was 
installed, but a year later the common people again complained that the new commission 
had sold and rented out vast areas of community land to private persons (Aldana 
1986:37).12 
By the end of the century, many people were convinced that the whole project of 
land repartition had failed. A Jalisco newspaper wrote in 1897: 
Who does not know of the eternal legal struggles (contiendas jurldicas) which the Indian 
communities in vain try to win in the civil courts. 
The article continues with the observation that four major actors had frustrated the 
programme: the lawyers (who themselves claim land), the hacendados (who have used 
the opportunity to grab more land from the Indians), the municipal authorities (who in 
fact are composed of hacendados), and even the leaders or representatives of the 
indians, who 
are sometimes their worst enemies, since they have played the game with those charged with the 
implementation of the laws, and having arranged their own business at the expense of their brothers, 
never will speak in favour of them, as by now they have become afraid to lose what they probably 
had taken. (Cited in Aldana 1986:13) 
As a result, the haciendas managed to grow rapidly between 1870 and 1910. Thus, 
decree no. 121 took away a major obstacle (communally held lands) to the reckless 
capitalist development seen during the rule of Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911), later followed 
by the Colonisation Law in 1883. This development was detrimental to the peasant 
population, who became increasingly landless. Disillusioned and impoverished they were 
to become the protagonists of the Mexican revolution. 
In the mean time, the local elite had learned that the higher government authorities 
had little power in enforcing programmes conceived in the capital. The town council 
and the hacendados had in fact succeeded in delaying the repartition project for 20 
years, and when it was finally implemented they successfully redefined its contents to 
their own benefit. The town council, reinforced by such experiences believed that they 
had enough discretionary power in the region to mix up private affairs with local 
government affairs. Furthermore, the identity of the region, as a political arena in which 
the local elite enjoyed maximum degrees of freedom to the exclusion of other sectors 
of society, had been underscored. This jeopardised relations with outside actors in 
future events, and to date such relationships continue to be problematic. 
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The 1910-1940 period: the formation of the ejidos 
During the period of 'the revolutions' (1910-1929),13 some haciendas were completely 
destroyed, including their irrigation infrastructure, resulting in the decline of agricultural 
production. The major land reforms of this period began in the 1920s, and were at their 
height in the 1930s, although there was some land distribution in subsequent decades. 
Of the estimated 23,000 hectares of arable land in the Autlah-El Grullo valley, some 
14,600 hectares (63%) were expropriated and handed over to some 2,800 families 
organised in 24 ejidos (SARH, 1978:33).14 
The formation of the ejidos was not a straightforward process. The first solicitudes, 
official requests to the government for the creation of ejidos, date from before 1920; 
other ejidos were formed much later. Opposition by landlords and especially the church 
was vehement, land lords simply hanging those peasants they suspected of being 
agraristas (peasant revolutionaries), and the clergy consecrated such acts, initiating a 
strong ideological attack against the agraristas. A further strategy of landlords and 
clergy concerned the creation of a local organisation, Obreros Catdlicos (Catholic 
Workers), and all peasants were urged to become members. Peasants were recruited and 
trained to make home visits to those compafieros who had become agraristas, in an 
attempt to convert them. 
One major obstacle in forming an ejido, was that once the request was formally 
accepted by the government, any land claims put forward in this request were 
announced in the official bulletin (Periddico Official) of the Jalisco government. Such 
announcements were meant to warn the present owners of those lands that selling them 
off had become illegal since publication. The publication included all the names of the 
people who had signed the request. The Periddico Oficial was of course closely read 
by all hacendados, and those who had signed it faced some strained years ahead; they 
were stigmatised in the village, and especially by the church. Many peasants wanted to 
get land but were afraid or lacked faith in the federal government enforcing the reform. 
From experience, they knew that little could be expected from a local government which 
was dominated by the landowners. They thus decided to wait and see, and so doing 
avoided taking unnecessary risks. Only after they saw that the more courageous peasants 
had actually got hold of land did they dare to join. 
I have already pointed to the existence of two different classes of peasants: the 
hacienda proletariat and the share-croppers. The former were subject to more 
ideological and physical control, and perhaps also identified themselves more with the 
hacienda, than was the case with the share-croppers (Silva 1987). The latter having a 
more open attitude, and having been engaged in a more entrepreneurial way of farming, 
were the first to organise themselves and make the formal request, or solicitud, claiming 
the best hacienda lands. These were often concentrated near the casco of the hacienda 
(its central buildings), to the effect that the peasants living in villages some kilometres 
away from the hacienda got lands under the noses of those peasants who lived on the 
hacienda. The latter only later dared to make the solicitud and obtained lands of worse 
quality further away. The share-croppers gradually moved to the former hacienda. And 
so the stage was set for many conflicts between ejidos to develop. Some of these 
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conflicts have taken many lives and are known to have persisted until today. 
For peasants living on the hacienda, to choose to immediately participate in land 
reform meant only one thing: to flee from the hacienda to another region where they 
could take part in the formation of an ejido. Many people did so, and the result was that 
there were lots of people on the move: many fled from the valley, and many others 
moved into the valley. Since any newcomers to the valley had few ties and were more 
or less anonymous in this society, they were often among the most active participants 
in the formation of ejidos. 
Despite the fact that land reforms redistributed much land and gave many households 
access to their own plots, such reforms did not help to quickly restore agricultural 
production; most ejidatarios had no capital nor the tools to make their newly acquired 
lands productive. They again made deals with their former bosses in order to borrow 
oxen for ploughing the soil, and to borrow food during the growing season. At the end 
of the growing season, maize prices fell and the ejidatarios were obliged to sell them 
their harvest at a cut price, because of their debts. During the dry season they gradually 
had to buy back the maize they had sold, at an inflated price. 
There were several responses to this situation. Quite a few ejidatarios did not hold 
out, having no other choice than to sell their ejido land to a compailero and return to 
working as agricultural labourers.15 Migration during the dry season was another way 
to make ends meets, at first towards the Pacific coast, where peasants worked in 
coconut palm plantations, banana groves and in horticulture. Later, starting during the 
2nd World War, new opportunities emerged in the U.S.A., where peasants also worked 
in the agricultural sector. These migrations were facilitated, in part, by better roads 
connecting the valley with wider Mexico.1 6 
There was also an organisational response to the difficulties faced. For instance, the 
borrowing of oxen and ploughs from the rich landlords was risky, because if something 
happened to the animals the ejido had to pay. Thus the position of jefe de potrero was 
instituted. This leader of the ejidatarios with lands in that potrero was given 
responsibility over the well-being of the hired oxen. The ejidos also tried to control the 
adverse effects of maize price manipulation by the rich entrepreneurs. In the ejido 
Autlan the ejidatarios handed over 5% of the maize harvest to the ejido board. The 
board stored the maize, and sold it back cheaply to the compaileros when they had run 
out of food. In this manner they circumvented the usury practices of the landlords, and 
at the same time the ejido was able to build up a small fund. 
Most agricultural practices survived the revolutions. In many ejidos, it was common 
practice to arrange work parties at harvest time, as they had done while working for the 
hacendado. Probably the acabo harvest feast was now more lavish and more enjoyable. 
The ejidos faced huge problems. Accounts of board members often corrupt, and the sale 
of ejido lands to former landowners or neighbouring ejidos abound.17 To date these 
problems still exist. The most common response to these problems on the part of many 
ejidatarios has been: 'not to bother', 'to mind your own business', 'quietly to work 
your own plot', and 'once a month to attend the ejido meeting without ever uttering a 
word'. 
In summary, the 1910-1940 period is important with respect to nominal changes in 
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access to land. During this period conditions were created which would set the scene 
for subsequent developments in the valley. At that time, however, agricultural 
production in the ejidos stagnated. A government initiative, started in the 1940s to 
provide ejidatarios with cheap agricultural credit, did not improve production. There 
is ample evidence that for the Autlah-El Grullo situation the actual costs (in both 
monetary and social terms, and in its low reliability) of this 'cheap' credit were so high 
that many ejidatarios preferred, although reluctantly, the usury credit provided by the 
old power holders and new entrepreneurs (Brunt 1990). With respect to infrastructure, 
the linking of Autlàh with wider Mexico through roads did however create the first 
conditions which enabled, in subsequent years, new markets to be opened up, and 
agriculture to become more commercially oriented.18 
2.2 New opportunities: the 1940-1968 period 
During the 1940s there was a steady increase in agricultural production (Perez, 1948). 
Not only food production increased, but also the production of commercial crops. In 
fact, sugar cane now reached a peak, some decades after the hacienda system had 
collapsed. In the El Grullo area alone there were 7 trapiches or sugar refineries for the 
production of piloncillo (sugar sweets). The introduction of the fuel engine water pump 
helped to make this development possible. In 1943, in the El Grullo area some 500 
hectares were irrigated, partly with pumped river water. Most of the owners of these 
works were the heirs of the former hacendados. A new class of entrepreneurs also 
emerged, many of whom had formerly been employed as mayordomos on the haciendas 
and had acquired lands from their former landlords. Of these new entrepreneurs some 
were lawyers who had helped the hacendados during the land reforms to secure as much 
hacienda land as possible, and who in return had received some of these lands. In 
addition a handful of army generals became landowners, apparently they had served the 
right factions during the revolutions and had been able to acquire lands during the land 
reforms. 
From the data collected, a picture emerges of these entrepreneurs as being all too 
eager to invest in commercially oriented agriculture, and especially in piloncillo 
production. The consumption of piloncillo in the urban centres like Guadalajara, 
however, began to decline, there was a glut on the market as this traditional sweet was 
produced in nearly all regions of Jalisco. An example of a typical investment for this 
period was that by Nacho Dfaz in 1943. Nacho Dfaz was to become one of the most 
influential characters of the valley. Of humble descent, he married the only daughter 
of Don Francisco Rosas, one of the major hacendados of El Grullo. Being a young 
ambitious man, he initiated a most daring project: the construction of an aqueduct 
(arquerta) of 1,300 metres in order to irrigate over 50 hectares of sugar cane with water 
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Figure 2.1 The irrigation system of Ayuquila and its surroundings (around 1940) 
pumped from the Rfo Ayuquila by a 12 inch motor pump. He furthermore bought a 
second hand trapiche with a steam engine, in order to produce piloncillo. From 1943 
to 1955 Nacho Dfaz cultivated sugar cane. Then he turned to another crop, cotton. 
According to his own version of this sugar cane enterprise: 
"It was not good business. We had problems, because we had to store the piloncillo which was 
problematic. On top of this, it fetched a bad price. Later, I decided to clear the land of sugar cane, 
and I knocked down part of the aqueduct. I did not use it any more. With this sugar cane business 
I lost 85,000 pesos (in 1955 c. US$ 8,500), despite the fact that I sold the trapiche for 11,000." 
Another of the important actors who would in subsequent years influence the destiny 
of the valley was undoubtedly General Garcfa Barragah. Although not born in the 
valley, the General lived most of his further life in Autlah. Shortly after becoming 
governor of Jalisco (1943), he acquired, under suspicious circumstances, 40 hectares 
of land which officially belonged to the ejido of Ayuquila. General Garcfa Barragah 
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bought a trapiche and let some of his soldiers work the land and cultivate sugar cane. 
This potrero was watered by the Ayuquila irrigation system. 
The Ayuquila irrigation system 
The Ayuquila irrigation system was constructed in the 19th century by two hacendados. 
By 1950, it was partly used by ejidatarios coming from two ejidos, Ayuquila and Puerta 
del Barro, and partly by a handful of entrepreneurs at the tail end of the system. The 
ejidatarios, situated at the head-end, preferred to cultivate irrigated beans during the dry 
season, whereas in the rainy season they mostly cultivated maize. The entrepreneurs 
grew cash crops, especially sugar cane, also some fruit trees, alfalfa, and sweet 
potatoes, beans and some vegetables which they share-cropped. The irrigation system 
was used intensively, consequently at the end of the rainy season when river discharges 
decreased but crop water demand increased, there were severe water shortages. Also, 
the Ayuquila irrigation system had to compete for water with the smaller irrigation 
system of Chacaltepec, used by the ejido La Noria, on the other bank of the river 
Ayuquila (figure 2.1). Chacaltepec was in a favourable position, since it diverted water 
from the river a hundred metres upstream of both river intakes of the Ayuquila system. 
Naturally this meant a potentially conflictive situation. 
To begin with, the tail-end landowners dominated the Ayuquila system which had 
been 'theirs' until the land reforms, and directed sufficient flows of irrigation water to 
their fields at the expense of the ejidatarios. Some ejidatarios recall Don Casimiro 
Nunez, who had acquired sugar cane land from the Rivera hacienda, as a very brave 
person (demasiado valiente). They were afraid of him, and appeared to have accepted 
his hegemony in the system, which gave rise to a kind of apathy, but also to particular 
strategies to access water. As Don Martin, one of the elder ejidatarios of Ayuquila 
(born in 1902) recalls: 
"You were irrigating only a small comer of your field, and then the water flow would run dry. Then 
you had to wait until the next day, and see whether there was some water left. So, normally we 
irrigated at night because they did not approve of us irrigating during the day. Sometimes, I simply 
robbed water at night. But I was afraid of Casimiro because he had money. One night I had taken 
water and there he came, and I heard him swear when he saw the diverted water. I took off all my 
clothes, and I put myself into the irrigation ditch, and with a bamboo I breathed." 
At the end of the dry season, when the river discharge had diminished considerably, 
sugar cane growers in particular were in need of water. So, Casimiro Nunez together 
with some agricultural labourers used to go at night to the river intake of the upstream 
Chacaltepec irrigation system, and destroy it so that more water would reach the 
Ayuquila system intakes. The La Noria ejidatarios resisted and formed an armed force 
(la armada) to guard their diversion dam at night. But Casimiro was a tenacious man, 
and he contracted someone from El Grullo who had relatives among the ejidatarios of 
La Noria. This man reached an agreement with his relatives and in this manner 
Casimiro continued to steal water. 
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Most conflicts, however, were not between the large landowners and the ejidatarios, 
but between ejidatarios, and also between ejidatarios and other peasants who share-
cropped land with the large landowners to cultivate sweet potatoes (camote). Sweet 
potatoes needed light but frequent irrigation. Don Eulogio, an old ejidatario of 
Ayuquila, remembers that 
"in those times you had to fight all people. Not only with the hacienda, but especially among the 
compafieros. If I went irrigating I always brought my carabina. I had it hidden in the potrero." 
Alejandro Salazar, a much younger observer, tries to explain these struggles among 
fellowmen: 
"The landowners used medieros, share-croppers. So, these share-croppers felt themselves backed by 
the rich, and thought themselves owners of the irrigation water. Then you had the tough ejidatarios 
who said: 'no, here we are going to be all equal (aqu( vamos a ser parejos), the water belongs to 
all'." 
This created conflicts. In the end, however, 'those who had most money, were the ones 
who irrigated'. Initially, then, the tail-end entrepreneurs succeeded in getting more than 
their proper share of the water, despite the fact that ejidatarios controlled the intake 
structures of the irrigation system, and had their fields at the head. The ejidatarios 
failed to secure a regular water supply because of the lack of solidarity and organisation 
between them. This can be explained partly by the fact that the ejidos were a recent 
creation. Discord among them was also fed, though, because the ejidatarios belonged 
to two different ejidos with adjoining lands. 
The leaders of both ejidos were tired of all the troublesome conflicts and devised 
among them a rule over water distribution. This agreement not only took away many 
petty conflicts, but also united the ejidatarios vis-a-vis the downstream entrepreneurs. 
Don Felipe Silva, the then president of the ejido Ayuquila recalls: 
"One day we had gathered to clean the irrigation canal, precisely because we wanted to get more 
water down here. We talked with some ejidatarios of Puerto del Barro, who have neighbouring lands 
upstream. We started quarrelling. At one moment, El Guero Santana who was Ha&jefe de potrero 
of Puerto del Barro, took the word and said to all people present: 'Look, Felipe and I are going to 
discuss the problem and we will work out an agreement.' That afternoon we met and El Guero said 
to me: 'Felipe, I respect you despite your age. You have always been honest and straight (derecho). 
From now on nobody will destroy our division structure. Only you, or a boy you send, can come 
on the agreed time and that I will respect. But besides you I will not tolerate anybody who moves 
the structure.' The next day I called for an ejido meeting, and I explained to the compafieros what 
we had agreed, El Guero and I. They all agreed with it. In this way we decided to make irrigation 
turns (turnar el agua) between both ejidos: on these days the water was for them, and on those days 
it was for our ejido. So, between the ejidos we turned days, and within the ejido we turned hours. 
Look what a good result this gave. (...) We, El Guero and I managed the water distribution, and we , 
for example, informed Casimiro Nunez when it was his turn. He had to respect it, and he did so." 
This then was the first organised irrigation of a farmer managed system in the valley. 
It reflects a step towards a change in the relationship between ejidatarios and 
entrepreneurs. 
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The cotton project 
The decision of many farmer entrepreneurs to get rid of their sugar cane came when an 
alternative cash crop was found: cotton. Whereas most ejidatarios were caught in a debt 
cycle with the entrepreneurs, the latter prospered, and in the 1950s they founded a 
credit union, called 'Union de Crédito del Valle del Grullo\ The members who 
dominated this credit society were Nacho Dfaz and Sergio Corona Blake. They 
succeeded in pooling resources in order to monopolise what was said to be 'modern 
agriculture'. This, at the time, meant a shift from sugar cane to cotton production. 
The main stimulator of this shift was Sergio Corona Blake, yet another young, 
dynamic son of a hacendado, who had been a well-known bullfighter during the 1940s. 
He coordinated the private initiative of some El Grullo farmers to cultivate cotton on 
an unprecedented scale, for an unprecedented market: the USA. Corona Blake 
established contact with an American firm, securing the commercialisation of the 
product through a contract. He constructed a cotton ginnery in El Grullo in 1954. And 
even an airstrip was laid out. Sergio Corona Blake and Nacho Dfaz were the first to 
grow cotton on a vast scale, but Corona Blake also established contacts with ejidatarios 
of the ejido El Grullo to join. Various groups of ejidatarios grew cotton (in adjoining 
fields) for some three consecutive years. In its peak period, it is believed that over 
1,000 hectares of cotton was grown during the rainy season. This gave an impulse to 
the El Grullo economy: labour (for harvesting) was in high demand; a new organisation 
of transporters (camioneros) emerged, who took care of the shipment of the cotton to 
Guadalajara. 'All was happiness, but soon problems started', writes Gomez Zepeda 
(1988:93). 
After a surprisingly rapid rise, cotton cultivation declined almost instantaneously. 
The decline was caused by a plague of bugs, locally remembered as the picudo. This 
plague was not properly handled in one season (probably 1957), since, according to 
various ejidatarios, the chemicals used to combat the plague that year consisted of 'pure 
milled white stone', with no effect on the devastating insects. The bad quality of the 
chemicals supposedly had something to do with the fact that Sergio Corona Blake had 
virtually a monopoly on both the supply of inputs to ejidatarios as well as the 
commercialisation of the cotton produce. The next year, when the plague was more 
severe, harsh measures were taken, and the plague was combatted through the spraying 
by airplane of one especially aggressive poison (according to some arsenic acid). Not 
only numerous cattle died, but also several agricultural labourers. 
During the first two years cotton yields appear to have been satisfactory. In 
subsequent years production levels fell, and around 1960 it became unprofitable. The 
period between 1940-1960 is thus dominated by two commercial crops, initiated by a 
handful of entrepreneurial farmers; first the rise and fall of sugar cane, then cotton. 
Cotton set the stage for later developments: modern agriculture, with the use of 
chemicals and even airplanes, and an export-orientation. More than a decade later, 
melon would follow much the same pattern (see below). By 1960, both sugar cane and 
cotton had lost their importance in the valley. A new initiative announced in 1951, the 
construction of El Operado, was eagerly awaited for by commercial fanners: 
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The construction of the El Operado irrigation system: 1950-1960 
It is important to note that the construction of the El Operado irrigation system 
coincided with the implementation of other infrastructural works in the region. In 1957, 
Autlah was finally connected to the national telephone system, and in 1958 the valley 
was linked to the Jalisco electricity line. In the same year the Autlah-Pacific coast road 
was asphalted. These infrastructural works of the Jalisco State government were 
coordinated between 1953-1959 by Augustin Yafiez. 
The Jalisco state government 
Governor Yafiez had established a special planning commission for the Jalisco coast 
(Comisidn de Planeacidn de la Costa de Jalisco), in order to 'open up the vast region 
to all kinds of economic activities' (Alvarez 1959:301). In his vision, which he partly 
borrowed from various of his predecessors (among them General Garcfa Barragan, see 
Torres 1990), the economic development of the coastal region was the only way for 
Jalisco to prosper, taking into account that: 
in the coastal region the greatest volume of raw materials which can be industrialised are found and 
the greatest extension of virgin lands are located, whereas its average demographic density is 5.26 
inhab./km 2. In contrast, in Los Altos region [Northern Jalisco] this density ranges between 30 and 
40. [...] To this imbalance between productive activity and territorial area one must add the 
contradiction which implies a habitat in decline in face of a promising internal expansion (una 
promisorfa expansidn interior) not yet achieved (id-, p.304). 
To infrastructurally connect the Autlah-El Grullo valley to the Jalisco centre 
(Guadalajara) was the first phase in finally conquering the entire coastal region. The 
valley served as a springboard. The commission's strategy consisted of appropriating 
federal budgets to projects which fitted into this developmental vision, and trying to let 
potential beneficiaries participate in the construction costs of the infrastructure. Yafiez 
formulated this stance as follows:" 
With respect to public works, turn the most humble member of a community into a shareholder, 
while making him contribute in financial efforts that exceeds by a million times his investment 
capacity. This constitutes the proper background facilitating the creation and expansion of a strong 
regional market of commodities. Underlying this mechanism [...] is the conviction that it is 
indispensable to transform Mexico, as soon as possible into a forthright capitalist country, that it 
becomes fully aware of its own resources, of savings, of credit, of investment (Alvarez 1959:319). 
Yafiez clearly was in favour of including private initiatives in his projects. So, when in 
December 1954 he personally inaugurated the El Grullo cotton ginnery constructed by 
Sergio Corona Blake (see above), Yafiez stated that 'only private initiative can profitably 
make good use of the economic opportunities of the State' (El Occidental 26/12/1954, 
reproduced in G6mez Zepeda, 1988: facing p.95). 
The presence of a transnational corporation which had started to exploit the San 
Francisco manganese mine near Autlah in 1952, suited Yafiez well. He was all too 
eager to let this company contribute substantial sums for the infrastructural works 
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undertaken. Admittedly, though, most investments were directly beneficial to the 
mine. 2 0 
When Yafiez became governor in 1953 he found the first plans of the construction 
of the El Operado irrigation systems ready. This project fitted into his development 
programme for the coastal region. There is some scant evidence that General Garcfa 
Barragâh (State governor 1943-1947) played a role in directing this project to the valley. 
However, it is difficult to reconstruct why particularly the Autlah-El Grullo valley was 
to receive such considerable federal investment. According to one agronomist, who at 
the time held a position at the Guadalajara office of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources 
(SRH), it was a highly political decision: 
"The preliminary studies for the Autlan-El Grullo irrigation system were not properly conducted. 
Officially, any irrigation system requires 7 technical studies (including pédologie, hydrologie, 
agronomic, sociologie and economic studies) to be completed prior to any decision to implement the 
project. For El Operado, first the decision was made, then we had to conduct these studies very 
quickly. They were of doubtful quality, and we had to technically justify the political decision already 
taken. Implementation of El Operado, like any other irrigation system in Mexico, was a political 
decision." 
The federal government 
The first studies for irrigation development in the valley started in 1947. In 1950, the 
initial project documents spoke of the construction of the Tacotah storage dam with a 
capacity of 145 million m 3 water, a hydropower plant of 6,500 Kw, and an irrigation 
system-covering 9,000 hectares (SRH: Informe Laboral 1950). The plans for El 
Operado were unfolded to the future beneficiaries by the Mexican president himself, 
Miguel Alemah (Mexican president, 1946-1952), in his visit to El Grullo in 1951. 
Between 1950 and 1955, although the engineers of SRH had elaborated detailed designs 
for the project, the overall dimensions of the project changed several times.21 
In 1954, the Rufz Cortfnez administration (Mexican president, 1953-1958) decided 
to diminish the overall project dimensions. This aroused the rage of the Yafiez Jalisco 
government, who in 1960 recalled that 
the Tacotan project was on the point of being partially frustrated when in June 1954 the Minister of 
Hydraulic Resources (...) decided to reduce the height of the dam and, consequently, its capacity and 
the area irrigated, anxious as he apparently was to hasten the economic use of the inversion already 
made. 
But Yafiez, somewhat self-contentedly, went on to conclude that 'the difficulty could be 
saved and the construction adjusted to the original plans' (Alvarez, 1959:205). Here, 
Yafiez solved the impasse through an agreement with the future beneficiaries of El 
Operado over the financial contribution they would make. Yafiez speaks of 1,159 
pesos/hectare (p.320), representing over 15% of total construction costs. In 1988, I 
could only find one farmer who could remember that they were supposed to make a 
contribution to construction costs. This farmer commented: 
"How would we have paid? It was a handful o f rich people from El Grullo who arranged that we had 
to pay that quantity. And yet a new president of the republic was elected, and a new governor came 
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in. So what was the problem?" 
According to many ejidatarios, the only way in which they 'participated' in the 
construction works was as wage labourers for the Morelos Constructors company. 
As late as 1955 the final dimensions of the project had still not been fixed, yet the 
construction of the main canals had started. In 1957, the Tacotan dam was near 
completion. Its gates were closed and the reservoir partly filled. With this water the first 
700 hectares were irrigated in 1958, while in other parts of the valley construction firms 
completed the remaining canals. In December 1960, the Mexican president L6pez 
Mateos inaugurated El Operado. The Informe Laboral in that year maintained that its 
command area amounted to 11,000 hectares, and an additional 3,000 hectares to be 
completed later when a system of pumping stations had been implemented (Informe 
Laboral 1961). The hydropower plant was never constructed, and the El Operado 
irrigation system actually only commands 8,700 hectares.22 According to the SRH 
ministry, by 1960 the El Operado irrigation system had cost 88.7 million pesos, 
equivalent to slightly over 10,000 pesos per hectare (approx. US$ 800 in 1960), which 
is surprisingly inexpensive.23 
The first years of El Operado 
Only gradually did the majority of the ejidatarios, now with access to irrigation water, 
turn to growing crops during the dry season. There was little fit between their farming 
system and irrigated agriculture. Also, the lack of a capacity to invest (e.g. for the 
levelling of the fields) inhibited them to readily make use of the new infrastructure. 
A second crop required a much tighter time table, especially quicker harvesting and 
ploughing of the land. It also jeopardised the place of livestock on the farm: ejidatarios 
were used to take their cattle into the hills after the first rains. Then the fields in the 
valley could be ploughed and cultivated. After the harvest (picking only the corncobs), 
the maize stalks were left standing on the fields and towards the end of the dry season 
when the pasture in the hills and the water sources became scarce, the cattle were 
brought into the valley again, where water was more easily available and they could 
graze on the maize stalks, and manure the fields. The moment the first rains came, the 
cattle were once again led into the hills. With an irrigated second crop, this cycle had 
to be broken up. Livestock had to take a secondary place on the farm. This was quite 
a change, since livestock traditionally had a high value, and many fanners derived from 
it their pride and self-esteem. Cattle still play an important role in village feasts. 
The prevailing knowledge among farmers was not suited to unquestioningly 
accepting irrigation. Many farmers were convinced that irrigation water would harm the 
soil. During winter time (the dry season) the soil had to be left fallow in order to 
become cold, before it could get 'warm', or fertile again in the rainy season. Irrigation 
would 'warm' the land, and thus break this cycle of 'warm' and 'cold'. Many fanners 
nowadays observe that there used to be fewer weeds and less crop disease and pests. 
This is partly linked to the observed fallow periods in the rain-fed system. 
34 Chapter 2 
Another factor inhibiting a ready shift towards irrigation, and beyond the direct 
influence of the individual farmers, was the lack of proper marketing channels towards 
urban centres like Guadalajara. This situation led to agricultural produce remaining in 
the region. The local market was easily saturated, and consequently prices for 
agricultural produce, especially maize and beans, fell. It was only after 1964 when the 
Autlan-Guadalajara road was completely asphalted that the accessibility of Guadalajara 
and markets further afield gradually improved. 
In the mean time, the power holders in the valley tried to ascertain control over the 
new irrigation infrastructure. With the introduction of El Operado a government office 
was opened which managed the irrigation system. This was the Irrigation Unit (later 
called Irrigation District, still later Rural Development District), which fell under the 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (SRH). Those in charge of the local office were 
engineers recruited from outside the valley, and their interests, thus, did not necessarily 
coincide with the interests of the local elite. The mandate of the Irrigation Unit's office 
was to provide services, including irrigation water and technical assistance, to both 
ejidatarios and the private landowners (in Mexico euphemistically called pequeflos 
propietarios). Indirectly, this threatened the entrenched position of the large landowners. 
According to them, this was not how things were arranged in this valley. 
The struggle between the earlier mentioned Nacho Dfaz and the head engineer is 
revealing in this respect. During the 10 years of design and construction of El Operado, 
Nacho Dfaz had established a good relationship with engineers from SRH and from the 
construction firms.24 It is told that the engineers in charge of the construction of El 
Operado would frequently call on Nacho Dfaz, where they were cordially received. 
Nacho Dfaz may have thought that this was enough to ensure a smooth working 
relationship with the SRH office when the irrigation system would finally start 
operating. But Engineer Arias, who became head of the irrigation unit, was a 
straightforward and stubborn person. He had his own ideas on how to run such a 
system, and did not give in to characters like Nacho Dfaz. This culminated in what in 
fact was a minor dispute about the extension of a drainage canal. Nacho Dfaz wanted 
it extended by some 10 metres, so that a small part of his huge farm could be better 
drained. Arias refused to give permission, because to extend this drain to within 3 
metres of the irrigation canal obviously would imply seepage losses and could even be 
dangerous. But Nacho Dfaz, even more obstinate than Arias, did not take it lying down. 
The conflict had become a matter of competence: who decides what happens in this 
valley, a young engineer from outside or one of the richest and most influential men 
from the valley? Nacho Diaz went to see the SRH representative in Guadalajara, who 
ordered Arias to extend the drainage canal. Engineer Arias then resigned. Nacho Dfaz 
had thus succeeded in extending his influence over the El Operado irrigation system. 
To conclude, the construction of El Operado was closely accompanied by 
interactions between three major groups: actors from SRH ministry in Mexico City; 
regional actors headed by the Jalisco governor; and some local entrepreneurs. The latter 
succeeded in ascertaining influence over how the irrigation system was managed after 
it was implemented. The majority of water users did not participate in this 
implementation process. Most farmers did not immediately turn to irrigated agriculture, 
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not only because of their lack of capital, and the lack of markets, but also because the 
prevailing farming system of the majority of users, the ejidatarios, was quite 
incompatible with a second, irrigated crop. Seven years after implementation, only 35% 
of the land commanded by El Operado had a second crop. Of these 3,000 hectares, 
2,400 hectares were sown with 'traditional' crops like maize, sorghum and beans. 
However, this situation was to change rapidly. 
2.3 Bonanza: the rise of export agriculture (1968-1980) 
In 1968, two Americans independently prospected the Autlah-El Grullo valley, and both 
were impressed by its agricultural potential.26 One, Jos6 Garcfa, El Cubano, settled 
in Autlah and started experimenting with tomato production.27 The other, Walter 
Holm, settled in El Grullo and initiated the cultivation of melon. Both readily started 
renting land, and cultivated the first export melons and tomatoes, to the effect that the 
area of horticultural crops quickly rose, doubling in four consecutive years from a mere 
270 hectares during the 1967-68 irrigation season to 2,000 hectares for 1970-71. After 
both Americans had paved the way, other Americans and also various Spaniards arrived 
in the valley. The Spaniards set up shops selling fertilizer, agro-chemicals and seeds. 
As one El Grullo farmer observed, 'these Spaniards came to reconquer Mexico'. Two 
social scientists who studied agricultural development in the valley agree with mis view 
and have observed that these foreign entrepreneurs, together with a handful of Mexicans 
'conquered' these 'new' agricultural areas (Gonzalez 1990) and their activities are 
described as a 'process of expansion' (Arce 1990:9). This, then, parallels what 
Governor Yafiez had dreamt of more than a decade earlier. 
The melon boom 
The main difference between the Cuban and the American was that the former directly 
organised tomato production through a well-organised workforce he himself had 
contracted (Torres 1989). In contrast, Walter Holm organised melon production 
indirectly through crop-financing local farmers who agreed to sell him the melon 
harvest. During the first three years that he cultivated melons on a considerable scale 
(1969-1973), this production system worked rather well, and Holm constructed a 
packing plant near El Grullo. The share-cropping farmers also fared well. According 
to Gomez Zepeda (1973), fanners earned on average between 3,500 and 3,900 
pesos/ha, during 1972-1973 (some 250 to 300 US dollars), which at the time were 
considerable sums. But in the 1973-74 season Walter Holm's company, Walter Co., 
went bankrupt, and the farmers who had contracts with him lost much money.28 The 
bankruptcy of Walter Co., starts a story that would characterise horticultural production 
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in the valley to date, and which has affected nearly all farmers who have been growing 
melons or tomatoes for export.29 
The formation of a growers association 
When Walter Co. started growing melons on a vast scale, farmers were urged by both 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG) and by Walter Holm himself to 
establish a local vegetable grower's association, and together with similar associations 
of the region to form a regional growers' union. There were several reasons why 
farmers were urged to organise themselves. First of all, a new government policy; 
during the period 1975-1980 the Mexican presidents Echeverria and Lopez-Portillo 
stimulated the formation of producers' associations, as part of a modernisation 
programme in the agricultural sector (Fox and Gordillo, 1989:142; 146-47). But there 
were also practical reasons why farmers had to organise themselves. Transporting 
vegetables within Mexico, and exporting these, required particular documentation, 
declaring the fruits to be free of plant diseases and free of agro-chemical residues (the 
so-called guias de sanidad or manifestosfito-sanitarios). These were issued by SAG. 
But when in the northern state of Sinaloa a strong group of vegetable producers 
emerged, organised in the UNPH (Unidn Nacional de Productores de Hortalizas), they 
negotiated with SAG that the growers rather than the ministry should issue these 
documents. UNPH were able to control the volume of different vegetables and fruits 
produced, and hence ensure a profitable price through a system of production quotas 
assigned to different regions. This became national policy. Furthermore, these manifests 
were only issued to Mexican nationals. This made U.S. companies establish contract-
farming with local farmers. 
So, melon and tomato growers in the Autlah-El Grullo valley had to create a so-
called Asociacidn Agricola Local, through which these documents were given to the 
individual growers. The experience of frauds committed by foreign companies was 
another argument used by SAG to convince growers to form an association. One 
government official working at the Guadalajara office of SAG had gained experience 
of U.S. company fraud concerning water melon production in the neighbouring Costa 
region (south-west of the valley) during earlier years of the 1960s.30 A growers 
association, according to him, would make it easier for the growers to defend their 
common interests against the companies. In January 1970, the melon growers 
association of El Grullo was formed, but it offered few benefits for the farmers: it only 
issued the crop documents, which was nothing more than a mere bureaucratic act. Its 
board consisted of two entrepreneurs who, according to many people, lacked initiative. 
In the same year of the break-down of Walter Holm (1974), various other U.S. 
companies, like Griffin & Brand, began operating in El Grullo. They all established 
packing plants in or near El Grullo, some took over the empaques of those companies 
who had left. Local producers received crop-credits from such companies. They would 
receive inputs like seed and agro-chemicals, but also irrigation syphons (on credit) and 
technical assistance. In return they were committed to sell (part of) the harvest to the 
company. Price wars regularly developed between the different buyers. At its peak, in 
El Grullo 1,940 hectares of melons were grown (1977/78 irrigation season). During the 
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harvest periods 'the sweet scent of melons could be smelt all over the valley', as many 
people from El Grullo recall. Labour and transport was in high demand. Women were 
contracted by the packing plants to select the fruits. They sometimes worked 18 hours 
a day in order to keep pace with the supply of melons. At the end of the busy harvest 
period, El Grullo would indulge in many a feast, where the successful farmers spent 
part of the (sometimes) huge profits made. It became possible for ordinary ejidatarios 
to buy a fancy camioneta (pick-up). 
The growers' organisation strengthens 
Not all the melons were sweet. Chivas, a Japanese American became well known (and 
loathed) in the valley. By 1976, Chivas' company had rented not less than 600 hectares, 
the majority of which was ejido land. Most farmers preferred Chivas to Griffin & Brand 
during 1973-1975, because Chivas paid a better price. But in 1975-76 (his third year 
in the valley), Chivas failed to pay the farmers a fair price, and he reportedly still owes 
many farmers money (some say 50 thousand dollars). A group of melon growing 
ejidatarios went to the state farmers organisation's office in Guadalajara (Liga de 
Comunidades Agrarias, linked to the CNC national peasant organisation) to complain. 
The farmers were headed by an ejidatario, Tofio Zamora, who was a friend of the Liga 
president. A meeting was organised attended by the State governor, and other 
government institutions (SRA, SAG, Banco Ejidal). The meeting led to the creation of 
the Unidn de Ejidos, a union of 6 ejidos, and Tono Zamora was elected president. 
Telesforo Zepeda, president of the ejido El Grullo, was elected secretary. The Unidn 
de Ejidos sought ways of directly getting access to a packing plant, in order to pack and 
market the melons independently from the companies. 
In May 1977, a coup was staged during the annual meeting of the 'dormant' El 
Grullo melon growers association, and Sergio Corona Blake was elected as the new 
president of this mixed (ejidatarios and pequenos propietarios) organisation. Corona 
Blake announced that he would only accept the post if he could designate the treasurer. 
This was accepted and he appointed his trustee, Telesforo Zepeda. With this meeting, 
both the Unidn de Ejidos and the melon growers association de facto fused into one 
organisation, with a leading entrepreneur as its head. Now, Corona Blake had his hands 
free and could take initiatives. Together with the president of the Unidn de Ejidos and 
with his treasurer he went to Texas to negotiate with Griffin & Brand a take over of the 
El Grullo packing plant, which happened to be built on ejido land. They hinted to Mr. 
Brand that it was quite possible that the packing plant would be invaded by angry 
ejidatarios. They furthermore suggested that he sell the plant to the melon growers 
association. Brand finally agreed, and it was decided that the melon growers association 
would pay for it in kind, that is, through packing the melons for Griffin & Brand, for 
a 5 year period. According to Telesforo Zepeda, 
"the idea was to lower the costs of agriculture and find the best prices. Our packing plant helped to 
lower the cost of the handling of the fruit (the maqnila) that the other companies would charge the 
farmers. When Griffin bought our melons at a certain price, other farmers who cultivated for 
different companies also wanted the same price. Our packing plant then served as a model so that 
other farmers began negotiations with their companies in order to get a better price." 
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From 1977, the Unidn de EjidosfMelon Growers Association packed and selected their 
own produce and sold it to Griffin & Brand for 7 consecutive years. In this way it 
became owner of the packing plant (in 1977 valued at US$ 80,000). 
In 1977-78, prices-paid to farmers by the Association were reasonable, but in the 
following season a dispute arose over 10,000 melon boxes which were unaccounted for. 
In subsequent years, there were many other problems. Farmers started to blame the 
people on the board of the Association, and distrust among farmers grew.31 When, on 
top of this crop diseases and pests started to affect the melons (investment costs rose, 
melon quality worsened and so the prices fell), many farmers decided to turn to a less 
risky crop. For many, sugar cane was the obvious substitute crop, although most 
farmers still say that sugar cane is not half as beautiful a crop as melon. For most 
farmers, few crops contrast so fundamentally from melons as sugar cane. 3 2 All they 
have in common is being sweet. But El Grullo farmers turned to sugar cane because 
melons had embittered them. Consequently, melon cultivation in El Operado dropped 
from 1,940 hectares for the 1977-78 season (representing 27% of the total irrigated area 
in that season) to 390 hectares for 1980-81. After slight increases in 1981-82 and 1983-
84, it fell to 30 hectares in 1984-85, and to zero the following season. 
In conclusion, melon production brought local farmers into contact with 'modern' 
agriculture, and foreign markets. More subtle irrigation methods, like the use of 
syphons, were introduced, and farmers learned to master these. They also got better 
acquainted with the use of different fertilizers. Inevitably they were confronted with new 
crop diseases and pests, with the confusing variety of different agro-chemicals to combat 
these, and with the agronomists who had set up shops to sell these chemicals and often 
gave contradictory advice to similar problems. Farmers became aware of the 
possibilities and impossibilities of marketing to the U.S.A., and of practices of U.S. 
companies and their local representatives. The melon boom, furthermore, fuelled the 
emergence of farmers organisations. At the end of the day, however, most farmers were 
tired of the politicking of these organisations as they were dominated by a handful of 
entrepreneurs, whom they came to distrust because of the many shadowy deals 
(maniobras) such leaders were involved in (cf. Fox and Gordillo, 1989:147). 
Most farmers reaped considerable monetary profits during the years of melon 
production. Some became very rich, and remain so today, because they were able to 
productively invest their profits through acquiring more land, engaging in other 
businesses and so on. Many ejidatarios acquired t.v.-sets, or refrigerators, and some 
even 'pick-up' trucks from melon profits. Their entrepreneurial status, however, did not 
change fundamentally. Today, they are still small farmers who try to make both ends 
meet. Although most farmers gained money in some years, they also lost substantial 
sums in others. Most of those losses were attributed to mismanagement within the 
association, and to the lack of legal defence, by the Mexican state, of contracts which 
farmer organisations entered into with U.S. companies. Accounts abound of people who 
had to sell their recently bought assets to pay their debts, or worse, some even had to 
sell their houses, and work during various years as farm labourers (braceros) in the 
U.S.A. to pay off their debts. At the same time, companies and local representatives 
accumulated assets, which in part had been acquired through illegal means. 
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A picture emerges of the Mexican government investing heavily in irrigation 
infrastructure, and thereby getting into debt. This is followed by U.S. companies who 
discover and are keen to exploit this resource and the available human resources, while 
writing off any cultivation risks, marketing risks or environmental hazards to local 
farmers. U.S. consumers are then offered high quality fruits at relatively cheap prices, 
whilst the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to defend or give legal support 
to its own citizens (cf. Sanderson 1986:82-83). 
The tomato story 
The melon boom in the El Grullo half of the valley is parallelled by a similar tomato 
boom in the Autlah region. Unlike melons, however, tomatoes are still produced for 
export in the valley on a considerable scale. During 1985-87 between 1,000 and 1,700 
hectares, most of it outside El Operado, were grown in the area near Autlah irrigated 
by deep-wells. Five companies, partly U.S. owned, partly Mexican owned, dominate 
tomato production. As has been briefly pointed out before, they are directly engaged in 
the production process, since tomato production involves a much more complicated and 
technologically advanced production system compared to melons. The five companies 
rely for the greatest part of the labour force on work groups recruited from outside the 
valley. These groups stay for half the year in the valley, are housed in so-called 
albergues, which some people from the valley describe as compos de concentracidn, 
they are paid very low salaries, do not enjoy any kind of social security, and are denied 
the right to organise and affiliate themselves to labour unions, or risk being fired. 
Melon production, by comparison, involved labour by farmers and their families, and 
by agricultural labourers, all living in, or very near, the valley. 
The companies were continuously in search of new lands, because after three 
consecutive years of production on the same plot, diseases (especially virus diseases) 
and pests (nematodes) increase and yields fall. After five years these plots are depleted 
and no longer suitable for tomato cultivation. This gives rise to 'shifting cultivation' 
practices, and the tomato companies roamed about the valley in search for 'new', 
'virgin' lands. These companies clearly displayed a 'mining mentality' (mentalidad 
minera), in going for quick profits (Hewitt de Alcantara 1985:300). 
Suitable lands gradually became more difficult to find. Not only was a secure water 
supply important, soil quality was also a crucial factor. This severely limited the 
available options. Moreover, the tomato production system as practised by the 
companies, required an area of at least 20-40 hectares for tomato mono-cropping. It was 
therefore often difficult to convince several small farmers to rent their adjoining plots 
simultaneously and for similar conditions. The companies were forced to choose plots 
which did not have a secure and regular water supply. Despite the formidable 
investment costs involved, they found it profitable to drill deep-wells within the 
irrigation system, as a supplementary and secure source of irrigation water. The adopted 
strategy, then, was to rent a number of neighbouring plots for a five year period, pay 
a nominal rent which was rather low, and to hand over the deep-well to the group of 
farmers at the end of the contract period. This, of course, was especially tempting for 
farmers outside El Operado irrigation system, i.e. near to Autlah (see Verhulst, 1988). 
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Farmers without irrigation facilities were easily convinced to rent out their fields for 
several years in return for which irrigation facilities were received. 
In El Operado tomato has never become as important a crop as melon. Instead 
tomato production has been concentrated in the Autlan region which lies outside the 
system. During the period 1973-1978, the number of deep-wells increased from less 
man 10 to 68. 3 3 For the 1985-86 agricultural year, 1,800 hectares were serviced by 
deep-wells, and 1,300 ha of tomatoes were grown. In the same season, 380 ha of 
tomatoes were cultivated in El Operado irrigation system. At present, those groups of 
ejidatarios who finally took possession of deep-wells, have turned to traditional crops 
like maize, and increasingly to sugar cane (from 200 to 330 ha between 1984-1986). 
They did not start tomato production on their own. They lacked the capital, contacts and 
skills to do so. 3 4 
2.4 The reaction: the spread of sugar cane (1975-1985) 
When in 1968 some Americans prospected the Autlah-El Grullo valley, an important 
Mexican also let his influence be felt in the valley: General Garcfa Barragah. At the 
height of his career, being minister of Defence, he is said to have decisively influenced 
the construction of a government owned sugar cane refinery in the valley (see Guzman, 
1989). This refinery, called Ingenio Melchor Ocampo, was built in the centre of the 
valley, exactly between El Grullo and Autlan, on lands the general 'donated' for this 
purpose.3S The arrival of the government-owned sugar cane refinery was related to a 
move by the general to limit the power of the tomato and melon companies, and perhaps 
also, of the growers associations that emerged.36 
The arrival of the sugar cane refinery was not welcomed by all farmers. Some large 
landowners based in El Grullo, in particular, opposed the initial ideas to build the 
factory near El Grullo town. One of these landowners was Nacho Dfaz, who was 
convinced that re-introducing sugar cane was not viable in the valley, his own sugar 
cane failure some 15 years earlier apparently still fresh in his mind. But he may have 
had other considerations as well. As Brunt (1990) has shown, the sugar refinery would 
provide farmers with cheap credit, and thus offered an alternative to the usury loans 
provided by men like Nacho Dfaz to small farmers. Consequently, many ejidatarios 
were in favour of the refinery coming to the valley. Many of them had been growing 
maize and other food crops, and had not dared to engage in more capital-intensive 
melon production. Several of those early ejidatarios still remembered the time when 
they had worked as agricultural labourers in the cane cutting and in the trapiches of the 
region, and they were confident of the viability of sugar cane production. Also, sugar 
cane production involved relatively little labour on the part of the farmer, since the 
harvest was entirely organised by the refinery. (Later, from 1975 onwards, this was 
organised by the sugar cane growers' associations.) On top of all this, the refinery 
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offered some special 'perks' to farmers, like free medical services, and a small pension. 
This all made sugar cane especially attractive for the older ejidatarios and, more 
significantly, for the female ejidatarios?1 
Around 1970, some parts of the El Operado irrigation system had still never been 
cultivated during the irrigation season because of adverse soil conditions. These being 
heavy clay soils and difficult to plough, in addition to which most crops did not grow 
well on them. Sugar cane meant an opportunity for farmers burdened with such heavy 
soils. Thus, the increase in the area of sugar cane cultivated at first went hand-in-hand 
with an increase in the over-all area irrigated in El Operado (figure 2.2). In 1977, sugar 
cane started to replace other crops, and it reached an all-time high in 1988/89 season, 
with 6,100 hectares planted, whereas non-cane crops decreased to 2,400 ha. 
Quite a few farmers who had so far grown horticultural crops, in the end also 
shifted to sugar cane. Many of these farmers had been growing melons during the 
seventies, and later cultivated other vegetable crops, like the green tomato (tomate de 
cdscara), for the Mexican market, so avoiding the interference of intermediary 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in sugar cane cultivated in El Operado, 1968-1988. 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo. 
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companies. Invariably, these farmers looked down upon the sugar cane crop, which was 
viewed as a dull (you only plant it once in six or seven years) or 'a lazy-man's' crop. 
Also, when pests and crop diseases started to abound in horticulture, the horticulturalists 
blamed this on the sugar cane, a perennial crop which provided a suitable habitat for 
many pests and carriers of crop diseases during the off-season. When in the midst of 
the eighties the inflation rates rose rapidly, sugar cane became the only crop to follow 
the price index, guaranteed by the government, whereas prices for other crops lagged 
behind. On top of this, the management of the refinery, which had built up a bad name 
during the 1970s (which was reflected by relatively low prices paid to farmers), became 
more efficient during the eighties, with resulting higher prices paid. Reluctantly, many 
vegetable growers finally decided to make the shift to sugar cane. 
Sugar cane growers and the refinery 
As with melon and tomato, the sugar cane production process gave rise to the formation 
of farmers organisations. Like both horticultural crops, the first sugar cane growers' 
association was not created on the initiative of sugar cane growers, but because any 
government owned sugar cane refinery forcefully requires the presence of a sugar cane 
growers organisation. In the valley there are now two sugar cane growers' associations, 
locally known as 'the CNC and 'the CNPP'. The former is the oldest and is affiliated 
to the national CNC farmers union of ejidatarios. The latter was created on initiative 
of some large landowners at the end of 1982, and affiliated itself to the national CNPP 
farmers union of private landowners (pequeflos propietarios).3* 
The main task of these organisations is to ensure the prompt and regular delivery 
of the harvested sugar cane to the refinery. To this end, these organisations organise all 
harvest activities, including the labour force which mainly consists of cane cutters. Like 
the tomato proletariat, cane cutters and some of their relatives are seasonally recruited 
from remote, poorer areas of Mexico. They are housed in camps, and a system of 
(often village or region-based) work-gangs with their overseers ensures that competition 
among sugar cane cutters prevails (Figueroa, 1988). This system of 'divide and rule' 
checks any attempts from within the group of cane cutters to organise themselves and 
defend their common interests against the sugar cane growers.3 9 
The growers' associations are also responsible for the transportation of the harvested 
cane from the plots to the refinery, which involves the presence in the valley of over 
100 heavy trucks, most of which are owned by the wealthier sugar cane growers. In all, 
both associations handle an immense annual budget, a fact which further enhances the 
prestige and power these organisations enjoy. Furthermore, these associations form the 
intermediate body between the refinery's administration, the (irrigation) District, and 
the sugar cane growers. Weekly meetings are held between the refinery and the boards 
of both associations in order to plan and synchronise the complex harvest activities (see 
Guzman, 1989). Both organisations have become strong platforms where sugar cane 
farmers succeed in defending their interests. The organisations have served for various 
farmer leaders to become politically important, and to prosper economically. 
Historically, the relationship between sugar cane growers and the refinery's 
administration is strained, since both parties try to impose their will on the other. When, 
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in the early 1980s, the power of some refinery officials had grown beyond acceptable 
limits40, and the first stories came out of ejidatarios (and especially ejidatarias) being 
blackmailed by these employees, the CNC association and especially its incoming new 
leader, Jesus Corrales, acted decisively. After a lengthy struggle he succeeded in 
pressing (through strikes) the refinery's executive to throw them out (Guzman 1989).41 
The sugar refinery, the District and the water users 
Around 1980, the irrigation District was involved in a struggle with these same refinery 
employees. The latter, together with some large landowners (among them some who 
would form the CNPP sugar cane growers association in 1982) and some employees 
from a local bank succeeded in organising a strong lobby in favour of sugar cane. In 
1976, one government agency in Mexico City granted the refinery permission to expand 
its milling capacity (to an equivalent of over 5,300 ha. sugar cane). However, at the 
same time a study of the ministry of agriculture and hydraulic resources (SARH) 
concluded that for hydrological reasons the maximum area of sugar cane cultivation 
should be 4,000 ha. By 1978, the then head of the irrigation District opposed the 
continuing increase of this perennial crop. 
An outright straggle between the District and the lobby developed during 1978-1980. 
The lobby had its network of influence extended to the capital city, and the head of the 
irrigation District stood on the point of collapse when he made an intelligent move in 
proposing the creation of yet another farmer organisation; the Water Users Commission, 
in which every ejido and pequefla propiedad organisation was to be represented. This 
commission would advice the District on all matters involved in the management of El 
Operado. Then, the head of the District presented the elected farmer representatives 
with the sugar cane dilemma, enroling them in the struggle, and diverting attention from 
his own person. The Water Users Commission, however, only partly succeeded in 
enforcing a compromise: The cane area was expanded to 4,600 hectares, and the 
number of irrigation turns received by sugar cane was reduced. 
Some years later, the head of the District was transferred to elsewhere. A new head 
came in, with little interest in letting water users participate in management matters, and 
so the commission fell into apathy. The water users themselves were unable to defend 
their platform. By that time, in 1985, sugar cane had become a very attractive crop 
indeed, especially because of its profitable and guaranteed price. Many farmers who still 
had not done so were interested in turning to sugar cane. The right to sow sugar cane 
had become a scarce resource. The new District head succeeded in setting himself at 
the centre of the negotiations on the expansion of sugar cane area, which annually 
recurred. These covert negotiations were held between the leaders of both sugar cane 
growers associations, the refinery's director, and the head of the District himself. 
Ordinary farmers were left out, and they tried to win the sympathy of one of the 
negotiators. Each year, the outcome was awaited for like an oracle. (For a further 
discussion on the Water Users Commission, see chapters 7 and 8.) 
Sugar cane has provided new opportunities to a category of farmers which did not 
participate in the melon boom, both because of lack of entrepreneurship, lack of capital, 
and lack of suitable soils. Furthermore, it was a viable alternative crop when vegetable 
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production became less and less profitable. The sugar cane development, especially 
during the 1980s, fits neatly into a pattern identified earlier. As was the case with the 
former sugar cane expansion (during the 1940s), the short-lived cotton initiative (during 
the 1950s), and melon and tomato production (during the 1970s and early 1980s), this 
pattern is characterised by one dominant crop, introduced by a limited group of 
entrepreneurs, after which it becomes the only fashionable crop and the majority of 
farmers try to gain access to it. Crop diseases and pests on the one hand, and marketing 
problems on the other, make for the subsequent decline of the crop trend. As yet, sugar 
cane has not reached this final stage. But the overall effect of its popularity is that some 
70% of El Operado is now covered with sugar cane, which thus has become virtually 
a mono-crop. Since 1986, more and more pests and diseases have been reported, and 
yields which had been climbing during 1968-1985 (from 45 to 100 tons/ha), started to 
fall in the 1985/86 season (in 1988/89 it stood at 89 ton/ha).42 Furthermore, its 
profitable price is likely to fall, since its inflation corrected pricing system had been 
negotiated by the powerful national sugar cane lobby with the Mexican political elite in 
power from 1983-1988, under the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid. With a new 
government in place, it seems quite unlikely that this policy which favours a few (who 
are already blessed with access to irrigation water) and affects many (since it is a 
burden for the government's budget) will be continued. In all, a sharp decline in sugar 
cane may happen within the foreseeable future. Perhaps the only element lacking is a 
suitable alternative crop. 
Finally, it is necessary to turn again to one of the actors who helped to shape the 
sugar cane story: General Garcfa Barragan. He retained a strong foothold in the valley 
through the presence of the refinery. Being able to offer services, he succeeded in 
expanding and consolidating his following in the valley. This group was mainly 
restricted to ejidatarios who have displayed unconditional loyalty towards the group 
around Barragan throughout the years. The General has strongly influenced local politics 
from 1960 to at least 1980. According to many people, the General decided who would 
be the PRI candidate for the presidency of the many villages and towns, not only in the 
valley, but in the entire Costa region.43 Although his power was strongest in Autlah, 
the four mayors of El Grullo between 1968 and 1979 were also all said to have been 
appointed by Garcfa Barragan (G6mez Zepeda 1988:91). During the 1970s, however, 
the power and political influence of the General was contested by another character on 
the Jalisco political scene: JosS Guadalupe Zuno Arce. Again, the assertion of local 
political influence was directly related to the construction of infrastructural works in the 
valley, as it had been with Garcfa Barragan and his sugar refinery, and earlier, with the 
implementation of El Operado. 
The Manantlah drinking water system 
In 1974, a project was completed whereby approximately 50% of the valley population, 
concentrated in the El Grullo half of the valley, got access to drinking water in their 
houses. The water was brought from the Sierra Manantlah. This project was directed 
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to El Grullo through a regional government body, which was called the Comisidn del 
Sur. Because of the impact it has had on the lives of many people from the valley, and 
of some connections with other developments we have already mentioned, mis project 
merits attention here. 
In 1965, the Jalisco government created the Comisidn del Sur, a regional office 
which would coordinate federal and state programs in the southern part of Jalisco. With 
its central office in Tuxpan (some 100 kms. from El Grullo), the Comisidn del Sur's 
influence was limited in the Autlah-El Grullo valley. Curiously, it seems that the Rio 
Ayuquila, which divides the valley into two, functions as a political divide, because 
most projects in the valley were concentrated in the El Grullo half. 
The commission was headed by the son of a former Jalisco governor, the said Jose" 
Guadalupe Zuno Arce. Until 1965, Zuno Arce had been personal secretary to general 
Lazaro Cardenas, former Mexican president, when he headed the Comisidn del Rfo 
Balsas in neighbouring Michoacah. In this capacity, Zuno Arce became acquainted with 
the harsh reality of rural Mexico. In December 1970, when Luis Echeverrfa became 
Mexican president, the Comisidn del Sur started to prosper. This was so because 3os6 
Guadalupe Zuno Arce was the son-in-law of the new president. During subsequent 
years, the commission became the only important government institution in the region. 
The Jalisco state government lost all control over it, since the commission directly 
negotiated federal programmes and its budget in Mexico City. The southern part of 
Jalisco had become a de facto state. Zuno Arce developed a strong ideology, mainly 
inspired by Mao (who visited the region), mixed with a kind of populism derived from 
his father-in-law, Echeverrfa. At the end of 1976, a new Mexican president was sworn 
in, and Zuno lost his privileged position and the Comisidn del Sur died a slow death. 
The commission's main achievement is the establishment of numerous inddstrias del 
pueblo (industries of the people) in the various villages and hamlets in the region. 
Furthermore it succeeded in directing other infrastructure to the region, like the small 
irrigation units (unidades de riego) along the Rfo Tuxcacuesco (in 1977),44 and the 
asphalt road El Grullo-Ciudad Guzman, completed in 1978 (Gdmez Zepeda 1988:104). 
The drinking water system which the Comisidn del Sur implemented in the Autlah-El 
Grullo valley was a daring project: water was taken from two sources in the Sierra de 
Manantlah, at an altitude of 1,700 and 1,600 metres above sea level, respectively, and 
brought to the valley (at 950-1,000 metres) through a pipe system with a length of 40 
kilometres. In the hamlets and villages all houses were connected to the system. The 
project started in 1972 and was completed in 1974. All households to be connected to 
the system had to provide 20 labour days, or an equivalent amount of money, for the 
digging along the projected line. These work parties are remembered by many people 
as 'the good days', when men and women were digging way up in the sierra, and when 
groups of women were in charge of the catering of food up there. The project was a 
success: technically it was well designed and constructed, the water quality was superb, 
and for more than 10 years its capacity was enough to provide water to over 30,000 
people. The person in charge of the project on behalf of the Comisidn del Sur was Jesus 
Corrales, a young engineer from nearby Unidn de Tula. He would later become the 
undisputed leader of the CNC sugar cane grower's association. 
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For its administration, a water committee was set up, with user representatives. 
During the first years, the committee was able to build up an impressive repair fund. 
In later years, the committee became the subject of local political disputes (this not 
wholly unconnected to its interesting funds). By 1982, the then mayor of El Grullo 
'sold' me administration to a specialised state agency based in Guadalajara. Accounting 
for the fees paid by the users was discontinued, and major repairs were not undertaken. 
Thus, by 1985 the neglected infrastructure could not meet any more the demands for 
drinking water from a rapidly growing population. However, the repair fund had 
disappeared. From that year heated debates among Grullenses and between different 
villages ensued, and water supply had become the major political issue during village 
council elections in December 1988. 
The story of the El Grullo town water supply to some extent broke the pattern 
whereby initiatives and new projects were dominated by the local elite. The Manantlah 
project was a project of the village, of the people. Most villagers conceived it as such. 
And yet, we see how, in the end the project works out quite congruently with the trend 
we found in earlier projects. Again, a new infrastructural development gives rise to a 
new local organisation, which initially does a good job. Within a few years, it is 
dragged into a political web, and becomes the subject of various struggles. After some 
time, most ordinary people are simply weary of all the trouble and become complacent. 
Most women, however, were active when in the 1987 and 1988 rainy seasons the 
drinking water system collapsed. Seven weeks without a regular water supply for a town 
of 25,000 people leaves nobody indifferent. Not even the men!45 
Getting the unasked: the rehabilitation of El Operado (1978-1990) 
The final section of this short history of agricultural development in the valley, and the 
role of infrastructural works in it, is about the rehabilitation and expansion project of 
the El Operado irrigation system. Already in I960, it had been envisaged that El 
Operado would expand its canal system by installing a series of pumping stations. In 
1970, the then head of the District in charge of El Operado, Engineer Montano, 
completed his thesis at the Agricultural University Chapingo, entitled: 'Plan for the 
rehabilitation of the lands and infrastructure of the Irrigation District Autlah-El Grullo'. 
During 1973-74 detailed studies were undertaken by SRH, and by 1978 the project for 
rehabilitation and expansion had been formulated (by the ministry which in 1977 fused 
with SAG to become SARH). In the same year, a co-financier was found: the 
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). In February 1979, the formal loan agreement 
between the bank and the Mexican government was signed (Contrato de Garantfa 1979). 
I found no evidence that people from the valley have pressed for this project. It 
seems that the entire project was conceived by SARH engineers, and that some SARH 
engineers lobbied and secured the project.4* According to the feasibility study dated 
April 1978 (SARH, 1978), the project would rehabilitate existing infrastructure, and 
extend it so that in total 19,050 hectares could be irrigated. The project included the 
construction of a tunnel, and 4 major pumping stations with several minor re-pumping 
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Table 2.2 Projected costs of rehabilitation and expansion project, as per 1978 
concept area irrigated cost cost per ha 
(ha) (million US$) (US$) 
rehabilitation of existing infrastructure 9,842 30.75 3 ,124 
expansion of irrigated area in Autlan-El Grullo 2 ,012 6.56 3,260 
expansion of irrigated area in El Limon valley 1,491 4.47 2,998 
expansion by means of pump station no.l (h= 18 m.) 2,731 6.87 2,516 
expansion by means of pump station no.2 ( h = 3 4 m.) 1,441 4.16 2,887 
expansion by means of pump station no.3 ( h = 5 0 m.) 1,088 3.11 2,858 
expansion by means of pump station no.4 ( h = 6 6 m.) 445 1.41 3,169 
total 19,050 57.33 3,009 
Source: SARH, 1978:52 
plants. The project did not include an expansion of the storage capacity, since 'the 
abundant resource here is water' (p.43).4 7 
The cost of the project was estimated at 717 million pesos (1975 prices) or US$ 57 
million, equivalent to 3,000 US$/ha (table 2.2). The IDB loan would cover over 20 
million US dollars.48 Implementation of the project works would be rapid, taking only 
three years, starting in 1979. According to the loan agreement, farmers would start 
benefitting from the new works by 1983. All users would continue to pay the usual 
costs for operation and maintenance. In addition, the agreement speaks of the 
amortisation payments (up to 30% of federal investment, or 425 million pesos) that 
were supposed to be made by the water users, but it does not clearly define how this 
would be ensured. 
By September 1983, only 8,400 of the 9,600 ha existing infrastructure was 
rehabilitated, and a mere 1,800 ha had received new irrigation mfrastructure of a total 
of 8,700 ha (total project area had decreased to 18,300 ha). Activities men virtually 
came to a standstill. The new infrastructure constructed has been lying idle since then. 
When in 1983 the activities of the original project stopped, activities on a newly defined 
work started: the construction of a huge storage dam, Trigomil, which would 
supplement the existing Tacotah dam. This was not part of the original project, and no 
documents could be traced in which the addition to the project was laid out in detail, 
and technically justified. The first traces of this new 'sub-project' date from the end of 
1982. A two-paged memorandum from the local Grande Irrigation Office in El Grullo, 
dated 8/8/83, dryly observed: 
The fundamental modification of the project consists of adding the construction of another storage 
dam (Trigomil), because the hydrological study which was considered in the original project has the 
deficiency of assessing the storage capacity of the Tacotan dam as sufficient. Whereas that dam at 
the most can provide for only 50% of the water requirements of the project. 
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Such a technical blunder is quite astonishing, considering the widely acclaimed and high 
quality standards of hydraulic projects elaborated by SARH. According to officials, the 
Trigomil dam at completion will have a storage capacity of over 350 million m 3. This 
storage capacity, together with the existing Tacotah dam (capacity 148 million m 3), 
would be enough to irrigate much more than the 18,300 ha of the rehabilitation and 
expansion project. No data were obtained about the new dam's projected costs, nor how 
it is financed. Construction activities developed very rapidly starting in mid 1983, but 
by 1990, the dam still had not been completed. The new Mexican president promised 
in a speech (18/4/90) to release enough funds (30 billion pesos, US$ 10 million) to 
complete the dam. 
Why did work on the original project so abruptly come to a near standstill around 
1983, and activities shifted to a completely new project? In December 1982, a new 
president, Miguel De la Madrid, came into power. He is from the state of Colima. The 
situation is such that the Rio Ayuquila, after it waters the Autlah-El Grullo valley, 
finally crosses Colima before flowing into the Pacific. It is a public secret that the 
Trigomil dam is mainly designed to provide Colima with irrigation water. People from 
the valley suggest that during his campaign as PRI candidate for the presidency (1982), 
Miguel de la Madrid had to respond to fellowmen from Colima who demanded 
irrigation. Due to its immense cost, De la Madrid had no choice but to use the existing 
budgets of the original project to get Trigomil started. To the effect that the on-going 
activities had to be cancelled. At the end of 'his' sexinio, De la Madrid must have felt 
sad that he did not succeed in completing the dam in his term of office. The 
deterioration of the economy during his 6 years apparently were so dramatic that 
finances for this project could not be secured.49 
This final piece of the jigsaw is thus about a project that had entirely its own 
'institutional' dynamic. At the start, no evidence exists of any farmer group requesting 
the rehabilitation and expansion project. The project probably owes its existence to the 
way certain SARH departments and/or their employees are linked to construction firms, 
and to the fact that an international financing institution was willing to invest in it 
millions of dollars. Half way into the project, it changed course, and the people of the 
valley were not involved in the decision to lay-off the works and start a new sub-
project. It was directly linked to the fact that suddenly the project became a political 
one. This may be explained by the dynamics the PRI candidate for the Mexican 
presidency chooses to indulge in, or is forced to take part in when on election 
campaign. He then has to appease different, often antagonistic, power factions, in order 
to get them all in line behind the party. 
2.5 Peasants, entrepreneurs and the state: a conclusion 
In the above account of some events and projects which emerged during 1850-1985, it 
appears that the valley has experienced remarkable changes. A class of small farmers 
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emerged; the valley has been 'opened up' and is now tightly knit into the wider 
Mexican society and beyond, not only economically through commercial transactions, 
but also ideologically: ordinary citizens now are quite aware of national and 
international policies, they travel a lot, nearly all have been in the U.S.A., and are 
proud to be Mexican rather then Autlense or Jalisciense. There is now also the seasonal 
influx of hundreds of agricultural labourers from other (remote) areas of Mexico. 
Agricultural production has increased enormously, and the Autlah-El Grullo valley is 
prospering economically. In comparison with other areas of rural Mexico it is a 
privileged region, with respect to natural resources and to existing infrastructure, to the 
effect that the economic crisis which has swept Mexico during the last decade has 
affected the valley less than other regions. 
And yet, despite these drastic changes, and despite its success story in terms of 
'economic development', quite a few characteristics which typified the valley in former 
times have survived. The people of the valley are very conscious of history: of their 
own personal history, and of the succession of events and the changes that have 
occurred in the valley. They have their version of how these personal experiences and 
the big changes are intertwined. And they frequently call upon their version of history 
in order to make sense and interpret new events and projects, but especially to define 
what stand they should take over contemporary issues. The suspicion with which many 
ejidatarios regard efforts to create new organisations, like a fully-fledged water users 
association (see chapter 8), is a case in point. 
For the analysis of El Operado irrigation system and for the social dynamic 
surrounding it, three recurring themes in the valley's history are especially relevant: 
1. The issue of outside intervention, and more generally, the fact that many people 
from the valley interpret events in terms of a dialectic of local control-outside 
interference. We came across this issue when discussing the land repartition and land 
reform programmes, the conflict over sugar cane between some local entrepreneurs and 
some engineers at the irrigation District, and the rehabilitation project of El Operado. 
2. The issue of the relationship between the politically influential of the valley and 
the common people; and more specifically, between entrepreneurs and small farmers. 
This relationship is characterised by inequality: economically, but also socially. Of 
course, through time this has changed somewhat. Land reform especially has helped to 
create a new class of small farmers who have been able to emancipate themselves. 
However, Jnost ejidatarios, as well as most agricultural labourers still frequently use 
the classification of people in terms of 'the rich' as against 'the poor', just as they did, 
say, during the land reform. 
The issue of the relationship between the elite and the poor is intertwined with the 
first issue, on the local - extra-local divide, since in the account of the various events 
we came across situations where outside actors formed a pact of convenience with the 
local elite (like with the construction of El Operado, or the boom of horticulture); but 
in other events, outside actors defended the interests of the small fanners (as during the 
first phase of the land repartition in the 19th century, through the land reforms and the 
drinking water system of El Grullo). 
The above may give rise to the wrong idea of the existence of two separate worlds. 
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This is not the case, despite the huge inequalities between rich and poor, or rather, 
thanks to these inequalities, many ties have existed and continue to exist between both 
groups. The frequent occurrence of patron-client relationships has helped to shape the 
valley's history (see e.g. some patterns of relationships in the melon growers' 
association; and the relationships the General built up with his following). This was 
again related to struggles between different factions of the elite, in which the various 
factions sought the support of certain groups of the poorer people (as was the case in 
the struggle between Zuno and Garcfa Barragan). 
3. This brings us to the third issue: the importance of intermediaries and 
intermediate positions throughout agricultural development of the valley. This refers to 
the fact that often infrastructural development, and innovations or changes in agriculture 
coincided with the setting up of users organisations (the ejido; the jefe de potrero in the 
ejido; the various growers' associations; the town water commission of El Grullo). 
All three issues mentioned above are about relationships, and about forces trying to 
change them or keep them as they are. These forces emerged or at least became 
apparent when projects concerning infrastructural works were initiated. These projects 
focused on the resources of water and land. The three issues identified are still issues 
today. They continue to be present in the actual management and use of the El Operado 
irrigation system. In the contemporary account of the social dynamics of El Operado, 
which will follow, we will have to bear these issues in mind. 
Chapter 3 
El Operado: characterising the irrigation system 
This chapter provides an introduction to the physical infrastructure of El Operado, 
emphasising its spatial setting, in contrast to the foregoing chapter which highlighted the 
temporal dimension. Both the natural conditions and the man-made infrastructure 
provide a setting which bears upon human behaviour, including the social relationships 
between groups of people. Such conditions constrain behaviour since they set limits to 
the options available to people. At the same time, they provide certain opportunities 
which enable people to develop new projects. Here we concentrate on how El Operado's 
infrastructure is tied to specific forms of access to both land and water. Access to land 
within the confines of El Operado automatically implies the formal rights of access to 
irrigation water. Thus, access to land defines the water rights. The first section of this 
chapter deals with access to land. 
Access to water depends not only on the formal water rights one has, but also on 
the way irrigation water is distributed. The specific technical characteristics of the canal 
system make possible particular ways of distributing the water, which is the subject of 
section 3.2. Section 3.3 deals with the operational possibilities and constraints of El 
Operado. It will emerge that the District personnel in charge of operating the system 
actively shape water distribution. Their activities need to be coordinated. In El Operado, 
the coordinating institution is the (Rural Development) District. The fourth section of 
this chapter concentrates on the formal arrangements underlying the District's activities 
with respect to El Operado, and the water users. 
This chapter, then, describes the interplay between irrigation infrastructure and 
social relationships from the perspective of the infrastructure. In subsequent chapters 
this interplay will be described from an actor perspective. 
3.1 Access to land: the use of El Operado 
El Operado is intensively used by its 1,300 water users. Nearly all 2,500 plots which 
can receive irrigation water have irrigated crops. For plots without sugar cane, crop 
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intensity lies around 2, which is to say that on each plot two crops are being grown in 
one year, normally one rain-fed crop (June-November) and one irrigated crop 
(December-May). Very few plots raise two irrigated crops, since this is forbidden by 
the District. 
During the 1987/88 irrigation season 8,700 hectares of land were irrigated. 
Furthermore, during the wet season 1987, 100 hectares received one or more auxiliary 
irrigation turns. The 8,700 ha of irrigated crops in that year consisted of 1,200 ha of 
cereals (maize and sorghum); 1,150 ha of vegetable crops (such as red and green 
tomatoes, melons, courgettes, egg plants etc.); 6,030 ha of sugar cane; 200 ha of other 
perennial crops (mainly fruit trees and pasture, and alfalfa); and finally 120 hectares of 
a variety of minor crops (figure 3.1). During this season average crop yields were the 
norm, for instance sugar cane with an average yield of 90 tons/ha. 
These crops received on average an estimated 780 mm of net irrigation water at the 
field inlet (based on data provided by the irrigation District, not measured). Irrigation 
water was fairly evenly distributed over these crops. For instance, sugar cane occupies 
69% of El Operado's lands, and received an estimated 68% of the irrigation water. 
Only the melons and export tomatoes (covering 4.8% of the irrigated area) used more 
water (6.1 % of total volume irrigation water). This is an empirical manifestation of how 
water rights are defined. All plots which lie within the confines of El Operado, as 
defined by the detailed map which includes all plots and defines them by means of a 
number-code, have water rights; that is, rights to receive enough water to grow the 
crops. The Federal Water Law contains a clause which protects the water rights of a 
farmer owning lands within an irrigation system: the moment a crop is sown, and 
established, it may not be denied water if in need (Ley Federal de Aguas, 1987). 
El Operado receives water from the river basin of the Rio Ayuquila, a tributary of 
the Rio Armerfa. Upstream of the head works of the system (approx.30 kms.) lies the 
Figure 3.1 Crop distribution in El Operado, 1987/88 irrigation season. 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo 
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Tacotah storage dam, which regulates the Rib Ayuquila waters for El Operado. The 
dam captures water from a 1,170 km 2 drainage basin. With its effective storage capacity 
of 140 millions m 3, the dam fills completely in 60% of years. The actual water need, 
126 million m 3 in 1987/88 season, is met in 1 out of 4 years. Shortages are sometimes 
alleviated through rainfall and river discharges during December-March. (Appendix 1.) 
Land tenure 
In El Operado, two types of land ownership are found: ejido land and land privately 
owned by small holders (pequeflos propietarios). Some 300 pequeftos propietarios 
control the privately owned lands, with an average farm size of 12 ha. Over half of El 
Operado (some 59%) belongs to 1,000 ejidatarios, who are organised into 17 ejidos. 
An ejido is based in a village or town, but may have various lots of land dispersed over 
the valley. El Operado does not cover the entire valley, nor are the higher lands 
irrigated. This means that in many ejidos only part of the land is irrigated. Each ejido 
member holds the usufruct right to particular plots, which he or she works individually. 
Formally speaking ejido plots may not be sold, however, if an ejidatario dies, one of 
the legal heirs inherits the ejido rights. The ejido land endowment may not be 
subdivided. Distribution of ejido lands over its members is fairly even. In some ejidos, 
each member holds 4 ha, whereas in other ejidos land endowment is as high as 8 ha or 
more. 
Renting land and share-cropping are common practices in El Operado.1 A survey 
conducted by District personnel in the 1983/84 irrigation season, shows that one third 
of all lands were cultivated under a renting or share-crop arrangement (table 3.1). 
Access to land 
When attempting to assess actual land distribution, one is confronted with a multiplicity 
of data which are incompatible with each other. The analysis undertaken by the 
operation department of the irrigation District in 1982 seems the most reliable. The 
study found that El Operado had 1,279 water users with 8,790 hectares of land, or on 
average 6.9 ha per water user. Of these water users, 87% had access to less than 10 
hectares, covering 60% of the area, with an average land size of 4.7 ha. The other 
Table 3.1 Renting practices in El Operado; 1983/84 irrigation season (ha) 
total cultivated rented share-cropped share-cropped 
total rented and percentage of 
 cultivated 
17 ejidos 5,072 
private owners 3,331 
all 8,403 
4,583 1,254 
3,202 912 
7,785 2,166 
299 
172 
471 
1,553 
1,084 
2,637 
34% 
34% 
34% 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo 
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13% (or 164 water users) controlled the remaining 3,500 hectares (over 21 ha. 
average). At the top end of the scale were eighteen farmers controlling 880 hectares 
(nearly 50 hectares on average). At the other end were the 530 smallest water users 
(41 %) with less than 4 hectares of land, covering only 16 % of El Operado (figure 3.2). 
Real access to land differs from the official figures. The study mentioned bases itself 
on the official land registration, which is not systematically updated, and reflects 
probably a situation of the 1970s. Also, as we have already observed, the renting of 
plots is a widespread practice. This makes it difficult to assess real access to land as 
against legal ownership. Furthermore, some larger land owners put some of their lands 
in the name of relatives and other trusted people (the so-called prestanombres) to 
obscure the real extent of their estate. They do this, because according to the federal 
water law (art.55), a person may not own more than 20 ha of irrigated land (cf. Ldpez 
Zamora 1977:255). 
To approximate real access to farm land, we must use data provided by the sugar 
factory (Ingenio Melchor Ocampo), which maintains accurate and updated records of 
the cane plots and the people registered as the owners of the crop. Since the factory is 
not interested in the official owner of the plot but in the person controlling the crop, the 
factory data include some renting practices. Furthermore, some large landowners do not 
bother to use prestanombres to the factory's administration (others, however, do). Data 
on sugar cane thus preclude some of the pitfalls of the official land registration data, 
and cover 75% of all water users of El Operado. 
area (acc.%) (100% • 8.790 ha) 
0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100 
w a t e r use rs (acc.%) (N-1279) 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of irrigated land over El Operado's water users, 1982. 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo. 
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The factory data were computed, showing a skewed distribution pattern, including 
1,087 sugar cane growers cultivating 6,270 hectares. Then the names of the sugar cane 
farmers were scrutinised in various sessions with two extremely well-informed farmers. 
They provided information on prestanombres, and finally the data were grouped 
according to actual enterprises growing sugar cane.2 In total 932 different farm 
enterprises were identified of the 1,087 registered sugar cane growers. The distribution 
of sugar cane over these enterprises was even more distorted when compared to the 
distribution of official land ownership. Of all cane enterprises, 12 (1 %) had extensions 
of over 50 ha. These control some 17% of all cane and of these, 5 had over 80 ha of 
cane each. At the bottom end, 91 % of the enterprises had less than 10 ha, comprising 
59% of all cane cultivated (figure 3.3). The data show that actual access to farm land, 
and especially sugar cane is more unequally distributed than official data reveal. 
Conclusion 
El Operado is being used quite intensively. Sugar cane is by far the most important 
crop, covering 69% of the command area, and attains acceptable yields. Land is 
unequally distributed. Access to water is defined in terms of access to land. Renting a 
plot thus also implies getting access to irrigation water. Since land is differentially 
distributed, also access to water is skewed. To have rights in water means to have 
access to enough water to raise the crop you cultivate. In theory, then, the amount of 
irrigation water used not only depends on the extent of ones land but also on the type 
sugar cane area (acc.%)(l00>6271ba) 
t l t l e h o l d e r s / e n t e r p r l s e s (acc.%) 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of sugar cane over titleholders and enterprises; 1987/88. 
Source: data from Ingenio Melchor Ocampo; own interpretation. 
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of crop sown. However, water use is fairly evenly distributed over the various crops 
grown, with the exception of melon and tomato which use significantly more water. 
Some water users benefit more from El Operado's infrastructure man others. For 
example, 140 sugar cane enterprises (15 %) control half of the 6,300 ha. of sugar cane, 
and consume 35% of all irrigation water. We may infer that El Operado has two basic 
categories of users: a small economic elite, and a majority of small-scale farmers. 
The dominance of sugar cane in El Operado has an important technical implication 
for water distribution. Four to six weeks before harvesting the cane, the irrigation 
service to the cane plots is suspended (suspensidn). This makes water scheduling 
complex. (See chapter 4.) 
3.2 The design of the canal system 
Before being able to analyse how access to water is actualised through its distribution, 
it is necessary to give some attention to El Operado's infrastructure. In this section five 
basic features of the infrastructure will be identified, which in principle allows the water 
distribution to be flexible. The overall performance of water distribution will also be 
assessed through a discussion of any water loss that occurs. 
The Ayuquila river divides the irrigated area into two parts: a right bank (lying in 
the municipality of Autlah) and a left bank (El Grullo). The right bank commands an 
area of some 4,600 ha, the left bank 4,100 ha. Each bank has its own intake structure 
in the river, and each has a main canal (canal principal) that provides water to 
secondary canals or laterales, to tertiary canals (sublaterales), to field canals (ramales), 
and to plots. Ideally, laterales and sublaterales feed the field canals, which distribute 
the water over a certain number of plots varying from one to five. It is the field ditches 
or regaderas that transport the water within the fields to the furrows. (Figure 3.4.) 
Under the rehabilitation project, all main, lateral and most sublateral canals were 
reconstructed in concrete from 1979 onwards.3 The concrete canals are equipped with 
approx. 100 control structures in the on-going canals (among others, radial gates in the 
main canal) with which upstream water levels can be manipulated, influencing the water 
level at the intake structures and field inlets (over 500). The intake structures are 
equipped with plates which are operated manually. In addition, the main canals cross 
numerous barrancas, or gullies, through 30 inverted syphons. This infrastructure has 
to ensure that all 2,500 plots are properly serviced with irrigation water. 
The canal infrastructure has five specific characteristics, with implications for the 
use of the system. Firstly, the canal design lacks a hierarchical rigidity often found in 
irrigation systems. There are plots which receive water from sublaterals or field canals, 
but yet others may get water from a lateral canal or even directly from the main canal. 
The design thus easily responds to all sorts of topographical details, and has a relatively 
small secondary canal system in relation to the size of the main system. This feature, 
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Figure 3.4 The canal system of El Operado 
however, implies that the designers did not employ a clear-cut definition of tertiary 
irrigation blocks, or irrigation units, and did not seek to standardise the size of the 
hydraulic units of adjoining plots receiving irrigation water from one common source. 
In this irrigation system, people (both users and irrigation officers) do not use a concept 
similar to that of tertiary block. They simply use concepts such as 'lateral x', and 
'sublateral y', which may serve an area varying in size from several tens of hectares to 
500 hectares or more. The lack of clearly marked tertiary blocks is a striking feature 
of this irrigation system. Moreover, the canal design makes no allowance for the 
existing organisation of land tenure. Any canal may cross-cut ejido boundaries, and 
most lateral and sublateral canals feed plots belonging to different ejidos and 
landowners. The pattern of land tenure does not necessarily respect topographical or 
other landscape features, which of course would greatly complicate the canal design. 
Here it seems the designers did not even attempt to match hydraulic boundaries to the 
existing land tenure pattern, or community boundaries. This is another design feature 
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which has implications for the organisation of water users at canal level. (See following 
chapters.) 
Secondly, no adequate provisions have been made to prevent siltation of canals, nor 
to remove silt from the canals through flushing. During the rainy season (June -
September) and the first months of the dry season a considerable amount of silt enters 
the canal system. Between September and November the Ayuquila river may carry a 
lot of aguas broncos ('wild waters'), run-off from the drainage basin downstream of 
Tacotan dam. The silt laden water is brown in colour contrasting with the clear water 
released by Tacotan during the irrigation season. The water users of El Operado 
(especially those with either sandy soils, or who grow maize or sugar cane) use the 
aguas broncos in the first dry month to give their crops supplementary irrigation. The 
silt, then, not only enters the main system, but also the minor canals and fields, which 
is enhanced by the fact that the canal structures are of the undershot type which easily 
let through silt. The silt decreases the discharge capacity of the canals. Aquatic plants 
attach their roots to the silt and together this decreases the water flow velocity and more 
silt is deposited, followed by more aquatic plants. The circle is complete. In the main 
canals there are only two wash-outs which should in theory remove much of the silt 
from the mains through flushing. In practice, however, these wash-outs do not function. 
Therefore, the silt has to be removed mechanically or by hand. The maintenance 
department of the District is in charge of removing the silt in all canals above field 
canal level. To do this they have hydraulic excavators. In the minor canals silt is 
removed by hand. The department, however, only succeeds in cleaning some of the 
canals between August and November. The silted canals thus make water distribution 
difficult and in some instances impossible. (See chapter 5.) 
Thirdly, the designers have not taken into account the other uses of canal water, in 
particular no provisions were made for taking cattle to water. Farmers have solved this 
problem themselves, in a rustic way. At places they have broken the concrete canal 
lining, enhancing seepage losses. 
Fourthly, the control structures in the canals reveal a further feature of the system: 
they are all of the 'undershot' type (i.e. water is forced to flow through an orifice 
instead of flowing freely over a weir). This type of structure is strongly defended by 
the irrigation officers of El Operado, using the argument that such a system responds 
more rapidly to intended changes in supply flows, which is an advantage for the tail-
reaches. Structures of the undershot type thus enable a more adequate and timely 
operation of the main system. The officers pointed out that in canals with structures of 
the overflow type (weirs) much 'dead water' (agua muerta) is stored. In the event of 
an increase in discharge, first a considerable time is needed to build up the new water 
level before the actual increase is being felt downstream of the weir. Although all 
officers expressed their undoubted preference for the undershot type of structures, their 
argument is only partly convincing, since in actual fact the main canals function far 
below design capacity, resulting in artificially high water levels in the main system. For 
this reason, there is a lot of 'dead water' stored, with the implication that in the main 
canals of El Operado it takes a while before changes in discharges are actually felt. 
Fifthly, all control structures are adjustable. Irrigation officers anticipate flow 
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fluctuations, and intervene through manually adjusting the gates. These structures are 
adjusted with a handwheel which operates the gate opening by means of a screw thread, 
allowing each structure to have an indefinite number of settings. This type of design, 
then, enables a great degree of freedom in establishing water distribution schedules, and 
in responding to flow fluctuations. 
A flexible canal system 
This last point is probably the most important characteristic of El Operado. It shows that 
El Operado's infrastructure is flexible: it can respond to many variations in water 
demand. The designers had a fairly sound reason for devising such a versatile 
distribution system. One of the assumptions behind their design must have been (I do 
not know for sure) to allow water users to be free to grow the crop of their choice. The 
infrastructure does in fact provide the farmers with a good deal of freedom in farming.4 
When El Operado started operating, the designers did not hand-over to the management 
an elaborate set of operating procedures. The management simply received a flexible, 
but complex infrastructure which it learned to handle in subsequent years. Such a set-up 
is generally considered as complicated by irrigation engineers, who warn that 
complexity may result in low operational performance (see for example Horst 1983 and 
1989). However, in El Operado, it works out quite well. In section 3.3 we will closely 
look at the complications this infrastructure poses for its operation. 
Actual water distribution follows more or less the 'delivery upon request' model. 
When a farmer thinks the crop needs irrigating, he/she finds the officer in charge of 
water distribution (the water guard) and asks for an irrigation turn. Within a period of 
10 days (normally shorter) a farmer may expect to receive his/her turn. This 'semi-
demand' system is another feature which stresses the freedom of farmers with respect 
to irrigation. 
Water losses 
Before analysing in detail the operation of the main system, I first want to assess the 
quality of operation practices. A useful indicator is the occurrence of water losses.5 As 
will be shown, water losses in El Operado amount to 45 % of the irrigation water 
entering the head works. There are three main causes of these losses: 
(1) inadequate infrastructure, resulting in conveyance losses due to seepage through 
cracks etc. in the canals (see below); 
(2) improper operation resulting in losses which make certain sections receive too much 
water and others too little, giving rise to unnecessary discharge fluctuations (see section 
3); 
(3) through seepage, or water losses occurring on the farm plots. Nearly all plots are 
irrigated by means of furrow irrigation. Furrow irrigation implies water losses through 
seepage, which are especially important on sandy soils, and water flowing directly into 
the drain, which occurs notably at night (see below). 
Water distribution efficiency for the 1987/88 season, defined as the irrigation water 
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that actually enters the fields relative to the irrigation water entering the head works, 
was estimated by the District to amount to 55 %. Assuming mat this figure was correct, 
of the measured 124 million m 3 entering the system, only 68 million m 3 reached the 
fields. The question, therefore, is where does the lost water go? The answer is simple: 
me major part drains into the river. For instance, in April 1989, all water flowing in 
the Ayuquila river was entering both main canals, i.e. 7,100 litres per second. Thus, 
beyond the diversion dam the Ayuquila river bed was dry. Downstream of the entire 
irrigated zone (30 kms. below the head works), 3,300 lps were measured (figure 3.5). 
All this water eventually came from El Operado, implying an efficiency of 55 % .* Since 
part of the drainage water measured in the river came from seepage losses occurring 
within the field, this figure includes both water distribution efficiency, and part of field 
application efficiency. Thus we may safely argue that actual water distribution efficiency 
in El Operado is higher man 55%. These water measurements in the Rfo Ayuquila 
represent the only existing hard data on actual water efficiency of the system. The 
figure used by the irrigation District is exactly the same as the figure we found. This 
is striking, because the District does not systematically monitor water losses. 
Conveyance losses 
A small survey of conveyance losses along the first 25 kms. of the right main canal 
concluded that some 250 lps or 10% of the water flowing through that stretch of canal 
(2,500 lps on average) seeped away, equivalent so some 10 lps/km, or 0.4%/km.7 
Since this stretch of canal is quite representative for the entire main system, total 
seepage losses in the main canals may only amount to approx. 500 lps, or 10% of the 
total volume entering the system. 
8 
discharge (1000 lps) 
6 - A 
Intake 55% 
4 - V 
01— 
-10 
3 45% 
A 
V 
-6 0 5 10 15 20 
dis tance irom el ope rado Intake (km) 
35 ao 
Figure 3.5 Drainage from El Operado into Rfo Ayuquila, April 2, 1989. Source: 
measurements by Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo. 
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Water measurements for a period of one month were carried out in a lateral canal 
which serves an area of 480 ha. On average, 550 lps flowed into the lateral. In this 
1,200 metres long lateral canal water losses varied between 30 and 100 lps, averaging 
some 10% of the entering flow. As a rough estimate, conveyance losses in the main 
canals and lateral canals together may be between 15-20% of the incoming flow. 
Practice at farm level: night irrigation 
At farm level, two major sources of water losses can be identified. One is over-
irrigating crops grown on sandy soils (see below). The other refers to losses occurring 
during night irrigation. Nearly all farmers who irrigate their plots will also irrigate 
during the night. Irrigating one hectare takes some 6-8 hours, on average (with a main 
d'eau of 40-60 lps, this gives an irrigation application of 100-150 mm). Since most plots 
are around 4 ha in size, an irrigation turn will often take 24 hours, or slightly more. 
Irrigating at night is quite difficult, and in fact only by full moon is it possible to 
irrigate cautiously. Normal practice, is to lower the incoming water flow by 10-40%, 
in order to make irrigating easier and to forestall irrigation water flowing into the drain. 
This, of course, results in increasing discharges at the lower ends of the feeder canals, 
and frequently irrigation water gets lost to the drain. However, since lowering the flow 
running into the field at night is so widespread a practice, many tail-end farmers have 
learned to rely on the 'night-water'. 
For instance, during a period of great water stress in the 1987/88 season, many 
farmers requested an irrigation turn, and most of them had to wait over 10 days. I 
suspected that tail-end farmers would be the most affected, and I interviewed several 
farmers with plots in the tail-ends of two long lateral canals. Most of them told me that 
their crops were doing reasonably well, although they said they had not applied for an 
irrigation turn. They had adopted the strategy of closely observing the water flows in 
their stretch of the feeder canals, especially late at night. In case of a gradual increase 
in flow, they would start irrigating. The following morning, by 10 o'clock or so, the 
canal would again run dry, and they would await for the next opportunity. Commenting 
on plots which were affected by water shortage, the farmers said that their owners were 
simply too lazy to frequently visit their fields. They reckoned mat their tail-water 
strategy was indeed very time-consuming. Night irrigation thus gives rise to water 
losses, but only half of the 25% expected really gets lost, which on a 24 hour basis 
means a loss of 6% of the entering water. 
Practice at farm level: seepage losses on sandy soils 
At farm level, another major source of water losses occurs on sandy soils. These soils 
easily get over-irrigated, which results in water percolating to the subsoil, and finally 
seeping into the drains. Here, I provide some comparative data on the irrigation of 
sugar cane in two lateral canals: one with only clay soils, and the other with mainly 
sandy (playa) soils.8 The sugar cane on clay soils received on average one irrigation 
turn in every 6 weeks, whereas the sugar cane on the playas received an irrigation turn 
every 3 weeks. One would expect that the irrigation turns on the sandy soils to be 
lighter, but this is in fact not so. Water measurements revealed that an average 
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irrigation turn on the heavy clays equalled 120 mm, which is considered adequate for 
these soils (Agricultural Compendium, 1981:358). On the playas irrigation turns 
averaged 150 mm, which inevitably results in percolation losses ranging from between 
30 and 50 mm or more. According to many farmers, one of reasons for over-irrigating 
the playas, is that 'the water does not advance in the furrows', resulting in long 
application times. 
In all, sugar cane on sandy soils received up to three times as much water as on clay 
soils. Sugar cane yields tended to be higher on the sandy soils when compared to the 
same crop on clay soils (103 tons/ha versus 93 tons). This frustrates clay farmers who 
will tell you mat sugar cane grown on clay soils will render higher sugar percentages, 
and that sugar cane produced on playa soils is 'pura agua' (mere water). Farmers are 
not paid according to the sugar content of their cane, but according to the gross weight 
of the harvested cane. Farmers with sandy soils are very conscious of seepage losses 
in the field canals. In the lateral surveyed, most field canals and field ditches had been 
lined, which in other laterals you would not see. Groups of farmers themselves 
constructed these canals, and paid for the investments. Of course, at sublateral level, 
other kinds of losses are also likely to occur. We did not measure these. It is estimated 
that in all, some 25% of the water entering sublateral canals gets lost. As was stated 
earlier, conveyance losses in the main and lateral canals range around 15-20% of the 
incoming flow. Losses due to poor operation are discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Access to water: operating the system 
Having discussed the most important physical features of the canal system, I will now 
analyse how these features structure the way in which the system is operated. For 
operation purposes, El Operado is subdivided into 6 zones, 3 on each bank of the river. 
The zones vary in extent between 1,000 and 2,000 ha, each zone including a part of a 
main canal, and various minor canals (figure 3.6). The division of El Operado does not 
automatically follow the hydraulic infrastructure itself. It is also possible to divide the 
system into 8 zones (as was the practice during the 1960s). So the division into zones 
reflects the management rather than the technical criteria of the infrastructure. 
Water distribution within each zone is the responsibility of one canalero (water 
guard). The distribution of the irrigation water over the different zones along one main 
canal is in hands of an aforador (water gauger), who carries out the daily water 
readings. There is also an irrigation supervisor, who has to check whether a farmer is 
present at plots receiving water, and whether water is being spilled or is wetting a 
neighbouring plot. The supervisor will do the job of a canalero in case of illness. In all, 
the field personnel in charge of the operation of this 8,700 ha irrigation system total 9 
persons. These persons are District personnel, and paid by the federal government. 
The water guards receive requests for irrigation turns from the farmers, establish an 
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Figure 3.6 The 6 zones of EI Operado (schematic) (pp = pumping plant) 
irrigation programme, and then adjust the control structures in the canals accordingly. 
Most control structures lack reading gauges for up- and downstream water levels, so all 
radial gates and all intake structures are operated through rules of thumb, which are 
"calibrated" on the basis of experience. This is normally done in terms of number of 
screw threads of the gate mechanism, but actual up- and downstream water-levels are 
also taken into account. Comparing a number of water measurements with the 
canaleros' estimates indicates that these rules of thumb reflect quite accurately actual 
Q-h (discharge - water level) relationships of the different control structures. 
The only quantified monitoring of performance is provided by the daily water 
measurements of the water flowing into the 6 zones (measured by the aforadores). With 
these data, the District personnel can evaluate expected and real discharges in the main 
system. However, no routine water measurements are taken in the off-taking minor 
canals, and thus there is no precise feed-back mechanism at this level. Moreover, the 
lack of data makes it difficult to assess losses due to the poor operation of control 
structures by personnel. 
During the irrigation season, some 4,000 to 9,000 lps flows into the system, day and 
night. In April 1988, the right main canal took in nearly 4,200 lps and the left main 
canal slightly less than 3,000 lps. This is below the design capacity of the main canals, 
since only half of the eventual 18,300 hectares are now irrigated. (See Appendix 2.) 
Since minimum water levels have to be maintained in order for the canal intakes to 
function properly, the control structures in the main canals (radial gates) are normally 
partly lowered. This makes the water velocity in the mains lower than designed (0.5 m/s 
or less as against 0.9 to 1.2 m/s designed). On the one hand this complicates adequate 
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water distribution, as more time is required before changes in the settings of the control 
structures take effect. For example, extra water taken into the right main canal destined 
for the tail end of that canal (approx. 60 kms. down stream) will only reach its 
destination two or more days later.9 
Operating the main system at less than half of design capacity also has an advantage: 
since the main canals partly store 'dead water', or agua muerta, sudden unforeseen 
changes in water use by the farmers are buffered somewhat. For example, with a 
discharge of 4,200 lps running into the right main canal, between 2 and 6 cubic metres 
of water per meter of canal length is stored along the first 30 km. of this canal. This 
represents a storage of approx. 100,000 m 3, or equivalent to nearly 7 hours of a 
discharge of 4,200 lps. 1 0 
This situation has some implications for the proper operation of the main system, 
and especially with respect to changes in the water distribution pattern, which occur 
during the irrigation season. An intended change or cambio in the existing water flows 
implies that on numerous points along the main canals the settings of the radial gates 
need to be adjusted. This, then, may result in flow fluctuations which are not intended. 
One way to assess the performance of the main system's operation, is through analysing 
these intended and unintended changes in water flow. Poor operation is reflected in 
fluctuations in discharge in the canals, under normal conditions intake discharge at the 
head-works is fairly constant. Since data on daily discharges in the main canals are 
available, we may try to assess the importance of these daily fluctuations (table 3.2). 
If we correct the occurring daily fluctuations taking into account the intended 
changes (or cambios), flow fluctuations only diminish at the head works of the main 
canal (from S to 2.5 %). Sifting the daily fluctuations on intended changes at km. 18 and 
km.38 in the main canal, and allowing for proper delay periods of one to three days, 
does in fact result in still higher fluctuations (from 8.7% to 10%, at km.18). These 
findings clearly imply that for the downstream zones, water availability is much less 
predictable and reliable than in the head reaches. 
Table 3.2 Fluctuation of discharge in the main system; January, 1 - June, 18, 1988 
system right main canal; distance from intake 
at km.O at km.18 at ki m.38 
mean discharge (lps) 
mean daily fluctuation (lps) 
as percentage of discharge 
stand .dev. of fluctuations (N = 146) 
5,980 
280 
4.7% 
583 
3,480 
170 
5.0% 
328 
1,880 
160 
8.7% 
223 
770 
104 
13.5% 
113 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo; own elaboration 
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Controlling fluctuations in the main system 
As was observed above, water distribution patterns are actively shaped by the actions 
of the District's field personnel. Every working day the canaleros and water gaugers 
meet at the District office in El Grullo with their superiors. This meeting is normally 
presided over by the head of the operation department (an agricultural engineer). During 
the meeting the two water gaugers report their findings of the water flowing into each 
zone. Then, the canaleros inform their superiors whether or not they have sufficient 
water at their disposal, with respect to the requests made by water users. If necessary 
a canalero asks for a cambio, a change in the water discharge entering his zone. In case 
of such a cambio, the first consideration is whether redistribution of the irrigation water 
over me three zones in that margin will solve the problem. If so, the aforador, and/or 
the canaleros involved will reset the different radial gates in the main canal. If, 
however, this arrangement is not sufficient, re-allocation of the water over all six zones 
is considered. If this is possible, both aforadores have to re-set the gates at the river 
intake (normally early next morning), and (some of) the canaleros have to re-arrange 
their control structures. If this is not enough, the dam guard at Tacotah is informed by 
radio to change the release of water. Normally, cambios are discussed at the beginning 
of each week. 
To see how these officers respond to intended changes, we turn to a practical 
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Figure 3.7 Daily flow fluctuations in right main canal, January 1-20, 1988. 
Source: Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo; own elaboration. 
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situation which occurred in January, 1988. During the last 10 days of December, water 
flows in the main system had diminished considerably: most farmers opted for feasting 
rather than irrigating, and also the water guards preferred a peaceful Christmas. Only 
some 2,200 lps were flowing into the right main canal. Consequently, after the 
Christmas recess many farmers started requesting irrigation turns, and during the period 
January 4-16 discharge had to be built up again. At the head-works, intake in the right 
main canal increased to over 3,000 lps, nearly a 50% increase. How did the main 
system react to this change? 
The resulting discharges at three points in the right main canal, at the intake (where 
zone 4 begins), at km. 18 from the intake where the canal enters zone 5, and further 
downstream at km.38 (zone 6), are represented in figure 3.7. As can be seen from the 
graph, at two points in time a major cambio at the head work of the canal was 
implemented; the first cambio involved an increase of 500 lps, and was agreed upon on 
Monday, January 4. Of this extra water, 100 lps were destined for zone 6, 250 lps for 
zone 5, and 150 lps for zone 4. The same afternoon the Tacotah gate keeper was 
informed by radio and the water guards went back to their zones to put the radial gates 
in the main canal to the settings required to receive the increasing flow. Already the 
following morning the intended change had reached the head of the main canal (from 
2,200 to 2,800 lps). At km. 18, the increase was slightly felt (from 1,360 to 1,440 lps). 
That afternoon, the canalero of zone 4 learned that not enough water was passing to the downstream 
zones, and that he had kept too much water in his stretch of the main canal. He had asked for an 
increase of 150 lps, but he had in fact received (or taken) nearly 500 lps. Therefore, still no increase 
was felt downstream. The canalero duly corrected the settings of his 6 radial gates in the main canal, 
and indeed, the next morning (Wednesday), at km. 18 the water was flowing slightly below the 
intended discharge. When that afternoon's water readings for zone 4 and 5 were close to the intended 
discharges, the water guard of zone 4 apparently thought he could now re-set the radial gates, the 
water wave having passed to the downstream zones. However, the following day discharge at km. 18 
had fallen sharply, and zone 4 was attributed to have taken it. After some other adjustments, the 
water flow zone 4 used in subsequent days stabilised around 1,240 lps, still well above the requested 
1,000 lps. 
In the mean time, zone 5, which had requested an increase of 250 lps (from 750 to 1,000 lps), 
experienced some major fluctuations. On Wednesday, the zone used 1,080 lps, a day later discharge 
fell to 930; then again it increased on Friday and Saturday to as much as 1,200 lps. This took the 
water guard of the zone by surprise, but the canalero of zone 6 was disgusted by it. He had seen the 
amount of water flowing into his zone (at km.38) falling steadily from Monday to Saturday, from 
600 lps to 400 lps. He had requested an increase of 100 lps. So, Saturday afternoon, the water guard 
of zone 5 re-adjusted his radial gates, and on Monday his flow had decreased again by 350 lps to 
850 lps (as much as he had before the cambio), and 800 lps was now running into zone 6. 
On Tuesday, January 12 (a week after the cambio), the water flows had still not 
stabilised. The state of affairs on January 12, in comparison with the pre-cambio 
situation, is presented in table 3.3. The table shows that zone 4 still was taking the 
water destined for zone 5. Thus, a minor cambio was asked for by zone 5 for an extra 
200 lps, to be provided by zone 4. By Friday, January 15, yet another cambio was 
agreed upon, an increase of 400 lps at the intake, of which 300 lps was destined to zone 
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Table 3.3 Flows in right main canal, before and after cambio of January 4, 1988 (Ips) 
at intake 
used by zone 4 
at km. 18 
used by zone 5 
at km.38 
( = zone 6) 
before cambio 
(January, 4) 
2,200 lps 
8S0 lps 
1,350 lps 
750 lps 
600 lps 
intended flow 
2,700 ( + 5 0 0 ) 
1,000 ( + 1 5 0 ) 
1,700 ( + 3 5 0 ) 
1,000 ( + 2 5 0 ) 
700 ( + 1 0 0 ) 
after cambio 
(January, 12) 
2,920 lps 
1,250 lps 
1,670 lps 
900 lps 
780 lps 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo; own elaboration 
5. It was again the most upstream zone that profited from this cambio. By January 26, 
zone 5 finally received the requested amount, but by then it was decided that zone 5 had 
to pass on 100 lps to zone 6, which was only receiving 500 lps. 
In summary, then, it took three weeks before the major cambio was actualised. On 
the basis of daily water readings an iteration process of trial and error was practised by 
the water guards in order to reach the correct settings on the control structures and the 
off-takes. Thus, a cambio gives rise to waves in the main canal (see again figure 3.7). 
The Christmas case of course was special, since such big fluctuations in the water flows 
do not normally occur in the remainder of the season (only after heavy rainfall). Part 
of the sudden increases in discharge cannot be properly used by farmers and is wasted. 
I estimate that one third of the occurring daily fluctuations have to be considered as 
losses, which results in losses ranging from between 2 to 4% of the incoming flow. I 
make one final observation. From the data presented it appears that both downstream 
zones (5 and 6) are affected, whereas zone 4 reaps the benefits. It is simply using too 
much water. This seems to point to a tail-end problem. 
Control structures 
The increasing fluctuations downstream in the main canal are partly caused by field 
personnel manipulating the gates. The control structures in the main canal play also 
their role. The basic hydraulic module consists of an orifice which feeds a lateral canal, 
and a radial gate which acts as a cross-regulator ten metres downstream in the main 
canal. Both types of structure are of the undershot-type, but the level of the sill of the 
orifice is higher than that of the radial gate. Thus the flexibility of the entire module, 
as defined by Bos (1978:94), is smaller than unity. It is then to be expected that the 
physical infrastructure is not neutral to occurring fluctuations in the main and lateral 
canals. Discharge measurements were made for one module over a period of 40 days, 
and the results show that whereas discharge in the main canal fluctuated 3.25%, 
discharge in the off-taking lateral fluctuated only 2.55 %. This is in accordance with the 
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Table 3.4 Correlation between distance to head works and water use, and between 
water use and soil quality, 1987/88 irrigation season 
zone distance from gross presence of presence of soil correction corr. gross 
head works water use s sandy soils clay soils factor (-) water use 
(km) (mm) (*) (%) (see footn. l l ) (mm water) 
4 1 1,802 30 20 1.14 1580 
1 1 1,435 10 30 1.06 1354 
2 15 1,572 - 60 0.95 1655 
5 19 1,084 - 70 0.92 1178 
3 20 1,413 - 60 0.95 1487 
6 39 1,470 - 50 0.97 1515 
• i 2 =0 .13 ^ = 0 . 6 7 
r* = 0.0005-
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo; own elaboration 
theoretical observation made above. Flexibility thus is smaller than one, which means 
that fluctuations in the main canal tend to be flattened in the off-taking canal, which 
inevitably results in bigger fluctuations in the on-going main canal. (Appendix 2.) 
The tail-end problem 
The question which arises is: Do the tail-end zones receive consistently less water than 
the zones in the head reaches of the system? Gross water applications for the different 
zones (table 3.4) give some (soft) evidence that no clear tail-end problem occurs. The 
correlation coefficient between distance to head works and gross water use is low 
(1^=0.13). Data on gross water use per zone were not corrected for cropping patterns, 
since cropping patterns are fairly similar. Correcting the data for soil quality seems 
necessary, since water use on sandy soils is much higher than on clay soils, and as the 
table also shows, distribution of different soils is quite uneven. Correlation between the 
volume of water applied during the year and the percentage of clay in the various zones 
is r 2 = 0.67, signifying that soil type helps, in part, to explain the identified differences 
in volumes applied to the various zones. The water use in the different zones was 
corrected for the different soils (clay-loam-sand), taking into account the farmer practice 
to apply relatively more water on sandy soils.11 The correlation coefficient between the 
corrected data and the distance to the head works of the system suggests that among the 
zones no severe tail-end problem occurred, and that the main differences in water use 
can be explained by the presence of different soil-types in the zones. However, there 
remain some inconsistencies. After correcting data, the relative water consumption for 
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Figure 3.8 Gross water use in the three zones of right main canal; 1987/88 
season. Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo. 
zone 2 increases, and becomes the highest in El Operado. Also striking, is the 
difference in water use between zones 4 and 5 (1,802 as against 1,082 mm), which 
remains significant when corrected for soil quality (1580 versus 1178 mm). In part, 
these differences should be attributed to operational matters. 
In the case of the right main canal, we presented graphically gross irrigation 
application against the distance of zone from the head works (figure 3.8). We see a U-
type of relationship, indicating that the least amount of water is used by the zone in the 
middle reaches of the system. There are two explanations for the relative high water 
consumption of zone 6. One explanation is that a tail-end bias does exist but that these 
are partly off-set by unexpected flows due to wastes in the higher reaches, and during 
rainfall. Much of this water cannot be used by the farmers in zone 6, but it does enter 
the zone, and in the statistics it appears as water available to farmers. The other 
explanation becomes apparent when comparing, once more, the flow fluctuations in 
zones 5 and 6 (see figure 3.7 above). We see that in zone 5 fluctuations are capricious. 
The sudden extra discharges entering zone 5 cannot be used by the farmers, and flow 
unused into zone 6. In zone 6, these fluctuations have a longer wave-length, and are 
thus somewhat easier to anticipate. Perhaps it is such that in El Operado, the middle 
reaches are in a more difficult position than the tail-end. Both factors help to explain 
the U-form encountered in figure 3.8. 
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The actor as a factor 
We have encountered significant differences in water use in the zones of El Operado. 
So far, I have attempted to explain these differences in terms of natural or physical 
conditions. Crops appeared not to be a relevant factor, since crops are evenly spread 
over El Operado. Differences in soil quality, however, contributed to the observed 
disparity in water consumption. The implications that the physical lay-out, and 
especially the choice of control structures had on operating the system were also 
reviewed. We found that there was a tendency for flow fluctuations to increase at the 
tail-end of the main system, where water availability tends to become less secure. 
Operating the main system implies regular adjustments of the radial-gates and intake 
structures. In some cases relatively big changes in flows have to be implemented (in the 
range of 50% of the current flow pattern). These go along with unintended flow 
fluctuations or waves in the main canal. It takes some time for the situation to stabilise. 
The middle reaches of the main canals are confronted with fluctuations of a high 
amplitude, which are difficult to anticipate. Sudden increases in discharge are therefore 
difficult to use effectively. Both the top- and tail-ends are in favourable positions. The 
former for obvious reasons, the latter because flow fluctuations have a longer wave 
length and are thus more easy to anticipate. 
And yet, despite the many explanatory factors reviewed, there is another crucial 
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Figure 3.9 Comparing water consumption in two years; January-March 1988 and 
1989. Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo. 
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factor influencing, or shaping the encountered disparities: the actor. In water 
distribution, the crucial actor is the canalero, who has a virtual monopoly on operating 
the control structures. To what extent do the canaleros influence water availability, and 
thus water consumption? Comparative data on water discharges during part of two 
irrigation seasons (January - March, both in 1987/88 and 1988/89) provide us with 
some circumstantial evidence that the water guard does indeed influence the observed 
pattern of water availability. Consider figure 3.9 where water use of the various zones 
in the two irrigation seasons are compared. The 50% increase in water consumption in 
zone 1 is striking, since the climatic conditions for both seasons were comparable, and 
the overall discharge flowing into El Operado between January-March, in both years, 
were nearly identical.12 Thus, the observed dramatic increase in water use for zone 1 
is difficult to explain by natural or physical conditions. The best explanation for the 
phenomenon is, that at the start of the 1988/89 irrigation season, the water guard for 
zone 2 moved to zone 1. 
When still working in zone 2 in 1987/88 season, the water guard was able to direct 
relatively more water to his zone (see table 3.4 above). After the water guard was 
transferred to zone 1, he continued to secure enough water for his zone, which is 
reflected in figure 3.9. Whilst controlling the head reaches of the left main canal, he 
used too much water, which directly affected his two downstream colleagues (zones 2 
and 3), who saw their water use decrease 14% and 11 % respectively. Since they both 
complained, relatively more water was directed to the entire left main canal. And this 
slightly affected the right main canal, where water use decreased 2%. 
On learning this, the relative importance of actors in the management process of El 
Operado became significant. In the following chapter, we will consider the important 
role of the water guard. It is necessary, first, to turn to El Operado's management, and 
briefly describe the formal set-up within which the actors of El Operado operate. 
3.4 Managing El Operado 
The infrastructure of El Operado is owned by the Mexican government, who have 
delegated management powers to the Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo. Most 
people refer to this office as the (irrigation) District; I also. The District is the local 
branch of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH). Farmers and 
the District have to deal with each other quite frequently, the former are expected to 
adhere to certain rules in both their dealings with the District, and in using El 
Operado's infrastructure. 
Each farmer owning land in El Operado (either as a pequeflo propietario or as an 
ejidatario) has access to irrigation water. Each year before the irrigation season starts, 
all water users (or better, those who own irrigated land) have to make a formal 
application to the District for the irrigated crop that they plan to cultivate (the solicitud 
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de siembra). This application is made to the operation department of the District. The 
farmer pays a lump sum for the irrigation service once per season (cuota del servicio 
de riego). This water fee varies according to the crop cultivated. During the 1986/87 
irrigation season, the fee for maize and sorghum was 8,000 pesos/ha (8 US$, at January 
1987 rate); for horticultural crops 15,000; sugar cane 16,000; export tomatoes and 
alfalfa 28,000 pesos/ha. These fees are relatively low, since they represent only 1 % or 
less of the gross return on these crops.1 3 Maize always has had the lowest water fee, 
and export tomatoes the highest. Farmers pay their water fee to the irrigation District, 
receiving an official receipt. The total amount of money collected in water fees covers 
only half of the real running costs (operation and maintenance). El Operado is heavily 
subsidised by the federal government, and the investment costs of the system are not 
charged for at all. 
The moment a farmer judges that his/her crop needs water, s/he can make a request 
to the water guard or canalero of the zone. Each water guard has one or two places 
where each day he is to be found at a given hour. The water guard decides when it will 
be possible to let the farmer have his turn. He fills in a small form, stating when the 
farmer can expect the water, and from whom he will take it over. This form is kept as 
evidence by the farmer, in case of disputes. Every other day the water guard reports on 
those who received irrigation water to the District's office (see chapter 4). As for canal 
maintenance, farmers have to keep their own field ditches and field canals clean and 
free of weeds. All the other infrastructure (lined canals, drains, roads, control 
structures, and the storage dam) is looked after by the maintenance department of the 
District. This chapter will not go into detail concerning maintenance, since this will be 
elaborated in chapter 5. 
Farmers do not formally participate in operation matters. They are the clients of the 
irrigation District who should provide all operation and maintenance services. Farmers 
only have to pay their water fees on time, request their irrigation tarns, and keep the 
field canals clean. From the farmer's point of view El Operado's management is 
characterised by two main features: (1) the farmers have a relatively high degree of 
freedom in farm decisions (which crop to grow; when to irrigate); (2) they have little 
or no say in issues on water management, despite the existence of a water users 
organisation which formally participates in management decisions (the comision de 
usuarios, see chapter 7). 
On the basis of the crop requests made by the water users, in August the office 
personnel of the operation department elaborate their irrigation plan for the coming 
season (see chapter 6). This plan de riego evaluates the need for irrigation water, and 
considers water availability at the storage dam. In the case of sufficient water being 
stored, all crop requests are accepted, and a monthly programme of water releases from 
the Tacotah dam is elaborated. In case the available water does not cover the estimated 
water needs of the requested crops, some crops are refused and replaced by less 
demanding crops. If water is still in short supply, the irrigated area is decreased, as 
happened during the 1982/83 and 1989/90 seasons.14 For the past few years no 
requests for some crops with a high water demand have been accepted, such as alfalfa 
and rice. In addition a second irrigated crop is not permitted. As has been observed, the 
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District tries to limit the area under sugar cane, as this perennial crop may cause big 
problems if the dam does not fill completely. However, during the last few years this 
policy of limiting the sugar cane area has not been rigidly adhered to. The water fees 
are defined after the irrigation plan has been formulated. 
The District's organisational structure 
Only a small part of the activities of the 'Distrito de Desarrollo Rural', which has its 
main office in El Grullo, is concerned with the operation and maintenance of El 
Operado. El Operado is the only irrigation system within the District's service area that 
is operated by the District itself (hence the system's name of 'El Operado'). Here, 
functionaries of the District directly intervene in operation and maintenance. The 
District's other main activities include the supervision of the 34 independent small 
irrigation units that are found scattered over the District's area. These unidades de riego 
are managed by the water users themselves. The 34 units irrigate a total of 7,000 ha, 
involving some 1,700 water users. The District provides agricultural extension services 
for irrigated as well as rain-fed agriculture, but also for animal husbandry and agro-
forestry. 
The service area of the District comprises 5,500 sq.kms in 13 municipalities. This 
area is subdivided into 4 regions, each with its own area office, the centro de apoyo, 
from which all activities in that area are formally developed and coordinated. Under the 
leadership of each area office work the agricultural extension officers (promotores and 
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Figure 3.10 Organisation chart of Distrito de Desarrollo Rural No.V, El Grullo 
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extensionistas), who maintain direct contact with the producers. Each area office also 
has personnel in parallel to the line departments found in the District's central office in 
El Grullo. The central office in El Grullo has 5 line departments, of which the operation 
and maintenance departments are the most important for our purpose. The main activity 
of both departments is the management of El Operado. The staff are supposed to 
develop policies and norms for the activities of the area offices, and to provide 
specialised assistance (e.g. topographical surveys, soil analyses etc.). At the apex of the 
hierarchical organisation of the District stands the head of the District. The department 
heads are his deputies (figure 3.10). 
One important feature of the organisation chart is that the field personnel involved 
in operating El Operado have partial independence at the Autlah-El Grullo area office, 
and are partly staff at the central office. This reflects the unclear relationship between 
the head of the area office and the department heads in the central office. Formally 
speaking, the field personnel involved in maintenance works of El Operado should 
report to the head of the area office. In practice they report directly to the maintenance 
head. Similarly, the water guards consider the head of the operation department their 
boss. Thirty-two people work in the Autlah-El Grullo area office (including the six 
water guards). The operation department, however, has only 8 people (the head, deputy 
head, irrigation supervisor, two water gaugers, the dam guard, and two engineers in 
charge of the irrigation units). At the maintenance department there are 64 persons 
working, of which 42 formally work under the Autlah-El Grullo area office. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted some characteristics of the canal design of El Operado, and 
described how the irrigation infrastructure intersects with specific forms of access to 
land and water. Data on access to land lead us to conclude that there are two basic 
categories of users in El Operado, a relatively small number of entrepreneurs (some 
180) having access to more than 10 hectares of land, and controlling 40% of El 
Operado, and a great number of small farmers (some 1,100) with less than 10 hectares. 
El Operado's infrastructure is formally owned by the Mexican government and not by 
its users. Thus, there is yet another category of important actors in El Operado: 
personnel from the irrigation District. 
The canal infrastructure has some typical features. For instance, it unfortunately 
allows canals to get silted in the rainy season, which results in major problems at the 
beginning of each irrigation season. The most important feature of the canal system is 
that all the division structures are adjustable. The system can thus respond to many 
variations in the demand for water. This is necessary because farmers make their own 
decisions, within limits, and choose the crops they want to cultivate. 
Adjusting the control structures in order to match the farmers' water demands gives 
rise to unintended flow fluctuations in the main system, which tend to increase towards 
the tail. This affects the tail-end zones, though the tail-ends do not systematically 
receive less water. The middle reaches of the main canals are most affected by high 
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amplitude flow fluctuations, which are difficult to anticipate and consequently some of 
the water that enters cannot be used and flows towards the downstream zones. Overall 
water distribution efficiency is higher than 55 %. It was estimated that some 25 % of the 
water entering sublateral canals gets lost. Conveyance losses in the main and lateral 
canals are around 20% of the incoming flow. 
The six water guards actively shape how the water is distributed. Some seem more 
able to secure a sufficient water supply than others. We concluded, therefore, that in 
addition to the specific form of the infrastructure, it is necessary to look at the actor as 
a factor in water distribution. We do this in the following chapter. The activities of the 
water guards must be coordinated in an irrigation system that involves as many as 1,300 
water users and 2,500 plots. In El Operado, the coordinating institution is the irrigation 
District, a government agency. This institution has a hierarchical organisation chart, 
which seems to suggest that officials at the apex of the institution are in complete 
control of El Operado's management. 
Farmers of El Operado have a relatively high degree of freedom in farm decisions, 
which is made possible by the specific canal infrastructure. At the same time, farmers 
have little or no formal say in issues on water management. Rather they have to adhere 
to a number of formal rules defined by the irrigation District. Close analysis of water 
distribution (formally controlled by the operation department) and canal maintenance 
(under the maintenance department) will show that actual management practices are 
significantly shaped by the lower-level field personnel and by farmers (see chapters 4 
and 5). 
Chapter 4 
Tender the waters; a case study of the canalero 
After two months in the research area, the water guards or canaleros were the first ones 
to really involve me in the reality of El Operado. I was lucky, in that they were willing 
to show me their work, and I was impressed by their detailed knowledge of the plots, 
canals, and the water users of El Operado. The water guards have fascinated me 
because of their bravery and jovial manners. My vision of the valley has been 
profoundly influenced by them. The story that follows is the result of intensive field 
work, over a prolonged period of time. 
The canaleros are the field personnel of the irrigation District who ensure that water 
is distributed from the main canal to the lateral canals, and from these finally to the 
individual farm plots. They physically move the weirs and sluices, and work out (in 
their heads, not on paper) the water distribution programmes. Water distribution is quite 
complex, since water users are free to choose the crop they want to cultivate, the date 
of sowing, and the time of irrigation. Furthermore, controlling water flows is generally 
considered a sensitive issue, associated with power and political influence. The 
canaleros form the frontline of the irrigation District, since they stand closest to its 
clients, i.e. the farmers. Despite the fact that this position exists in virtually all 
government managed irrigation systems of scale, relatively little attention is paid in the 
literature to them. 
Central to this chapter is the understanding that the canaleros do not simply 
unthinkingly execute orders received from the engineers in the District's offices, as we 
would perhaps expect, since they occupy the lowest ranks in the District. Canaleros 
interpret the guidelines received from above and adapt them to the varying needs and 
constraints found at field level. They devise specific strategies to give form to their 
relationships with both District superiors and fanners. Moreover, in some instances they 
succeed in assisting farmers to develop strategies against the engineers. 
I first examine the canalero's practice, concentrating on his daily routine and his 
proficient knowledge of the physical infrastructure (section 4.1). I will describe in some 
detail the relationships the canalero maintains with the water users (section 4.2) and the 
engineers of the District (section 4.3). Having outlined the activities of the canalero, 
I then explore how he actively shapes his work tasks (section 4.4). I also, briefly, 
compare the work styles of three different canaleros (section 4.5). In the concluding 
section I will review the most important aspects of the canalero's position, and try to 
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identify the factors which condition their attitudes in response to their position, and thus 
to what extent they consciously shape their working arrangements. The chapter 
takes an actor perspective. It focuses mainly on one canalero, Miguel. I choose Miguel 
for this case study for two reasons: the first and foremost is that of all 6 canaleros, I 
know Miguel best. He was also thought of by various people from the valley, engineers 
and farmers alike, to be 'the best canalero'. The scope of this chapter is necessarily 
limited, the main argument derives from a limited number of canaleros researched 
(three). However, what is gained with the actor-perspective is the depth of analysis. Let 
me first introduce Miguel, since he is the central character of this chapter, 
Miguel 
Miguel is 41 years old. He was born in a small village in the valley of Autlan-El 
Grullo, the second child in a family of 12. The family was poor. His father did not own 
land. When the agrarian land reform started, he did not participate, as he was loyal to 
the old hacienda administrator for whom he worked. When Miguel's father finally got 
hold of ejido land, some years later, he lost it because the ejido board sold all ejido 
lands to a big landowner. Having followed 4 years of primary school, at 13 Miguel was 
sent by bis parents to an aunt in Guadalajara to work in the shoe industry. At the age 
of 17 he returned, and lived for one year with his parents because his elder brother had 
left for the North (the USA). Occasionally he worked as a labourer. 
Then, a water gauger of the District asked him to become bis helper. Soon, Miguel 
was bored by the job. His father, who had worked as a labourer in the construction of 
the irrigation system during the 1950s and had good contacts with the District, arranged 
a permanent job for Miguel in the maintenance brigade of the District. He worked for 
two years with his machete cutting weeds in the canals. Then, in 1970, he was asked 
to become canalero. In 1972, he married Celia, who is from the neighbouring village, 
and now has three children. He bought a house from his brother-in-law, and with the 
7 cows Miguel had accumulated over the years, he bought a small shop from his father-
in-law. In 1981, Miguel was able to buy a second-hand pick-up from the melon profits 
produced on 4 ha of share-cropped land. 
4.1 The canalero's routine 
We are like the tildio, a bird whose only concern is to follow the canals. It is 
a small bird, and walks fast, always in a hurry. They don't like standing 
water, they prefer flowing water. [Miguel, 13/11/87] 
Miguel is responsible for an area of 1,700 hectares, divided into 500 fields, to which 
he has to allocate irrigation water. In total he deals with 350 water users. He controls 
the gates over 50 kilometres of lined canals. There are 30 gates and main intakes along 
his 18 km. stretch of main canal.1 He is responsible not only for his own water flow 
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(700 to 2,000 litres per second), but also the flows destined for the downstream zones 
of Gabriel and Pedro. Normally 2-5,000 lps flow through his zone. This creates an 
extra burden to his task: his colleagues can easily accuse him of using part of 'their' 
water. This means he has to be very careful in adjusting the gates in the main channel. 
By me same token, it is also a great advantage: an upstream zone is never short of 
water (see chapter 3). 
During the irrigation season, Miguel works for 60 hours per week. Each day he 
drives his motorbike between 50 and 80 kilometres through his zone. The major task 
of his work is to check that all the irrigation turns are running well, to adjust gates, and 
to talk to the farmers or their labourers.2 (Figure 4.1) 
When he is driving through his zone, observing cautiously all the fields, sluices, and 
gates, farmers have little difficulty in signalling to see him. Moreover, he is easy for 
farmers to locate, as his motorbike makes a lot of noise (he cannot afford a new 
silencer). Arriving at a plot where someone is irrigating, Miguel will pause. In seconds 
he can observe the situation, and judge whether it is to his expectations. He will often 
chat with the farmer or labourer irrigating. This chat is partly about irrigation matters, 
but invariably other subjects are also discussed. It is not unusual, for the canalero, to 
do his job properly, needs a lot of information: where is farmer so and so, what is 
happening on this or that plot, who is the new share-cropper of such and such a plot 
etc. In particular the canalero needs information about people, and farmers are usually 
very well informed about their neighbours' farms. Information exchange is a two way 
process. Fanners need information too: Information about current prices of agricultural 
products, the names of buyers, new varieties of crops, the chemical products and 
amounts of fertilizer to apply. This can all be obtained from the canalero. 
One other recurring theme of conversations with fanners is the 'suspension' of sugar 
cane plots. Four to eight weeks before harvesting, sugar cane plots have to dry (this 
enhances sugar content, but it is also necessary because of the lorries entering the field), 
and irrigation services are suspended. Time and again Miguel urges farmers irrigating 
near to these suspended plots to irrigate with care and not to wet them.3 Farmers 
sometimes complain when they are denied an irrigation turn until an adjoining sugar 
cane plot has been harvested, this is done in cases where the field canal leaks. This is 
a common source of irritation for farmers who grow crops other than sugar cane, such 
as maize which needs water more frequently. They themselves do not profit from the 
suspension. While doing his daily round, Miguel cannot take too much time to solve 
such grievances. He is under pressure to continue. At 2:30 pm he has to be present at 
the daily meeting of canaleros in the District. He must finish his round before then. In 
addition, he may have other things to do; his own crops to attend (most canaleros share-
crop some land) or some other business, or to return home to have lunch. 
Apart from the 15 to 25 water users irrigating, on his daily round Miguel will also 
encounter perhaps 10 to 20 farmers who request an irrigation turn. He is often called 
as he drives by. The moment he sees who the farmer is, he already knows the relevant 
information: that is farmer A, with plot number B lying at canal C, with crop D, which 
had its last irrigation turn on date E. When the farmer then asks for an irrigation turn, 
Miguel is already processing the data, and within seconds he will respond by saying: 
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Key: LAT = Lateral — = gate or cross-regulator; 1 = field inlet 
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Figure 4.1 The zone of Miguel (zone 4), approx. 1,700 hectares 
'no, you irrigated your plot two weeks ago, you have to wait another week'; or, 'you 
will have to wait until farmer F has finished, and F will start irrigating when G has 
finished, I think on Friday at 6 pm it will be your turn'. Sometimes he will take his 
notebook from his small rucksack, in which he writes the name of the farmer, the 
acreage, the crop and the dates of the irrigation turns received for each plot. When the 
farmer does not agree with a decision, Miguel refers to his book. He will look up the 
plot, and show the farmer the date of the last irrigation turn, and argue that he still has 
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to wait. Miguel, however, knows most of the necessary information by heart. 
Often it is the canalero who looks for a particular fanner. Usually this happens 
when the canalero has worked out an irrigation schedule for a certain lateral canal. 
Perhaps, for example, farmer H has nearly finished his turn, farmer I has already 
applied for his, but Miguel judges that after H, it would be easier if farmer J followed. 
He will try to locate farmer J, and inform him to irrigate on a particular day. 
Sometimes he cannot find the farmer (especially those who grow sugar cane who often 
do not show up in the field for a week or more). This is one of the things mat irritates 
Miguel. He thinks they are lazy and take little interest in their crop. 
Programming a canal 
The canalero works out a water distribution schedule in any one canal on the basis of 
the differences in water demand field by field, dependent on crop and soil, on optimal 
distribution patterns, dependent on the canal system, and on farmers requests (figure 
4.2). The pattern evolves during the irrigation season. Water demand gradually 
increases from November to March, because of climatic conditions and crop stage, and 
then decreases again. The canalero thus builds up a more and more complex water 
schedule in his zone, and along each canal. 
Once a basic irrigation schedule has been established at the beginning of the 
irrigation season, the canalero can add an extra irrigation turn without reconsidering the 
whole irrigation plan. From a fairly simple core pattern, a complex schedule of 
irrigation turns evolves, which is well structured, and accounts for the differences in 
water need that exist from plot to plot. 
I RR IGAT ION S E A S O N 
Figure 4.2 Irrigation turns along one sublateral serving 7 plots on 40 ha (1986/87 
season). Note the variety of crops grown. The soils are coarse textured. 
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Take for instance a big lateral canal, irrigating 600 ha. At any one time, the 
canalero may have six irrigation turns 'working'. With an average plot size of 3.5 ha, 
and a water flow at field level of say 70 lps, a normal irrigation turn will take between 
21 to 32 hours. This means that every day or so the canalero has to ensure that six 
other farmers are ready to take over these turns. When he sees he is falling 'behind 
schedule', that is, the six turns working are not enough to ensure that each plot gets its 
water in time, he will decide that extra water is needed in the lateral canal. At first, he 
may try to avoid this, as it needs considerable effort on his part. If the situation in the 
lateral gets worse, he will be forced to programme an extra turn. 
First, he will have to consider whether it is possible to take an irrigation turn from 
another canal in his zone. If this is not possible, as in the months of January and March 
when water demand is on the increase, he will need more water entering his zone. So, 
at the daily meeting of canaleros he will inform the engineer that he needs extra water. 
When his request is granted, and the increase in discharge reaches the main canal, the 
canaleros cooperate in order to send this extra water to the right zone. The upstream 
canalero will at first receive the extra water, he has to pass it to the downstream 
canalero, which means adjusting all the gates in his part of the main canal. The 
downstream canalero will get his extra water two to four days after his request. He can 
now programme the extra irrigation turn, and has to adjust the inlet from the main to 
the lateral canal and other sluices in the laterals and sublaterals. 
The canalero allows an extra irrigation turn (somewhere between 70 and 100 litres 
per second) to be superimposed upon existing water flows, which is not so difficult to 
implement. He does not reconsider the flow pattern. At each gate, he considers the 
extra water to be passed on, and assesses the adjustments he has to make (in terms of 
the number of screw threads or turns of the hand wheel operating the gate). 
There are two situations which may severely disrupt the established water schedule: 
interference by a superior (see further) or sudden rains in the dry season. If enough rain 
has fallen (over 50 mm), the immediate result is that all water users stop irrigating. This 
may indeed be welcomed by the canalero. But he fears the consequences. Within three 
weeks, all water users will urgently want to irrigate, so within perhaps one week, he 
has to re-establish the complex irrigation order, without having a 'core' upon which to 
slowly reconstruct the schedule. For him, this will be the most critical week of the year. 
The canalero has to work in a fairly systematic manner in order to cope with his 
task. He does not, however, make elaborate programmes before entering the field. He 
structures the water distribution pattern in a practical, immediate, way. It is a tough 
schedule he has to develop, and his freedom of action is indeed limited. But it is this 
domain of programming, adjusting gates and estimating water flows from which he 
derives his competence. He is the only one who has the proper knowledge and 
experience to be able to do the job. His demanding task, thus, produces specific 
knowledge, which in turn gives him a certain degree of authority, and this gives him 
some freedom in decision making. The canalero not only needs this freedom of action 
to be able to do his job properly, he may also use it for his own benefit. This may vary 
from favouring farmer friends, to irrigating his own share-cropped plot more frequently 
than is formally permitted. Before proceeding to discuss the relationship he maintains 
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with farmers, I first want to present an example which underscores the knowledge the 
canaleros have of the canal infrastructure. 
The expert and the engineer 
On the afternoon of the 6th of April 1988, Miguel invited David (the water gauger of 
the right main canal) and myself, to review a situation which bothered him badly. We 
arrived at the intake of lateral 5, which serves 500 hectares (figure 4.3). Here, Miguel 
had established a represo in the main canal, that is, through lowering the radial gate 
immediately downstream of the off-take, he had backed up the water in the main canal. 
In fact, he had already used some of the freeboard of the main canal, the water stood 
some 15 centimetres below the board. Miguel confirmed that this was the maximum 
head possible, and thus no more water could possibly enter into the lateral canal (that 
morning David had measured 559 lps). 'But,' Miguel added, 'it is not enough. I am 
running behind schedule. Before finishing a complete round of irrigation turns farmers 
are already requesting the next turn.' 
It was April, and the period of peak-water demand. The year before Miguel 
managed with intake 5, which has an 18 inch pipe. But at the beginning of the present 
irrigation season, some 30 hectares of land had been added, previously unirrigated (of 
which 20 hectares were sugar cane), and on lands already irrigated another 30 hectares 
had changed from annual crops like maize to sugar cane. In all, this meant that the 
water demand had increased by 10% compared to the previous year. Miguel was 
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Figure 4.3 The 'lateral 5' canal with the irrigated fields. 
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running behind schedule. We discussed the possibilities for augmenting the discharge. 
I said the only way to augment the discharge was to back up the water in the main canal 
some more. This would only slightly increase the water flow into the lateral (perhaps 
a 5 % increase, the inlet being a pipe), at any rate there would be somewhat more water. 
Miguel said this was impossible. The lateral canal would receive hardly any more 
water, while backing up the main canal at kilometre 5 would disturb the established 
discharge in the main system. An initial decrease in discharge passing the gate would 
also mean a decrease of the water flowing into the zone of another canalero (Gabriel) 
at kilometre 18. According to Miguel it would take a lot of time, more than 12 hours, 
before the water flow would stabilise again. 
I roughly calculated that it would be possible to lower the gate to back up water in 
the main canal at six in the afternoon, and that the rebajo (decreased discharge) would 
be felt by Gabriel some hours later, when it would be night. The following morning the 
situation would be normalised, and because Gabriel would not visit his zone during the 
night, he would not even notice any change. I checked my estimations and explained 
them to Miguel and David. In principle they agreed, but Miguel did not accept the 
outcome. He insisted that when you lower the gate in the afternoon at kilometre 5, the 
next morning at 9 a.m. the water gauger would register a considerable decrease of 
discharge in Gabriel's zone, and this would cause problems. Miguel could not produce 
any argument for why an increase of 10 centimetres in the water level would take such 
a long time to normalise at kilometre 18. So the discussion ended and we all went 
home. 
In the afternoon, however, Miguel decided to try out my suggestion. He lowered the 
gate at kilometre 5, so that the water in the main canal increased by another 10 
centimetres, its very maximum level. Later, Miguel told me that the water stood level 
with the road alongside the canal. At nine that night he sat at home, but felt uneasy. 
Would too much water enter into the lateral, causing the lateral canal to overflow? So 
he went on his motorbike to check, but everything was OK. The next morning he was 
already waiting for the water gauger at the gate. He was now convinced that the backing 
up of the water in the main had decreased the discharge in Gabriel's zone considerably. 
He wanted badly to draw the gate up again; to undo the changes made. But he also 
wanted the water gauger to measure the discharge into the lateral, to see whether it had 
increased significantly. When the water gauger finished the measuring (with a propeller 
meter), Miguel quickly drew up the gate. The reading of the water gauger showed that 
there was no increase at all in the water running into the lateral (reading: 557 bps!), and 
my suggestion proved to be useless. Miguel felt uneasy, he expected trouble with 
Gabriel during the canaleros meeting that afternoon. 
When the meeting started, Gabriel immediately accused Miguel of stealing water 
from him (200 litres per second). Then, the discharge readings were read, and Gabriel 
had been right. The discharge in his zone had decreased by 263 litres, whereas in 
Miguel's zone it had increased by 211 lps. The 'wave' (the decrease in discharge) had 
been exactly on the spot where the water gauger measured Gabriel's water, attributing 
the 'lost' water to Miguel's zone. The following day, April 8, the 'wave' had reached 
Pedro's zone, downstream of Gabriel. Therefore, the readings for Miguel had finally 
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Table 4.1 Consequences of slightly lowering a gate at Km. 5 in the right main canal, at 
6 p.m. on April 6, 1988. Discharge in lps, measured between 9 and 10 a.m. 
zone 4 zone 5 zone 6 lateral 5 
day (Miguel) (Gabriel) (Pedro) (zone 4) 
April 6 2003 1367 908 559 
April 7 2214 1104 919 557 
April 8 1971 1568 754 569 
April 9 1941 1528 812 n.a. 
Source: data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo 
normalised. Now Gabriel in his turn had to bear the brunt. It now appeared that he had 
taken water from Pedro. On April 9 this situation still persisted (table 4.1). 
For me it was an embarrassing experience, because now Engineer Corona, head of 
the operation department, also started to question Miguel. How could this have 
happened? Miguel then explained that it was an experiment to try to get more water into 
this lateral canal, because there was a severe water shortage, and this, in turn, was 
caused by the expansion of the area under sugar cane (implicitly criticising his superior 
for having allowed this). Although I felt guilty, I was surprised that Miguel did not say 
it had been me who had suggested the idea. He assumed full responsibility, backing me. 
Thus, my calculations as an engineer appeared to be disastrously incorrect. I had 
severely overestimated the velocity of the water wave. My calculations were based on 
the assumption that the wave speed would be more or less equal to the water velocity 
(around 0.5 m/s). However, it appeared that the decrease in discharge moved much 
more slowly: initially around 0.25 m/s, and further down the main canal even more 
slowly. This is because water levels are maintained artificially high, since the main 
system is running below design capacity. This implies that it took far more time for the 
temporary change in water flow to normalise. Thus, according to the water readings, 
Miguel had taken 200 lps from Gabriel, although Miguel did not make use of that water 
since it remained stored in his part of the main canal. 
I was impressed by the detailed and relevant knowledge that the canalero had about 
the canal infrastructure. Miguel simply 'knows' how the infrastructure reacts to certain 
manipulations of the gates. The fact that Miguel hesitated and finally adopted my 
suggestion, in my view does not run counter to this conclusion, but rather says 
something about the magnitude of the problems he was experiencing at that moment 
with farmers. Anything that could help diminish these problems was welcome to him. 
His knowledge about the infrastructure is both situation specific and implicit. He knows 
how the canals in his area react to particular manipulation, but may not know it for 
another situation. He could not convince me of his opinion with technical arguments. 
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Yet, bis knowledge proved to be far more effective than my formulas and simple 
assumptions. 
4.2 Interacting with farmers 
How does a canalero cope with farmers during his work routine? I will focus here 
entirely on Miguel, firstly analysing his more routine contacts, i.e. communication 
without any real problems.4 Secondly, I will describe briefly how he interacts with 
some 'special' farmers. 
Routine encounters 
Normally, Miguel arrives on his motorbike. He stops, looks, tries to locate the farmer 
or the labourer, and then starts to whistle or yell ('fuuuuuuut', or 'heeeeeey'). Since it 
takes some time for the farmer and the canalero to come together, both have time to 
assess the situation. The canalero in seconds concludes whether the situation he 
encounters is as expected or not, and whether any measures have to be taken. The 
farmer will have time to work out some explanation for the situation. Then, when 
farmer and Miguel come together, a first conversation develops which often refers to 
something which the farmer is doing at that moment, or about something that is going 
on nearby. Miguel asks or comments on something rather obvious, and the farmer 
responds affirmatively, using almost the same words in repetition. 
The function of this opening phase may be twofold. First, both participants implicitly 
reassure each other that they each recognise the other's position, but also that they know 
what brings them together. Second, it allows Miguel to create the opportunity for either 
of them to start talking business. Normally it is the canalero who takes the initiative for 
this. He evaluates the situation to see whether it is as he expected, but he passes his 
judgement in a conciliatory manner. He may say something like: iya mero?, indicating 
that the farmer, in his opinion, should finish his turn. Or, say, for example, "there is 
a lot of water now, isn't there?". 
The farmer will invariably reply with an affirmation of the canalero's opinion. Here, 
he will often repeat the words of the latter. ("Yeah, now we have a lot of water. It's 
running really fast.") But, when he does not agree, the farmer will subtly offer another 
opinion. It now depends entirely on the canalero as to whether he will accept the 
suggestion for discussion, or negate it. He is most likely to reject the farmers' 
suggestion when he is stressed. 
Both the comments of the canalero and the response of the farmer are often difficult 
to understand. This is not only because of a language barrier (between myself and the 
Mexicans), but also because the mutual understanding between farmer and canalero in 
relation to the actual state of affairs is so subtle that often only half a word is needed 
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(canalero) 
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(canalero) 
business 
(canalero) 
decision on action 
(canalero) 
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(farmer) 
shifter 
(canalero) 
question - or 
(canalero) 
information 
(farmer) 
I . 
reaction 
(canalero) 
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(canalero) 
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I 
reaction 
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I 
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summarising/closing 
(canalero) 
Figure 4.4 Structure of routine encounters between Miguel and farmers 
for them to be able to communicate their meaning. 
Sometimes Miguel may change tack and break off the first round of business talk, 
introducing a 'shifter' steering the conversation to another subject. Often, there are two 
reasons for Miguel to introduce such a 'shifter'. He may feel the need to temporarily 
shift the farmer's attention to another subject, for example, when there has emerged a 
difference of opinion between them. But a 'shifter' strategy may also emerge out of 
Miguel's need for specific information about neighbouring farmers, or perhaps involve 
subjects such as crop diseases, crop prices etc. This 'shifter' can be short-lived if the 
farmer does not pick it up. Normally, however, a shifter results in an interesting 
discussion and exchange of information. 
After guiding the conversation, Miguel takes the initiative to make some conclusions 
and verify whether the farmer/labourer knows what he has to do, and whether he 
agrees. Miguel subtly indicates that that conversation has reached its end. Sometimes 
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at this point, the fanner will take the initiative, and introduce a completely new subject. 
Such an initiative nearly always results in meaningful communication, from which the 
canalero gets new information. The canalero will start a closing procedure, going over 
again the decisions reached and verifying whether the farmer agrees and understands 
them. He may say: "tomorrow I will pass by" or "don't forget to repair this field canal" 
or "take care not to water the neighbouring sugar cane plot" etc. These are usually 
repetitions of earlier statements. Then, the canalero will say something like "let's go" 
"goodbye", or something to close. The fanner will answer to this goodbye, sometimes 
raising a new question. Finally he gets on his motorbike and drives off. These contacts 
will normally only last between 5 and 15 minutes, but invariably they consist of most 
elements mentioned above, which is summarised in figure 4.4. 
During his working day, Miguel communicates with perhaps 15 to 30 farmers or 
labourers. Most of these are purely routine: nothing special happens, no conflict 
emerges, nor is there much emotion put into them. The encounters Miguel has in the 
field are important, not only to him but also to farmers. In the routine encounters I have 
analysed, it is invariably Miguel who takes the lead, who initiates most in conversation. 
However, the farmer also actively participates, and talks at least as much as the 
canalero. Despite the fact that Miguel has the lead, he leaves farmers and irrigators 
enough space to contribute new points of view. The communications derive from a need 
that both actors have with respect to their different positions. The opening conversations 
have a lot to do with an explicit recognition of this and their mutual understanding of 
a concrete situation. There is a big overlap of shared experience, which is one reason 
why the very condensed discussions are sometimes hard to follow for outsiders. Miguel 
tries to avoid being paternalist or authoritarian in his attitude and instead tries to involve 
the farmer; a strategy which helps him to succeed in his tasks.5 Here, I also wish to 
stress the elaborateness of such encounters, complete as they are with summaries, 
verifications, settling procedures, and with clear opening and closing procedures. In 
Miguel's work it is very important to know for sure whether the water user and he are 
'together', that they understand each other, and that any agreements reached are 
transparently clear to both.6 
In general, interactions with big, rich water users, develop differently from the 
interaction typified in this section. Miguel, for instance, maintains economic 
relationships with some water users. An employee of the agricultural bank who arranged 
cheap credit and insurance for Miguel's maize crop, expects in return some favours 
with respect to irrigation water. When this employee needs water, he will go to 
Miguel's house at night. Another example is Miguel's dealings with a big tomato 
producer, who rents vast areas of land. Miguel rarely interacts directly with this farmer. 
In daily affairs he deals with his employees, the administrators. When some special 
circumstance emerges, for example when the tomato producer urgently needs water, he 
will communicate directly with the head engineer at the District office, who in turn 
instructs Miguel. 
On several occasions I observed how one particularly rich and influential farmer 
simply talked by radio to the canaleros involved in solving water distribution problems 
(this farmer has plots in 3 different zones, and thus has to communicate with 3 different 
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canaleros). If possible, the canaleros responded immediately to tins farmer's requests. 
They explained their favouritism by saying: "if we don't attend him, he will 
immediately go to the head engineer, and then it will be our boss who gives us exactly 
the same instructions. So why bother?" 
In contrast, Miguel sees his work with the small ejidatarios almost as social work. 
Indeed, the contrast with bigger farmers is great. "You have to be there, in the field," 
says Miguel: 
"because you will always find water users there, if only to ask you a question. To me it may seem 
a stupid question, but for them it is very important. For instance: have you seen somebody who can 
buy my maize? . . . or just to listen, or anything. For them, you are like a life-buoy (tablita de 
solvation), or a moment of distraction, and it also serves you well." [12/4/89] 
4.3 The canaleros in the District office 
Every afternoon, the canaleros meet with some of the engineers at the District office. 
The two water gaugers and the irrigation supervisor also attend the meeting. Of the 
engineers, it is usually Engineer Corona, the head of the operation department and/or 
his deputy who attend. Before the meeting starts, the canaleros meet each other under 
the big tree in front of the District offices, where they joke and gossip. The atmosphere 
among the canaleros is also relaxed during the meeting. It seems that this is one 
moment in the day when they can air tensions, built up during a hard day's work in the 
field, by joking. It is the only occasion when they are truly among equals and can share 
experiences. 
During the meeting, discharge flows for the zones are evaluated, and each canalero 
has the opportunity to request changes in water quantity. They may also raise other 
problems that have come up. Each second day they have to write a report which lists 
those plots that have finished irrigation. Sometimes major conflicts arise. Miguel gives 
us an account of a situation that he considered highly problematic. 
"Sometimes you have problems. I do not recall all the others I have had during the 20 years I have 
been canalero. But I have always had problems. One day during the meeting at the District, we had 
requested more water to be released from the dam. The engineers had approved it, and said that very 
early the following morning the extra water would arrive in the main canal. The following morning 
I did my round and I noticed that there was no increase of water. I got on my radio and told the 
engineer that the water hadn't arrived. He answered that they had forgotten to inform the gatekeeper 
at the dam. They had forgotten it! I followed my round in the field and came to the gate at kilometre 
8 of the main canal, which I had 'working' (lowered, in order to back up the water). And in the 
afternoon, I later heard, two engineers went to check my zone and saw this gate with the water 
backed up completely. The next day, the extra water still had not arrived, but that was logical 
because they had not released any. Then the engineers started to accuse me of having lowered the 
gate, so the extra water could not pass on to the next zone. That made me wild, angry, because they 
wanted a thing to be true, when I knew perfectly well it was not. And they also said it was gate 10. 
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I said: "no, engineer, it is gate 8." "No, it was gate 10, because we saw it," they replied. Later I 
checked it and of course it was gate 8. It made me mad. So I decided: tomorrow I won't come. And 
I did not work the next day. And then I did not go to work the following day, this created big 
problems in lateral 5. So I had to go in the afternoon, to adjust everything. The result was, that the 
report I wrote the next day had many errors, because I had made up the data. Just imagine what 
happens if a canalero doesn't show up for a whole week!" [12/4/89] 
Linking the refinery to the District 
One of the recurring topics of the meetings involves sugar cane. Canaleros are informed 
which sugar cane plots have received the order suspending irrigation. The operation 
department of the District receives this information every few days from the 'committee 
of sugar cane production' which coordinates the harvest activities (in this committee 
both the sugar cane refinery and the two sugar cane growers associations are 
represented). The operation department thus receives lists of suspended plots, but these 
data are unintelligible to the office personnel at the District, since the refinery's 
administration of plots does not coincide with the District's adrninistration. The District 
denotes all the plots of El Operado by a 4-digit number, and this plot number, together 
with its official extension, and the name of official plot-owner features in its 
adrninistration. This plot number is not used by the refinery, which bases its 
administration on the name of the farmer owning the crop (often not the one registered 
as the plot owner in the District's administration), who has a 6-digit identification 
number. To make things worse, the area under sugar cane as registered by the refinery 
concerns the net area planted, and thus is normally less than the area the District uses 
in its administration. 
The canaleros are the only ones in the District able to decipher the refinery lists and 
translate them into terms intelligible to the District. They are thus the link between both 
administrations. It is amazing to see the speed with which they can do this: the engineer 
reads aloud the sugar cane growers' name and the cane acreage, and normally within 
seconds the canalero has produced a corresponding plot number which he writes down 
in his booklet. Hilarious situations may emerge when the list provided by the refinery's 
computerised administration appears to contain numerous faults, which are only 
immediately recognisable by the canaleros, especially cases in which the cane ready to 
be cut has already been harvested, sometimes months before, for planting material (this 
is an activity not administered by the refinery), and has been replanted again and needs 
water. When the canaleros are in a bad mood they say, "OK, they can have it, I'll cut 
the water." 
In reality, the refinery cannot do without the canaleros. The refinery cannot enforce 
irrigation suspension, and thus the canaleros become the frontline of the refinery, acting 
as 'policemen', since normally the farmers first hear from the canalero that irrigation 
to their plots has been suspended, a decision farmers often disagree with (an extra 
irrigation before the harvest increases the gross weight of the cane). Of course, the 
canaleros are aware that they are indispensable, but this complicates their work. They 
feel especially bitter when, at the end of the year, they hear rumours about the refinery 
donating bags of sugar to all the personnel involved in El Operado, but they do not 
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receive any. 
The silted canals 
Still focusing on the canaleros meetings, during a meeting tiiat took place in November, 
when problems with the silted canals were most notorious, Juan, a tail end canalero, 
complained that he needed 800 lps, but that only 200 lps was running into his zone. The 
main canal had become severely silted and with only 200 lps the canal was now at peak 
capacity (whereas normally it can carry at least 1,000 lps). He again complained to the 
head engineer (the first time the problem had been mentioned was at least 4 weeks 
before, and this was perhaps the 10th time he had raised the issue) that the canal had 
to be cleaned by the hydraulic excavator, because the water users badly needed their 
first irrigation. The head engineer responded as usual: "yes, we are looking into this 
matter, but the problem is that the machine has broken down, and it is being repaired". 
But Juan insisted that the situation had become unbearable for the farmers. Then, Pedro, 
another canalero, exclaimed: 
"Why. We seem to fool ourselves here completely. Juan, you need 800 litres for your farmers? Why 
then don't you ask for it? Why worry that the canal cannot carry it? If it flows over and the canal 
breaks down. That is not your problem, is it?" [9/10/88] 
All the canaleros nodded. Juan looked up, helplessly. The head engineer continued to 
say that they were working hard on it. The next day, 4 tail-end farmers threatened to 
beat Juan up if they did not get water. After that Juan simply did not show up for one 
week in the tail-end part of his zone. Finally the machine was repaired and the main 
canal was cleaned. I give this example to show how canaleros assume total 
responsibility for their zones. The attitudes of canaleros during the meeting reflected 
this. It was Pedro who realised how they were caught in the web; taking on the 
problems created by others as their own concern. He expressed his thoughts, but that 
was all. Nothing would change. 
4.4 The canalero shaping the outcome of his work 
"The water is not waiting for you', the canaleros say. While they have a continuous 
water flow running down the canals, the canaleros are bridging both the farmers 
demands, and (infra)structural constraints and working to the rules. They have to have 
a good memory, an agile mind, and to act diplomatically with water users. That is the 
only way to solve this complex equation in a quick and simple way. As Miguel once put 
it: 
"It's difficult. When I have problems in the irrigation season, I feel bad. At night I am thinking: 
what do I have to do the following day? How will I tackle that problem? I am always thinking. It 
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is usually these two things: not to have trouble with the District, nor trouble with the people. And 
when the District orders me to do something, then I have to do it. The moment it really becomes 
tough, is when I have to explain to the farmers: why this, why that, in order to keep me on good 
terms with the people." [17/8/87] 
And 18 months later: 
"The most important thing for me is to have the water user satisfied, to have the farmer contented. 
Unfortunately, sometimes it is not possible to solve this problem. There are two magnets and you 
stand in between them, that is, your bosses and the water user are dragging you in opposite 
directions. Thus, you have your fixed water flow, so if I should give in to the request of the water 
users, then I would not comply with the working norms, since I would have to take water from the 
downstream canaleros, and I would have trouble with them." [12/4/89] 
The situation a canalero finds himself placed in, can be called the 'canalero's 
dilemma'7. It calls for constant choices, which are often mutually incompatible. How 
does Miguel handle such situations? We first consider a potentially conflictive situation 
with water users, which Miguel has to handle carefully. 
Seeing is understanding: the case of the incredulous farmers 
During one of the last days of March 19881 visited the fields of lateral 5, where I knew 
there were problems with irrigation, because of the limited capacity of the inlet (see 
above). Miguel had told me he was fed up with the situation, because he could not meet 
the requests for water from water users. 
I came across Miguel, and we stopped and chatted. He looked tired. Immediately 
he started to tell me of all the discussions he had had with the farmers of lateral 5. I 
realised I functioned as a kind of sounding board for him. He aired his frustration. He 
said he had expected problems, and that two years ago he had told his superior that he 
should press the maintenance department to construct a new inlet with a diameter of 24 
inches (as against the actual 18" pipe), but nothing was done. At the beginning of this 
irrigation season, an additional 50 hectares of sugar cane was planted along the canal. 
Miguel had been angry with the engineer, and had said he would not be responsible for 
the problems this would cause. Miguel concluded: "now it is me who is facing the 
problems", adding "we are like bull fighters: we fight the bulls, and the bosses are way 
up in the stand, yelling ole, ole." 
Miguel told me that that morning he came across two water users from the tail of 
the canal, and that they had accused him of purposely denying them irrigation water. 
He related how he had tried to explain the situation to them, that because of the small 
inlet no more water could enter the lateral. "But they did not believe me", he sighed, 
"because they had seen that the lateral canal upstream was completely filled with water 
and yet despite that, I did not give them water". They thought Miguel was favouring 
other water users. "I tried to explain to them that the lateral was indeed full of water 
because I had set the water level very high in order to feed sublateral 1 (see figures 4.1 
and 4.5), but that all that water was 'dead water' (agua muertd), that it was only stored 
in the canal, without working (sin que trabajabd)." He could not convince them, so he 
decided that the only way they would understand was to show them in practice that 
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Figure 4.5 Sublateral 1 branching off from lateral 5 
there was not much water, and why. So he had taken them to the spot where the 
sublateral branches off from the lateral. 
"I said it indeed seemed a lot of water but that this was in fact not so. I opened the sluice that had 
backed up the water, and after a few minutes they could see that of all that water 
only a small stream was left. I finally convinced them, and they understood that there was in fact 
very little water, because of the intake of lateral 5." [12/4/89] 
A few days later, when I was talking to some farmers of that canal, it appeared that the 
two water users had been able to explain to other fanners why there was insufficient 
water running into their area. 
So despite a tough schedule that day Miguel had decided to take the time to explain 
carefully the situation to the two complaining water users. Miguel told me that he could 
also have adopted another attitude: "Notice the things you have to do! If I were a son-
of-a-bitch, I would have said: don't make trouble, I am giving the orders here, and I 
don't care what you think." But Miguel has learned that involving farmers by explaining 
in detail is the best way to avoid clashes. And he also realises that it is precisely those 
two water users that are recognised as 'leaders' by the rest of the water users in that 
area. So, taking the time to explain the situation to them was an investment. He 
anticipated that they would explain the issues to their fellow farmers, and that they 
would have less trouble in convincing them than he. This attitude avoided an escalation 
of the problem. 
One of the direct consequences of Miguel's attitude was that after the end of that 
irrigation season, the two 'leaders' of the lateral 5 area took the initiative to solve the 
problem of the reduced intake of that canal. To everybody's surprise, and without the 
support of the maintenance department, they managed to construct a completely new 
intake structure in less than a month (see chapter 5). Now, one season later, all 
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problems are solved, which makes Miguel's work a lot easier. Miguel now feels he has 
a special 'compromise' with the farmers of canal 5 as he explained: 
"When they now ask me for water, do you think I can say to them, 'Sorry, I don't have enough 
water, the canal can't take more?' Or that I stick to the District's rule of one irrigation turn every 
4 weeks, when they themselves constructed a whole intake structure in order to get enough water to 
the field? Am I to deny them water, or say to them there is not enough? Put yourself in my place." 
[12/4/89] 
The photograph and the silted canal 
We have already noted the problems that silted canals bring to the canaleros, and that 
there seems little room to change the situation fundamentally. The silted canals put an 
extra burden on the canalero's dilemma. The maintenance problems can only be solved 
if farmers are willing to organise themselves, and exert pressure on the engineers. From 
Miguel's perspective, canaleros will never be able to solve the problems. 
"I, to whom ought I to complain? I don't have anything in my hands, only the facts. What do I gain 
if I become angry with an engineer? It will make no difference. I am only a civil servant. But I have 
talked a lot with the water users. They are not organising themselves, because they are afraid that 
the finger will be pointed at them, that they will be criticised. Otherwise, they would have the power. 
They should do something, organise themselves, but it is as if they want to get on well with the 
engineer. And the bastard they fall back on is the bloody canalero who is in the field, he is the one 
to whom they complain. If they would only join together, then the problems could be solved. It's 
easy, simple. But they won't do it. They are lacking in civic values. They should go to the District, 
and say to the engineers that it is their obligation to clean the canals, but they won't go . Now they 
are starting to open their eyes. Yes, they are awakening! I hope so." [12/4/89] 
Although he sees few practical possibilities for changing the situation with respect to the 
maintenance services, Miguel has on several occasions sided with the water users, in 
their struggle with the engineers. He recollects one situation which illustrates the 
canalero's degree of freedom; freedom to act that could have far-reaching 
consequences. 
"On one occasion, there was this canal (the already mentioned sublateral 1, see figure 4.3) 
completely silted up. I knew that the District would never clean it, and the maize plants had started 
to flower and needed much water. But the canal couldn't be used. It was a mess, while the engineers 
had the hydraulic excavators of the District doing something which was not urgent. I even saw the 
cleaning brigade of the maintenance department cutting the grass along the main canal near the 
village, because a senior official from Guadalajara was coming to visit the District. So several times 
I urged the water users to go to the District, but nothing. I recall the day that I met Chico and 
another water user of that canal, and I told them they should get together, and really organise a 
working party (faena). So that afternoon at the canaleros meeting I got an idea and said to the 
engineer: "do you know that over there the water users have taken photographs of the silted canal 
and are planning to send them to the State office in Guadalajara." Haha. I think my invention 
succeeded, because the next day the bastards sent the brigade to clean the canal." [12/4/89] 
This story of a small minor canal (only some 10 water users were involved) had some 
unexpected consequences. Gabriel, the canalero of the neighbouring zone, heard the 
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story and the next day he used it, when faced with complaining farmers in a silted 
lateral canal. He transformed the story of Miguel's canal and told it to the complaining 
farmers as a success story: of a group of farmers who had come together, and who, as 
a group, went to see the head engineer at the District and demanded that their canal be 
cleaned. The next day, the canal got readily cleaned. Gabriel, of course, left out the 
muddy part of the story (the farmers themselves cleaning the canal). So Gabriel told this 
story to his farmers, and urged them to learn from it. Indeed, they grasped the story 
and as a group they went to the District, and surprisingly, they managed to get the 
machine to attend to their canal. When, some days later, Gabriel faced another group 
of water users, from yet another silted canal, he could now use 'his' success story to 
press these farmers to organise as a group and go to the head engineer. So, a small 
event, that was Miguel's invention of the photographs, had considerable effects on a 
wider scale - for a hundred farmers, for the excavator and the cleaning brigade of the 
maintenance department, and also for the engineers. The engineers were really taken 
aback by the photograph story, and even investigated in the concerned village which of 
the farmers had taken the photographs. They had reportedly asked farmers: "who is 
organising this movement" QQuien trae ese movimiento?), thus trying to give it a 
subversive political connotation. 
Both examples show that Miguel solves the canalero's dilemma in a particular way. 
In the case of the incredulous farmers, he involves those who accuse him of giving 
preference to others. In the case of the silted canal, he takes the side of the water users. 
Miguel chooses and thus actively gives direction to the outcome of his work. 
4.5 Different work styles 
Miguel has a particular work style, which is the result of the experiences gained over 
the years. Other canaleros have adopted styles which differ in some respect to Miguel's. 
Although they have different work styles, the canaleros do share a common basis of 
experience. This we can appreciate when considering the canaleros as a group. In this 
section, we will first examine the group, and then we will discuss some differences 
among canaleros. 
The group 
The group of canaleros, as they see it, consists of 9 persons: the 6 canaleros, the two 
aforadores (water gaugers, normally ex-canaleros) and the supervisor (also an ex-
canalero), who acts as a reserve and stands in for any canalero who falls ill. The group 
as such, becomes manifest most clearly when they gather before the District offices 
each afternoon. The rest of the District personnel (over 100 persons) recognise their 
existence as a 'closed' group. This is most marked when labour problems arise. The 
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canaleros then always get 'special treatment' from the head engineers, without the need 
for the presence of the union leader. This again underscores the indispensable position 
the canaleros occupy. The group also manifests itself at the occasional parties the 
District organises. If the canaleros are invited, they often do not show up as a group. 
But when they do attend they stick together, and merely talk among themselves. The 
canaleros also organise their annual party, the cierre de la compuerta (the closure of 
the gate), or also called the acabo (the completion), to which only their direct superiors 
are invited. 
The group has a kind of 'culture' or shared understanding. When a stand has to be 
made, for example, vis-a-vis District policy concerning their wages, they will discuss 
among themselves what to do, and will try to come to a consensus. Also, the work 
situation of the canaleros requires numerous working rules and information, and this 
knowledge is shared to a great extent by all group members. This type of knowledge 
is transferred from the 'older generation' to newcomers. When a new canalero is 
appointed, he (invariably a man) will be initiated by one of the canaleros, and will 
follow this canalero for at least a month. The information may vary from technical rules 
of thumb (e.g. lowering this particular type of shutter-gate 10 roscas or screw-threads, 
leads to a reduction in discharge of 200 litres per second), to rules on how to treat 
farmers and engineers (often specifying certain farmers who are considered itrabqiosos', 
troublesome), to inside information on certain relationships between, for example, the 
head engineer and certain water users, to more covert rules on the group solidarity, 
when one of the canaleros is in trouble (e.g. accused of corruption by a fanner), and 
how to proceed with prudence. One such rule says: if you don't want trouble, never 
accept money from water users, but rather ask it in kind (for example, tyres for 
motorbikes are 'safe' presents). 
Miguel is the eldest of the group, and he says he has been most profoundly 
influenced in his work by Don Angel, who initiated him twenty years ago. Don Angel 
initiated nearly all the existing canaleros. He has now retired, but when one of the 
canaleros is in trouble, he will probably pay a visit to Don Angel, and ask for advice. 
The canaleros see him as their 'father figure' on working matters. So, there are some 
elements of the group culture that is rooted in tradition, or rather, past practice. But, 
in spite of the shared knowledge and shared secrets of the profession, and in spite the 
same working situation, the canaleros vary greatly in the way they give form to their 
work. 
Contrasting Miguel with Gabriel 
I concluded earlier, that stuck in a tough working routine, the canaleros become caught 
and assume responsibility for things that, formally speaking, are beyond their control. 
Some canaleros, however, show more resistance to this than others. Miguel is a good 
example of a committed canalero. If we had analysed the case of Gabriel we would 
have got a different picture: he has experienced so many 'showdowns', and encountered 
so many problems in his work, that he has become cynical. He does not care any more. 
The engineers say that he is 'not a good canalero*. Miguel, in contrast, is considered 
to be 'the best'. 
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In trying to 'explain' this difference in work-interpretation, we have to consider that 
Gabriel has 'only' 6 years experience. Other factors contribute to the fact that Gabriel 
finds himself in an isolated social position. He is rather a stubborn character, and often 
does not participate in social events organised by the canaleros1 group. He is from 
another state, and only a few years ago settled in El Grullo with his wife and 4 
children. They consider themselves outsiders, also because of their protestant religion 
(which in this valley is viewed with a lot of suspicion). Gabriel is even seriously 
considering quitting the job and moving back to the state from where he comes. Miguel, 
on the other hand, is from the valley, has many family ties there, and has built up a 
fairly impressive social network in the village where he lives and is well respected. Last 
year he was asked to become president of the parents organisation of the primary school 
that his youngest son attends. Another difference is in their economic situation. Apart 
from the fact that Miguel owns his own house, he also cultivates some maize each year 
and draws some income from it. In addition, his wife has her own income (buying small 
chickens, fattening them, then slaughtering and preparing them for sale to villagers), 
of which Miguel says that she is earning as much as he is as a canalero, although it 
takes her only a few hours per day to earn it. In contrast, Gabriel rents a house, is not 
involved in agriculture, though he engages in some occasional trade (where he more 
often seems to lose money than earn it) and his wife does not work. In conclusion, 
Miguel is much more embedded in the local situation. This has been important for him 
in developing his attitudes towards work. 
Contrasting Miguel with Luis 
In comparing Miguel and Gabriel, we have been able to come a bit closer to Miguel's 
motivation in his work. Nevertheless, Gabriel probably is the least representative of all 
canaleros, because of his 'outsider' position. Let us contrast Miguel now with the 
canalero that stands closest to him, namely Luis. Of all the canaleros, Miguel considers 
only Luis a real friend. They have worked together now for ten years, and after Miguel, 
Luis has the longest experience. At the same time, they are such very different 
characters. Luis, is considered by nearly everyone (also by Miguel) to be the biggest 
'son-of-a-bitch' (cabrdn) of all the canaleros. Whereas Miguel is the naive do-gooder, 
Luis simply confronts farmers with problems, and solves them autocratically and thus 
brandishes his authority, through bluff, through a feeling of superiority and bluntness. 
The way Luis gives form to routine encounters with farmers differs markedly from 
Miguel's way of doing things. Luis' encounters are more of the one-way type: canalero 
instructs farmer. Another curious aspect of these encounters is that Luis frequently 
makes mention of Engineer Corona, the head of the operation department, referring to 
him by bis first name. (Miguel hardly ever mentions the names of his superiors in 
routine encounters.) Luis is displaying in this way that he is close to the engineer, which 
gives him some extra authority. 
Luis actively stimulates 'gratitude' from farmers by creating (unnecessary) 'water 
scarcity' in bis zone. There are farmers who bring sodas or even alcohol to the field if 
they plan to ask Luis an irrigation turn. Luis has such a thick skin that he never suffers 
sleepless nights thinking about the problems his work style creates in his zone. He has 
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other reasons for sleepless nights since he is engaged in many trades and is always 
involved in various activities as a share-cropper. Furthermore, he is a kind of 'broker', 
putting those who want to rent land in contact with poor ejidatarios who want to share-
crop, putting in touch those needing agricultural labourers (such as Engineer Corona) 
with the landless who need work, and seed companies in search of land with fanners 
who might have it. He thus not only manipulates water, but he also exploits the detailed 
knowledge of plots and farmers which he has acquired during his work. 
The other canaleros are astonished by all the things Luis takes up. It seems 
impossible, but they say "Poor Luis, one day he will end up in the gutter", because Luis 
likes to take risks. In his 'normal' work as a canalero, his working style has created 
conflicts with many, mostly smaller, water users. These conflicts he solves by drawing 
upon his relationship with the head engineer, for which he now provides certain 
services, and on this point Miguel and he part company.8 Miguel, like Luis, also likes 
to work hard. Taking high risks (in economic and social terms) is something that 
Miguel would simply not be able to do. But Miguel admires Luis. He is what Miguel 
will never become: a dynamic character, easy with his superiors, with women, etc. At 
the same time, however, he does not agree with his blunt and reckless working style 
(the lcabr6n' side of him). Miguel is too serious a person for that. 
Miguel 
What, then, are for Miguel the elements that structure his behaviour? One important 
element is that Miguel does not seem to betray bis humble descent. This contrasts 
markedly with Luis (also stemming from a poor family), who has such a grudge against 
the way he was brought up that his goal is to make life better for his children. He 
recently bought a huge modern house, and tends to spoil his children (Miguel is much 
more demanding of his). For Miguel, the agricultural labourers and ejidatarios he meets 
in the field are people like his father or himself, and he believes he should serve them, 
or at least treat them respectfully. "Taking them seriously", he says, 
"sets limits to the way you act in your work. I cannot say that a canalero is bad or good. The water 
user, the farmer, is the one who judges. He is the one you spend time with, with whom you always 
talk. All day you are with him. Not even with your own family do you live the time that you live 
with the water users, day after day. Very simple: they know when you are angry, and when you are 
not. The water users know you perfectly well. To the point that you get sick of it, the bastards!" 
[12/4/89] 
A second element, as I see it, derives from Miguel's religious beliefs. 
"I am a Catholic, but not too much. I go to mass every week. You have certain fears in your 
religion, because you have to have your proprieties, especially about honesty . . . sometimes even with 
yourself. If you are not honest with yourself, then you are worth nothing." [12/4/89] 
A third element is that being a canalero is extremely hard work. And you appreciate, 
therefore, the agricultural labourers and farmers who, like you, take farming seriously, 
and loath all those who do not. 
We now may conclude that Miguel's dedication has to be attributed to bis 
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socialisation and experiences and to the specific position he finds himself in. His high 
work load and awkward position make it difficult for him to detach himself from his 
work. The structuring process we see happening in his work (see for instance the 
elaborate structure of his routine encounters with farmers) takes place through working 
out practical strategies to solve the many problems with which he is continuously 
confronted in the field. His social personality arises from this process of accommodating 
the tasks and pressures he faces. Social practice, then, shapes social personality. 
Miguel has developed a way of dealing with problems that is fairly consistent. We 
have seen how he tries to explain problems to farmers. His attempt to involve them is 
for him a survival strategy. If he did not do that, he would become slowly crushed 
between the meshes of the District and the farmers. This attitude towards farmers has 
succeeded in influencing their attitudes in return. We saw how, on various occasions, 
Miguel urged groups of fanners from one lateral canal to take initiatives which ran 
counter to normal farmer behaviour. Miguel has helped to shape farmer expectations 
and perceptions on what is going on in the irrigation system. 
Proximity and remote control 
Proximity is one of the characteristics of the relationship Miguel has with his work. 
When you ask Miguel general questions, such as, how is it to work in the District, how 
is your zone, is your work difficult, he will look somewhat helpless, and start to say 
something, anything it seems, and stammer. I now know that he would find it difficult 
to say: my zone is like this, and then review all plots, soils, crops, farmers, control 
structures. He lacks the distance to generalise, to summarise. He would not respect the 
variety of answer which would go: my zone is big and complex, as are my work tasks. 
Miguel's stock of situationally specific knowledge inhibits the development of grand 
over-all pictures. He is caught by demanding tasks which immediately plunge him into 
the idiosyncrasy of harsh reality. He does not need such overviews. Engineer Corona, 
the head of the operation department, by contrast, however, is in the position to 
generalise, to compress data, to simplify. Data with which he is able to develop 
strategies, both for the institution and for his own personal projects. He need not be 
bothered with all the peculiarities of implementing water distribution at field level, this 
he effectively delegates to his field personnel. They are his eyes and hands in the field. 
Despite the fact that canaleros consciously filter the information that they channel to the 
District, and this information is only a fraction of all the information they have, it is 
enough for Engineer Corona. 
The only graph hanging on the wall of his office, which serves as an example of the 
compressed data he uses, he daily updates carefully. The graph displays planned and 
actual volumes of irrigation water released at the Tacotan dam. To Corona, the graph 
represents hundreds of actions, decisions and conflicts in one stroke of a pencil. On the 
bases of this graph, Engineer Corona devises appropriate strategies and delegates work 
to canaleros, without having to leave his office. In this nerve centre he gathers 
information, summarises it and prepares the necessary documents for his superiors. He 
interprets them, devises new procedures if necessary, instructs and mobilises people.9 
While the engineer is sitting up there in his office on the first floor, overseeing the 
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arena, the field personnel get their boots muddy, their heads troubled and their nerves 
racked while facing the 'bulls'. Clearly, there is a huge divide separating the engineer 
and his field staff, not only culturally speaking, and regarding education, language etc., 
but also more practically: there is a discontinuity between what the engineer observes 
and how he interprets, and the way the canaleros observe and interpret. They see 
different things and therefore see things differently. Those at the bottom of the 
hierarchy see variety and reality's complexity. What the engineers in their superior 
positions see is that which can be articulated from facts in other realms.1 0 
The canaleros emerge as 'victims' in cases where they have to cover up the personal 
projects of the engineers. They have nevertheless the possibility to counter act. This is 
most clearly shown when Miguel defines an old problem in a completely new way, as 
was the case of the silted canal partly cleaned by the water users themselves. The 
moment Miguel re-interprets the situation and re-defines it according to the farmers' 
perspective, he is able to manipulate that situation, in this case inventing the story of 
the photograph. So, also the humble field personnel devise their own summary 
documents (photographs), instruct people ('when the engineers come, then tell them that 
indeed a photograph was taken and sent to Guadalajara office'), and are able to practise 
some remote control over their superiors, without their knowledge of it. 
4.6 Working at the frontline, a conclusion 
This chapter has shown the important role water guards play in the El Operado 
irrigation system. It is therefore surprising how little attention is given to this position 
in the existing body of irrigation literature. The literature mainly focuses on engineers 
and overseers rather than on field personnel. The only elaborate discussion of the 
position of the water guard I know of is provided by Hofstede and Van Santbrink 
(1979), who discuss the role of the oeloe oeloe, or water distributor, in irrigation 
systems in Indonesia during colonial rule. The oeloe oeloe originally formed part of the 
village council. Through interventions by the colonial power, the oeloe oeloe gradually 
became an employee of the government. The oeloe oeloe emerges as a key 
intermediary, cunningly used by the colonial government in order to extend control over 
irrigation affairs into the tertiary units. The oeloe oeloe in Indonesia must have found 
himself in a similar situation to the canalero in El Operado. They both faced the 
'canalero's dilemma'. 
In the literature treating government managed irrigation systems in Mexico, various 
authors briefly refer to the people called canalero or fontanero (Hunt and Hunt 
1974:143; Finkler 1974:115-16; Finkler 1978:66-69; Mares 1980:476-77; Martinez 
Vazquez 1980: 185-86). All authors suggest that canaleros usually take bribes. Finkler 
stresses that water users have to maintain a good relationship with the canalero, 
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Figure 4.6 The position of the canalero (cf. Grindle 1980:205) 
otherwise they might face water shortages. Many water users consciously 'invest' in this 
relationship. Martinez Vazquez is the only one who states that District engineers 
manipulate canaleros to their own benefit.11 But none of these authors have remarked 
on the productive nature of the canalero's work, which emerges from the evidence 
presented in this chapter. 
People like the canalero are frontline workers, who face three major preoccupations 
(figure 4.6): 1 2 
1. doing their specific tasks properly, 
2. maintaining a working relationship with their employer, the District, 
3. maintaining a working relationship with the water users. 
The canalero's specific work task produces a linkage between water users and the 
government institution. His professional competence forms the middle ground upon 
which this linking is produced. In the foregoing we have paid attention to these three 
aspects. In concentrating on one actor, we saw how these three aspects overlap and are 
interwoven. 
As far as the institutional aspect is concerned, the case of the water guard shows 
how low-ranked field personnel play an important role in scheduling and implementing 
water distribution. The water guard emerges as a key actor who makes the system 
work. It is not, then, as simple as the head of the operation department sees things 
regarding the canalero: "he distributes the water, and we do the rest". Miguel believes 
the canaleros are the movers of everything. Engineers in their offices have only a 
limited view of what actually happens in the field. Canaleros seem to have created their 
own autonomous field of action. Although there have been several administrative re-
organisations in the District over the last 10 years, these changes have had little impact 
on the way in which water guards do their job. Engineers, farmers and field personnel 
alike, expressed the view that the water guards have been the only, constant factor in 
the District. 
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The canalero'% technical competence is directly related to the type of infrastructure 
he has to work with. The typical canal infrastructure makes the position of the canalero 
crucial. As has been set out in chapter 3, the infrastructure of El Operado is 
characterised by the adjustable gates and intakes. It is flexible in so far as it can meet 
varying demands for irrigation water from water users. But it is only a potential 
flexibility: the structures have to be operated properly in order for the system to become 
flexible. What is flexible in El Operado thus is the canalero. 
Their flexibility derives from the fact that they do not strictly conform to the 
organisation chart, and the simple technical guidelines of the District. The organisation 
chart suggests that the canaleros simply follow orders from superiors. In reality, 
canaleros are 'interfacers', linking farmers to the District, connecting the District with 
the sugar refinery, and also, as we have seen, creating linkages among farmers. As far 
as the technical guidelines received from the District engineers are concerned, these are 
far too broad to be operational. Were the canalero rigidly to adhere to these, he would 
face problems with those farmers finding themselves in 'exceptional' situations. Such 
as producing crops on sandy soils, or having flowering maize in urgent need of water, 
or being affected by the 'suspension* of a nearby sugar cane plot. The models used by 
the District are translated into the set of far more complex actions of canaleros, which 
acknowledge the diversity found in the field. Thus, flexibility implies complexity. 
The canalero'% work not only consists of moving gates and checking canals. It also 
involves interaction with numerous people: Farmers, big and small, labourers, engineers 
and colleagues. The canalero, in fact, stands at the centre of a field of forces where the 
rich farmers, peasants and labourers cope with each other, and where local actors and 
an intervening outside agency interact. He stands in the middle of a social dynamic 
which we already came across in chapter 2. It is why the canalero often finds himself 
on the horns of a dilemma of one sort or another. 
We have identified 3 major aspects of the canalero's work, that is: the institutional 
environment, the technical system, and the social dynamics encountered. We concluded 
that this work is complex and difficult. Which factors contribute to the canaleros doing 
their job relatively effectively? 
First of all, the canaleros receive adequate financial remuneration for their work. 
Their nominal salary as field officers of the District is augmented with extra allowances, 
so that the actual amount received is nearly double their salary. This makes the 
canalero's earnings nearly as much as the head of the operation department. Canaleros 
may receive other rewards. There are the social rewards, for example. For Miguel these 
are important. He likes to be respected in his village, and he is. This social reward is 
important for those coming from the region. Four of the six canaleros come from the 
valley. As we have shown, Gabriel comes from another state and does not seek social 
rewards, which in turn affects his dedication to the job. Other rewards are material: 
farmers frequently give presents to canaleros, as a token of gratitude for the received 
services. The most natural present is of course a small share of the harvest. It is 
commonplace for a farmer to say to his canalero: take tomatoes (or whatever) whenever 
you like. Other tokens may be a sack of fertilizer, a tyre for bis motorbike, a bottle of 
liquor, or some present at Christmas. Also, I have observed how farmers sometimes 
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'lend' one of their agricultural labourers for a day or so to work on the plot of their 
canalero. It is also normal to lend him money, without charging interest. This is very 
attractive, as interest rates in 1987-88 reached levels of 15% per month. The canaleros 
are very cautious about accepting these presents (especially money) and try to keep it 
secret. 
Accepting presents leads to favouritism. There is however a strong limitation to 
favouring practices of canaleros vis-a-vis certain water users: when some are favoured, 
other farmers are likely to be affected negatively, and the latter will show their anger, 
and may complain to the head engineer. Favouritism on the part of the canalero 
increases considerably the tensions he will encounter in his work. Some canaleros cope 
more easily with such tensions than others, and some canaleros find it less difficult to 
use their position to their own profit than others.1 3 Farmers are keen to keep such 
practices within certain limits. 
The fact that all canaleros are 'small boys', and have not received higher education, 
makes them observe a natural distance towards the engineers, and the District in 
general. The experiences with their superiors is such that this distance is reinforced. 
(The exception to this rule is Luis.) I think this affects their work performance 
positively. They keep to the middleground between farmers and the District, and 
therefore they are socially acceptable to farmers. 
A final factor is, that the canaleros have created a group culture, with certain norms 
and values. Don Angel, among the first canaleros after El Operado's construction, has 
been very important in shaping these values. Now retired, Don Angel is the father 
figure in the back stage, whom the canaleros consult when facing really big problems. 
This group culture has been reproduced over the years and it serves to transmit 
experiences and technical skills. It also provides the canaleros some values concerning 
work ethics: how to treat superiors, farmers, and each other. 
These factors are locally specific. In other irrigation systems in Mexico canaleros 
are likely to perform differently. In other countries this may differ even more. 
However, we can learn from this chapter that field staff are potentially able to 
contribute substantially to the performance of irrigation systems, if adequate conditions 
are created and if they are given real responsibilities. 
We found that a flexible canal infrastructure (every structure movable) does not 
necessarily mean that operating it becomes too complex. It may be that the engineers 
who designed El Operado in the 1950s never realised what a burden the design would 
put on field staff. They may also have assumed a certain way of operating it which is 
quite different from the way it is now operated. Unfortunately we do not know. What 
we do know is that the canaleros have been able to make the infrastructure work. This 
finding suggests that the physical design is not so determining of its subsequent 
operation as is often assumed. I do not here want to suggest that the specific technical 
form of El Operado does not influence the way water is distributed, it clearly does. This 
actor-centred account of the practices of canaleros, however, has shown how the actor 
has internalised the physical properties of the system. 
We can also learn from the canalero's story that lower level field personnel in 
irrigation systems managed by a government agency are more than simply employees, 
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or subordinates. They are also implementors, consciously shaping broad guidelines into 
specific forms, and thereby producing water distribution. In some instances they even 
appear as organisers, stimulating farmers to join forces and take initiatives. 
Chapter 5 
Cleaning canals and making up our minds; 
managing maintenance and farmer response 
The maintenance of an irrigation system's canals normally involves a substantial number 
of resources (in labour and/or money).' These costs can be regarded as an investment: 
a (small) part of the overall profits in irrigated agriculture is re-invested in the canal 
system in order to ensure that in the next season similar gains can be realised. In 
contrast to water distribution which is directly productive and oriented to short term 
goals, canal maintenance (and improvement works) involves the reproduction of the 
system, and thus has a longer term perspective, although the removal of silt from the 
canals has immediate gains. Analysing practices associated with canal maintenance can 
thus provide valuable insights into the long-term viability of an irrigation system, and 
may reveal both the strengths and weaknesses of a system's management. It is therefore 
surprising that in much of the literature on irrigation management, canal maintenance 
receives only secondary attention.2 Canal maintenance has a direct bearing on a 
system's organisation and especially on cooperation among water users since it requires 
the mobilisation of resources. Water distribution often results in petty conflicts among 
water users along the same canal, but the need for cleaning a canal, on the other hand, 
brings people together in cooperation.3 When compared to the analysis of water 
distribution, analysing canal maintenance may reveal another level to the relationships 
between the different groups involved.4 
In the case of El Operado focusing on canal maintenance is highly relevant, since 
during the months of September, October and November this is by far the hottest issue, 
recognised as such by virtually all the water users and most of the irrigation officials 
at the District.3 This chapter provides a 'triptych' of canal maintenance. It first 
analyses farmer initiatives in the field, concentrating on one canal (sublateral 1 of lateral 
5, see also chapter 4). Section 5.2 focuses on how the maintenance department of the 
District manages canal maintenance, and in section 5.3 we return to the farmers and 
examine further initiatives taken by them in lateral 5. 
The silted canals 
As has been pointed out briefly in chapter 3, during the months of September to 
November the Ayuquila river may still carry a good deal of aguas broncos ('wild 
waters'). This silt laden water is brown in colour. Water users of El Operado 
(especially those with sandy soils, or growing maize or sugar cane) use the aguas 
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broncos in the first dry months to give their crops supplementary irrigation. The silt 
from this water not only enters the main system, but also the minor canals and fields. 
While the silt on the fields may be beneficial, in the canals it causes problems. The silt 
decreases the discharge capacity of the canals. Aquatic plants attach their roots to the 
silt and these aquatic plants further decrease the velocity of water flow and more silt is 
deposited. 
The maintenance department of the District is in charge of removing the silt in all 
canals above field canal level. However, the department only succeeds in cleaning part 
of the canals during the period between August and November. The silted canals thus 
make water distribution difficult. This gives rise to what I prefer to call 'problematic 
situations'. In 1987, the sediments in 5 lateral canals created problems for water 
distribution amongst 300 water users (1,500 ha). The water users managed to solve 
these problems, however, in different ways. An unknown number of other canals were 
also silted up in that year. In autumn 1988, approximately 700 water users (2,900 ha) 
were confronted with poor water distribution caused by the silting of canals. The canals 
were not cleaned in time by the maintenance department, so there were many initiatives 
and joint actions undertaken by farmers to counter the problems posed. The silted canals 
resulted in many situations where we can actually see these organising processes at 
work. 
Research strategy 
In 1987, several cases of canals in need of maintenance presented themselves (although, 
at that time I was not looking for them). I selected three canals and interviewed more 
than 40 water users with plots along them. In the next year, 1988,1 decided to study 
canal maintenance in more detail. Gathering field data was not always easy; the number 
of events relating to canal maintenance during the period between September and 
November 1987, for example, was huge. It would have been physically impossible to 
cover even all major events.6 Studying canal maintenance presented yet another 
practical problem. From February 1987, I had become engaged with two worlds: that 
of the water users in lateral 5, and that of the operation department of the District. This 
in itself was a risky affair, since my relations with one world could jeopardise my 
credibility in the other. It was when I felt that I had been accepted in both these realities 
(a year later), that I realised research would have to be done on maintenance as well. 
However, by that time I had lost all credit worthiness with the maintenance personnel, 
and felt uneasy each time I visited the office. I had given too much attention to the 
operation department, which apparently had offended the maintenance people. 
As it became obvious that I was not going to be accepted by the maintenance people, 
I had to find someone else. After failing to enrol a Mexican researcher, I asked support 
from my department at Wageningen University. In August 1988, Piet Sijbrandij arrived, 
who undertook a study of the maintenance department. Sijbrandij furthermore identified 
four silted canals which he studied. One of these, the case of lateral 5,1 had previously 
studied the year before and I helped him to follow this up. A considerable part of the 
material presented in this chapter (especially in sections 5.2 and 5.3) was collected by 
Piet Sijbrandij between August 1988 and April 1989 (Sijbrandij 1989b).7 
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5.1 Farmers cleaning their canal 
The rains of 1987 were relatively good in the months of June and July (40% above 
average of the decade). However, half way through August the rains stopped, and in 
September only half of the 10 year average precipitation was recorded. In October it 
did not rain at all, whereas in the previous year October rains had been abundant (180 
mm). In September, 10 plots of maize (52 ha) along sublateral 1, which is fed by lateral 
5 (see figure 4.1, chapter 4), were in trouble. The farmers or the rentistas working the 
plots saw to their awe how the maize had started flowering but that the leaves were 
rolled, indicating water stress. The farmers ask Miguel, their canalero, for an auxiliary 
irrigation with aguas broncos. They received it, but due to silt in the canal bed, the 
minor canal could hardly carry a flow sufficient to satisfy one irrigation turn, whereas 
all 10 maize growers were equally in need of water. Normally, the canal, which I will 
call here the Limoncito canal, would have a discharge capacity of some 180 Ips or three 
irrigation turns, but now no more than some 40 to 50 lps entered, hardly enough for 
one. 
Cleaning the canal 
On September 17, 1987, Dionicio was struggling to finish the irrigation turn for the plot 
he rented and had planted with maize. In the mean time, Abraham, who also has a 
maize crop, had started to irrigate with the little water remaining. But the water did not 
flow properly in the sandy playa soils which so much characterise the potrero of El 
Limoncito, situated alongside the river. They certainly wanted to complete their turn 
quickly: they did not want trouble with their companeros, who were looking on with 
envy and some with annoyance. Some words had already been exchanged. But Abraham 
and Dionicio wanted also to save their harvest: when flowering is hampered the corn 
cobs (plotes) will not fully fill with seeds, severely reducing the yields. 
At 8:30 am, Miguel (the water guard, see chapter 4) arrived at the inlet of the 
Limoncito canal, which is part of his daily routine. Chico, who cultivates part of his 
father's 9.5 hectare land with maize, sat near the intake structure. The first part of the 
conversation which ensued was highly predictable, and wholly determined by both the 
actors' formal roles. Chico obviously asked Miguel for irrigation water, as he had done 
5 days earlier. Miguel told him the canal could not take more than one irrigation turn, 
that he had to wait another four or five days since Dionicio still had not completed his 
turn, and that Abraham had started only the previous afternoon. "Wait until Abraham 
finishes", Miguel concluded. In fact, nothing really came from this conversation: both 
knew the outcome beforehand. They simply played the game as expected. Both Miguel 
and Chico acknowledged that what happened next was surprising. It was because Chico 
was desperate for water. As he told me: "It was a Thursday. Miguel had promised to 
give me water on Monday. I waited and waited. Then this Thursday arrived, and still 
he did not give me water. I was angry." 
Then, spontaneously, Miguel and Chico together lifted the gate in the feeder canal, 
and cut off the water to the Limoncito canal.8 Chico then immediately plunged into the 
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silted canal and started cleaning. Soon, seven other water users and two labourers had 
joined him. They now formed a work party or faena. The ten men worked for some 
four hours, removing silt from the canal bed with spades, until the worst part had been 
cleaned. 
Some days later, I met Don Alonso, Chico's father, who is considered the jefe de 
potrero of El Limoncito. He told me they had taken photographs of the work party and 
told Miguel that they would complain to Guadalajara about the District.9 A few days 
after the canal cleaning, the maintenance department sent the slashers' brigade (brigada 
de macheteo) but they only cut the weeds that grew along the canal banks. The water 
users had cleaned only about 200 metres, so problems persisted. Forty days later the 
brigade came again and then they really removed the mud with spades. Arturo, an old 
ejidatario who had rented part of his land to Dionicio and who dedicated most of his 
time to his enormous herd of cattle, watched the brigade: 
"I was so amazed. One day I was in the potrero, and suddenly there were these guys from the 
District, starting to cut weeds along the canal bank. I thought: so that must be it. But then they 
entered the canal, and really, they were standing with their feet in the water!" 
The Limoncito canal 
To put the spontaneous work party of cultivators in perspective, I first give the 
comments of two cultivators who did not participate in it. Salome\ working on his 
mother's sugar cane plot (#9, see figure 5.1), cynically commented: "They were 
cleaning the canals, but at the same time, over there nearby, the machine [the hydraulic 
excavator of the maintenance department] was working, making money from some 
private landowner." And Patricio, who rented plot #6 and grew maize, told me: 
"The people of the District live off one. They sit there comfortably in their offices, while we sweat 
it out (nos chingamos) in the field. Each year the water fee goes up. I didn't cooperate because I am 
fed up with cooperating. To be the labourer (mozo) of the Secretaria [District], while they fill their 
pockets. Never!" 
No doubt those who did participate in the cleaning party hold a similar view of the 
District, but it did not stop them taking action. Who were the participants? But first, let 
me discuss the Limoncito canal and its plots, before I introduce the users. 
The Limoncito canal serves 85 hectares of land, owned by 10 ejidatarios. Nine are 
from one ejido, Mezquitah, and the plot at the tail of the canal (#10) belongs to the 
ejido Chacaltepec. Two ejidatarios cultivate the plots themselves and two others work 
part of their land and rent out the rest. The remaining plots are taken care of by non-
ejidatarios: some are the sons of ejidatarios, others rent the land or share-crop it. In 
total, 14 people are involved in cultivating the 85 hectares, of which 46 are under 
maize, 35 under sugar cane and 4 are planted with green tomatoes (tomate de cdscard). 
Irrigation water enters the intake through an orifice, but will only do so if the water 
level in the on-going feeder canal is sufficiently backed up. After some 250 metres, a 
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Figure 5.1 El Limoncito canal with its fields 
small field canal branches off the Limoncito canal. This is an old canal, constructed by 
the farmers in the 1960s with bricks and is called 'La Calzada' (figure 5.1). After the 
Calzada canal, the Limoncito canal continues and serves the other fields. This canal was 
constructed of concrete in 1982, under the rehabilitation project. It looks perfectly 
alright, but the topographical surveyors probably made an error, because the first 500 
metres of the canal has, in fact, a counter gradient; the canal bed slopes upwards instead 
of down. As one water user explained: 
"When you open the intake of the Limoncito canal, the water does indeed enter the canal, but soon 
it is as if it returns. The water in the first stretch is dead, and the silt that the water carries with it, 
settles (se asienta). This is why the canal does not have sufficient capacity (gasto)." 
So, nearly every year the canal becomes badly silted up. In former years, Los Leon's, 
the Autlah based tomato company, had grown about 40 ha of export tomatoes along this 
canal (renting various adjoining plots for several years), and they had kept it clean. 
Three years ago, Benito, owning plot #10 at the tail, had cleaned quite a stretch of the 
canal himself. 
Table 5.1 sums up the plots served by the Limoncito canal, its water users (both 
owners and cultivators) and who joined the cleaning party. All six persons who with the 
help of four workers cleaned the canal, cultivated maize, and had not yet completed 
their first irrigation turn. Obviously, those with maize in flower were most interested 
in cleaning the canal. But the fact that all those who participated in the cleaning lived 
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Table 5.1 The water users (landowners and cultivators) of El Limoncito 
land owner 
plot area crop name village 
(no.) (ha) 
1 1.2 s. cane Alejandro Mezquit. 
2a 4.0 tomato Arturo Chacal. 
2b 7.0 maize Arturo Chacal. 
3a 4.0 s. cane Alfredo Chacal. 
3b 4.0 s. cane Alfredo Chacal. 
3c 2 .2 maize Alfredo Chacal. 
4a 6 .2 maize Antonia Grullo 
4b 4 .0 maize Antonia Grullo 
5a 3 .0 maize Alonso Chacal. 
5b 6.5 maize Alonso Chacal. 
6 9.4 maize Alberta Autlân 
7a 5.4 s. cane Adam Chacal. 
7b 1.8 maize Adam Chacal. 
8 4.0 maize Abraham Chacal. 
9 15.0 s. cane Arcadia Grullo 
10a 5 .0 s. cane Benito Ayuq. 
10b 2.0 maize Benito Ayuq. 
Source: own field data 
cultivator 
name village relation participated 
with owner in faenal 
Carlos Chacal. - no 
Dionicio Chacal. - yes 
Pedro Chacal. son no 
Alfredo Chacal. = no 
Felipe Grullo - no 
Dionicio Chacal. compadre yes 
Hector Chacal. - yes 
Leandro Chacal. brother yes 
Chico Chacal. son yes 
Nacho Chacal. son yes 
Patricio Chacal. - no 
Quetzal Chacal. 'grandson' no 
Quetzal Chacal. 'grandson' no 
Abraham Chacal. = yes 
Salome1 Grullo son no 
Benito Ayuq. = no 
Benito Ayuq. = no 
in nearby El Chacalito, shows that the aspect of neighbourhood was also important. This 
is not surprising: the cleaning action was an ad hoc affair, and only those nearby could 
get information about it. Benito (growing maize, not having irrigated) for example, 
might have been interested in participating but lives in Ayuquila (some 4 km. from El 
Limoncito). 
The issue I want to explore further in this section is how the people involved got 
mobilised. First I will consider the types of relationships that water users of the 
Limoncito canal maintain among each other; then how the cleaning party came into 
being. 
The canal community 
Importantly, in El Limoncito, kin ties are intertwined with ownership of adjoining plots: 
of the 9 ejidatarios of Mezquitah (plots #1 to #9), five are related to each other by kin 
ties. Two others have ties with this group through marriage (they married before the 
ejido was founded in 1934). These 7 ejidatarios form a family group centred around 
Don Arturo Zapata. The overlap between landholding and kinship along this canal is the 
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result of a feud within the ejido of Mezquitan, which took place two years after its 
foundation, between the leaders of two factions: Carlos Villa, heading the Villa faction, 
and Don Arturo Zapata, heading the faction consisting of Zapata and Paz kin and their 
in-laws. Eight persons died in the fight (matanza) that ensued. After this, Don Arturo 
decided to leave Mezquitan, and took the Zapata and Paz families and settled in 
Chacalito (some 4 km. away). The ejidatarios of Mezquitan then decided to exchange 
plots of lands, and all but one owner of plots in the El Limoncito potrero, situated near 
Chacalito, swopped their lands with the Zapata and Paz ejidatarios. Of the 14 persons 
now working the lands in El Limoncito, 9 are related to either the Zapata or the Paz 
family. Arturo Zapata, the eldest son of Don Arturo, is now considered family head. 
The water users of EI Limoncito (both land owners and cultivators) are knitted to 
each other through a complex network of ties of friendship, kinship, affinity (through 
marriage) and compadrazgo (ritual kinship, co-parenthood). We also see that in 8 of the 
10 plots, farmers and cultivators have some kind of renting or share-crop arrangement, 
showing that there also exist numerous economic relationships. They are closely knit 
neighbours, which appears to have greatly facilitated the emergence of their joint action 
to clean the canal. However, the fact that the Limoncito water users are so tightly knit, 
in some way also constrains them from organising a work party. The story of Chico, 
and how he initiated the work party, helps to explain this apparent paradox. 
The attitude of Chico vis-a-vis the social group 
The water guard and Chico had taken the initiative to clean the canal and thus they 
temporarily cut off the water to the Limoncito canal. Chico risked a conflict with the 
two water users who were irrigating: Dionicio and Abraham. Soon after they cut off the 
water, Dionicio came to him, Chico recalls, "angry with me (bravo conmigo). I told 
him: 'there is no water here, not for me, not for you.'" Creating a conflict with 
Dionicio was tricky for Chico. It could have more consequences than simply a dispute 
among two men, since Dionicio lived next-door to Chico andhad a shop where Chico's 
wife bought all the necessary small stuff for the household. Chico had a running account 
with Dionicio, and he owed him quite a lot of money. In fact, with the proceeds of his 
share of the maize harvest Chico hoped to pay off the debt. But Chico felt he could 
count upon Abraham, the other one irrigating. Chico and Abraham were mates in the 
village football team, had a number of mutual friends and were related through remote 
kin. 1 0 Chico had talked to him the day before the cleaning: 
"I had told Abraham the day before that I was going to cut the water, but he did not believe me. He 
thought it was mere talk (pura pUticd). I knew that he would not get annoyed with me. We are good 
friends and he knew that I needed water and he also needed it. After this, they all helped to clean 
the canal." 
Abraham's reaction to Chico's suggestion is typical, I think. He did not say: 'I agree, 
I will help you'. He simply did not believe that Chico would dare to cut off the water. 
Apparently, you need guts to launch an initiative which will affect the social group of 
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whom you are a part. 
This particular characteristic of social groups in the Autlah-El Grullo valley seems 
to have direct implications for group initiatives, such as canal cleaning. The 
characteristic can be summed up in the following way: it is unlikely that someone will 
launch an idea or initiate a project which is favourable to the community, and should 
it occur, everybody will seek for the private interests it may serve. People taking 
initiatives in community affairs are suspect. In sharp contrast, initiatives taken for 
personal business or enterprise (e.g. an innovation on a private plot, a new crop) are 
followed with interest, and if successful, people will acknowledge them. People tend to 
conform to rather than oppose the current state of affairs, and seem to expect each other 
not to 'stick out' (sobresalir), since why should one presume to be above or different 
from the rest?11 This kind of attitude goes along with two other features which so 
much characterise village life. The first is widespread distrust (desconfianza), which 
exists between almost everyone, be they neighbours, close friends, compadres or even 
close relatives.12 The second is the practice of gossiping, and people talking slander 
(chismeaf), which is a result of people distrusting each other, but which also fuels it. 1 3 
Thus, Chico was inhibited in taking action and cutting off the water by a more 
general, diffuse norm which appears to rule much of ordinary village life. Chico took 
the risk, which says something of the urgency of his need for water. Nevertheless, he 
had given it some thought since he had talked the day before with his friend Abraham. 
Abraham 
Chico counted on Abraham, and was convinced he would cooperate with the cleaning, 
despite the fact that he was irrigating. Abraham takes a special position among the water 
users of El Limoncito. He is widely considered a serious and hard-working bachelor, 
and his maize yields have always been among the highest of the potrero. This year, 
Abraham cultivated plot #8 for the first time as a landowner, though a dispute over the 
ownership of this plot was still going on in the ejido. Arruro, the respected family head, 
had proposed to make Abraham the new ejidatario and all landowners of El Limoncito 
had agreed. But a group in the ejido supported another candidate. With all the water 
users of El Limoncito supporting him, Abraham had to show that he merited the land. 
He cultivated it seriously (that year his maize yield was the highest in the potrero, 8 
tons/ha) and was prepared to help neighbouring ejidatarios. As Abraham tells it "I was 
irrigating. You are right, I had not such urgent problems as the others. But I wanted to 
help the people. It is also because I only recently got my land. We are all friends here." 
The moment Abraham decided to join Chico in cleaning the canal, Dionicio had no 
other option than to join them as well. Thus Abraham's attitude greatly facilitated the 
initiating of the work party, since his cooperation precluded a potential conflict between 
Chico and Dionicio. 
Miguel and Chico 
The interaction between Chico and Miguel, the canalero, was crucial to the canal 
cleaning. Miguel had his own view on the silt problem, as he knew beforehand that the 
maintenance department of the District would be unable or unwilling to clean this canal 
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in the near future. Moreover, he had his own motives for supporting Chico in his 
project (this was shown in the foregoing chapter). Chico wanted to force his fellow 
water users to resolve the problem once and for all, and clean the canal. But to do this, 
he had first to enrol Miguel in his project. He wanted Miguel to share the responsibility. 
Otherwise, the risk he was taking ('sticking his neck out') was far too great. 
Thus when Chico and Miguel had met at the intake and performed the obligatory 
part of their encounter, Chico obviously asked for an irrigation turn. When Miguel said 
he had to wait, Chico proposed to augment the water flow, although he knew only too 
well that this was hardly possible. "I first proposed," Chico claimed, 
"that Miguel should lower the plate of the control structure [in the on-going canal], in order for [the 
water level to rise and] more water to enter our canal. But Miguel did not agree and said that no 
more water could possibly enter the canal, and that Abraham and Dionicio were irrigating with the 
little water that entered. I had wanted to irrigate before Abraham, but Miguel chose to first give the 
turn to him." 
Chico then took action. He provoked the canalero, by lifting the gate somewhat. It was 
a tense moment, in which both actors weighed each other up, ascertaining each other's 
motives. Miguel considered the situation, and suddenly decided to support Chico. 
"Then I walked to the control structure", said Chico, "I turned the wheel slightly and the gate was 
lifted some centimetres only. At first, Miguel disapproved, but while I was turning the wheel he 
shouted [the falling water made a lot of noise]: lift it completely! It was he who lifted the gate 
further. Or rather, we did it between the two of us." 
At this moment, nothing reminds us of their role playing in the first act of their 
encounter. The positions fuse for a moment, and a new situation emerges, which has 
consequences far beyond the small Limoncito canal (see chapter 4). Chico then decides 
to take the consequence of what has happened. He immediately plunges into the canal. 
Found struggling with mud will give him some advantage. How could anyone say he 
is arrogant, when stuck in the mud? 
"I jumped into the canal and started to remove the silt, and then came this Hector and joined me. 
Hector had irrigated before but had not completed his turn when Abraham started irrigating, and no 
water had arrived at his plot. Then, also Dionicio came, angry with me (bravo conmigd). I told him 
'there is no water here, not for me, not for you.' [...] After this, they all helped to clean the canal. 
We were ten. My brother Nacho, Hector with a mozo, Abraham with his brother and his brother-in-
law, Dionicio and his son, and Leandro. Salome' did not help us, but he has sugar cane and therefore 
had no preference for irrigating. At noon we had cleaned the worst parts of the canal, and then we 
started irrigating: first we irrigated Abraham, Dionicio and then me. After some 36 hours, when 
Abraham had finished, Hector started irrigating." 
The intense contact that existed between Chico and Miguel has been broken. The two 
of them have now re-assumed their respective roles. Both worlds detach. But something 
had happened. 
A clean canal: analysing the faena 
The problematic situation which faced a handful of actors, resulted in a joint effort to 
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clean the canal. However, the work party was not a self-evident affair. The faena hung 
in the balance, and depended upon the active decision making, and the weighing of risks 
and benefits, of at least three actors. Gradually, we see as a trigger effect, how one 
move provokes another finally resulting in joint action. Only when different actors (with 
varying motives) are enroled and cooperate, does the faena succeed. If the felt needs 
of the actors had not been so great, the whole project would probably have died an early 
death, since attitudes of people towards each other seem to inhibit such joint efforts. 
The faena is of an emergent character: it had not been entirely planned that way by 
the actors involved, nor had they the same perception of the situation. The consequences 
of their response were not fully envisaged beforehand.14 The group of people engaged 
in the work party could gradually become more strongly organised, should they in the 
future again take up similar activities.15 The group could become the cornerstone of 
a more formally established canal organisation of farmers. Thus, the work party that 
emerged may have a lasting effect. This perspective will be elaborated in section 5.3. 
Surprisingly, the water users of the Limoncito canal hardly made any reference to 
the maintenance department of the District, when I interviewed them about the faena. 
This department is supposed to solve the troubles caused by silted canals, but only two 
on-lookers made any sharp observations about it. It seems that the water users of El 
Limoncito never even considered going to the District to complain. What happened that 
17th of September, was entirely an affair between farmers and fellowmen, where there 
was no place for the District. It was simply ignored. This is an important observation: 
through the work party, El Limoncito cultivators reaffirmed their ultimate ownership 
of the potrero as a whole, including the canal infrastructure. The work-party thus 
appeared a crucial effort at a critical time, of a group of people interacting with each 
other, and acting upon an artefact: the canal. The faena for them was an experience, 
and one which might be remembered, and influence their attitude towards the canal, 
each other, the canalero and the District engineers, and result in a future change of 
practice.16 The Limoncito canal has the potential of becoming a symbol, associated 
with the successful 'domestication' of government property, but also to the work parry 
which effectively bound some villagers together.17 
Other organising patterns around silted canals 
Farmers along other canals in El Operado were also affected by the silt, but unlike the 
Limoncito water users, they were able to get the maintenance department to clean their 
canals. Some of these experiences I will discuss here. 
Lateral 23 was severely silted up in 1987 and 1988. In both years, water users from 
the Las Paredes ejido went several times to complain to the engineers of the District, 
and succeeded in getting the District to do the job. Apparently, the water users of this 
canal easily find their way to institutions, and have fewer problems demanding a right. 
The difference with the Limoncito canal perhaps can be explained in that El Chacalito 
is only a small hamlet in a corner of the valley which hardly benefits from government 
services. Las Paredes lies along the El Grullo-Autlah road, near the sugar cane refinery. 
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It has benefitted from several different government programmes.18 
The case of lateral 23 is also important in another respect. From the analysis of a 
visit to the head of the District, it transpired that those who had gone to him, had been 
on account of four different issues: one related to the silted lateral 23, another 
concerning drainage problems at the tail of this lateral, another about a blockage 
(because of silt) in lateral 14, and about yet another canal, where problems were 
experienced at the tail end. Most of those who had gone were interested in more than 
one issue, since most farmers have plots along more than one canal. What for me 
seemed to be a complex situation was for the water users a daily reality: that of coping 
with a variety of problems emerging simultaneously, and which depended on 
government institutions for their solution. 
The case of lateral 23 shows how water users do not define the problem of a 
severely silted canal in terms of a community responsibility, with all its inhibiting 
connotations, but in this case as a problem for which the maintenance department was 
wholly responsible. They acted accordingly, and apparently it was quite easy for them 
to mobilise visits to the District. The water users of lateral 23 thus were more externally 
oriented than the users of the Limoncito canal who appear to be more inward looking, 
since the latter did not call the maintenance people but defined the silt problem as their 
own personal affair. 
Another case, that of lateral 14, which in September and October 1987 was severely 
silted, shows the importance of leadership. Rodolfo, a water user, is considered leader 
of this potrero. Rodolfo finds it relatively easy to go and talk with District engineers, 
because he has occupied several positions in farmer organisations. He knows most 
District engineers personally. According to Rodolfo, he went 7 times to the District to 
complain. The maintenance department cleaned only a part of the canal after a small 
group of water users had also visited the District. When the worst part of the canal had 
still not been cleaned, Rodolfo first had a stiff talk with the canalero, whom he accused 
of giving preference to upstream water users, and then went for the 8th time to the 
District, demanding the immediate cleaning of the canal from the head of the District. 
The head engineer communicated with his maintenance head, who said that since it was 
a Friday, Rodolfo would have to wait until Monday for the hydraulic excavator to 
arrive. Rodolfo was furious and proposed to pay the operator's salary during the 
weekend. This was accepted, and the problem was thus solved. 
In the case of another canal, a sublateral, one actor was also decisive for the way 
the canal got cleaned. However, the situation was very different here: one big farmer 
virtually owns all the land. This farmer negotiated directly with the head of the 
maintenance department to give the sublateral priority. The farmer paid the salaries, the 
extra hours, and all the fuel and transport costs. For her, it was simply a matter of 
flipping on the radio in her pick-up, tuning to the District's frequency, and calling for 
one of the head engineers. 
Small farmers along a lateral find it much more difficult to solve the silt problem 
in a straight-forward manner. A final example may show this. The last stretch of lateral 
26 serves 15 water users from one ejido. At the end of September severe shortages of 
water began to occur, due to the limited capacity of the silted canal. On September 30, 
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I witnessed a very tough dispute between two fanners. Gabriel, the canalero, urged 
them to organise fellow users and go to the District. They did not do so. Two weeks 
later, Gabriel asked me to talk to the water users and convince them of the need to do 
something. I did, but it appeared that most water users were not on speaking terms with 
each other. At the end of October, four water users finally went to the District. For two 
days labourers of the maintenance department tried to clean the canal by hand, but in 
vain. They found that the canal was too severely invaded by silt and weeds, and 
complained about the working conditions to their superiors. As a result, lateral 26 was 
left as it was. Water users were arguing over the water, and Gabriel feared some of 
them. He insisted during the canaleros meetings of the importance of cleaning lateral 
26. Finally, on November 18, 50 days after problems started to surface, the canal got 
cleaned by a hydraulic excavator from the maintenance department. 
Along many silted canals, no effective solution is found by the water users. They 
complain to their canalero but seem unable to overcome the petty irritations that exist 
among them. It seems that before an initiative can be taken, the attitudes of people vis-
a-vis each other have to change. The pattern characterised by mutual distrust and 'not 
sticking out' has to be broken. 
In cases where farmers find a more effective solution to the maintenance problem, 
we see different organising principles at work: some opt for cleaning; in other cases 
they demand maintenance service; yet others directly negotiate with the District. Groups 
have devised different ways of coping with the situation. They all have in common the 
mobilising of contacts and networks. Such networks enable action to be taken. 
The question arises, however, whether the emerging forms of farmer cooperation 
have a lasting character. In section 5.3 I will analyse incipient farmer organisation in 
the canal known best, lateral 5, and show how joint actions undertaken to solve the 
maintenance problems gradually do take on a lasting character. In the next section the 
maintenance department is examined, and I try to show how it organises its activities. 
5.2 The District managing maintenance 
Field notes ofPiet Sijbrandij (Sijbrandij, 1989b; pp.35-36, 38-39, 40-41, 74-75) 
"September 1988. I contact the operator of one of the two hydraulic excavators. His 
name is Pancho and he invites me to join him. The next morning we leave at 8 o' 
clock. We're not heading far but it takes us more than an hour to arrive at our goal. We 
sit down because we cannot start our work: lack of fuel. We wait for a truck from the 
District to arrive with fuel. They arrive and refuel the Poclain. Then we make a small 
fire and together with the two truck drivers we roast our tortillas and heat our beans. 
While we have our brunch I ask one of the truck drivers how they decide which canal 
to clean. He answers that "this is pure politics". After our brunch we start to clean the 
canal. It had taken us three hours from leaving the District offices, to begin. While 
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Pancho operates the machine I sit on it and watch what is happening. We're cleaning 
a small canal of about ISO meters long full of sand and aquatic plants. After two hours 
work, the mouth of the excavator shatters the concrete lining of the canal. We stop. The 
mouth of the machine is too big to clean the last 30 meters of the canal. 
We sit down in the shade of a tree and Pancho starts filling out a report of the day. 
He explains to me that he has to do this every day and hand it over to the field 
supervisor of the maintenance department. I ask him why we are cleaning this particular 
canal. Pancho tells me that Los Leon's, an Autlah based tomato company, is going to 
grow tomatoes on the plot which it irrigates. Pancho adds: "yes, sometimes I ask the 
same question. Why here?" I notice the motor of the Poclain still running and ask why 
that is. Pancho says that it is because of the tachometer, and we must now make up for 
the time lost waiting for the fuel. We go back to the District offices. We arrive at 3 pm. 
I chat with another operator. He tells me he likes doing double shifts to earn extra 
money. I ask him who pays him for extra shifts. He says this time it is the District who 
is paying him. However, at other times the District lends out the machine to others and 
they pay the operator, fuel and oil. Sometimes he also works during the weekends but 
this hasn't happened for the last two months. Three days later I hear the machine has 
broken down, been repaired and broken down again. The work is taken over by the 
tractor equipped with the small excavator. 
A week later I go to check the situation and meet the group cleaning the canal by 
hand. They tell me the small tractor has also broken down and therefore the work has 
to be done by hand. They don't seem very happy about it. It is 1 o'clock and they stop 
when I arrive. We sit down under a tree and start playing cards. I ask them why they 
stopped. They tell me they work very hard in the early morning to be able to stop when 
it gets too hot to work. I ask them if they are content with their wages. The wages are 
low, only 170,000 pesos a fortnight (US$ 75) and the work is hard and dirty. To sustain 
their families they try to earn money in the afternoons as well. They mention taxi 
driving, bricklaying or selling pork crackling (chicharrdn). 
October 25. At the daily meeting of the water guards, six water users drop by. They 
all demand water. The water guards tell them to wait until the meeting is finished or say 
it is impossible to give an irrigation turn because of the bad condition of the canals. The 
water guards complain to the assistant of the head of the operation department. Five of 
the six water users leave. They are quite disappointed. Only one water user insists. He 
says to the water guard of 'his' zone that he needs the water urgently for his recently 
planted sugar cane which will be lost if he doesn't get water. The assistant explains it 
is impossible because bis lateral is completely silted. The water user argues that the 
District promised to give him water if he cleaned his field canal. The field canal has 
now been cleaned so now he wants his irrigation turn. The assistant again says it is 
impossible because the canal is silted. I ask the irrigation supervisor why there are so 
many problems. He points his finger in the direction of the maintenance department and 
says that the people over there don't work. The atmosphere at the canaleros meetings 
these days is very negative, the water guards are stressed and don't think their problems 
will be solved in the coming weeks. Instead of making their usual jokes they complain 
about their bosses and the maintenance department. 
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October 26. At the office of the maintenance department the senior personnel are 
becoming more and more tense. The number of people passing by with 'torn T-shirts 
and mud on their shoes', i.e. water users, is steadily increasing. Alone, or in groups 
of up to 5, they have to wait in the hall of the department. They look tired, nervous or 
angry. When Engineer Fuentes calls them into his office the doors are closed. It takes 
10 to 30 minutes before the water users come out again. When I try to chat with them 
they walk away or tell me they are not willing to talk. Engineer Fuentes mentions that 
he has never before had such problems in the 8 years that he has worked at the 
department. According to him, the plans are well made but the lack of money makes 
it impossible to keep the machines functioning well. Oscar [the field officer and 2nd in 
charge] confirms this and states they are trying to solve the situation by working in 
double shifts. I talk with Engineer Llamas, the desk officer, who tells me the 
department is faced with problems because of the frequent breakdown of the heavy 
machinery. I ask him how the problems can be solved. He sighs, is silent for a moment 
and states in a somewhat hopeless tone that the only thing they can do is hope for help 
from the water users. 
Half way through November. The problems are decreasing. Most water users have 
had their first irrigation turn. The requests for water are becoming more spread over 
time, the first plots of sugar cane are suspended from irrigation, and more and more 
canals have been cleaned. Daily water demand is decreasing. Less people with 'torn T-
shirts and mud on their shoes' wait to talk with Engineer Fuentes. The crisis is over. 
At the office, two persons are organising photos of the maintenance and stick them into 
an album. The moment I see them doing this I realise that there is always a camera in 
the office of Engineer Fuentes. I become aware of the differences between the offices 
of the maintenance and the operation department. In the former the walls are full of 
technical drawings and tables, whereas the operation department is just bare and shabby. 
This contrasts with my impression that the people of the operation department always 
seem to be busy, and people of the maintenance department are frequently hanging 
about. I enter the office of Engineer Llamas and ask for the working programme of 
1988. He gives me 13 pages and says that is all there is." 
The maintenance department 
The above impressions of the maintenance department's activities show a reality which 
is quite distinct from the reality found in the field, among farmers. And this again 
differs from the formal institutional arrangements which underlie the maintenance 
department's activities. 
Institutional arrangements 
Water users are responsible for maintaining field canals, while the District is responsible 
for the rest of the canal system. Maintenance works are programmed and executed by 
the maintenance department.19 Thus, the main irrigation tasks (water distribution and 
canal maintenance) are separated into two different departments. The water guards, who 
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are important for data collection (for early warning), have no direct communication 
channel with the maintenance department. Nor is the Water Users' Commission, a 
platform where water user representatives of El Operado meet with District engineers, 
effective in establishing a link between water users and the maintenance department. 
(See following chapters.) The maintenance department (64 personnel) has three sections; 
1) 'the workshop' (maquinaria y taller), responsible for the maintenance and repair of 
vehicles and heavy machinery; 
2) 'the desk' (gabinete), responsible for planning, for control, for reporting and for the 
formulation of projects and contracts; 
3) 'the field' (campo), responsible for data collection and the actual execution of the 
maintenance. The 'field' section is again sub-divided into 4 task forces: canal 
maintenance by hand, maintenance of canals, drains and roads by machinery, 
maintenance of structures, and topographical studies. 
The three sections of the department are headed by qualified engineers or 
experienced men of practice. Most of the decisions are made by the head of the 
department (figure 5.2). 
Each year a maintenance plan is formulated on the basis of the foregoing years and 
current field data collected by the field section. For each canal, drain and road the 
quantity of required maintenance is calculated in volume, surface and length, and costs 
for the execution are estimated. To the actual costs of the maintenance programme, the 
overhead costs, i.e. studies, supervision and control, are added. The maintenance plan 
is sent to the Jalisco department of SARH in Guadalajara which checks it, sends it on 
to SARH headquarters in Mexico City, which finally allocates the budget. If this is less 
than requested, a part of the planned maintenance will be postponed to the following 
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Figure 5.2 Organisation chart of the maintenance department. Source: Distrito de 
Desarrollo Rural El Grullo, as presented in Sijbrandij 1989b: 16. 
Cleaning canals 119 
Figure 5.3 Movements of a Poclain hydraulic excavator during September-
November 1987 
year (conservacidn diferida). The budget for the maintenance is supposed to be covered 
by the fees paid by the water users. However, the amount of money collected in fees 
is not necessarily the same as the budget the District makes for operating and 
maintaining El Operado. Of the water fees, approximately 20% is for operation, and 
80% for the maintenance of the system. The fees are collected by the District, which 
immediately transfers them to an account of the ministry of finance which redistributes 
them over the ministries at national level. Thus, the federal SARH ministry exerts a 
strong influence over the ability to execute the required maintenance. 
There is no strict programme for the sequence of when, and which canals, roads and 
drains will be maintained. One criteria seems to be to execute the works per 
geographical area, preventing unnecessary transport of machinery. The other criteria is 
the urgency of the maintenance problem. The head of the maintenance department 
decides, should these two principles clash (which is quite often). This gives rise to crisis 
management. (Figure 5.3 shows how the hydraulic excavator is moved around during 
September-November 1987.) 
Every day, the head engineer meets with his field officer (his right hand) to discuss 
the situation, before deciding which works have priority. Also, he maintains frequent 
contact with the head of the operation department. The field officer manages the actual 
execution of the maintenance task. For routine canal maintenance a group of 11 manual 
workers (the slashers' brigade or brigada de macheteo) and two hydraulic excavators 
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(Poclains) and their operators are available.20 The slashers brigade mainly cleans the 
canal banks and smaller canals while the Poclains are used for the maintenance of the 
mains and laterals. 
Each morning, work instructions are handed out to the slashers brigade and to the 
operators of the machinery. They execute the works and write day reports of the 
advances made. The field officer collects the day reports and accumulates every month 
the progress made on each task, which is handed to the office personnel. The office 
personnel keeps records about progress made on each canal, drain and road. The 
monthly report consists of works executed and money spent. This report is signed by 
the head of the District and sent to SARH in Guadalajara for monitoring purposes. 
Actual execution of the maintenance task 
It is difficult to assess exactly the budget available to the District for maintaining El 
Operado. No precise data on financial management could be obtained. All financial 
transactions of the District with higher authorities are controlled by four District 
officials: the head of the District, heads of the operation and maintenance department 
and the administrator (head of the administration department). The state of affairs with 
the finances of El Operado is highly complex because the financial years of the 
operation department (October-September) and the maintenance department (January-
December) differ. This notwithstanding, farmers pay only one water fee, including 
operation and maintenance components. There seems to be hardly any direct relationship 
between the actual amount paid and the level of the budget of the maintenance 
department. The allocated budget is decided upon in Mexico City.2 1 The figures given 
here are indicative only. 
While for the year 1987 the water fees paid by the farmers covered some 60% of 
the allocated budget, for 1988 the amount it covered had diminished considerably: the 
District did not adjust the fees for the 1988/89 irrigation season, even though Mexico 
had experienced an inflation rate of around 140% in 1987. Consequently, the Mexican 
Table 5.2 Requested maintenance budget and allocated budget for 1987 
maintenance requested budget allocated budget percentage of 
activity (million pesos) (million pesos) of requested 
dams 62.7 1.4 2% 
canals 90.4 43.8 48% 
drains 45.2 33.4 74% 
roads 38.0 28.8 76% 
other 12.1 2.8 23% 
overhead 50.1 50.1 100% 
total 298.5 160.3 53% 
Source: Distrito de Desarrollo Rural El Grullo, as presented by Sijbrandij 1989b:18 
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Table 5.3 Planned and realised canal maintenance for 1988 
clearance of water plants by hand 
by machinery 
by hand 
by machinery 
by hand 
planned 
12 km 
realised 
12 km 
removal of silt 
clearance of canal banks r 
repair of canal banks 
repair and maintenance of structures 
66 
6 
83 
161 
4 
66 
6 
87 
161 
4 
218 pieces 218 pieces 
Source: Distrito de Desarrollo Rural EI Grullo, as presented by Sijbrandij 1989b:19 
government subsidy to the management of El Operado increased from around 40%, to 
over 70% in 1988. The allocated budget for 1989 was four times higher than that of 
1987. However, this increase was entirely offset by the increase in costs, which meant 
that still only half of the required maintenance could be executed. Table 5.2 presents 
the required maintenance works in 1987 as defined by the maintenance department (in 
the second half of 1986), and the budget finally allocated, which covers 53 % of the 
amount requested. Remarkable are the low allocations for the Tacotah dam, and canal 
maintenance and the high budgeted overhead, which is fully covered. Table 5.3 shows 
the relation between planned and realised maintenance of the canals in 1988, according 
to data from the maintenance department. It shows that execution of works strictly 
followed the programme, which is surprising given the crisis situation encountered 
during the months September through November 1988. The data manufactured by the 
maintenance department mask the reality in the field. The department tries to uphold for 
the higher SARH authorities the image of an efficient institution. 
The maintenance department is responsible for 232 km of canals, including main 
canals, laterals and sublaterals (field canals excluded). Of these canals, approximately 
100 km needed to be cleaned during autumn 1988 in order to prevent problems with 
water distribution. The maintenance department cleaned only 19 km during the period 
September-December. The water users cleaned another 23 km, implying that the water 
users executed 55% of canal maintenance, and the District 45%. The water users along 
the remaining 58 km that were not cleaned at all, were confronted with delays in 
receiving their irrigation turns by up to a month or more. Some water users mentioned 
having suffered considerable crop production losses. In total 2,900 ha (involving 685 
water users) were affected by poor water distribution caused by the lack of clean canals. 
This is one third of the total irrigated area. (Sijbrandij 1989b:21-22) 
The maintenance department faces four major constraints against performing its task 
properly. The first is a severely restricted financial budget. The final allocation of 
money is beyond the control of the District, so that the maintenance department has to 
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try to comply with, its task within the financial framework defined by higher authorities. 
In 1987 only 53% of the required amount was allocated. In 1988 the situation was 
worse. Secondly, the maintenance department seems unable to increase its execution 
capacity during the critical period between August and October. This has also to do with 
the tight bureaucratic rules which the department has to follow with respect to the 
purchase of spare parts. A third major constraint is inherent to the organisational set-up 
within which the department functions: responsibilities over operation and maintenance 
are separated into two different departments. Lack of performance by the maintenance 
department has little repercussion on the department itself, but it does affect the 
operation department. Both departments function independently to perform their tasks, 
and have developed different work styles, and set differing priorities. A fourth 
constraint is the lack of accountability of the maintenance department to its clients, i.e. 
the water users. Farmers cannot let their opinions be known to the maintenance 
department other than through complaining on an ad hoc basis. No formal contact is 
established to ensure that the maintenance department is confronted by its own good or 
bad performance.22 As we have seen, the canaleros play an important role in voicing 
the problems farmers face with maintenance. 
The above situation results in the maintenance department being quite autonomous. 
It appears to follow its own logic, as exemplified by the field notes with which this 
section opened. There is little place for fanners in the maintenance department. 
Alongside the maintenance department's domain, there is the fanner's domain. Among 
fanners there seems little place for the maintenance department. 
The head engineer 
If we want to understand how the maintenance department's domain is produced and re-
created, we have to consider that the department is autocratically managed by its head, 
Engineer Fuentes. The way in which this engineer operates, highly influences the 
department's internal dynamics. I want to analyse here the position of this engineer and 
his actions, by describing some of the relationships he maintains in his work. I start 
with how he treats farmers, then how he relates to his fellow engineers. A next 
important factor is the position he takes within the wider SARH institution. Finally, I 
will briefly describe how he relates to some trusted employees in his department, and 
how he treats other subordinates. 
How Engineer Fuentes approaches farmers 
Let us start with how Engineer Fuentes approaches farmers who come to pay him a visit 
in the office. Piet Sijbrandij discussed the matter with Fuentes. 
I ask Engineer Fuentes how he reacts if water users come to talk with him. He tells me they sit down 
in the hall of the maintenance department. He lets them wait, in the meantime observing them, which 
is possible because the door of his room is open. When he calls them in he already knows how to 
treat them. First he lets them have their say. "I say to them, "The truth is here. I don't have personal 
interests. Do you have other alternatives?' I say it as a tactic, to put them in my place. I give them 
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the feeling they can make their point, that they participate in making the analysis of the problems and 
the alternatives. But the solution is already decided. Clearly!" According to him the water users only 
think about their own plot. He is able to have an overview of the whole situation, they can't. He 
explains to them the situation and together they check the alternatives. Alternative after alternative 
appears unsuitable. In this way only the planned solution remains. It has to be so because it has been 
decided already the day before together with Engineer Corona of the operation department. I ask him 
if the water users are angry when they come. Fuentes tells me they are sometimes very aggressive: 
"We are a public service but they should treat us with respect. We are the authority. But it is better 
to solve it by convincing them than by imposing the solution." (Sijbrandij, 1989b:75-76) 
His way of approaching water users suggests that he does not seem concerned that those 
who come to his office are often desperate. He leaves little space for them to influence 
his policy. 
The bosses 
In discussions on power relations within the District, various people (lower District 
personnel) used the word 'triangulacidri' to explain to me where the locus of power is 
concentrated: in the triangular relationship between the head of the District, the head 
of the operation department and the head of maintenance.23 The basis of this 
relationship seems to be that if the head of the District puts a demand on department 
heads, they comply whenever feasible. In return the chief engineer leaves them free to 
organise their own affairs, with only one restriction: that they do not create problems 
for him. In practice this means: ensure that reports to the higher authorities leave no 
room for question. These three engineers thus have some pact of convenience, and back 
each other. They form the back-bone of the District. Engineer Fuentes puts it this way: 
"Take for example the situation of Lopez Garcia [head of the District] giving me the order to clean 
a specific canal. Lopez Garcia gives this order to help some friends whose support he needs. 
Sometimes, I will try to explain that it is impossible, and I may succeed in convincing him. But often 
I do not. Then I have no choice, Lopez Garcia after all is my boss." (Sijbrandij 1989b:41-42) 
Apart from such specific orders, Engineer Fuentes has his own discretionary power to 
decide on which canals to clean, and which water users to please. The relationship 
between both department heads (Corona and Fuentes) is that of two equals, which is 
reflected in their being compadres. 
From what I have seen of these three engineers interacting, their relationships do not 
appear to have any affective content. The triangle seems to be entirely functional, and 
I tend to believe that they may even harbour aversion for each other. The functionality 
of the relationship makes checks necessary: the one has to know for sure that the others 
are not breaching the pact of convenience. This is clear in the relationship that Corona 
and Fuentes maintain. Their working relationship is not entirely balanced: if Engineer 
Corona fails to perform his task (adequate water distribution), this does not affect 
Engineer Fuentes in any way, but the failure of Fuentes to comply with his job (keeping 
the canals clean) does affect Corona's ability to comply with water distribution. So, in 
critical situations such as the autumn period, Corona uses one of his faithfuls (the 
irrigation supervisor)24 to check on the work performance of the maintenance 
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department, and to provide him with information. Fuentes knows this, and this is itself 
enough to ensure some minimum activity by the maintenance personnel. The head of 
the District also has a check system, which is very simple: when severe problems with 
water distribution or canal maintenance occur, acquainted and unacquainted farmers may 
come to his office and complain. Neither Fuentes nor Corona can prevent this from 
happening. Moreover, the District head has to counter-sign all the reports the 
departments elaborate and send to Guadalajara, which provide a further check on both 
departments heads. 
Department head within the institution 
Being a department head of an irrigation District implies a position of power. But what 
degree of freedom does Fuentes really have? The head of a department in the District 
not only has to report to the District head, but is also accountable to his superior in the 
homologous or 'mother' department of the SARH office at state level (here the 
Guadalajara delegacidn). It is common knowledge that the maintenance department, 
which manages a relatively large budget (nearly half of the entire budget of the 
District), is tightly bound to its 'mother' department at state level. Or to be more 
precise, the engineer heading the maintenance department is bound to his superior at the 
mother department. Engineer Fuentes is granted some latitude by his superior at state 
level only if he commits himself to him. 2 5 Without having committed himself to this 
superior, Fuentes would never have got the position, because the line superiors in 
Guadalajara finally appoint department heads, not the District head in El Grullo.2 6 
The connections with officials of the 'mother' department at higher levels (state and 
federal level) gives the head of the maintenance department within the District some 
degree of freedom vis-a-vis the District head. This also makes it plausible that in the 
same District, differing working styles and dynamics in the departments are found, and 
can persist. Given this context, it is very difficult to assess the exact room for decision-
making a head of the maintenance department really has, and the present research has 
not been able to explore this in any detail. The above seems to indicate that Fuentes is 
often forced to make certain decisions because of guidelines given by either the District 
head or a distant superior.27 
The unconditional of Engineer Fuentes 
Within his department, Engineer Fuentes has established a strong bond with his field 
officer, Oscar. Oscar himself observed: "I am Engineer Fuentes' eyes in the field, the 
connection between the people in the field and the department. We discuss the situation, 
but Engineer Fuentes takes the decisions and gives the orders. Apart from him no one 
else gives me orders." (Sijbrandij 1989b:49) Oscar seems to follow Fuentes 
unconditionally. He owes his present position entirely to him, and Fuentes also 
frequently takes Oscar with him during his weekend missions as a private consultant, 
making topographical surveys. 
Under the former head of the maintenance department, Oscar was the desk-officer 
and Engineer Llamas the field officer, who was then the head's right hand. When 
Fuentes took over, he promoted Oscar to right hand man, and demoted Llamas to desk-
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officer. The field officer is crucial to the maintenance department head since he is the 
person controlling activities in the field. He processes the day reports and presents the 
data to the desk officer. The field officer is therefore able to cover up any activity 
which is not in accordance with the programmes and thus should not show up in the 
reports or bookkeeping sent to the state level SARH in Guadalajara. This post is 
therefore given by the head of the maintenance department to a trusted person. Having 
Oscar tied to him, Fuentes can control what is happening in the field, including all 
parallel activities that his department undertakes (the machinery is a scarce resource) 
and which generate profits. Obviously, the relationship between Llamas and Oscar is 
strained, and this serves Engineer Fuentes well: it effectively checks side activities that 
either one of them might undertake without his knowledge. Both officers are aware that 
their positions might weaken if Fuentes should be transferred and a new head appointed. 
Both have a common interest in supporting Fuentes. 
The rank and file 
Engineer Fuentes depends on his lower level personnel for the performance of his 
department. These rank and file officials take a subservient pose towards him, quite 
unlike the field personnel of the operation department towards their boss. This reflects 
the authoritarian manner in which Fuentes tends to treat them. He is intelligent enough, 
however, to leave them some spoils. Fuentes gives the example of the slashers' brigade: 
"They are willing to work, they come in the afternoons, on festivity days and even 
during the weekends to help me with the construction and modification of my house. 
In this way they have a double salary." (Sijbrandij 1989b:43) The manual work 
personnel seem pleased with this arrangement, and are loyal to their boss. Also most 
operators of the hydraulic excavators seem to blindly follow orders. Some, however, 
did fall out of line. They were subsequently transferred to other Districts. 
Conclusion 
The maintenance department controls access to a scarce resource: heavy machinery. 
This machinery can be used in different ways. Groups of farmers have been able to 
influence when and where the excavators will work, but they are not able to effectively 
control the way the machinery is used. The type of resource involved, the way in which 
the department head is bound to superiors, and the way he has organised his 
department, enables him to control entirely the use of these machines. The operation 
department also controls a scarce resource: water. However, the operation department's 
head does not have complete control over this resource for several reasons: one is that 
water is difficult to control, store and put into use when and where one desires. A 
second is mat the canaleros have a more appropriate knowledge on how to distribute 
the water than the department head. Another reason is that water flows are easily 
detected by farmers, and since they perceive water more than machines as a public 
good, they do not easily accept misallocation. Water and machines thus give rise to two 
quite differing organising principles found in the operation and maintenance 
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departments. 
The way farmers perceive the problems related to a maintenance service differs 
widely from how the personnel of the maintenance department see them. For the 
fanners, silted canals imply water shortage, wilting maize, arguments among fellow 
users, complaints to the canalero and finally mobilising networks to go to the District 
to demand a proper maintenance service or to organise work parties to remove the mud 
themselves. The maintenance department sees the silted canal as a problem which is 
difficult to solve within the existing institutional environment (the officially allocated 
budget is not enough, spare-parts of broken down machines are not readily available; 
workers unwilling to perform the filthy job by hand, etc.). But it appears that the head 
of the maintenance department is not really willing to solve the problem. The cunning 
way in which the machinery and the personnel of the department are used for private 
projects contrasts with the apparently insurmountable institutional obstacles when regular 
works have to be performed. The rewards for the first type of activity appears to 
outweigh the costs of the latter. 
The way the head of the maintenance department behaves seems to be a good fit 
with the organisational structure in which he functions. He plays an obedient 
subordinate role towards his superior, the head of the District. In return, he is given 
relatively high discretionary power to pursue both his formal task and private projects. 
He pursues a parallel strategy with his superiors at the hydraulic resources department 
in Guadalajara. He tries to solve all emerging problems at his own level and to uphold 
the image of an able engineer running an efficient department. In this he partly 
succeeds: the impression the higher SARH authorities have of this department derives 
from the reports he sends them, and these reports mask any problem or conflict 
situation which, as we have seen, were many in autumn 1987 and 1988.2 8 The many 
irritations that existed among water users and also among District personnel (especially 
the water guards) over the lack of canal maintenance had few repercussions for 
Engineer Fuentes. This can be partly explained by the attitude of the head of the 
operation department, Engineer Corona: he systematically avoided confrontations with 
Engineer Fuentes. Although Corona exerted pressure to ensure some bottom-line activity 
from the maintenance department, he had little interest in creating a row. First, the 
silted canals effectively reduced the volume of irrigation water used, and a reduction of 
water use at the beginning of the season would help to forestall an impending water 
shortage towards May and June. 2 9 Second, openly challenging his colleague and 
compadre would imply a breach in the pact of convenience to which they both were 
held. To be undisciplined is considered in 'political' Mexico as unacceptable, if not the 
worst crime possible. 
The discontent among farmers could be partly dissipated through the initiatives they 
took themselves. Actions taken by some water guards, together with some water users, 
created some uneasiness at the District's top, but seem to have had little lasting effect. 
The hermetical structure of the department proved to be sufficient to preclude a serious 
threat from outside. The question which arises is: if the maintenance department simply 
continued with the same practices, did the farmers follow up any of the joint actions 
they had taken? It is time to return to the field, in particular to lateral 5. 
Cleaning canals 127 
radial gate 
« right main canal 
intake 
pequena 
propiedad 
llano canal 
ejido 
tree* 
ejido 
pequena propiedad 
lateral 5 
limoncito canal 
ejido Mezquitan 
Chacaltepee 
El Grullo 
zona federal 
V 
V 
V 
« rfo ayuquila 
Figure 5.4 Lateral 5, its canals and the ejido lands served. 
5.3 An emerging canal organisation 
Apart from problems caused by the silt, lateral 5 has another pressing problem: its 
intake is too small. (See chapter 4, for the canalero's point of view on this problem.) 
The canalero had informed the operation department various times of the problem over 
a period of three years. It was up to the maintenance department to enlarge the intake, 
since the" department is also responsible for improvement (amelioracidn) of the 
infrastructure. Nothing happened. As was shown in chapter 4, water shortage resulting 
from the small intake created conflicts among water users, and finally Miguel (die 
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canalero) succeeded in convincing some water users of the exact cause of the problem. 
From that moment (during August-October 1988) things began to move. Miguel 
summarises the story: 
"Let us see what happened in the area of canal lateral 5. They had this problem of the small intake 
. . . I also had problems there. There was never enough water. What did the water users do? They 
assembled. They went to the District: Sirs, are you going to clean our canal? Errr, no. And repair 
the road? No . And the intake? No . Go to hell! So they went to the sugar cane organisation who lent 
them the money. They constructed a new intake, cleaned the canal, repaired the road. The problems 
were solved. In how many days? In two weeks!" 
This is a case of water users along one canal decisively taking action, not only cleaning 
their canal, but also improving it through the investment of a considerable amount of 
money. The undertaking suggests that these water users had a longer term perspective, 
and planned their project quite well. Is this the response of farmers to a failing 
maintenance department, of farmers along one canal strengthening their informal 
cooperation which gradually develops into a coherent canal organisation? This section 
tackles this question. 
Lateral 5 supplies water not only to the Limoncito canal, which irrigates 85 ha 
belonging to 9 ejidatarios from Mezquitan, and one from Chacaltepec. Lateral 5 also 
feeds the Llano canal, feeding approximately 90 ha belonging to 23 ejidatarios from 
Chacaltepec and El Grullo, and 130 ha upstream of these sublaterals belonging to a 
group of private landowners (pequeflos propietarios). The on-going lateral serves other 
ejidatarios from El Grullo and Chacaltepec (120 ha). At its very tail, the lateral irrigates 
30 ha of privately owned land (pequefla propiedad), and a small area near the river 
denominated a federal zone (zona federal).'** (Figure 5.4.) 
The Llano canal organisation 
The first section of this chapter indicated that water users of the Limoncito canal 
conceptualised themselves as a group, despite the petty conflicts and small irritations 
that crop up in every day life. This was important to understanding the work party these 
water users were able to organise to clean their canal. Water users along the Llano 
canal also seem to define themselves as a group with some common interests. In 1985, 
they also cleaned their canal, since the District did not show up to do it. Some 25 
people (nearly all water users and some mozos) from both ejidos (Chacaltepec and El 
Grullo) participated when one farmer, Enrique Negro, called for the faena, and in 6 
hours the job was done. This is a first indication that also in the Llano canal some 
farmer organisation is present. A second indication is given by the field canals, which 
are well-kept and which have been reconstructed in concrete by the water users 
themselves. In March 1988, I talked with Enrique Negro about their canal. I 
commended him on the nice field canals on his land, and said I had heard that they 
cleaned their canals themselves some years ago. He responded: 
Cleaning canals 129 
"We have an organisation here. Look, the fines o f the District are useless. They are 2,000 or 5,000 
pesos [1-2 US dollars]. So , you're better off robbing water and paying the fine! We have decided 
here among eftdatarios to fix our own fines: 20,000 for the first infringement, 50,000 for the second. 
For the third: suspension of irrigation. And the people respect this!" I asked where the water users 
have their meetings, and he replied, "Over there, under the tree." 
Enrique Negro is one of the important actors in this organisation, in his capacity as jefe 
de potrero of the ejidatarios of El Grullo along this canal. His deputy is another El 
Grullo farmer called Navidad. 
An extraordinary meeting 
As I drive my Volkswagen into the potrero of El Llano, I pass by the tree marking the 
centre of the potrero and I see Miguel, the canalero, near the intake of some field 
canal, closely observing the water. I stop, get out of my car and greet him. He tells me 
he is checking whether the plot is taking too much water. While checking the canal, 
Miguel explains to me the problem which is surfacing at that moment in El Llano. Paco 
Paniagua is irrigating his 27 odd hectares of newly sown sugar cane at the tail of the 
lateral (he recently rented this pequetla propiedad for a 5 year period). He has blocked 
the canal with sand-bags in order to get all the water into his field. Now other farmers 
are annoyed. 
While we are chatting near the tree, two youngsters in a gleaming white pick-up 
pass by. They stop because my car is blocking the way. They readily join our talk about 
Pace's sand-bags. Miguel tells us that yesterday Corona (head of the operation 
department) had called him by radio and ordered him to irrigate Paco's sugar cane. "I 
told my boss that I would give him the water if he would remove the sand-bags. Corona 
had responded something to the effect that he is the one who determines what has to be 
done. So now Paco Paniagua is getting his water, the sand-bags still in place, and now 
I am in trouble with Enrique." One of the youngsters dryly observes that it is no 
wonder, Corona and Paco are compadres. This is new for Miguel. I pull my car over, 
so the boys can pass. 
At the same moment, the small yellow pick-up of Enrique Negro arrives. He stops, 
remains seated in his car, and we come nearer to him and the conversation resumes. It 
appears there is a body of collective knowledge here in this potrero, everybody being 
able to join the conversation at any moment. Enrique indignantly tells Miguel he has 
been to see Engineer Fuentes of the maintenance department, and in the name of all the 
water users of El Llano had asked permission to construct a new field-intake and control 
structure at the site where Paco Paniagua now has his sand-bags.31 Enrique had told 
him that the water users themselves would finance the work and that they only wanted 
formal permission to execute the work and some technical assistance. Somewhat later 
in the talk he added, "and the Poclain excavator for a few hours". But Fuentes had 
refused. It was impossible, wait until July he had said. Enrique lets himself get carried 
away by his own story. By now he is furious. He says: "we have to go all of us, then 
they will listen. It is exactly as it was with the intake (entrada) of lateral 5. We 
requested for its enlargement three years ago! What planning!" 
At this point a red camioneta arrives with Navidad. He stops and gets out. 
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Immediately he picks up the conversation. We stand around Enrique's pick-up, who still 
makes no attempt to get out of his car. Miguel, on the right side of the car, bends his 
head to talk to Enrique. Navidad and I on the left side, are doing the same. Enrique 
Negro comments he has talked to Don Alonso (father of Chico) of the Limoncito canal. 
"We have made up our minds. We are ready to take over, all the water users of lateral 
5, to arrange affairs for ourselves, together with the canatero," he adds while nodding 
in the direction of Miguel. "We simply deal with that one from Chacalito, and with 
Sr.Meda of the pequetla propiedad. No problem. Then we arrange our affairs amongst 
ourselves, without those engineers in their offices (escritorid).* Navidad smiles: "We 
simply say that it is now our canal, and we do not allow them to enter." 
In the meantime, another water user also passes by in his car, and since a traffic jam 
has now developed, he has no choice but to get out and join us. Miguel starts recalling 
the recent trial he performed with Enrique and Navidad the week before, showing them 
that the intake of lateral 5 really was too small. (See chapter 4.) Both men acknowledge 
that they first thought that Miguel was giving the Limoncito canal too much water, but 
that now they know better and that the intake should be enlarged. The gathering 
disperses, as suddenly as it emerged. It requires some manoeuvring for all the cars to 
get out. Later I realise that I had just attended an extraordinary meeting of the executive 
committee of the canal organisation of lateral 5, under the big tree. 
Three months later, at the beginning of July, I attend a planned meeting with the 
water users of lateral 5. Again the venue is in the field, now where the Llano canal 
branches off the lateral. Some 30 water users are present. We wait for half an hour, 
because, as Enrique says, he has invited engineers from the District, and also the boss 
of Grande Irrigacidn (the local SARH office in charge of the rehabilitation project of 
El Operado). When finally two engineers from Grande Irrigacidn show up, it is decided 
to go to the intake of lateral 5. Enrique and Navidad discuss matters with the two 
engineers. The other water users chat among themselves. The engineers and Enrique 
discuss whether a bigger pipe should replace the current one, or that a rectangular 
concrete structure should be cast in place. The engineers promise to help the water users 
with a technical drawing. Most of what is discussed is not followed by the rest of the 
water users. Then the meeting is over, everybody is going his own way. No clear 
decisions have been reached. Enrique is angry with Engineer Fuentes who failed to 
attend. He tells me he can do the job without him. He looks determined. 
At the beginning of September a construction firm started the work on the intake. 
Two weeks later it had been completed. The pipe had been replaced by quite a big 
rectangular concrete structure. I was pleased to see that the new construction looked 
professional. Not the botched job Fuentes perhaps expected from these farmers. On 
September 26, Miguel tested the new intake: more water entered the lateral without 
having to back up the water in the main canal. That same day water users from the 
Llano canal also cleaned their canal, organised in two working groups (one for each 
ejido). 
Miguel was pleased. While in other parts in El Operado problems were mounting, 
with this new intake and the cleaned canal, water distribution here will be easy. And 
if this is not enough, two weeks later yet another problem is solved: on the initiative of 
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Don Alonso, head of the potrero of El Limoncito, the water users demolished the 
Limoncito intake, and enlarged it. Now more water enters the canal with the wrong 
gradient.32 
Problems solved, and yet.. 
It all seemed to run quite smoothly, the construction of the new intake of lateral 5. It 
was, however, quite a complex project which involved different departments of the 
District (who eventually did not cooperate), Grande Irrigacidn (who provided the 
technical drawings)), the CNC sugar cane grower's association (who provided through 
the sugar factory a loan of 19 million pesos or US$ 8,000), a construction firm, the 
canalero and, of course, the water users. It was all organised by Enrique. He was 
satisfied: "Last year the canalero had little water. The farmers grabbed water to irrigate 
faster, but not now. We went about organising ourselves little by little. Now the 
problems are over." (Sijbrandij, 1989b:62) 
Not all the water users were happy with Enrique's initiative. Some complained they 
had not been well informed, and mat now they had been presented with the bill of 
30,000 pesos/ha (US$ 12), but the expenses were not clearly accounted for. Most 
people also disagreed that all the roads along the canals of lateral 5 had been repaired 
under the same project, which had cost an extra 9 million pesos (apart from the 10 
million for the intake). The sugar cane growers had least difficulty with these costs: the 
sugar cane refinery had provided the loan, and the amount owed would simply be 
deducted from the net returns of the harvest. But the maize growers especially were 
reluctant. They had to pay in cash (which always hurt), and why did they need better 
roads? "If it is for the benefit of the sugar cane lorries, let them pay!", they 
complained. Apart from the water users, the villagers of Chacalito were also charged 
with paying their share for the repair of the road (which connected them with El 
Grullo). Those water users living in El Chacalito paid double, and this they saw as 
unfair. (Sijbrandij 1989b:61-70) 
Few people openly acknowledged Enrique's ability to complete the project within 
such a short time. Perhaps he had proceeded too quickly and resolutely, and had failed 
to involve the water users and give them the feeling it was their joint project. Actually, 
it was not. It was clearly Enrique's project. This seemed to bother most people. Enrique 
is an entrepreneur and he is commercially the most successful of all the ejidatarios of 
El Llano. However, he does not belong to the original founders of the ejido. He bought 
his ejido plot only 10 years ago, and this causes him to be regarded with suspicion by 
his fellow ejidatarios. This did not change with his initiative to rehabilitate the lateral 
5 intake. On the contrary, we again see how 'sticking out' in community affairs is little 
appreciated, distrust grows and the gossip network thrives. Since a huge amount of 
money was involved, most people feared being cheated. 
The intake project succeeded because of the help Enrique got from his neighbour, 
Paco Paniagua, at his tail-end plot. Paco is secretary of the CNC sugar cane growers 
association and is steadily building up his sugar cane estate. Between them they worked 
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out the financing of the project. The maize growers now have to pay money to those 
who are far richer than themselves. This is the more painful because, as some of them 
realise, it was, among other things, because of Paco's newly sown sugar cane that water 
shortage in the lateral occurred. 
This notwithstanding, the success of mfrastructural improvement in lateral 5 by its 
water users is impressive. The maintenance department was simply set aside, and 
farmers moved themselves from the back to the front stage. They rightly say 'we 
arrange our affairs amongst ourselves, without those engineers in their offices', and 'we 
simply say that it is now our canal, and that we do not allow them to enter'. There is 
some continuity between the story of the Limoncito canal (section 5.1) and that of the 
entire lateral 5. Initiative after initiative is taken, like dominoes tumbling. The former 
experience of the Limoncito farmers of joint action (cleaning their canal in 1987), 
together with the important experiences of the rehabilitation of the intake of lateral 5, 
made it fairly easy for the Limoncito farmers to decide to rehabilitate their intake of the 
Limoncito canal. To the farmers of the Llano canal, cleaning their canal now seemed 
such a small thing to do, and they did it without much fuss and in a clearly defined 
way, each ejido doing their share, and each water user cleaning 5 lotas (canal segments 
3 metres long) per hectare. All the water users profited from these initiatives, especially 
since the canalero was willing to give them irrigation turns once every 20 days. (See 
chapter 4. More frequent turns are important for part of the plots along lateral 5, which 
have course-textured soils.) Some profited more than others, however, and people 
remained suspicious. 
The rehabilitation of the lateral 5 shows that in that area water users seem to have 
a fair degree of self management. The setting in which the farmers meet (their potrero) 
ensures that it is their project, defined by those concepts and words they prefer (and not 
of the District engineers). The majority of farmers, however, fail to press for proper 
decision-making procedures and to urge for an adequate account of expenditures. 
Enrique monopolised information, procedures were ill-defined, and the project itself was 
not well delineated (a road repair was later included). Too much was left to the 
discretion of the one who presented himself as leader.33 It is not necessarily self-
evident that the water users of lateral 5 will support the next initiative of a joint project. 
However, if they choose to do so, it may well be possible that among the farmers some 
will demand better formal arrangements. Smaller works, such as the cleaning of canals, 
already seem to be better organised. The various initiatives taken by farmers in lateral 
5 have left their mark on the landscape, and have produced new points of reference, 
around which new initiatives may grow. In a sense, then, these initiatives have a lasting 
character. They are embodied not only in the tree under which farmers gather for 
discussion, but more especially in the new intake structures, clean canals and smooth 
roads. These artefacts are lasting symbols of the farmers' actions. 
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5.4 Canal maintenance and farmer cooperation, a conclusion 
The study of problematic situations related to maintenance reveals characteristics of both 
fanners cooperating at field level, and of maintenance personnel performing their job. 
In the maintenance department we found several aspects which influence its functioning. 
One key feature to understanding the department are the personal bonds between people 
who occupy different positions in the District's hierarchy; the vertical alliances. Another 
key concept is discipline (disciplina), or obedience: those who fall out of line fear 
dismissal. Distrust amongst the maintenance department's personnel seems no less than 
among farmers. But the department is a closed institution, managed in an authoritarian 
manner by its head, and where there are no opportunities for farmers to check the use 
of its heavy machinery. 
Farmers are careful to stick to their own plot and business. Only when problems 
become really serious do they attempt to organise a solution. Such initiatives, as we 
have seen, are facilitated by a multiplicity of networks through which farmers along one 
canal are tied to each other. Although farmers are sceptical about such joint 
undertakings. Desconfianza, distrust, is a key concept in understanding this attitude. 
Fear of social repercussions limit the easy launch of initiatives on behalf of a wider 
social group by farmers. 
A striking element of many of the joint undertakings vis-a-vis the physical 
infrastructure (investing labour, money, social capital etc. in cleaning canals, 
rehabilitating an intake structure), is that the definition of ownership over that 
infrastructure, which has always been rather vague, changes. It shifts from being 'the 
government's' to 'ours', i.e. the farmers. This provides an important perspective for 
how the management of El Operado might develop in the future (cf. Coward 1986a). 
Problems encountered with canal maintenance point out that the relationship between 
the District and the water users is strained. The gap that exists between the farmers and 
District personnel (a gap which with respect to water distribution is effectively bridged 
by the canalero) has gradually widened with respect to maintenance. The water users 
and the maintenance department prefer not to take each other seriously, and farmers try 
to avoid the department altogether. It is only because farmers take initiatives themselves 
that the long-term viability of El Operado is not at stake. Many people concerned with 
El Operado were well aware of this critical situation. The founding of a water users' 
association was one response to this situation (see chapter 7). 
This chapter concentrated on the problematic situations which farmers faced. These 
situations did not come out of the blue. 3 4 Analysing these problematic situations 
highlighted the strong and weak points in the system's management. The weak point is 
the maintenance department, and its lack of accountability to both the operation 
department and the farmers. An organisational structure whereby one engineer is 
responsible for El Operado's management (the head of the Autlah-El Grullo area 
office), both for operation and maintenance would be a step forward.35 Another 
perspective is formed by the many group mobilisations of farmers. These may be the 
potential basis for more formal farmer involvement in El Operado's management. When 
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groups regularly engage in joint activities, the cooperation between members of a group 
endures beyond the specific activity. This conclusion underscores the diagnostic value 
of analysing canal maintenance, which made us reach this conclusion. 
What is lacking is a proper organisational structure which would enable canal groups 
to articulate their opinions and experiences, and to address joint conclusions to the 
District. This would help to ensure that when a group of farmers engaged in an 
undertaking, clear procedures were followed with the leaders being accountable to the 
other farmers. This points to the need for more formally established canal organisations, 
or 'canal arenas'. We must, however, be careful, since many formal farmer 
organisations in the Autlah-El Grullo valley have in the past collapsed (see chapter 2), 
and farmers tend to regard them with suspicion. We have to appreciate the contexts in 
which group mobilisations emerge; they were nearly always the potrero, the field. For 
farmers to meet in a setting which is entirely 'theirs' helps define projects in their 
concepts and words, and thus remain 'theirs'. A tree may thus become more than only 
a tree. 
Chapter 6 
The making of the irrigation plan; 
an institutional chronology of decision-making 
One day I gave Engineer Acosta, head of the Autlân area office, a preliminary version 
of the chapter on the canaleros (chapter 4 in this thesis). He was interested. I asked him 
to read it, and said I was eager to know his criticism and comments. A week or so later 
we made an appointment to discuss the canaleros'' story. After the obligatory 
compliments, Engineer Acosta lost no time in commenting on what he saw as the major 
shortcoming of the story: the lack of any proper reference to the irrigation programmes 
(irrigation plan and maintenance programme) which the engineers in the District offices 
elaborate. He pointed out that water distribution and canal maintenance is carried out 
on the basis of these programmes. I agreed with his comment and said that this was 
something still to be worked on. I added, however, that the canaleros hardly ever made 
reference to the irrigation plan, and not one of them had told me that it was important 
in their work. 
A variety of manuals and official publications state that operating a government 
managed irrigation system in Mexico is completely taken care of, and entirely controlled 
by the District (e.g. Zapata Faccuseh, 1977; Palacios Vêlez, 1981; and the Federal 
Water Law). To that end, a set of procedures has been developed with respect to water 
distribution, and the roles attributed to District personnel and water users are defined 
in detail. From these 'recipes', a fairly mechanistic picture emerges of how an irrigation 
system is operated. In the foregoing two chapters I have tried to show that this is quite 
different in practice. 
The question which now remains is: What is the importance of the plans elaborated 
in the District offices? How are they formulated, and to what extent are they used in 
operating El Operado. This chapter concentrates on the irrigation plan. This annual plan 
defines the crops entitled to irrigation, their expected water consumption and the level 
of the water fees to be paid by the farmers. In El Grullo, the irrigation plan is made 
during the months of August and September, before the irrigation season starts 
(October). The story of the irrigation plan examines how decisions over crops, water 
consumption and fees are arrived at. It is an 'institutional chronology' and has two 
stages. One is formed by the offices of the operation department at the District with two 
engineers as key actors elaborating the irrigation plan. The other stage is formed by a 
meeting between District staff who present the plan, and representatives of water users. 
I first introduce the District headquarters in El Grullo. 
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The District headquarters: an outsider's view 
The locus of El Operado's management is the District offices in El Grullo. There are 
three words people use to indicate the District: 'el distrito', the 'secretarla' or 
'recursos'. The term 'el Distrito' came in fashion after the re-structuration in 1976, 
when the El Grullo offices were upgraded from unidad de riego (irrigation unit) to 
distrito de riego (irrigation district).1 All three words refer to a set of buildings in one 
particular compound in the village of El Grullo. Here, over 100 functionaries work and 
pass the time for some 6 to 8 hours on working days. The compound (50 x 50 m.) has 
a patio, around which three buildings are located, of which one has a second floor. This 
is where the operation department is located. 
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Most small farmers, especially ejidatarios, are impressed by these offices, since it 
is all so different from the field. There are the two huge red-and-white painted radio 
masts, suggesting that the people inside have direct contact to higher spheres. Second, 
the compound has some large buildings, a big gate and a high fence. Third, the number 
of cars, pick-ups and trucks stationed on the patio is remarkable. Many farmers do not 
easily enter the offices, and prefer to wait at the fence, asking the guard or any passing 
bureaucrat whether a functionary is present or not. Farmers may also decide to wait on 
the other side of the road and settle beneath a tree, keeping a constant eye on the 
office's entrance. Here also, at around two o'clock, the canaleros park their greasy 
motorcycles, sit on a fallen tree, and gossip. Farmers feel more at ease with this type 
of bureaucrat, who differ markedly from the ones sitting behind their desks in the 
offices. Or farmers go to the coca-cola stand neighbouring the District office, and take 
some refreshment. Only when farmers have a pressing problem will they decide to visit 
the departments. There is, however, a distinct category of farmers, who have no 
hesitation in going in to see an engineer. They are normally the richer, private 
landowners, but also some are ejido leaders and farmers occupying positions in the 
various farmer organisations. 
Inside the offices of the operation department 
The building where the operation department is housed looks quite shabby. Little effort 
is made to make it a pleasant place, unless one counts the one and a half plants that are 
kept by the secretaries. The relative importance of this department with respect to the 
other 5 departments is reflected in the fact that a lot of people are always present 
(functionaries as well as water users), and that a lot of activity, movimiento, is going 
on. In short, it is a dynamic department. As a result, space has always been a problem. 
The office is rather small for the 12 persons permanently working there, as well as for 
the many visitors, most of them farmers hanging around in the corridor while waiting 
for an interview with the head engineer. 
The lay-out of the office partly reflects the department's hierarchical organisation 
chart. (Figure 6.1.) After climbing the staircase we enter the building and find on our 
left the office of the engineer heading the department, Engineer Corona. To enter his 
office, we first have to pass through the room of both secretaries. Opposite Corona's 
office is the room of his deputy, who is in charge of all smaller irrigation units of the 
District (the Unidades de Riego). Here, also Chuf, the statistician of El Operado 
(formally residing under the area office of Autlah-El Grullo) has a desk. He processes 
all statistics, such as the monthly data on actual water use and on area irrigated. Next 
door, we find the office of Engineer Ramirez, who is the hydrometeorologist in charge 
of the irrigation plan of El Operado. Ramirez shares his office with the assistant to the 
deputy. 
The biggest office is occupied by Mario, extension supervisor of El Grullo, who 
does not properly belong to the operation department but to the area office of Autlah-El 
Grullo. As his working area is El Grullo and he is the officer in charge of the 
canaleros, he is detached to this office. Mario's two agricultural extension officers and 
the design drawer also work in this office, behind a huge drawing table. Here also, the 
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canaleros have their daily 2:30 pm meetings. During the meeting, too many people are 
crammed into too little space. This has regularly led to irritations, with suggestions 
from the canaleros that the designer should seek another office. The designer gets his 
work from the topographical officer, who shares an office with the administrator of the 
official register of landowners in El Operado (Padrdn de Usuarios). During the weeks 
that the irrigation plan is in the making, the head engineer of the Autlah area office, 
Engineer Acosta, is also frequently seen in the offices. His office is in Autlah and when 
he works at the operation department he simply looks for any desk which is free. 
There are no fixed times for the department's personnel to get together, but they 
often do so at the small kiosk next to the District office. Instant coffee can be prepared 
in the offices and everyone guards his or her own pot of instant coffee. Only Ramirez 
and his office mate drank coffee together, but even so, they kept their own private 
coffee stocks in their desk drawers. 
6.1 Manufacturing the irrigation plan 
The making of the irrigation plan is an important activity for some of the personnel of 
the operation department. The plan is meant to help the department with the operation 
of El Operado. Before the proper irrigation plan can be made, exact data on which 
crops are to be cultivated have to be defined. These data are compiled in the so-called 
cultivation plan. The cultivation plan is calculated by the head of the Autlah-El Grullo 
area office, Engineer Acosta and by bis right-hand man in El Operado affairs, Mario, 
the extension supervisor of the municipality of El Grullo. 
The making of the cultivation plan 
On Monday, August 24 1987,1 started a three week period at the operation department. 
I had been visiting these offices regularly, but had not yet stayed for a prolonged time. 
As agreed, Engineer Acosta and Mario allowed me to participate in the preparatory 
work for the irrigation plan. Acosta had found that the deputy's office was empty, so 
we established ourselves there. The work could begin. 
All crop requests made by the water users of El Operado were reviewed, which is 
a lot of work, because it involves 1,300 water users with 2,500 plots. Moreover, many 
farmers had not filled in a request, but their crops nevertheless had to be included in 
the programme for the coming cycle. It was striking that it was mostly the private 
landowners (pequeflos propietarios) who had failed to forward crop requests. For the 
ejidatarios such requests had been collected during ejido meetings, and had been 
brought to the department by their ejido presidents. These requests had even been 
stamped by their president. The private landowners, in contrast, simply do not bother 
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with this formality since nobody will stop them growing their crops. Quite a lot of crop 
requests therefore had to be invented. Engineer Acosta commented: "It is not inventing. 
It is based upon the requests and crops grown over the past year, and upon the 
knowledge we have." 
Acosta sometimes consulted a shabby piece of paper with some names and numbers 
on it. He explained to me that they were requests from Vergeles, Los Leon's and 
Bonanza, the big tomato companies from Autlah. I concluded that therefore these 
companies had sent their applications to the District in due time. "No,", said Acosta, 
"I simply phoned them and asked which crops they would plant that season." Since the 
Guadalajara SARH office urgently needed the irrigation plan, we had to quicken our 
progress, and Engineer Corona, head of the operation department, suggested that for 
the ejido of El Lim6n, whose crop requests were all missing, we would be better using 
the data of the previous season. We were surprised about the department boss' lack of 
concern for accurate figures. 
The data on crops to be cultivated were noted down on long lists with plot numbers. 
The area cultivated had to be specified and whether the crop would be sown in the 
winter or spring cycle. To check the data we used for the cultivation plan, Acosta asked 
the canaleros during their meeting to make a list of all the plots already planted, 
specifying the crop (especially sugar cane). By the following day, the canaleros had 
brought their lists. Valuable information for us. When Acosta asks the canaleros to do 
something, they seem to respond without delay. 
It was now Wednesday, we sat in Mario's office. We continued our work, while 
Chuf, the statistician, silently did his calculations on the past irrigation season. At one 
moment Acosta needed an eraser. Mario offered to find him one and borrowed 
Corona's for him. When Mario handed it over to Acosta, we observed that the rubber 
had been bitten on. Mario commented: "Every time Corona makes a telephone call, he 
is nervous. Especially today. He had to go to the interview with the audit commission 
and he was so nervous he nearly ate the whole thing!" The audit commission was 
currently visiting the El Grullo District and had created quite some uneasiness among 
the higher placed District officials. This was also the reason why, for example, all the 
water users who had failed to pay their water fees were now receiving a reminder by 
post. 
This Wednesday we got the first results of our work: we had totalled all the sugar 
cane crops and had ended up with a figure of 6,000.72 hectares. Engineer Acosta was 
disturbed. It was an increase of over 600 ha compared with the foregoing irrigation 
season! Acosta went to the office of Ramirez and informed him. Ramirez reacted calmly 
enough saying that it was quite possible, it was only a few hundred hectares more than 
the previous year. However, Ramirez was not so calm as he appeared, since in a low 
voice he engaged in a discussion with Mario and Acosta, while keeping an eye on the 
door of Corona's office. They concluded that indeed a lot of friends of both the Head 
of the District and Engineer Corona had started growing sugar cane that rainy season, 
and that all these crops were now entitled to irrigation water. That might pose 
problems, especially at the end of the irrigation season, since there was not enough 
water. Apparently, Ramirez, Acosta and Mario did not discuss this matter with their 
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boss. 
At that moment, I did not really understand their discussion: how could they fear 
a water shortage while Tacotah was completely full? I learned only the next day what 
the three engineers had in mind but did not want to say: a huge flood of water caused 
by the rains some days earlier, had completely filled Tacotah, causing a massive volume 
of water to flow over the dam's spillway and damage part of the new Trigomil dam 
construction, located some 5 km downstream of Tacotah. The flood had also washed 
away some heavy machinery. The District had yesterday received urgent instructions 
from Guadalajara to release as much water as possible from the Tacotah storage dam, 
in order to ensure enough buffer capacity to take any new flooding. "But this," Ramirez 
observed some days later, "is a risky affair. If we spill too much water and then the 
rains stop, we will end up with too little water stored and we are saddled with huge 
problems towards the end of the irrigation season. Especially now, with this increase 
in sugar cane." 
On Friday, August 29, we completed the cultivation plan, which gave the number 
of hectares for the different crops to be sown in each month for both the Autlah and El 
Grullo parts of El Operado. The basis of these data had been the calculations made from 
borrowing data from the previous year and making rough estimates. Again we discussed 
the 6,000 hectares of sugar cane with Chuf, the statistician. He had his own monitoring 
system and had arrived at 5,797 hectares. Acosta concluded, that there were definitively 
over 200 hectares of sugar cane planted without proper authorisation. Anyhow, he 
added, that they would use the 6,000 ha figure in the plan, since the unauthorised cane 
in the end would surely receive water. 
The making of the irrigation plan 
The irrigation plan is elaborated on the basis of the cultivation plan. Engineer Ramirez, 
as die hydrometeorologist in charge, is the only engineer in the District who has the 
skill to bring together a wide variety of data (on crops, water demand, water availability 
etc.), and to transform them, through a set of calculations and estimations 
incomprehensible to most other engineers, into parameters and finally present them as 
the El Operado irrigation plan (plan de riegos y cultivos); a plan which will be 
mathematically, physically and institutionally consistent. The plan defines for the 
different crops how much water will be used during the months of the irrigation season. 
Apart from the hectic period when he is making the irrigation plan, Engineer 
Ramirez only has a few tasks to attend to: each day before 9 am he makes radio contact 
with the gate guard of the Tacotah dam, who reports the water level behind the dam and 
gives him climatological data. After such contact Ramirez reads the volume of water 
stored from a table. At 10 am he is phoned by the SARH office in Guadalajara, to 
whom he reports the volume of water in Tacotah. At 3:30 pm Ramirez has to contact 
the Tacotah gate keeper again if the canaleros have agreed at their meeting on a change 
in the discharge of water to be released. 
On Monday, August 31, Ramirez started working on the irrigation plan. It was 
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nearly noon when he fetched the piece of paper by now so familiar to me: the 
cultivation plan as elaborated by us the foregoing week. Ramirez started filling in new 
forms, a separate one for each crop. Since there are two cycles in the irrigation season, 
some crops have two forms. Irrigation water need, and irrigation intervals are calculated 
on these forms and Ramirez would fill in IS of them. It would take him three full days. 
On Wednesday, Acosta dropped in. He said he was eager to learn how to make the El 
Operado irrigation plan. So then we were three again. Ramirez explained to us in detail 
how the crop forms had to be calculated and filled in. Acosta did not appear to like how 
often Ramirez had to make estimates. Acosta must have thought: if Ramirez also 
founded his calculations on guesses and estimates, then the whole irrigation plan was 
in reality one big guess! Several times Acosta suggested consulting not only the 
irrigation plan and performance of the foregoing year, but also the irrigation 
performance of earlier years. Ramirez replied that all foregoing years experiences were 
already included in the irrigation plan of the previous year. For that purpose he had 
elaborated a huge table called the indice, which laid out the monthly irrigated areas for 
all the different crops and their water consumption for many previous years. With this 
reply, and no doubt impressed by the incomprehensible table Ramirez displayed, Acosta 
seemed more relaxed. 
The following days we continued to complete the crop forms and calculate and fill 
in the four annexes of the irrigation plan, in which the crop forms are totalled and 
summarised. On Friday, Engineer Corona dropped in. Ramirez asked him a crucial 
question: "should I calculate on the basis of a full storage dam?" Corona, very 
decisively and firmly (perhaps also somewhat grimly), responded with a simple yes. 
"OK," replied Ramirez, "but you realise that we need 129 million m 3 of water. With 
the 6 millions of evaporation and the 4 millions of silt that makes 139 million to be 
stored in Tacotah." But Corona reaffirmed his answer. "Count on a full dam," he said. 
When Engineer Corona had gone, Ramirez confided to me that they had received an 
order from the Ministry in Mexico City to reduce the volume of water stored behind 
the Tacotah dam to only 130 million cubic metres. (Its maximum storage is approx. 145 
million. On that Wednesday it held 144 million.) Since that order had arrived Ramirez 
had received a telephone call every day from SARH Guadalajara. He had informed 
them that the gate was spilling 14 m 3/s. Ramirez: "I have told them that the gate is 
completely open. The guy from Guadalajara was saying that we were not executing the 
order, since the water level behind the dam was hardly decreasing. But I refuse to keep 
the gate open until after next week. We will need that water!" 
Some days later, on Wednesday, Ramirez was busy completing the diagramas 
bdsicos. This seemed to be the most complex phase in the whole process. Filling in 
these diagrams should in fact be the first step. Ramirez had decided to change the 
order. According to Ramirez this saved a lot of time. The formal procedure for arriving 
at the irrigation plan is very time-consuming, since it necessarily involves an iterative 
process. A certain cropping pattern is taken as a point of departure, then a whole set 
of calculations are made following formatted tables and procedures defined by the 
Direccidn General deDistritos de Riegos, at the SARH Ministry in Mexico City. These 
calculations finally lead to a conclusion as to whether or not too much water is 
142 Chapter 6 
consumed. If so, then a new cropping pattern (with crops that demand less irrigation 
water or a reduced area) is assumed and the calculations have to be made again, and so 
on until the cropping pattern fits water availability. The formal procedure follows seven 
steps: 
1. Input data on cropping pattern of next irrigation cycle: from plan de cultivos. 
2 . Fill in the Diagramas Bdsicos, in which each irrigation turn is defined per crop and per season, in 
10 day intervals, with water layer applied. Fifteen forms have to be filled in with some 1,500 data. 
3 . Fill in Annex 3 summarising the crop forms in one table, giving area irrigated per month and per 
crop. 
4 . Fill in Annex 4 and 5. Annex 4 summarises net water layer and irrigated area per month per crop; 
Annex 5 the gross water layer and gross water volume needed. 
5. Input data: water available at Tacotan; storage losses (evaporation; leakages) 
6. Fill in Annex 1: the water balance, with monthly water releases at Tacotan. 
7. Check if water balance fits; if short of water, repeat procedure from 1. to 6. , decreasing area or 
change crops. 
Ramirez short-circuits the iterative process through postponing step 2, by far the most 
elaborate calculation, until after step 7. In step 2, he fills in much smaller, summary 
'crop forms' which Ramirez especially developed for that purpose (requiring only 360 
as against 1500 calculations). Through this strategy, he obviates the need to do step 2 
all over again when in step 7 he arrives at the conclusion that the water balance results 
are negative. This year, Ramirez got a match directly in the first round of the 
Table 6.1 Summary of the irrigation plan for El Operado, 1987/88 irrigation season 
crops winter/ area irrigation gross water layer gross water i 
spring (ha.) turns (no.) (mm) (1,000 m 3) 
maize w 1,324 6.8 1160 15,358 
sorghum w 659 4.6 875 5,769 
hort.crops+green tomato w 516 6.0 1180 6,089 
(export) tomato w 262 7.0 1360 3,563 
other crops w 23 2.0 400 92 
maize s 154 5.8 1250 1,925 
sorghum s 22 4.0 718 158 
(export) tomato s 38 8.0 1760 669 
hort.crops+green tomato s 50 6.0 1064 532 
sugar cane - 5,200 6.0 1734 90,183 
sugar cane El Relicario - (800) re-pumped from river with drain water of El Opera 
alfalfa - 44 10.0 2000 880 
fruit trees - 76 5.0 1251 951 
pasture - 193 6.0 1654 3,192 
total 8 , 561+800 6.0 1511 129,361 
Source: Plan de Riego 1987/88, Unidad de Riego Autlan-El Grullo; Distr. de Desarrollo Rural El Grullo. 
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calculations. 
In the meantime, Ramirez completed step 3, and he gave a copy of annex 3 with the 
preliminary data on the total area of different crops to be grown to Engineer Corona. 
With these data Corona set to defining the new water fees. That Friday, the irrigation 
plan was completed, and Ramirez submitted it for approval to Engineer Corona (table 
6.1). According to Ramirez this was a formality. His boss did not even know how to 
read all those tables and annexes. Ramirez was however careful to get the formal 
approval. From that moment it was his boss who was responsible. The conclusions of 
this preliminary irrigation plan then were discussed on Saturday, September 12 (see 
below), by the Water Users' Commission (consisting of water user representatives). 
Meanwhile, the tables were typed on huge sheets. The chapter on the water fees, as 
formulated by Engineer Corona, was appended to the plan. On Monday, Corona and 
Ramirez presented the plan to the SARH office in Guadalajara, three days late. 
Engineer Ramirez accompanied Corona, because, as Ramirez told me, "if my boss 
presents it to them, and these engineers have comments, he does not know how to 
defend the plan. So he prefers me to go with him". Moreover, Ramirez has some 
friends among the engineers in that specific office of SARH Guadalajara, which 
facilitates getting approval. The engineers made some small comments, and Ramirez 
made some corrections. On Thursday, September 17, Ramirez handed over the final 
plan to the engineers in Guadalajara. 
Evaluating the irrigation plan 
To what extent did the actual situation of the 1987/88 irrigation season differ from the 
plans made? (table 6.2). Total area cultivated within El Operado was over-estimated in 
the irrigation plan. From the initially planned 9,361 ha (including those sugar cane plots 
inside El Operado which are irrigated by a pumping plant with drainage water from El 
Operado), only 8,674 ha were irrigated. This figure includes 100 ha of melon grown 
outside El Operado that were not in the plan, but irrigated with water destined for the 
system. It follows that the plan over-estimated the lands to be cultivated by over 700 ha. 
In fact the only crop realistically planned for was sugar cane (total sugar cane area 
planted was 2% more than envisaged), but this is not surprising: at the end of August 
(rainy season) nearly all new sugar cane had already been planted. Furthermore, 
Engineer Acosta received detailed information from the canaleros on the plots with 
established crops. Most annual crops which would receive irrigation were planted long 
after the cultivation plan was formulated (except export tomatoes). Their areas 
appearing in the plans were not more than educated guesses. 
The irrigation plan misjudged the cultivation of cereals by nearly 1,000 hectares: the 
actual area irrigated was 46% less than expected. The area with (export) tomatoes was 
less than planned for, but much more of the other horticultural crops was planted. This 
was due to an unexpected increase in the area of green tomatoes sown, which fall under 
die category of horticultural crops. The melon crop was entirely unexpected. Engineer 
Acosta had not received any crop requests for melons by August, so the irrigation plan 
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Table 6.2 Evaluation of irrigation season 1987/88, as per 1 July 1988 
crops area cultivated (ha.) gross water layer (mm) water used (1000 m 3) 
planned realised planned realised planned realised 
maize + sorghum 2,159 1,166 1075 1458 23,210 16,997 
hort.crops+green tomato 566 793 1170 1281 6,621 10,159 
(export) tomato 300 217 1411 1674 4 ,232 3 ,632 
melon - 100 - 3824 - 3,824 
other crops 23 70 400 609 92 426 
sugar cane 5,200 5,502 1734 1459 90,183 80,261 
sugar cane El Relicario (800) (600) 
other perennial crops 313 226 1605 1637 5,023 3,699 
total 8 , 561+800 8 ,074+600 1511 1474 129,361 118,998 
Source: Informe del desarrollo del plan de riego, mes de junio, 1988; Distr. de Desarrollo Rural, El 
Grullo; data for sugar cane were corrected on the basis of my own observations. 
did not consider that crop. However, in December 1987, 100 hectares of melons were 
sown outside the actual confines of El Operado, in an area which will receive irrigation 
after the Trigomil dam is completed. The melon crop consumed far too much irrigation 
water, as can be read from table 6.2. Irrigation water demand for melons in former 
years was considered by the District to range around 1,000 mm. During the 1987/88 
season, the 100 ha of melons supposedly consumed as much as 3.8 million m 3 of water, 
or equivalent to a water layer of 3.8 metres! This is physically quite difficult to 
imagine. The high consumption rate is partly due to the fact that the melon area lies 
outside El Operado, and a new stretch of the left main canal which so far had lain idle, 
was used to bring the water to the melons. Much water was lost through these 
operations, since water flowed down the new main canal to as far as El Limon. 
The irrigation plan was not very realistic with respect to the area of the different 
crops cultivated. This is not surprising in view of the many educated guesses which 
underlie the making of the cultivation plan. The irrigation plan appeared quite sound in 
another respect: the actual amount of water consumed per hectare was quite near to the 
figure planned. This implies that while the total area irrigated was less than envisaged, 
also the gross volume of water used was proportionally less.2 
Decisions on crops 
The above discussion reveals that the decision-making procedures with regard to crops 
to be included or excluded in the irrigation season are not all that clear. 
Firstly, the formal rule that farmers have to submit a crop request before the start 
of the irrigation season is not strictly followed. Many fanners cultivate other crops than 
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requested. Other farmers simply do not bother to request a crop at all, since they know 
the District will not deny them water. District officials when formulating the cultivation 
plan make rough guesses for those farmers who do not submit a request. The handful 
of tomato companies are asked to produce information on the area they are going to 
grow. 
Secondly, in the case of sugar cane, which clearly is a special case, farmers do not 
submit a crop request to Engineer Acosta, head of the Autlah area office. They know 
he cannot decide on access to sugar cane, i.e. the right to start growing that crop. To 
get permission, farmers submit a request informally to Engineer Corona or the head of 
the District personally. At the same time, these farmers contact either of the two sugar 
cane growers associations. Farmers know that decisions over new sugar cane are the 
result of negotiations between the District (represented by Engineer Corona and the head 
engineer), both sugar cane organisations (represented by their presidents) and the sugar 
factory (represented by its director). These negotiations are behind closed doors. The 
decisions taken during these negotiations (concerning who is allowed to start growing 
sugar cane, and how much) are typed out by both sugar cane organisations, but these 
are not entirely accurate. The final decision seems to lie with Engineer Corona. When 
a canalero reports to him that a certain plot has been planted with sugar cane (whereas 
in the foregoing year it had another crop), Corona simply replies with: "it is OK," or: 
"I'll give you a letter to hand out to the farmer concerned." 
Thus, access to sugar cane is restricted, which is quite unlike other crops, except 
for rice (which is forbidden) and alfalfa (no new alfalfa is allowed). Also, the criteria 
underlying the decision to allow some to grow sugar cane and others not, are known 
only by those directly involved in the sugar cane negotiations. Engineer Acosta is not 
informed. Furthermore, Corona does not formulate a list of plots which are finally 
granted sugar cane, so Acosta remains ignorant about them. This is strange since he is 
responsible for the cultivation plan. 
Finally, the situation of the 100 hectares of melon suddenly appearing is interesting 
since it shows another manner in which decisions regarding crops can be taken. These 
melons were grown by ejidatarios from the ejido El Limoh. In former years, El Limdn 
ejidatarios used to grow melon, and they had their own organisation, which owned the 
packing plant (empaque) in El Limon. With the demise of melon (since 1984), the 
farmers organisation and the packing plant also fell into disuse. In 1987, the SARH 
ministry in Mexico City launched a new programme of rehabilitating all existing 
infrastructure owned by farmers organisations which did not function any more. The 
engineer responsible for this programme at the District level (the head of the 
organisation department) found the packing plant of El Limdn to be a suitable site for 
the programme. He and the local District staff organised a meeting with the members 
of the melon growers association (asociacidn agrtcola local) which owned the plant, and 
suggested that they start growing melons again. Twenty of the original 80 farmers 
responded positively. But they formulated one condition: they wanted to grow melons 
only on lands which had never before been intensively cultivated, since the farmers 
expected thereby to have fewer problems with crop diseases and plagues. They proposed 
to grow these melons in the extension zone of El Operado, not far from El Limdn. 
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Those lands already have irrigation infrastructure but will only receive water when the 
new Trigomil dam is completed. The District engineer had to show the farmers he was 
serious and started to negotiate with the District head for the permission to grow melons 
in the extension zone. The request was also formally submitted to the governing board 
of the District (Comité Directivo), in its meeting of September 1987.3 The board 
approved the plan, and after the head of the District had consulted his operation 
department, he gave his approval. This was in October, when the irrigation plan had 
already been defined and accepted, which is why the melons did not appear in it. 4 
The melon case is special, since here the decision-making process lies outside the 
operation department. The head engineer is involved and the governing board is 
consulted. Engineer Acosta and the canaleros were informed only in December. 
The relevance of the irrigation plan for operating El Operado 
Decisions concerning the crops to be grown and the formulating of the cultivation plan 
involve essentially two separate activities. The plan is thus not accurate with respect to 
the areas of the different crops to be grown. Since there are no accurate data on crops, 
the data arrived at in the irrigation plan bear a questionable relationship to the real 
situation in the field. Nobody knows the accuracy of the plan with respect to the field 
situation, and thus, to what extent the irrigation plan and the programme of water 
discharges have to be respected during the irrigation season. 
What normally happens during the irrigation season is that the engineers consult only 
one graph, that hanging in Engineer Corona's office with the planned water storage in 
Tacotah for the entire irrigation season, in addition, they may compare actual water 
releases from Tacotah with discharge during the same period of the foregoing year. If 
discharges are lower in the current year they conclude that "they are safe". If not, they 
urge the canaleros to irrigate with less water, and try to limit water deliveries to them. 
During daily operations, hardly any reference is made to the irrigation plan. 
Drought years 
However, in years with little rainfall the irrigation plan suddenly has immediate and 
practical consequences for operational strategies. In both 1982 and 1989, the Tacotah 
dam was only partly filled in August when the irrigation plan was formulated. (Rains 
normally stop in September.) Serious water shortages were expected. 
Because of this, in 1982, the irrigation plan was calculated on a water availability 
of 69 million m3 (or less than 50% of maximum storage capacity of Tacotah). Water 
use had to be restricted through limiting the area planted. The engineers in the District 
elaborated two different scenarios (the Federal Water Law 1972 version was multi-
interpretable in this respect). The head of the District then consulted the Water Users' 
Commission, who opted for the scenario whereby in principle each water user was 
allowed to irrigate a maximum of only 6 hectares, regardless of the size of his or her 
lands in El Operado. However, given that a vast area of sugar cane was already 
established, the decision was adjusted to local circumstances. Sugar cane growers were 
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allowed to irrigate a maximum of 10 hectares. At the same time the planned water 
consumption of sugar cane was reduced by some 20% (from 1217 mm to 979 mm), as 
the number of irrigation turns it would receive was reduced by one.5 During the 
1982/83 irrigation season, the irrigation plan thus had a significant impact on the day-to-
day operation of El Operado.6 
In August 1989, the Tacotah dam contained only 40 million m 3 of water. The 
irrigation plan was drafted, but had to be revised at the end of September. It was 
decided to allow all established perennial crops two irrigation turns, whereas all other 
crops were forbidden. Thus, 5,300 ha sugar cane (all cane to be cut for the last time 
was not replanted) and 270 ha of other perennial crops received the lowest possible 
irrigation quantity needed for their survival. 
The difference between the conclusions arrived at in 1982/83 and in 1989/90 is 
marked. Whereas the measure taken in 1982 can be regarded as liberal, the measures 
taken in 1989 favoured cane producers, including those with vast areas of sugar cane, 
while those farmers with no perennial crops were denied access to water. Both examples 
show that the irrigation plan is important during droughts. However, more important 
than the plan itself is the way it is interpreted by the head of the operation department. 
The Federal Water Law is ambiguous about how to proceed in case of water shortage 
(Hewitt de Alcantara 1985:60-61; L6pez Zamora 1977:256-57; Mares 1980:482; Yates 
1981:81). It leaves the head engineer room to decide how to reduce water demand. 
Water fees 
With the formulation of the irrigation plan, new water fees are defined and a budget for 
the personnel involved in water distribution is formulated. This is done by the 
department head. The criteria he uses are not clear. Engineer Acosta explained to me 
that the water fee of a crop depended both on the amount of water it consumed and on 
Table 6.3 Relative water fees, water use and crop value, 1987/88 season 
crop water f ee 1987/88 water use (plan) value of crop 
(cane= 100) (cane=100) (estimated) 
sugar cane 100 100 100 
maize+sorghum 50 62 40 
hort.crops+green tomat. 93 67 90 
export tomatoes 173 81 300 
other annual crops 50 23 40 
alfalfa 173 115 250 
fruit trees 75 72 90 
pasture 50 95 40 
corr.coefficient 1 2 = 0 . 3 2 
^ = 0 . 9 6 -
Source: Distrito de Desarrollo Rural El Grullo, and own data. 
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the relative profitability of the crop. But Engineer Corona, in charge of defining the 
level of the fees, was not willing to explain to me how both criteria used are weighed 
against each other. Table 6.3 gives the relative crop fees as proposed by Corona with 
relative water use of the crops as planned in die irrigation plan. Also, estimated data 
on relative gross value of the different crops are given. The table shows that water use 
and crop value influence the level of the crop's water fee. Crop value appears to be the 
most decisive criterion. 
Water fees are a sensitive issue for District staff. Policy makers in Mexico refer to 
them as problematic and far too low. Local District officials are reluctant to increase 
these fees, as they fear opposition from local landlords (see e.g. Olafz 1981:32). Given 
the inflation rate in Mexico during the last decade, the water fees covered a 
progressively smaller percentage of total operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. 
Whereas the water fees in Mexican irrigation Districts are reported to have covered 
95 % of O&M costs in 1950, between 1960 and 1970 this figure ranged between 70 and 
80%, and by 1985 this had fallen to approximately 30% (average figures for Mexico, 
Olafz et al. 1986:66; cf. Brajer and Cummings 1990). Consequently, federal subsidies 
to the irrigation sector have risen sharply. However, by 1987 the federal government 
had issued a new law which stipulates the recovery rate of operation and maintenance 
costs from water fees (Diario Oficial de la Federacidn, July 16, 1987). For the Autlan-
El Grullo irrigation system this percentage was fixed at 80% (i.e. the water fees should 
cover at least 80% of real O&M costs). It seems that Engineer Corona therefore 
decided to drastically increase the fees, by nearly 100%. At the end of the 1987/88 
season, however, this 80% recovery rate had not been reached. It was estimated that 
the water fees covered a mere 50% of actual O&M expenditures of the District. 
The irrigation plan in the operation department, a conclusion 
Since the irrigation plan does not include detailed irrigation schedules for the different 
canals of El Operado, the plan does not have immediate implications for the work of 
the water guards. As we have seen in chapter 4, they hardly make reference to this 
plan. The irrigation plan rather serves to show higher levels of the SARH ministry that 
the El Grullo District is doing its work properly: it allows the operation personnel to 
show off some of their skills; it provides the department head with data for the revision 
of water fees and for drawing the graph of the planned water releases from Tacotah. 
The irrigation plan is an institutional necessity, with its own internal logic and fixed 
procedures (exemplified by the standard forms to be filled in), which are defined by the 
Ministry's headquarters in Mexico City. On the office floor, however, the forms are 
being filled in by Engineer Ramirez in a slightly different order and following slightly 
different procedures. The outcomes are wholly in accordance with the rules. The 
irrigation plan is not very accurate: crop areas assumed may differ from those actually 
cultivated. The data for the area under sugar cane, however, are accurate. Since sugar 
cane covers some 70% of El Operado, the overall accuracy of the plan concerning total 
water consumption is thus acceptable. 
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During August and September the plan is an issue talked about among District 
personnel. Irrigation plans have to be made not only for El Operado, but also for all 
irrigation units (Unidades de Riego). Various people are involved in supplying data, 
filling in forms, authorising diem, etc., at different times. The irrigation plan has a 
scientific image about it. This image also has an impact on engineers themselves. It is 
illustrated by Acosta's disappointment when he was initiated by Ramirez into the 
calculations, and came to realise they were anything but precise. 
Engineer Corona monopolises two crucial dimensions of the irrigation plan: the right 
to decide who will grow the most important crop in El Operado, sugar cane; and the 
formulation of the irrigation budget and revision of the water fees. In the operation 
department there is a definite line which separates the department head from his 
subordinates. The head makes the decisions, and personnel involved in elaborating the 
irrigation plan do not take part. Also the head of the Autlah area office, who is formally 
responsible for all policy implementation in El Operado, is ignored by Corona. Only 
in years with water shortage does the plan emerge as a document which influences his 
decisions. 
6.2 Presenting the plan: the engineers and the Water Users' Commission 
After its manufacture in the District offices, the irrigation plan has to 'touch down' at 
grass roots level: it has to be made known to the water users, especially the new water 
fees, and accepted. To this end, the staff of the District present the irrigation plan to 
the Water Users' Commission (Comisidn de Usuarios). This is the last phase in the 
decisions regarding operating El Operado prior to the irrigation season. 
The Water Users' Commission, which was set up in 1980, is constituted of 38 
delegates, each ejido (17) and private landowners association (2) sending two 
representatives. In addition, farmer organisations like the two sugar cane producers 
associations are allowed to send observers to the commission meetings. It is significant 
that the Water Users' Commission has no board, no president, no secretariat, nor office 
of its own. It normally meets every month at the District office. Its meetings are always 
presided over by a District official, normally the head of the operation department. It 
is also a District official who serves as secretary (normally the head of the Autlah area 
office). Some other lower District personnel may attend the meetings, but field 
personnel (such as canaleros) are never invited. On rare occasions the Head of the 
District is present. During the commission meeting of September 12, 1987, the 
irrigation plan was presented and approved. It is worthwhile to analyse in detail the 
development of this meeting. It not only puts the irrigation plan in a broader 
perspective, it also shows how some of the institutional arrangements get new content 
when confronted with water user representatives. 
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The meeting 
The September meeting of the Water Users' Commission in 1987 was held on a 
Saturday, at the District office. Most water users arrived late. Three engineers were 
present for the District: Engineer Corona, head of the operation department, his deputy, 
and Engineer Acosta, head of the Autlah area office. Acosta had formulated the agenda, 
and had invited all water user representatives. He played the role of secretary, taking 
notes etc. The three District engineers were seated at one end of the conference table 
near the blackboard when the water users dropped in, about half an hour late (figure 
6.2). Acosta opened the meeting, then went through the list of delegates, mentioning 
all names, writing down who was present and finally concluding that attendance 
represented a legal quorum, although only 15 (representing 13 ejidos, the majority) out 
of 38 water users were present. Acosta went on to say that the next point on the agenda 
was the irrigation pian. He gave the floor to Corona. 
Corona then presented the summary of the irrigation plan written on the blackboard 
(a whole lot of figures, including acreage, water layer, number of irrigation turns and 
total volume of water demand for the 8 major crops grown, identical to table 6.1, 
above), and started reading aloud all data, and concluded that thus 130 million m 3 of 
water was required, which posed no problem, because the storage dam was almost full. 
He also mentioned that the new storage dam under construction, Trigomil, would be 
completed before the first of May next year, and suggested visiting the works of 
Trigomil during the next meeting of the commission. He went on to open the discussion 
on the irrigation plan by asking whether there were any doubts concerning the irrigation 
plan. A discussion followed which was dominated by two water users. They were 
astounded by the huge quantity of irrigation water destined for sugar cane in the coming 
season (some 70%). But no one, of course, objected: of the 16 delegates then present, 
all but one grew sugar cane. Apart from that, the head of the operation department 
himself and his deputy both grow vast areas of sugar cane. Some informative questions 
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Figure 6.2 Setting of the Water Users' Commission meeting, September 1987 
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were raised, and a few commented on the lack of maintenance of the canals, but at mat 
moment (in September it still rains) tins was not yet a major preoccupation (though this 
would soon change, see chapter 5). Then, Corona wanted to proceed to the next item 
on the agenda, the level of the new water fees, and forced a decision on the irrigation 
plan. He said: "Seflores, do you approve or disapprove the plan?" It was Don Guco, 
one of two water users who had dominated the discussions so far who simply replied: 
"No, it is alright. It is approved." I heard the rest of the water users present murmur 
approvingly, and that was it. 
The next item on the agenda was the most important one for the delegates. They 
have to report the new water fees to their ejido, so the lower the better. The current 
water fees and the proposed new ones were written on the blackboard. Something like 
an increase of 90% was being proposed by the District. Corona did everything he could 
to explain the reason why the fees had to be raised. Leon Ruiz, the other water user 
active in the discussions, then asked Corona to specify the expenses: "How much money 
do you spend per month?", he asked. Corona's answer was: "We do not know." He 
then quickly switched to another argument; the increase was because of the high 
inflation rate (in 1987 140%). He explained that these fees covered the expenses of 
water distribution and of maintenance. However, he gave no details on how the money 
for maintenance (80% of the budget) would be spent, nor how it had been spent last 
year, neither did any of the water users insist on a specification. Corona mentioned 
recent price increases of almost every imaginable product but water. In the meantime, 
Leon Ruiz and another water user, Rodolfo, used the opportunity to say how they had 
been affected negatively by the poor water distribution practices of the operation 
department and the lack of communication between the sugar cane factory and the 
District. Another water user, whose land was at the tail-end of the irrigation system, 
complained that at the tail they never received the six irrigation turns that were planned 
for in the irrigation plan, and that now appeared on the blackboard. They received only 
3 or 4 turns. 
The general feeling at that moment was that a price increase of 90% was too much. 
Leon Ruiz then indicated he wanted to negotiate a new level for the water fees, and 
said: "But would an increase of only 25 per cent not be better?" And the discussion 
went on. I could see that Corona was beginning to feel irritated, and he changed tactics. 
He had until then, been talking to the water users more as colleagues (he himself also 
being a water user). Now he started saying things such as: "it is not possible to do the 
impossible" (No se puede hacer cosas que no se pueda). When this did not have the 
desired effect, and Rodolfo and Leon persisted, Corona said: 
"If we were traders (comerciantes) we would tell you that this is the water price, like it or not. But 
we do not treat you like that. We give you a service. Imagine the amount of m^ney the federal 
government is investing here in El Operado, for instance, under the rehabilitation programme. 
Thousands of millions of pesos." 
Rodolfo was not impressed by this and proposed to lower the fees by 30%. Corona now 
became even more irritated: 
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crop actual fee 
pesos/ha 
proposed fee 
pesos/ha 
accepted fee 
pesos/ha 
maize 
sorghum 
horticultural crops 
export tomatoes 
green tomatoes 
other annual crops 
sugar cane 
alfalfa 
fruit trees 
pasture 
8,000 
8,000 
15,000 
28,000 
15,000 
8,000 
16,000 
28,000 
12,000 
8,000 
15,000 
15,000 
28,000 
52,000 
28,000 
15,000 
30,000 
52,000 
22,500 
15,000 
14,000 
14,000 
27,000 
52,000 
27,000 
14,000 
29,000 
52,000 
22,000 
14,000 
Figure 6.3 The blackboard with the old, the proposed and the accepted water fees 
"In the end it is the Comité Directivo (the governing board of the District) which determines the 
water fee, and Hacienda (Ministry of Finance) has the last word. Hacienda says we should be 100% 
self-sufficient, but the proposed water fees cover only 86.6 per cent of the operation costs. If we are 
to lower these fees, Hacienda will not accept it." 
Finally, a compromise was reached and the water fees were decreased by some 3-6% 
from those proposed by the District. Corona and Acosta were busy calculating for some 
15 minutes, and then announced that the new fee for maize would be 14,000 pesos per 
hectare (US$ 10), sugar cane 29,000, and for tomatoes 52,000 pesos. Acosta wrote the 
new fees on the blackboard. (Figure 6.3.) Corona said: "These new water fees are the 
lowest possible. " Then, a water user proposed a slight change in prices, clarifying that 
the big tomato producers were not represented in the commission. His proposal was: 
why not increase the water fee for tomatoes and lower the one for maize. The rest of 
the delegates laughed because they thought it was an alternative which would not affect 
them. Corona and Acosta started calculating, and Corona concluded that lowering the 
water fee for maize by 1,000 pesos implied increasing the water fee for tomatoes by 
another 8,000 pesos, and Corona dismissed the possibility. After some more talking, 
he asked: "\Sefloresl Once more, do we agree on these prices?". And a similar 
murmuring of words like 'esta bien' was heard, but no voting was done. Leon Ruiz had 
the last word, when he stated: "Yes, it's OK. But you have to give us the number of 
irrigation turns that are written there on the blackboard." Corona diplomatically 
comments: "These are averages." And Leon has to give in: "It's alright, I agree", he 
said. The rest of the water users appeared to accept that with this conclusion Leon Ruiz 
expressed their feelings, and they kept quiet. 
The agenda now reached the item 'participation of the delegates'. The delegates 
invariably mentioned the small problems that affected their own production. Here they 
seemed to be speaking on their own behalf, and not to be acting as representatives. The 
answers given by the engineers were vague, such as "we will look into the matter 
tomorrow" (!), "Monday", "put the request in writing". Anyhow, this point on the 
agenda took almost an hour. Finally, Corona said that the new water fees had to be 
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presented for approval at the next meeting of the District's governing board (Comité 
Directivo). He explained that representatives of all government institutions participated 
on the board. Who was going to attend the meeting next Friday? He turned to the 
blackboard, and wrote the word Comité, then two numbers, 1 and 2. After a moment 
of silence, Corona glanced for a second at the meeting, and then wrote 'Leon Ruiz'. 
For the third time I heard people murmuring approvingly. Leon himself did not seem 
to object, but neither was he excited. Then, Corona said: "A minimum of two persons. 
Who more? Rodolfo?" Rodolfo also seemed not to object, and the rest either showed 
no interest or nodded approvingly. People now began to stand up, and the first water 
users left the room. Corona went on that the meeting would be in El Limon, at 10 in 
the morning. Then, Rodolfo asked, perhaps a little taken aback: "Are you of the 
Secretarta going to prepare everything for that meeting?" With Corona's answer, 
Rodolfo seemed to relax: "Yes. We formulate the minutes (pointing to Acosta), you 
only have to read them aloud. And we are going to make a list of the new water fees. " 
By then, everybody was already leaving the room, but Corona continued: "The next 
commission meeting; are we going to hold it in Tacotin or in Trigomil?" It was decided 
to hold the meeting in Trigomil, and Jesiis Corrales, leader of the biggest sugar cane 
growers association would be asked to assist with organising the food and drinks. 
Corona finally concluded the meeting: "Seflores, thank you very much. " The delegates 
left the room. Outside the District offices they dispersed amazingly fast, with hardly any 
social talk. Within five minutes, all the people had left. The three engineers stayed 
behind. I thanked Corona for letting me attend the meeting, and left somewhat puzzled. 
Was this farmer participation? A week or so later, I decided to find out what had 
happened in the Comité Directivo meeting that Friday and visited Rodolfo. Rodolfo: 
"I read out the minutes and they readily accepted the new water fees. I think it is because the minutes 
clearly stated that we farmers negotiated the prices and that we succeeded in lowering them 
considerably, and that we then accepted the new fees. So, also the Comité Directivo accepted it, 
because if we accepted it, of course everybody else has to accept it." 
Analysing the meeting 
From the account of the meeting of the Water Users' Commission I wish to highlight 
a few salient points. First, I would like to stress the mis-en-scene: the meeting is held 
in a District setting; the chairmanship, the agenda, and the information provided are 
wholly controlled by District staff. Furthermore, the development of the meeting is 
quite typical. Its beginning is clearly defined by the ritual of welcome, verification of 
quorum and reading the minutes of the foregoing meeting. Then chaos gradually grows, 
until the point at which the meeting finally fizzles out. When Corona says: "Thank you, 
gentlemen," indicating that the meeting has finished, some 20% of all delegates have 
already left. It is also noteworthy that no explicit vote is taken. At one moment one of 
the delegates simply concludes matters, after which the other delegates produce some 
approving sounds. If some delegates do not agree, they at least do not say so. Also, the 
manner in which the two delegates were elected and commissioned to the Comité 
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Directivo meeting was disorganised, and heavily influenced by Corona. Those delegates 
with the most articulate criticism and who questioned Corona's arguments the most 
severely were pushed by him to report to the Comité. This might be understood as one 
of the ways in which Corona tries to co-opt those who have been most critical. 
Only three of the 17 water user representatives actively participated in the 
discussions about the irrigation plan and the water fees (speaking in total 34 times). 
Seven others made one or two small comments during the discussions (speaking 11 
times). The remaining seven did not utter a word. During the round devoted to the 
'participation of delegates', most delegates appeared to give priority to self-interest 
rather than defending the interests of their constituency. Here we should take into 
account the fact that farmer representation in the Water Users' Commission follows the 
ejido structure. Many delegates stem from traditional power groups within their ejidos, 
and thus do not simply behave as representatives of all water users. Moreover, the 
constituency of each delegate does not directly relate to hydraulic units within El 
Operado. Also, size of irrigated land varies per ejido, between 40 and 1,200 hectares; 
whereas both private landowners associations have about 2,000 hectares each. This 
notwithstanding, each congregation sends the same number of delegates. This all makes 
the relation delegate- water user ill-defined. 
Little importance is attributed to the Water Users' Commission by the richest and 
most powerful user groups. Representatives of both the Asociaciones de la Pequefla 
Propiedad (Autlah and El Grullo, holding 2,300 and 1,800 ha, respectively) hardly ever 
attend its meetings. In the September meeting they did not send representatives. The big 
tomato companies, although they are entitled to send observers through their Asociaciôn 
Agrtcola Local organisation, never attend. The big producers simply ignore the 
commission, and this is quite understandable: they seem to view the commission simply 
as a platform where farmers receive information and instructions from the District staff, 
and not as a farmer organisation which defends the interests of the water users. These 
big producers, through their relationships, have direct access to District engineers. To 
them the commission is redundant. But they also dislike the commission: it is dominated 
by ejidatarios, and many of the big private landholders look down upon them. They 
hate the idea of loosing half a day in a meeting, having to listen to the petty discussions 
these ejidatarios engage in. 
For the District, the water users' commission meetings, especially the September 
meetings, are very useful and time-saving. They can in this way reach the water users, 
and get their formal approval. Without the commission, the District would have to 
attend 17 separate ejido meetings in order to inform all the ejidatarios. At the same 
time, the District consciously tries to limit the influence of the commission, through 
carefully filtering the information it provides. So, when Leôn Ruiz asks how the District 
spends the money raised by the water fees, Engineer Corona decides to short-circuit 
such a discussion and simply tells him he does not know. The District staff are careful 
not to account for the water fees collected during the past year, nor do they provide the 
delegates with a budget for the coming season. It is striking that not one delegate insists 
on being given this information. The delegates accept water fees, not knowing how they 
will be spent and knowing that the budget will never be accounted for. When some 
The irrigation plan 155 
delegates persist too much in their demands, the tone of Engineer Corona changes, and 
he reveals that the whole meeting is in fact a farce, and that die Comité Directivo and 
the Ministry of Finance have the ultimate say. This is a threat, and it is effective. The 
spokesmen back away somewhat, and finally a price decrease of only 5 % is granted by 
the engineers. 
The delegates, through their attitudes, contribute actively to the commission being 
entirely dependent upon the District engineers and having no real influence or power 
of its own. In that respect the reaction of Rodolfo to being commissioned to report to 
the Comité Directivo is revealing. He worriedly asks the engineers to prepare the 
relevant information. With double satisfaction Corona answers this question positively, 
and Rodolfo is relieved. First, Corona denies the delegates relevant information, end 
they accept the engineers' proposals without much fuss. And secondly, when a delegate 
is commissioned, he is grateful that he only has to read what the engineers write down. 
The linkage between the District and the water users as established in the September 
meeting is thus wholly geared to the District's needs, and entirely orchestrated by the 
District. The delegates play a passive role. Of course, the delegates are aware of the 
marginal role they play. Corona tries to please them by offering diem the opportunity 
to bring forward private irrigation problems (during the 'participation of delegates' 
round); and he regularly organises social gatherings (convivencias) for them where they 
are offered food and drinks, such as the meeting proposed for October at Trigomil. At 
this October meeting the delegates were offered a lavish party (pachanga), with food, 
(alcoholic) drinks, and music (mariachi), which must have cost several thousand US 
dollars. The meeting was further remarkable in that, apart from the delegates and some 
10 District personnel, some 10 (politically) important people from the valley were also 
present. This gave the meeting an extra dimension. It provided the ordinary ejido 
delegates with the illusion of forming part of the valley's elite. Furthermore, it diverted 
their attention from the pressing problems which at that moment were felt in the field: 
the lack of canal maintenance. Although some delegates mentioned these problems 
during the party, no minutes were written, and no measures were taken. This then is 
one of the perks which Corona and Jesus Corrales leave the delegates. They expect 
docility in return, which, as we have seen, they get. 
6.3 Some observations on the analysis of an irrigation institution 
This chapter has examined the way certain decisions concerning crops, water use and 
water fees are arrived at. I have shown that crucial decisions concerning crops which 
people are allowed to grow are not made during the formulation of the cultivation and 
irrigation plans, nor during the Water Users' Commission meeting. Decisions are made 
elsewhere, as exemplified by the way requests to grow sugar cane are negotiated 
between the highest representatives of the irrigation District, the two sugar cane growers 
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organisations and the sugar refinery. The lower-level District employees formulating the 
cultivation and irrigation plans are not even well-informed about the exact outcome of 
these negotiations. The water fees are also fixed by the head of the operation 
department. Farmer representatives are allowed to give their opinion about the new 
fees, but are not given the power to ultimately decide on them, nor the information to 
critically assess the proposal. 
The making of the irrigation plan follows the rules and procedures designed by the 
Ministry in the capital city. However, from the account given above it would appear 
that it has developed essentially into a local activity. Higher District staff leave lower 
personnel to work on the irrigation plan. The latter may think they are involved in the 
process of making crucial decisions. The outcome of these complex calculations, 
however, are interpreted by these senior engineers with a considerable degree of 
freedom, and the power of decision-making lies wholly with one or two engineers. The 
prescribed procedures concerning the making of the irrigation plan are happily 
incorporated into the local institution without affecting it much. It might rather 
strengthen it, making it look more serious, more professional, while making it more 
difficult for laymen (like water users) to critically assess its underlying criteria. 
The relationship between District engineers and the majority of small water users 
is strained. Water users tend to regard engineers as government officers vested with 
authority, rather than civil servants supposed to provide them with adequate services. 
Farmers will hesitate to criticise or even comment on proposals put forward by District 
engineers. Engineers have become accustomed to the manner in which they are 
approached by farmers, and anticipate and expect such attitudes. Given this institutional 
culture, the water users' commission is a queer fish. Farmers are not expected to 
fundamentally question District proposals and yet a farmer platform exists. 
In this chapter, I have tried to contextualise the activities concerning decision-
making, while appreciating the environment in which civil servant's work, or farmer 
representatives discuss with engineers. I purposely included small events which 
coincided with these activities. I did not systematically analyse the institutional decision-
making process on the basis of a set of pre-defined factors, like tasks (or goals, 
objectives), performance and organisational structure. Such an analysis might not do 
justice to the institutional reality found in the El Grullo District. Below, I show that a 
seemingly unimportant factor like 'setting' merits attention because of its analytic power 
for analysing management issues. Appreciating the settings of actions and negotiations 
leads us to consider the District office as an arena where different groups at different 
stages interact, struggle or are set aside (cf. Crehan & Von Oppen, 1988). 
Setting 
This chapter has included information on the spatial arrangements through which 
interactions take place. The way space is organised, and the way physical structures are 
situated and people take up positions helps us to appreciate the physical co-presence of 
people, and of people and materials. This helps us to primarily analyse situations in 
their actual appearance. 
Take the operation department floor. We note first the difference between how office 
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space and space in field situations is organised (e.g. the big old tree as ordering artefact 
in the field, chapter 5, as against the organisational chart in the office); and how the 
operation department differs in appearance from the maintenance department (whereas 
the operation department is quite shabby-looking, the maintenance department's walls 
show impressive charts). From the distribution of the department's space we can partly 
read its formal organisation. At the same time, we observe the fact that it is not all that 
rigidly applied. Due to space shortage, personnel have to be flexible in sharing offices. 
Consequently, contacts and exchanges of information are effective and not time-
consuming. Compartmentalisation of the office not merely reflects its organisational 
structure, it also provides its personnel with niches where they enjoy privacy, can relax, 
joke with friends, or gossip. 
I have tried to indicate that things such as a drawing table may become the focus of 
tensions between colleagues; how locked away coffee pots may characterise the office 
atmosphere, and that erasers may become important vehicles of meaning. These material 
artefacts reflect or may become metaphors of other, much wider, issues. The same 
considerations apply to the Water Users' Commission meeting. Take for instance the 
setting of the September meeting (figure 6.2). It was surprising to see that water users 
appear to maintain some minimum physical distance towards the engineers, which is 
much bigger than the distance they observe among each other. The farmers form a half-
circle around the three District engineers, and do not seem to be willing to pass that 
boundary. Also revealing is my own position in the scene. I am caught between both 
groups, my distance towards the engineers being less than the distance the farmers keep, 
but the distance between me and the farmers still larger than that which they observe 
amongst themselves; a fairly precise reflection of the position I felt I had. Much more 
salient is the setting of the October meeting of the Water Users' Commission. It hardly 
left any doubt about what was happening in that arena, and what relationships the 
various groups participating have. The venue was the construction site of the Trigomil 
dam, a one-hour drive from El Grullo. 
After an excursion over the construction plant organised by ICA (the company 
constructing the dam), we went to a place near a small lake that formerly must have 
been the river bed. It is rather a curious place, because it is a pit where heavy machines 
have deposited and later excavated huge amounts of sand. The place is undulating. At 
the lowest point of the pit a central table had been placed, which became the 'centre' 
of this convivencia. Around this table some 15 people sat. They included the head of 
the District, the head of the operation department, the head engineer of ICA and his 
second-in-command, a representative of the Autlan municipality, and three farmers who 
were not delegates to the commission, among them one of the richest sugar cane 
producers. Furthermore, five farmer delegates also sat around the table, at the head of 
which was seated Jesus Corrales, who arranged the meal. 
Around this focal point of the meeting there are 4 smaller groupings of people and 
activity, concentrated on four heaps of sand. The heaps form a half-circle. The result 
was a kind of arena, with the key actors sitting in the centre court. On one of the 
extremes there was the place where the drinks and food were kept, and where there was 
a coming and going of people and to which beer, sodas and mezcal were constantly 
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brought. The beer was kept cold with huge blocks of ice. The ice was also used for the 
cubas (mezcal with coke). As an appetizer, pork crackling was prepared and distributed 
among the guests. In all, some 50 men were present (not one woman). Also, some 
policemen walked around, among whom were the bodyguards of Jesus. 
The majority of farmer delegates and District engineers sat on the ground or on 
trunks, some having arranged a chair. I participated in the group remotest from the food 
and drink spot, and nearest to the lake. It was a rather high heap of sand (maybe 6 
metres high) upon which we sat, and we had a nice view on the scene below us. There 
we sat: 5 District officers, among whom was Engineer Acosta, one farmer with his 10 
year old son, and me. A handful of delegates were seated below a nearby tree. Another 
tree gave shade to some other delegates. We all looked at the oblong table in the centre. 
Over there, the ambience was good and loudly expressed. All kinds of jokes were told, 
most of them stressing different aspects of macho behaviour. We looked on, in silence. 
I was fascinated by the scene, and felt a kind of intimacy among our group, which 
perhaps was created by our peripheral position. 
Chapter 7 
Irrigation and intervention; 
the case of the Water Users' Association 
As has been convincingly argued by Hunt and Hunt (1976:394-396), irrigation often 
implies the emergence of more linkages with distant markets and institutions. Irrigation 
systems thus give rise to a more marked presence of outside institutions, which 
intervene more intensively in the local scene. In this chapter I want to explore the 
nature of interventions in El Operado, the responses to these at local level, and the 
resulting change or lack thereof. 
The argument is built around three interventions concerning the organisation of 
water users in El Operado.1 The first intervention relates to the foundation of the Water 
Users' Commission in 1980; the second to the creation of the Water Users' Association 
in 1988, which replaced the commission; and the third intervention to the effects on El 
Operado and its Water Users' Association of the new rural modernisation programme 
together with the organisational refrom launched by SARH in 1989, which involved the 
creation of the National Water Commission (Comisidn National del Agua, CNA). 
In the next three sections these interventions will be analysed in chronological order. 
It will become clear that these interventions not only came from outside, but local 
actors, involved in struggles for control over El Operado, also played important roles. 
An attempt is made to link these local struggles with the social dynamics found at higher 
institutional levels. In the fourth section the issue of irrigation and intervention is 
discussed in a broader context. 
7.1 Creating the Water Users' Commission: intervention by local actors 
As has been briefly mentioned in chapter 2, at the root of the creation of the Water 
Users' Commission in 1980 lay the clash between a group of entrepreneurial farmers, 
allied with a handful of high-level functionaries of local government institutions and 
banks, on one hand, and the then Head of the District, Engineer Chavez, and some of 
his close collaborators, on the other. The entrepreneurial farmers wanted to plant vast 
areas of new sugar cane, but the chief engineer was opposed to this and tried to confine 
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the area of sugar cane to clearly defined limits. The ordinary water users were also 
partly involved, in that their interests could be affected by the interests of either of the 
opposing groups. In Chavez' vision, a handful of entrepreneurial farmers planting new 
sugar cane would jeopardise water availability and thus affect the interests of the 
majority of farmers. Conversely, the efforts of the District to limit the sugar cane area 
implied that many small farmers who also wanted to start cultivating sugar cane would 
not be allowed to do so. The struggle between the entrepreneurs and the engineers was 
partly played out over the heads of the ordinary farmers. 
The struggle grew because both groups linked their self interests to policies 
developed in Mexico City. The entrepreneurial group consisted partly of some senior 
employees of the valley's sugar factory, and these maintained very good contacts with 
the national sugar cane lobby. In 1976, when some 3,000 hectares of sugar cane were 
grown in El Operado, the state-owned sugar factory in the valley had applied to the 
central commission of the sugar industry in Mexico City (Comisidn National de la 
Industria Azucacera, CNIA) for a major increase of its milling capacity, which was 
received positively.2 In April 1979 the increase in the factory's milling capacity was 
formally accepted, allowing the sugar factory to mill some 5,300 hectares of sugar cane. 
Simultaneously, in 1976, the SRH Jalisco office had studied the sugar factory's request 
for an extension of the area under sugar cane to 5,300 hectares, and arrived at the 
conclusion that only a maximum of 4,017 hectares of sugar cane could be allowed in 
the El Operado irrigation system. This conclusion was based on a technical analysis of 
the availability of irrigation water for El Operado. 
In 1977, El Grullo District got a new head engineer, Engineer Chavez. One year 
later, this engineer became committed to a new SARH policy of food self-sufficiency. 
This policy had been elaborated in Mexico City during 1978 and 1979 by a group of 
senior engineers, among whom was Chavez' former teacher and padrino, Engineer 
Velazco. Backed by the latest SARH policy, Chavez decided to stick to the 4,000 
hectares limit for sugar cane. He argued that sugar cane consumed more water than 
other crops, and that the steady growth of the total area irrigated had reached the limits 
of water availability (during the 1977-78 season water consumption nearly equalled the 
storage dam's capacity). In his view, any further increase in area under sugar cane 
would mean less water available for the basic food crops. On top of this, too much 
sugar cane (a perennial crop) would create big problems in years with water shortage 
and would especially affect the annual (food) crops. 
Opposition to Chavez' sugar cane policy was heavy and came from a variety of 
people who closed ranks. We may therefore speak of a 'sugar cane lobby'. The lobby 
consisted of some of the entrepreneurial farmers who wanted to shift from horticulture 
to sugar cane production, some employees of the sugar factory and a handful of 
bureaucrats of two banking institutions in El Grullo.3 They aimed at an increase of 
several hundred hectares in 1980. The requests were put forward to the District by 
medieros (share-croppers) and prestanombres (relatives and trusted employees of the 
said entrepreneurs). A further element in the struggle was that all protagonists of the 
lobby were members of local families. Engineer Chavez was thought of as a stranger, 
as he was from another region. The sugar cane lobby simply would not accept outsiders 
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curtailing their (autochthonous) power. Statements Çmanifiestos') appeared in regional 
newspapers, signed by the sugar cane growers organisation, defaming El Grullo 
District's management. 
Aware of the importance of the situation, Engineer Chavez invited the presidents of 
all ejidos to a meeting of the Comité Directivo (governing board of the District) in April 
1979. Normally only one ejido representative per municipality participates, which means 
fanner representatives form a small minority. In the April meeting, however, 12 ejido 
presidents participated. Thus, together with the 5 representatives of the farmer 
organisations for once they constituted a majority and the vote of the meeting was 
therefore to stick to the limit of area under sugar cane, and the agreement was signed 
by all parties involved: not only by ejido leaders, by representatives of the sugar factory 
and the sugar cane producers' association (now obliged to go along with the majority 
decision), and the District, but also by the head (delegate) of SARH Jalisco himself and 
even by the representative of the federal government in Jalisco. In this way, Chavez 
managed to contain the sugar cane area within the 4,017 hectares limit during the 
1979/80 season. 
At the end of 1979 and in 1980 a 'paper war' was fought, principally between the 
Head of the District and the Field Officer of the sugar factory, both writing to senior 
functionaries of government institutions in the capital city. SARH engineers from 
Mexico City came and investigated the El Grullo situation. Chavez realised that his 
position had become almost untenable and that he had to do something or face 
replacement. The solution came from a trusted junior colleague and former university 
friend, Engineer Ochoa, whom Chavez managed to get transferred to El Grullo and 
appointed head of a department. Ochoa appreciated the initiative of Chavez to involve 
all ejido presidents in die Comité Directivo meeting.4 This brought him to the solution 
of the El Grullo conflict. If farmer representatives themselves had to decide how to 
distribute the rights to grow sugar cane, then they would soon come up with the only 
solution: not to expand the area under sugar cane. This would be precisely what Chavez 
wanted, and achieved without making his hands dirty. Chavez and Ochoa readily started 
to organise ejido meetings, where the idea of the formation of a Water Users' 
Commission (Comisiôn de Usuarios) was launched. It was proposed that every ejido 
would send two delegates to the commission. The delegates would participate in the 
collection of crop requests which water users had to fill out each season, they would be 
entitled to present specific irrigation problems in their ejido at the commission meetings, 
and to decide on the irrigation plan. One District engineer recalled in 1988: 
"The lobby would never have allowed us to get our hands on sugar cane. They have never let the 
District control the sugar cane, and they never will, because it is a closed political group and the 
sugar factory agreed with them. (...) The principal motive in creating the Water Users' Commission 
was for us to control the sugar cane growers. How to control them to a certain degree? To get them 
together at the District, so that they would speak there, and not go elsewhere behind our backs." 
The strategy followed by Chavez and Ochoa was to create a second front, or what they 
themselves called applying 'the tactic of the scissors' (la tâctica de las pinzas) which 
entailed attacking your opponent simultaneously from above as well as from below.5 
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In conclusion, contradictory elements were at the core of the formation of the Water 
Users' Commission. First, there were the local competing power groups, one primarily 
concerned with expanding its economic activities, the other with implementing a new 
government programme which was considered sound and just. Second, there were 
contradictory policies at national level (stressing basic food crops as against stimulating 
industrial crops). The local groups then articulated their interests with national policies, 
and the District head was confronted by a strong lobby which he was unable to control. 
He therefore invented the Water Users' Commission. This commission shielded Chavez 
from attacks from the sugar cane lobby, since he succeeded in enroling the commission 
in his own project. The commission's delegates then performed exactly as the Head of 
the District had orchestrated, since he had saddled them with responsibilities they had 
not asked for, and had placed them in a dilemma, namely, for each hectare of new 
sugar cane they allowed fanners to plant, they had to indicate which hectare would be 
denied access to irrigation water. They could not but decide therefore, that it was 
impossible to grant any water user the right to plant new sugar cane. 
The creation of the commission was an intelligent move. It was effective since it 
enabled Chavez to stick to the new SARH policy of stimulating food crops, while 
securing his position. At the same time, it fitted Engineer Ochoa's conception of farmer 
involvement in rural development. For him, the commission was a first step. The 
subsequent history of the commission shows that it was not able to serve both purposes 
simultaneously. 
The formation of the commission was mainly a local affair. Although initially both 
contending groups (engineers versus entrepreneurs) tried to find allies at higher levels 
(in the state and the federal capital), the group that succeeded in creating an ally at local 
level was able finally to impose measures which affected the other group. The story is 
thus not confined to outside intervention only, and to the implementation of 
(contradicting) government policies. It also, and essentially, is about how local groups 
try to manipulate the local state of affairs in their own interests, through taking risky 
initiatives and creating coalitions. The founding of the Water Users' Commission was 
to have some lasting consequences. 
The Commission's apparent consolidation and demise 
During subsequent years, the commission was not able to contain the sugar cane area 
to the limit of 4,000 hectares. The expansion of sugar cane became a negotiated 
process. One major event in the history of the Water Users' Commission was the water 
shortage which struck the irrigation system in the 1982-83 irrigation season. (See 
chapter 6.) In October 1982, the Tacotah storage dam was only filled up to half its 
capacity (69 million cubic metres). It was the first time in El Operado's history that this 
had happened. The cropping plan had to be adapted, and the planting of sugar cane was 
severely restricted. This generated a conflict between the District and the sugar factory. 
The District prohibited the factory to re-plant sugar cane. Then when the factory went 
on planting 200 hectares sugar cane, the District effectively denied them irrigation water 
and the cane died. The District also succeeded in enforcing the restriction on irrigated 
crops, i.e. each water user was allowed a maximum of 6 hectares, or, in case of sugar 
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cane, 10 hectares. This was a major success for Chavez, since in practice it is very 
difficult to effectively control access to irrigation water. 
His success can partly be attributed to the Water Users' Commission: for once it 
really got involved in the matter, it formed the important and effective link between the 
District's engineers and the water users. Shortly after that season's first meeting of the 
Water Users' Commission, most ejidatarios were informed about the restrictions on 
irrigated crops, restrictions which hardly affected the ejidatarios but which did affect 
the larger landowners. The majority of small producers supported and apparently were 
able to control and enforce the measures decided in the commission. 
This event suggests that the commission was gradually consolidating itself as an 
organisation. The subsequent decline of the Water Users' Commission had much to do 
with its 'founding father', Engineer Chavez. He recalls that, 
"During the last years that we stayed in El Grullo [1983-1985] we did not dedicate enough attention 
to the Water Users' Commission. There was a huge pile of other work to be done." 
At the end of 1983, Chavez was called by the new director (delegado) of SARH in 
Jalisco to help him to define a large-scale re-organisation of the SARH, which 
concerned the fusion of the Distritos de Temporal (rain-fed Districts) and the Distritos 
de Riego.6 Half a year later, Chavez was called by bis former teacher, Engineer 
Velazco, to participate in the planning of the same re-organisation process at federal 
level, at the Ministry in Mexico City. By that time Chavez had become known as an 
extremely astute engineer.7 Consequently, Chavez had little time for his District and 
could not supervise the work of Engineer Corona, who, in his capacity as Head of the 
Autlan area office, was directly involved in the matters relating to the Water Users' 
Commission. 
The commission began to participate less and less in the decisions made by the 
District concerning El Operado. The influence of Corona in the commission increased 
further when in September 1985 Chavez was transferred and appointed head of another 
District, taking with him Engineer Ochoa. In El Grullo District, Engineer Lopez Garcfa 
became head engineer. Lopez Garcfa, like Corona, was from the valley, and had been 
head of a rain-fed District. After some months, he made Corona the new head of the 
the operation department, when the head of that department resigned. Lopez Garcfa had 
no experience with irrigation systems, and thus he gave Engineer Corona carte blanche. 
7.2 Founding the Association: intervention by regional actors 
By 1987, the role of the Water Users' Commission had become marginal, and had little 
say in the management of El Operado (chapter 6). Control over El Operado was entirely 
monopolised again by the District's triangular power core, namely the District's head 
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and the heads of the operation and maintenance department (chapter 5). Then, from 
different sides came an initiative to create another, more powerful organisation, the 
Asociacidn de Usuarios, the Water Users' Association. 
The idea for such a new water users' organisation came first from a relatively small 
number of discontented farmers, who were especially dissatisfied with the poor 
maintenance service provided by the District. They wanted to form a water users' 
association, an organisational entity recognised by the Federal Water Law (unlike the 
water users' commission) which would get real responsibilities for the management of 
El Operado, especially over maintenance, and have real decision-making power. These 
farmers referred to another irrigation system, that of El Agua, where at the end of 1985 
a similar water users' association had been formed, under the auspices of Engineer 
Chavez and Engineer Ochoa who, as I explained earlier were now working there.8 That 
association now managed canal maintenance. They said they were an informal group of 
water users who were meeting more or less secretly, and that they planned a trip to the 
El Agua association. The group was not more than a network of persons, which met in 
small subgroups of three or four, which changed composition constantly. Much of these 
informal discussions were held in the plaza of the town, where you always find (older) 
people sitting on the benches, talking and gesticulating, or simply looking at the people 
who pass by. As one of the participants explained to me in a rather cryptic way: "Yes, 
we are already a group, but so far we have not met as such. We only talk in the plaza." 
One major characteristic of the network was that it linked different water users: 
ejidatarios with 8 hectares of irrigated land, as well as rich private landowners with 
over 50 hectares, and even a few lower-level District personnel. The informal way this 
pressure group was organised resulted from a real fear the participants felt about being 
identified by political and government people as opponents, dissidents, or maybe even 
as members of the new coalition of left opposition groups.9 The network structure of 
the group was effective because it was not a formal group, and thus difficult for others 
to identify, let alone to infiltrate or encapsulate. Probably the group's most important 
contribution to the formation of a water users' association was that some members 
informally visited the Head of the El Agua District, Engineer Chavez, whom they 
knew. They inquired about the functioning of the El Agua Water Users' Association, 
and the possibility of forming one in El Grullo. This network emerged at the beginning 
of 1987. 
Somewhat later, in May 1987, the Head of El Grullo District, Lopez Garcfa, 
participated in a Water Users' Commission meeting, where he put forward the idea of 
putting the water users in charge of the maintenance tasks of El Operado. He was not 
in favour of such a move, but this idea had been suggested to him by one of his 
superiors in Guadalajara, Engineer Velazco. Lopez Garcfa presented the idea cautiously, 
as if he only wanted to sense the opinion of the delegates. The reaction of the delegates 
who spoke was very clear: they immediately objected to the idea. They responded by 
pointing out that it was the head engineer who was responsible for maintenance and that 
he should not try to pass this burden on to the water users. Ldpez Garcfa must have 
been relieved with this reaction, as he could now safely dismiss the formation of a water 
users' association, and for the moment he let it rest. The farmers' leaders on the 
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commission were not amng those who participated in the network mentioned above. 
The emergence of the network of 'dissident' water users wanting to create a water 
users' association, and Lopez Garcfa's sounding out, at Guadalajara's suggestion, the 
water users' view on being put in charge of maintenance, was of course no coincidence. 
Both events were connected through Engineer Chavez and his former professor, 
Engineer Velazco. 
The engineers continue to keep the initiative 
More than half a year later, in February 1988, Engineer Lopez Garcia again attended 
a meeting of the Water Users' Commission and informed the farmer delegates of the 
new SARH policy of 'decentralisation of its functions to farmer organisations that work 
in an organised fashion and efficiently', and proposed for the second time the creation 
of a water users' association. It is perhaps surprising that this time the commission 
accepted Lopez Garcfa's proposal with little discussion, whereas in May 1987 the 
'opinion leaders' had responded negatively. The existence of the pressure group may 
have influenced their decision. Now, L6pez Garcfa, who was still quite reluctant to 
launch a new water users' organisation, was ordered to do so by his superiors from 
Guadalajara. His (political) ambitions compelled him to appear disciplined and comply 
with this order. Two weeks later, he called another meeting, this time with all ejido 
presidents (no private landowners present). At this meeting, Lopez Garcfa informed 
them of the new policy: 
"The objective of this meeting is to work out a strategy for the hand-over of the maintenance tasks 
of the Autlan/El Grullo irrigation system to the water users. The policy of SARH is one of 
decentralisation, which means handing over activities to farmers in a way which ensures that they 
will be executed as before but with greater seriousness, faster, and more efficiently." 
He then mentioned one of the problems the District faced: the collected water fees had 
to be deposited in the Ministry of Finance, who later on a monthly bais made certain 
repayments to SARH. However, these amounts were fixed and were not compensated 
for inflation, which created a big problem. The result was that the District could not 
comply with the President's decree of 1987 that the El Grullo unit should be 80% self-
sufficient financially. Lopez Garcfa then said: 
"Two years ago the maintenance tasks of the irrigation units of El Agua and La Cienega were handed 
over to water users' associations, and we can already conclude that this is more efficient. Here in 
El Grullo we are lucky, because there is already a Water Users' Commission. For the District, this 
commission has been very good, it has given the District good backing. Unfortunately the 
commission is not an organisation which is legally recognised. What we want is to form a Water 
Users' Association, in a legal manner. When this is done, they have authorised us to hand over the 
canal maintenance to this association. We will not only offer you technical assistance but we will also 
give you machinery, such as the dragline, the poclains etc. It has already been approved by the 
Water Users' Commission, and I called for this meeting in order to work out the strategy to follow 
for the creation of the water users' association. [...] The most important point is the election of 
delegates. You must explain this very well to your ejidos, in order that the information will not be 
distorted. Think very hard who will represent you. Be careful that he is not someone who will start 
working for his own ends. This is very important. And when all the delegates have been elected, 
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then the Water Users' Association can be founded. [...] I want to insist that the delegates should be 
born leaders, in the good sense of the word. But we do not want to interfere in the elections of 
delegates." 
Although no formal voting was held on Lopez Garcfa's proposal to form the association, 
the ejido presidents implicitly agreed since they accepted his suggestion to organise ejido 
meetings and inform the ejidatarios about the new policy. Then, over a period of seven 
weeks some 24 meetings were held in the 17 ejidos and in both Asociaciones de la 
Pequena Propiedad. From each of these 19 bodies 2 delegates were elected, totalling 
38 delegates. 
The ejido meetings 
All the meetings followed the same pattern: a long discourse by a District official (either 
Lopez Garcfa, Corona, Fuentes or Acosta) started the meeting, explaining why the 
District could not do the maintenance efficiently, and why a water users' association 
could do it better. The language used made it difficult for the greater part of the 
audience to follow. Invariably some 5 to 10% of the ejidatarios present asked a whole 
series of questions. I nearly always had the feeling (and in a few cases I was later able 
to check that I was right) that this relatively small portion of 'involved' fanners came 
from the group of dirigentes (leaders) of the particular ejido. Because these meetings 
are held in the ejido setting, these same people were always able to dominate the 
meetings, and so it is no surprise that those finally elected belonged to this same group 
of leaders.10 Twenty-three out of 38 farmers (or 60%) elected into the Asociacidn had 
previously sat on the commission (or 60%). This raises the question of why this 
association had to be newly formed, and why the District did not simply force a 
decision to rename the commission an asociacidn. In March 1988 I asked Engineer 
Corona about this. 
Corona: T h e Comision is not a legal body.' 
Pieter: 'OK, but you can always find a way to simply transform it, can't you? Or is the reason that 
it is not convenient for you to do so? 
Corona: 'Indeed it isn't, because.. I don't know if you noticed that there are a lot of delegates in the 
Comision who are only concerned with personal problems: my inlet, my canal, etc. The Asociacidn 
will be far more important, and therefore we need more serious people.' 
This comment of Engineer Corona was interesting, because as I have tried to show in 
chapter 6, the behaviour of representatives in the Water Users' Commission was partly 
influenced by the very same District engineers. They had denied the commission 
decision-making power and had contributed to the 'individualism' of representatives 
which Corona now complained about. Corona now had to develop a strategy to 
overcome the culture he himself had helped to create. 
His strategy was to try to relate to the water users' experiences and show he was 
aware of how farmers saw the District. In order to re-establish a link with the water 
users, he had to dispell the images farmers had created of themselves and the District. 
During the ejido meetings, Corona acknowledged the fact that farmers usually saw the 
District workers as la engorda (lit. the engorged one; as for fattened animals), and that 
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this was in fact a useful image to summarise actual practices of District personnel. 
Farmers were surprised to hear this from an engineer (who himself could not be said 
to be slender), and had to laugh. Corona then went on to explain the institutional 
constraints which made it understandable why the District could not do its job more 
effectively. Therefore, he continued, the idea now was to directly involve the farmers, 
who would do a better job because it was in their immediate interests to see that the 
canal system was properly cleaned. Engineer Corona had to use the 'farmer image' and 
their language in order to attract attention to try to regain their confidence, and to reach 
his goal. Hence in this situation, it was the farmers who defined the language through 
which the problem was re-formulated. 
After the last ejido assembly in May 1988, the constitutive assembly of the 
association was celebrated with the participation of the newly elected delegates. The 
meeting was presided over by Engineer Velazco, who had come from Guadalajara for 
the purpose. Engineer Lopez Garcfa did not get a chance to participate, whereas the 
engineer from the state capital gave the delegates ample opportunity to raise questions 
and express doubts. In the meeting Velazco proposed forming a working committee 
which would draft the internal regulations. Once this had been completed, the general 
assembly could discuss, amend and accept it, and only then would an executive board 
be elected. This proposal was agreed upon. Six delegates were elected to the working 
committee. In November, the association's assembly of delegates met again, the drafted 
regulations were agreed upon without discussion, and six delegates were elected to the 
Association's board. In this way the El Grullo Water Users' Association had become 
a fact. 
The idea of forming a water users' association that arose in El Grullo in 1987 
seemed an appropriate solution for tackling the maintenance problems that the El 
Operado farmers faced. In the next chapter I will analyse how the association begun its 
work. Here I am interested in the way actors intervened in its foundation. 
Its creation cannot be understood solely as a local initiative of unsatisfied water users 
in El Grullo. The wider institutional environment also had much to do with it. The role 
of actors at Jalisco level was decisive. But also the national level was involved: the 
serious interest senior engineers in Mexico City demonstrated in the El Agua experiment 
contributed greatly to the confidence people like Chavez and Velazco experienced in 
1987/88. So, the idea was an outcome of initiatives that came from different sides, with 
distinct objectives, and which were influenced and shaped not only by actors at the 
local level, but also by people and developments at regional, state and even national 
level. Moreover, the intervention was shaped by earlier experiments undertaken by 
some of the regional actors involved. In addition, the intervention to create the 
association was also linked to the political climate in Mexico during 1988, the last year 
of the sexenio (i.e. presidential 6-year period). 
The interventions which resulted in the creation of both the Water Users' 
Commission and the Water Users' Association have several similarities. In each case, 
the intervention was rooted in a struggle between two opposing groups, and on both 
occasions, one of the two opposing groups proposed the founding a new farmers 
organisation with the intention of creating a new ally in the struggle in which the group 
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was engaged. Furthermore, the District engineers who launched the Water Users' 
Commission in 1980 had many connections with those engineers who in 1988 had 
ordered the creation of the new Water Users' Association. A further parallel is that in 
both interventions the water users were essentially onlookers, although with the 
Association a group of discontented farmers were active in establishing links with El 
Agua District, and with Engineer Chavez. Thus for both interventions the organisations 
created were geared to the needs of a particular faction within SARH. Before turning 
to the third intervention it is therefore worthwhile to take a closer look at the 
institutional dynamic found within SARH. 
The institutional dynamic 
Earlier in this section, we saw that within the institutions of SARH different vertical 
chains of alliances coexist alongside each other. Actors belonging to one such chain 
used a profitable political context to strengthen themselves and debilitate another such 
chain through the formation of the Water Users' Association in El Grullo. 
These chains are highly personalised and involve trusted friends, colleagues, allies, 
pupils and tutors within a given government institution. One important characteristic of 
such a chain is that it cross-cuts different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Hence, 
Grindle (1977:150) speaks of vertical chains of alliances that need not be short-lived, 
often enduring more than one sexenio (six years). Institutions such as SARH are 
interwoven with such chains and any ambitious young engineer must knit him or herself 
to a senior one, this being virtually the only way of rising in the hierarchy, to become 
for example a Head of a District. One engineer explained: 
"An engineer has to have a relation with a senior engineer at state level. 'I bind myself with so-and-
so' (Yo me discipline con Julano) and thus identify myself with him. Groups coalesce around the 
different leading engineers."" 
Being part of a chain gives people a certain strength and self-confidence and provides 
them with an 'identity'. Chains also short-circuit the normally slow information flow 
between different levels within the bureaucracy which may result in unexpectedly fast 
and effective policy implementation (cf. Kelley 1981:2). These chains of trusted 
relationships may determine the implementation or non-implementation of policy 
measures decided upon at higher levels, but may also bring about new initiatives at a 
local institutional level. This occurred with the chain tying Engineers Ochoa, Chavez 
and Velazco to each other. Over the years, they have been responsible for a consistent 
series of initiatives (involving water users in irrigation Districts), and have made a good 
'team' (equipo). They also succeeded in interesting colleagues and superiors in their 
approach as an effective response to institutional and political reality. 
Viewed from the position of a lower-level bureaucrat, some person plays an 
important role in the chain at a higher level: he connects the local level chain members 
with the institutional centre, since that person has direct access to it. He plays the role 
of patron or political godfather (padrino politico), protector and elder. A vertical chain 
of alliances essentially consists of protector-protege' couples. The protege is supposed 
to be always loyal to his protector (cf. Greenberg 1970: 51), and the relation is 
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cemented by mutual favours. One interesting consequence of the many patronage 
relationships that exist in a government institution is that bureaucrats tend to be more 
honest to their protectors (i.e. superiors) than to their equals (cf. Greenberg, 1970: 
130). 
The relations within an alliance network are usually friendly, though they need not 
be. Nor should such a network be considered a fixed and well-defined group of people, 
with clear mutual obligations, and a clear set of objectives to strive for. This sometimes 
occurs, when the institutional and/or political context is favourable. But most of the time 
members of a network do not interact frequently, although they are quite aware of the 
(remote) presence of other alliance members - as potential resources which can be 
activated when the time is ripe. Alliance members move around in different fields of 
action, often at different 'levels'. It is precisely because of this that these alliances can 
be mutually convenient. The individual member will normally pursue highly personal 
'projects' which are probably not even known to his 'protector' or 'proteges'. At any 
one time personal interests may clash with projects other members pursue. A member 
of an alliance is thus caught between self-interest and demands from patrons. There 
always exists the possibility of proteges becoming too powerful which in the end may 
result in a clash with their patrons and the emergence of a new chain.1 2 
During the transition from one sexenio to the other, members of one chain 
individually 'spot' signs at higher levels: who is likely to become the new minister, 
which people are likely to rise in position. Whereas during the earlier years of the 
sexinio most members hardly see each other, during that last year interaction intensifies; 
they contact each other, and exchange information. The new political situation may 
enable them to strengthen their group, to occupy more crucial positions, and finally to 
compose a team (hacer equipd). Such a team, they think, will be likely to perform 
much better than former ones. 1 3 This was the perspective that Velazco and others saw 
when the new sexinio was shortly to begin. The emphasis on the financial self-
sufficiency of irrigation systems in 1987 was for them one of the signals from the 
political centre to go ahead with the creation of other water users' associations, despite 
the fact that institutionally such a move had not yet been accepted. They gambled that 
if they succeeded, it could have a major impact and this would enhance their position 
during the new sexinio considerably. 
Of course, the Velazco alliance was not the only one in the region. For instance, 
Engineer Lopez Garcia, Head of the El Grullo District, identified with another senior 
official within SARH, a colleague of Engineer Velazco. During the transition period 
between sexinios, tensions are likely to build up between competing alliances. Yet 
differences in opinion and competition may have their roots in earlier years, for 
example during college years. In mid-1987, Velazco was involved in a power struggle 
with an engineer colleague at state level, who happened to be L6pez Garcfa's 
'institutional godfather' and protector. All the more reason for Velazco to use the 
information he got from his protege\ Engineer Chavez, and to debilitate Lopez Garcfa's 
position through an order to form a water users' association in El Grullo. In such a 
way, vertical chains of alliances are an important factor in policy implementation. 
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7.3 Modernising rural Mexico and the backlash 
Having examined two interventions where respectively local and state actors played 
decisive roles, we now turn to another which took place during 1989 and 1990. The 
intervention concerns the takeover of responsibility for El Operado by the local office 
of a new body, the Comisidn National del Agua, which was instituted at national level 
in January 1989. Consequently, El Grullo District (fheDistritodeDesarrollo Rural) lost 
its coordinating role in the operation of the irrigation system. I examine this outside 
intervention so far as it concerned the Autlah-El Grullo Water Users' Association. The 
intervention was connected to a new government programme (the modernisation of rural 
Mexico programme) launched by SARH during 1989. I first examine this new 
programme, and then sketch how it articulates locally and how it is connected to the 
story of the Water Users' Association. 
Policies at the centre: the modernisation of rural Mexico 
The presence of government agencies in rural areas of Mexico has been marked ever 
since the land reforms in the 1930s. Over the years, however, there have been 
alternating tendencies of the government to regulate and de-regulate rural Mexico. The 
presence of the federal government in rural areas is clearest in irrigation districts. Even 
in 1949 ideas already existed to de-regulate government influence in these irrigation 
districts, as a discourse by the then director general of water development (SRH) makes 
clear: 
Big irrigation Districts are now operated by the Government and water users are being organised in 
such a way as to make it possible to turn lateral systems and eventually the whole District over to 
them. (Rodriguez 1949:8) 
This idea however was never implemented, probably because irrigation districts had 
become too important politically.14 Then, following the presidential elections of July 
1988, government policy towards farmer organisations has begun to change. During his 
political campaign in the first half of 1988, the future president of Mexico, Salinas de 
Gortari, launched an ambitious plan to modernise rural Mexico (7a modernizacidn del 
campd'). Modernisation not only implied a more open and capitalist approach to 
agricultural development, it also implied a break with established practices of 
government intervention in rural areas. Independent farmer organisations would now be 
able to participate and profit from government programmes and the virtual monopoly 
of the 'official' organisations (CNC, CNPP, PRI etc.) in principle would be broken. 
The new programme was much in line with the strategy Salinas de Gortari adopted 
throughout his campaign of 'social reconciliation' (concertacidn social) which was 
meant to give people a feeling that they were being listened to. All this was a desperate 
attempt of the future president to respond to the desparate situation that the majority of 
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the rural population found itself in. 1 5 Government programmes, canalised through 
(semi-)government institutions and official farmer organisations, did not reach the 
population who needed them most. These programmes were often poorly defined. 
Implicitly it was recognised that independent farmer organisations were better equipped 
to formulate and implement development programmes. With this policy, Salinas de 
Gortari attempted to halt widespread discontent with government rural development 
programmes, dam the growing opposition during the electoral campaign, and 
compromise independent organisations, through binding them to his new programme. 
This strategy of the 'official' presidential candidate was continued during the first year 
after he took office (1989). 
The modernisation programme had two basic characteristics: (1) diminishing 
government intervention in agriculture; and (2) government sharing responsibility for 
development programmes with producer organisations (Hernandez 1989:9). The 
Minister of SARH, shortly after he took office, gave his analysis of the failure of 
former development programmes: 
Surely this is due to the fact that we intervened a great deal, and without them [the peasants] 
(seguramerUe se debe a que intervenimos muchos, menos ellos). (De la Vega Dominguez 1989:6) 
To accomplish this change in policy, the Minister urged all Mexicans: 
to break dykes and vicious practices, to defeat apathy and corruption which perpetuate injustice, 
waste resources and prevent change. (De la Vega Dominguez 1989:8) 
One of the brains behind the modernisation programme was Gustavo Gordillo, once 
involved in one of the most important independent farmer organisations of Mexico (see 
Gordillo 1988), now subsecretary of the department of farmers organisations in SARH. 
He describes the whole effort as 'a national crusade which promotes the reactivation and 
efficient productivity of the agricultural sector' (Gordillo 1990:3). In his analysis of 
what went wrong with the old approach to rural areas, Gordillo observes that the 
'tutelage' or paternalism of the government which was designed to guarantee social 
justice in rural Mexico, has gradually evolved into government institutions becoming 
the protagonists of rural development instead of the producers, resulting in 
bureaucratisation, inefficiencies and the obstruction of production (Gordillo 1990:4). 
Thus, modernising rural Mexico implies, firstly, returning to the producers their 
central role in rural development. This could be implemented through redefining the 
functions of institutions and producers. Secondly, the mechanisms which enabled 
differential access to resources and public services (Gordillo calls this mechanism 'renta 
institutional", something like: institutional tribute) have to be dissolved, because they 
generated greater social inequality and inefficient use of resources. Thirdly, the 
institutions should become flexible, permitting the instruments of the agricultural policy 
(among others subsidies) to be applied selectively and differentially according to 
product, type of producer and region (p.9). 
Gordillo, however, is aware that such a programme carries obstacles and risks, since 
it implies a redistribution of forces at the regional level. Moreover, he hints at deeply-
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rooted feuds within the state apparatus (p. 14). The idea is that through involving 
producers and producers' organisations, a kind of social accountability ('contraloria 
social', SARH 1989:12-13) over government institutions can be build into the 
programme, which should ensure the efficient and just implementation of the 
programme by these institutions. 
Despite its interesting features, the programme received a lot of criticism. Here I 
leave aside the many partisan critiques by spokesmen of independent farmer 
organisations, especially addressed to Engineer Gordillo who was accused of betraying 
the independent movement in Mexico. I here mention only three critiques which focus 
on the content of the programme. 
(1) A main criticism of the new programme was that the strongest independent 
farmer organisations were found in irrigation Districts, especially in the northern part 
of the country. These were privileged farmers, but through their strong organisation 
they were best equipped to formulate projects and secure funds under the new 
programme. This was compounded by the fact that in 1989 it was in the government's 
interest to quickly show that the new policy could work. However, sound projects were 
scarce. Hence all strong farmer organisations who had submitted projects immediately 
received funds. In contrast, the majority of poor peasants in Mexico are rain-fed 
producers, who live scattered all over the country and who are not organised. How will 
they get access to the new programme? (Hernandez 1989:22). Curiously, Gordillo 
himself had foreseen this pitfall when, in 1988, he speculated on future 
developments.16 
In those situations where farmer organisations exist but are still feeble (because of 
their 'institutional' heritage), throwing all the weight of formulating productive 
programmes on the organisation's executive board, and more importantly, quickly 
channelling considerable amounts of money through these organisations will most likely 
result in the corruption of farmers' leaders and the disintegration of organisations. 
(2) Another drawback of the programme was that it depended for its implementation 
on regional and local government officers. Apart from the fact that they had little 
interest in the programme becoming a success, they were also poorly equipped to 
strengthen farmer organisations, since government policy had always appeared to favour 
the opposite (van der Zaag 1991). 
(3) Finally, the legal framework of Mexico was not yet adapted well enough to the 
new programme and many laws were multi-interpretable, which consequently offered 
unwilling regional elites and government officers many escape routes with which to 
obstruct any genuine farmer initiatives (van der Zaag 1991). 
In short, the programme did not contain guarantees that it would indeed reach the 
rural poor, nor that it would strengthen farmer organisation. 
Opposing forces 
The above programme neatly fits in with the initiatives in both El Agua and El Grullo 
to create water users' associations. However, at the time of the creation of these 
organisations, no explicit policy had been formulated in the federal capital. In June 
1989, with the publication of the national development plan for 1989-1994 (Plan acional 
Irrigation and intervention 173 
de Desarrollo), these initiatives received institutional support: 
It is reckoned convenient to create bodies with the participation of the social [=ejidd\ and private 
sector, which will become responsible for the operation and maintenance of the hydraulic 
infrastructure. It is aimed to see that the irrigation Districts will be financially autonomous and 
administratively independent (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1989:77). 
At the state level, the position of engineers such as Chavez and Velazco was quite 
comfortable, since they had been busy creating independent farmer organisations and 
handing over financial responsibilities from the government to water users well before 
it had become an explicit policy. So, by 1989, they had put themselves centre stage, 
because they could provide a concrete perspective for implementing part of the 
modernisation programme. Moreover, some of the members of their institutional 
alliance had been promoted to key positions in different government institutions. Chavez 
and Velazco expected to be appointed soon to higher positions as well. 
However, institutional change does not come about without counter moves by those 
who feel jeopardised by it. Some groups of engineers within SARH opposed the 
programme since it turned upside down the normal government policy of channelling 
funds and programmes through 'official' organisations and government institutions. In 
this sense the programme was revolutionary, and it questioned the proven practices of 
bureaucrats over the past decades which seriously disturbed the old hydraulic engineers 
(known as the dinosaurios, dinosaurs). These engineers form a powerful group within 
SARH who at the time controlled SRH (Hydraulic Resources) before it fused with SAG 
(Agriculture) in 1977. They opposed the new programme. During the presidential 
campaign, this group did not openly criticise the new programme. In return for their 
silence they demanded the re-institution of the old Distritos de Riego, conceived under 
a new, relatively independent body within the ministry (the Comisidn Nacional del 
Agua, or CNA). This National Water Commission would, apart from other things, 
manage and operate the Irrigation Districts.17 Since the CNA would incorporate most 
hydraulic engineers, the engineers would be able to retain their relative position of 
power within the Ministry. 
By early 1989, SARH was re-organised into 4 departments and one commission, 
CNA. The Minister of SARH said about this new organisational structure: 'Now we are 
better integrated in order to comply with our obligations' (De la Vega 1989:2). But, at 
the local level, as we shall see, the Ministry disintegrated. 
Modernising the local level: winding the clock back a decade 
Here we again take up the story of the formation of the association. After May 1988, 
when the association held its constitutive assembly, nothing much happened. The lack 
of speed with which the association was finally formed contrasts sharply with the 
urgency the engineers first showed. It reflects the unsettled atmosphere within 
government institutions during the second part of 1988. The presidential elections in 
July created some turmoil. During the period after these elections and before the 
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inauguration of the new president in December, the activities of all government 
institutions sharply decreased in the rural areas. The federal government had run out of 
money, and many government officials were more interested in speculating about the 
composition of the new cabinet, and the personnel reshuffles this would entail, than to 
provide services to the public. In El Grullo District, the chief engineer had to 
temporarily resign during his own electoral campaign (he stood as candidate for mayor 
in Autlan during the December municipality elections). Engineer Corona was nominated 
acting head but faced budget restraints and could not perform canal maintenance 
properly, and he did not even bother to revise the water fees for the 1988/89 irrigation 
season. He eagerly awaited his formal appointment as the new Head of the District. 
Institutionally the interest in the Water Users' Association had suddenly faded (cf. 
Grindle 1977:164-166). 
About the same time, rumours began to circulate about Engineer Ochoa becoming 
the new District Head. This worried Engineer Corona, as he too had ambitions to be 
appointed head, and he knew his chances were slim. Together with other engineers, he 
had heard about the incipient creation of CNA. Corona and the other engineers decided 
to do everything they could to activate the necessary contacts and networks to secure 
positions in this new body. 
Other rumours directly related to the formation of the Water Users' Association also 
circulated in the valley. Several were about important persons who tried to put forward 
trusted delegates as candidates for the association's presidency. Quite a different 
rumour, encountered in the remotest ejidos, was that the SARH District supposedly had 
received a government subsidy of 190 million pesos (equivalent to some 90,000 dollars) 
for canal maintenance. This rumour made sense to the ejidatarios: now they understood 
why SARH functionaries were rushing to get rid of the maintenance task, to put this 
money into their own pockets. The rumours may not have been true, but what matters 
here is that the rumours were there, and that they circulated in the villages. 
In early 1989, Engineer Ochoa was appointed head of the El Grullo District. One 
of the first things he did was to marginalise the position of both heads of the operation 
and maintenance department, Corona and Fuentes. He simply did this through a major 
reshuffle of responsibilities, so that they reflected the official organisational chart, and 
not the informal one. Thus, all concerns with policy implementation were redirected to 
the area offices. This meant that from now on, the head of the Autlan area office, 
Engineer Acosta, an old friend of the new District head, was placed in charge of El 
Operado. Engineer Ochoa was in a euphoric mood, because he had been able to set 
aside both department heads in one stroke without sacking or degrading them. Having 
now a trusted engineer in charge of operating and maintaining El Operado, meant he 
could proceed with strengthening the Water Users' Association. First he handed over 
the maintenance machinery to the association, then the association's delegates were 
given the responsibility of gathering requests for canal cleaning and checking any work 
done. The association executed the cleaning of canals quite successfully: better, more 
opportunely and less expensively than in previous years. The financial position of the 
association was stabilised by defining and collecting an additional water fee for the 
1988/89 irrigation season (which had not been revised by Engineer Corona). For Ochoa 
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this was not enough. He wanted to put a fully-fledged water users' organisation in place 
before the CNA took over management of El Operado, in September that year. In July 
1989, Ochoa suggested that the association's board should start thinking about how to 
get involved in operation (water distribution) as well. Ochoa mobilised many of his 
extension workers and after some busy months, they finally created a new position: that 
of the gate leader (jefe de toma). In the potreros along all canals farmers elected gate 
leaders. (Chapter 8.) 
By August 1989, Engineer Ochoa was satisfied: the basic structure was in place, and 
many senior officials were interested in the project. Not only did the director of SARH 
in Jalisco visit his District and the association, but so did the Governor of Jalisco. 
Together with the board members of the association, Ochoa formulated a document 
including the advances of the organisation, which was presented to the governor (see 
appendix 4, first document). 
At this most glamorous moment in the story, things again began to change. The 
change came from above, with the appointment of the resident engineer for the newly 
formed local CNA office in El Grullo. His office was in El Grullo, but he was in 
charge of two other irrigation systems as well. This meant that the old 'Irrigation 
District' structure, identical to the pre-1977 situation, was re-instituted. This implies that 
the District headed by Engineer Ochoa (the Distrito de Desarrollo Rural) was put aside 
in all matters relating to the management of El Operado. The heads of both the 
operation and maintenance department were transferred to the new CNA office, and 
were again in charge of El Operado. 
The engineers Fuentes and Corona, who had never shown interest in a strong water 
users' association, together with the new CNA resident engineer, started to work along 
two lines. Firstly, to higher authorities they started to portray the association as a highly 
effective farmer organisation which was the logical response to the modernisation 
programme, and suggested that it was entirely their invention. To this end, they 
produced some documents and a video film, which they sent to their superiors (for the 
video text, see appendix 4, second document). 
Secondly, they tried to curtail the influence of the association in matters concerning 
El Operado, and to give themselves a prominent place. They therefore revised the 
Association's regulations or charter (acta). The resulting new regulations as accepted 
in the general assembly of February 1990, gave the association's board many powers, 
and reduced the central role which the general assembly of delegates had. The board 
now defined the assembly's agenda, delegates were allowed to add further issues to the 
agenda but only if 2/3s of all delegates agreed. In the former regulations no such 
limitation was defined. The new regulations did not define whether delegates had the 
capacity to call for an extraordinary assembly, and the suggestion was that they did not. 
In the former regulations 5% of the delegates could call for a general assembly. 
Other changes made in the regulations included: replacing all references to the Rural 
Development District by CNA; and sharply increasing the number of clauses by which 
the power of the board was subject to control by the CNA office. The CNA was also 
able to appoint one of its engineers to the board. All financial proposals, arrangements, 
and reports (including defining the water fees) by the board had to be presented to the 
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CNA for approval. Also all activities in the field were subject to supervision by the 
CNA. The CNA member of the board had the capacity to intervene temporarily in the 
association in cases of serious conflict, and it was left to the discretion of the CNA to 
decide when a conflict had become serious. The regulations furthermore stated that one 
of the basic tasks of the association was 'to carry out and to let others carry out the 
decisions taken in the sub-committee of operation and maintenance', which in fact were 
decisions taken by the CNA (Asociacioh 1990, Instructivo, p.4). The new association 
thus was tightly bound to the CNA. 
The CNA engineers had to overcome one major obstacle in order to secure their 
own central position in El Operado. Having a formal water users' association meant that 
the irrigation system ceased to be an 'irrigation district' (system managed by the 
government, now CNA), and was now an irrigation unit of rural development (unidad 
de riego de desarrollo rural, a system managed by its users and supervised not by the 
CNA but by the Rural Development District). This implied that the CNA would lose 
its mandate over the system and had to transfer it back to El Grullo District. In Mexico 
City a senior engineer found the solution: the El Grullo Water Users' Association 
should become a foundation (Asociacidn Civil), which, in a legal sense is not the same 
as a water users' association. Thus El Operado remained an irrigation district. 
Furthermore, creating a new foundation implied that its constitutive deed had to be 
formulated, which offered the CNA engineers the possibility to revise completely the 
association's regulations. 
Most water users were not surprised by the new 'tutelage' to which the association 
was subjected. They had never had much confidence in the association in the first place. 
The same more or less held for their representatives: since their role in the association 
had been severely restricted, there was little they could do. Finally, the six members 
of the association's board felt little sympathy for the CNA engineers and their zeal to 
dam the power of the association. They realised that if they openly opposed the new 
regulations, the CNA would simply dismantle the association. The association's board, 
however, did succeed in negotiating that in the new regulations the association should 
have responsible for water distribution. According to board members, this was planned 
to be agreed to in July 1990. Therefore, the board members opted to play the CNA 
game for the time being. They suggested to me that once water distribution was in their 
hands they had more means to ignore interventions from the CNA. In the meantime the 
board was busy training (paid) staff, among whom there was a young engineer who 
would later take charge of water distribution. During the first half of 1990 the board 
had to play a double game. This confused the delegates and strengthened scepticism 
among water users. 
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7.4 Irrigation and intervention: a conclusion 
This third case of intervention in the Water Users' Association is a case in which 
distant, or outside forces play an important role (the new modernisation programme 
developed in the federal capital, and a major re-organisation within SARH). However, 
new policies provide new opportunities to local and regional actors, who re-interpret 
these policies and use them to their own benefit. In El Grullo, modernising the rural 
areas with a view to 'producers determining their production programmes, their 
commitments and work styles, without the authorities exercising anachronic and harmful 
tutelage' (Gordillo 1990:2) resulted in just the opposite. 
The three cases reviewed in this chapter are interrelated, since they all concern the 
water user organisation of El Operado. These intervention cover a period of a decade, 
and provide a diachronic picture. We examined the background which led to each 
intervention, their implementation, how they worked out, and finally how particular 
groups of actors reacted in various ways against them. All interventions were double-
layered: (1) the stated goal of the interventions (e.g. let water users participate in 
decision-making, in maintenance; let them pay the real operation costs) were geared to 
solve institutional problems; and (2) the (more or less hidden) goals of the intervening 
engineers. They themselves wanted to gain institutionally from these interventions. This 
is best demonstrated by the way in which the intervening engineers of the second and 
third interventions cautiously managed public relations. The engineers made the 
association write documents which selectively displayed its impressive developments, 
and the crucial role the institutions had played in it. The goals of the interventions thus 
were ambiguous.18 
Despite the three interventions having many common characteristics, they also 
differed. The first intervention, the creation of the Water Users' Commission, was not 
planned well in advance and was implemented very quickly. The intervention was 
designed to contain the power of the sugar cane lobby, but it had no stated long-term 
aim with regard to the management of El Operado. The foundation of the Water Users' 
Association, the second intervention, by contrast was a slow and tedious process. Its 
stated goal was clear: to hand over maintenance tasks to the organisation. Nobody 
involved, however, exactly knew how this goal could be reached, and the District 
engineers displayed different commitments to it. Water users and water user 
representatives at first did not fully understand what the intervention was about, and 
were not able to contribute actively to its implementation. The third intervention, 
whereby the CNA took over responsibility for El Operado was all the more confusing, 
since now two local offices (CNA office and District) of the same institution (SARH) 
openly displayed contrary intentions. The stated goal of the CNA was to proceed with 
the consolidation of the Water Users' Association. What it in fact did was to debilitate 
it. 
All three interventions were implemented at a formal level (creating a formal 
organisation), but the interventions failed to take account of the implications both for 
the organisational set-up of the management of El Operado, and for the social 
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relationships found at local level. The interventions remained confined to formal rules, 
and did not therefore have an impact on existing practices with respect to the 
management of El Operado. 
Only when the association defined precisely its relationship with its productive 
resource, i.e. the canal infrastructure, and the local actors at field level received their 
role in the operational process (first the role of the farmer representatives with respect 
to maintenance was clearly defined; later a new nexus much nearer to field level was 
established through gate leaders), did the association have a proper structure to enable 
the practices of the people involved to change (see chapter 8). Counteracting forces 
were omni-present, and it appeared that attempts to reorganise the existing order 
through programmes devised in a distant centre created new opportunities for local 
actors, especially for those who profited most from the existing order. 
The three interventions gave rise to a series of encounters and social interactions 
which were important. In table 7.1, I single out a number of interactions I found 
crucial. One thing emerges from this: interventions are implemented partly through 
encounters and interactions between actors stemming from different social worlds (e.g. 
engineers-farmers, engineers-entrepreneurs) or belonging to different levels in the 
institutional hierarchy. These encounters can be understood as social interfaces, since 
Table 7.1 Important encounters in three interventions in the water users' organisation 
(1) creating the commission 
(a) no direct interaction between rival groups (local District engineers-sugar cane entrepreneurs) 
(b) intimate encounters between SARH engineers cross-cutting hierarchical lines 
(c) District engineers convincing farmers in ejido meetings 
(2a) creating the association 
(a) some farmers informally discuss at the plaza, express their discontent, and some of them having 
an interview with the head of El Agua district 
(b) high level SARH engineer orders District head to form the association and to hand-over 
maintenance 
(c) District engineers address ejido meetings 
(2b) reviving the association 
(d) the new District head sets aside some engineers, and works intensively with the elected board 
(e) the district head works with lower level engineers, who elaborate a plan for farmer involvement 
in water distribution 
(f) board members have an autocratic attitude towards the delegates during assemblies 
(3) take-over by CNA 
(a) two District engineers mobilise their networks in the hierarchy, and are appointed into local 
CNA office 
(b) once the CNA is in charge, these engineers make clear to the board members that regulations 
have to be revised, and the CNA role secured; the board strategically abide. 
(c) District engineers and the association's board meet informally 
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major discontinuities between the participants exist (Long 1989). This is also consistent 
with the thesis of Hunt and Hunt (1976) that irrigation development goes hand in hand 
with the emergence of linkages with formerly distant or absent entities. But another 
thing which emerges is that in each intervention crucial actors are set aside, neglected 
or by-passed. These non-interactions or 'disjunctions' (Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 
1989:213) are as important to capture the essence of the interventions as are the 
encounters or social interactions that take place. Indeed the majority of common fanners 
were hardly taken into account. 
It is important furthermore to note that most social interactions were imbued with 
power inequalities: engineers convincing ejidatarios; farmer representatives deciding 
while they felt the hot breath of the engineers on their necks; engineers making clear 
to the board that regulations had to be revised, and so on. The three interventions 
reviewed did have immediate effects (i.e. the sugar cane area was contained; better 
canal maintenance to be achieved), and coincided with needs felt by water users 
(especially the case with the association). These interventions did not change the 
relationships between the major groups of people involved in El Operado. However, the 
moment the association defined a more prominent role for local-level water users the 
stage was set for more fundamental changes, changes in the practices of people involved 
in El Operado: of farmers, their representatives, entrepreneurs and functionaries. This 
I will explore in the next chapter. 
Chapter 8 
Decentralising irrigation management; 
farmer participation and changing practice 
This chapter, like the foregoing, deals with both water users' organisations of El 
Operado. In chapter 7 I examined how outside interventions impinged on these 
organisations, and we analysed how the various parties involved dealt with the 
interventions. In this chapter we will look in detail into the internal dynamics of both 
the defunct Commission and the new Water Users' Association. Since water user 
participation in irrigation systems is a major theme in irrigation policies nowadays, it 
is of interest to know how both water users' organisations, which are rather unique in 
Mexico, actually function. My argument centres around water users' representatives, 
and how they cope with both District engineers and their constituencies (i.e. the water 
users). Power relations are likely to crystallise around such intermediate positions (Fox 
and Gordillo 1989, Bartra 1980, Long 1989). 
In the foregoing chapters we concluded that the role of the District engineers in the 
daily operation of El Operado was less central than they themselves thought. It emerged 
that farmers' informal participation in the government managed irrigation system is 
important and not to be neglected. We saw how farmer initiatives partially filled the gap 
that exists between water users and District engineers. The question now arises of how 
a formal water users' organisation finds a place within the existing patterns of 
interaction between water users and District engineers. In other words, if local farmer 
initiatives with respect to, for example, canal maintenance fill an organisational vacuum, 
is there space for a formal water users' organisation? How does the organisation relate 
to the numerous informal initiatives, working arrangements and the informal patterns 
of cooperation between farmers, and between farmers and lower level District 
personnel? 
The first section gives a base-line of formal farmer participation, through an analysis 
of the functioning of the now defunct Water Users' Commission. Then, we will 
examine how farmer representatives and District engineers dealt with each other, in 
June 1988, when they defined the formal charter of the Water Users' Association. By 
December 1988, there was still little to distinguish the new organisation from the old 
commission. In the third section we see how, at the beginning of a new sexenio, the 
association gradually developed into a serious farmers' organisation, as it was able to 
break with some of the old practices characteristic of El Operado's management. This 
section then, is about a change of practice. The final section discusses the perspectives 
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and pitfalls of the Water Users' Association. At the time of writing its ultimate fate was 
all but settled. 
8.1 The Water Users' Commission operating at the intermediate level 
In order to contextualise the theme of farmer organisations in El Operado, it is 
necessary to analyse in detail the commission's internal dynamics. I will discuss the 
commission in terms of an intermediate organisation. Then I will pay attention to the 
commission's composition and analyse the attitudes of commission members during 
meetings. The empirical material upon which the analysis is based was gathered during 
1987, when the commission was still in place. 
Farmers' organisations can be understood as intermediate structures, mediating 
between on the one hand government (or other) 'outside' institutions, and on the other 
the individual farmers (Esman and Uphoff 1984). For a government agency, such 
organisations present an important entrance at grass roots level. For the farmers, in 
turn, the organisation is viewed as a canal through which access to a distant institutional 
and economic reality can be realised. Similarly, the Water Users' Commission can be 
understood as an arena where different forces and interests meet or intersect. 
The Autlah-El Grullo Water User Commission was set up in 1980 and designed to 
solve institutional problems like safeguarding food crops for instance (see chapter 7). 
From its origin, the commission was designed to serve the purposes of the government 
agency rather than the water users. Over the years, this gradually became the basic 
characteristic of the commission. Farmer delegates being unable to make their own 
demands on top of the agenda and to hence change its practice. Moreover, since 1984, 
some engineers purposely marginalised the commission's mandate and heavily 
influenced management matters'. They cunningly played a strategy of divide and rule 
on the commission. This strategy was effective because it was easily articulated with 
existing mechanisms of distrust. 
The most succinct analysis of the commission's actual functioning as an intermediate 
organisation was given by a delegate, Don Guco. Shortly after the September meeting 
(see chapter 6), Don Guco invited me to his house, and gave me an 'in-a-nutshelT 
power analysis of this intermediate organisation. 
"It was the engineers of the Secretarfa who created the commission out of self-defense, not because 
it was necessary, but in order for them to strengthen themselves. To the effect that those from the 
Secretarfa washed their hands of the bad things (las malas cosas) they engaged in. We, as delegates, 
stand in between the water users and the Secretarfa, but we do not serve to defend our water users. 
We bend before the Secretarfa. So, the Secretarfa hits (chinga) the water users through us in the 
commission." 
Don Guco stood up, bowed his back, and plastically indicated with his hands how the 
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District, over bis back, reaches the water users, and how he is used in this process. It 
was clear that Don Guco was not satisfied with the actual functioning of the Water 
Users' Commission. So what does he do about it? 
"We cannot change the situation. I don't have the papers; the data. They have not given us the 
information. I do not have the probabilities [hydrological data] in order to judge [their decisions]. The 
people in the commission do not speak up, don't you see? Who spoke up during the meeting?" 
The problems with the Water Users' Commission can be partly explained by the 
obvious power issues at hand: District personnel can side step the commission at will. 
Since El Operado's construction, the District has had a central role in managing the 
system. Like all medium and large scale irrigation systems in Mexico, El Operado was 
designed to be managed centrally by a government agency. Water distribution, canal 
maintenance and decision making were all to be handled by the District. Strategic 
decisions, such as the level of water fees and the cropping plan, were to be formulated 
by the District's personnel in the annual irrigation plan, to be approved by the board of 
the District (Comité Directive-).2 Farmer involvement in the management of El Operado 
was virtually nil. The only decision farmers could influence was in relation to the 
cropping plan. Individually they decided which crops to grow. The Water Users' 
Commission was not able to change the relationship between District and water users. 
The commission was debilitated by its crippling organisational set up. Its organisation 
precluded the commission's ability of becoming an effective organisation through which 
fanners defined and defended their own interests. 
Firstly, the commission was a lame organisation because it did not have an elected 
board or a secretariat, nor its own financial resources. It was designed to have none of 
these. Secondly, the organisation had no legal backing, since federal water law only 
recognised water users' associations. Only to associations could the federal water laws 
be applied. The head of the District purposely gave the organisation the title of 
'commission' precisely because it then had no legal backing, and was thus easy to 
establish without repercussions. Thirdly, the delegates were recruited from among the 
ejidos, each ejido electing or designating one delegate and a deputy. Thus, the 
commission's organisational set-up formed part of the organisational structure of the 
ejidos in the valley. In addition, the commission tends to follow the existing power 
structure underlying the ejidos, subsequently copying their practices. The commission's 
attention was easily diverted from its specific tasks, concerned with the irrigation 
infrastructure and its management. Delegates limited their participation to generalities 
(like rubber stamping decisions already made by the District), and normally did not 
address practical issues. This resulted in their contribution being insignificant, and had 
much to do with the fact that the relationship between the delegate and the water users 
he represented was feeble, and his responsibility over (part of) El Operado's 
infrastructure was ill-defined. 
We can understand this when we consider that the ejido boundaries do not follow 
the 'hydraulic boundaries' created by, for example, lateral canals. There are great 
differences in the irrigated areas between ejidos, but all are entitled to one delegate and 
a deputy. The commission's constituency is not thus defined in hydraulic terms. This 
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directly affects die type of relationship established between a delegate and his 
constituency: he is meant to report during the monthly ejido meeting but does not 
discuss problems farmers may face in the field. Ejido meetings have their own dynamics 
and seem to follow their own logic (see chapter 2), which ensures that certain practical 
issues are hardly ever addressed. Water users do not see what their delegates do, and 
cannot thus control them or demand an account of their actions. As such the content of 
the relationship between water users and their representatives tends to be divorced from 
the dynamics encountered at canal level. As we saw in chapter 5, at canal level, the 
experiences of farmers' cooperation and mobilisation allow us conclude that in the field 
there is a reality to be found that consists of informal collective water user initiatives 
which are defined along canal boundaries rather than ejido boundaries. By contrast, the 
commission's reality is rather theoretical and self-contained. 
In conclusion, then, the Water Users' Commission is ineffective as an intermediate 
structure since it does not establish a link between the 'grass roots' and the institutional 
reality.3 How do the water user representatives cope with this situation, and what 
attitudes do they take during commission meetings? 
Speaking attitudes 
The delegates of the commission, who are all male,4 do not form a unified social 
group. Many do not even know each other by name. In some instances, factions of 
delegates have emerged around specific geographical areas (see below). An important 
division is that between the delegates living in Autlah and El Grullo as against those 
living in the small hamlets of the valley. Though, perhaps, the best way to distinguish 
between delegates is to consider whether or not a delegate has any 'political' or 
administrative experience; either as a member of the ejido board (mesa directiva) or 
another farmer organisation, or through being active in party politics. Half of all 
delegates (members of the commission in 1987) have former administrative experience 
outside the commission, most of them having, at some point, occupied a post in the 
board of their ejido. In total 20% of all delegates have had important posts in either 
local politics, or in other farmer organisations (Asociacidn Canera, Unidn de Ejidos, 
Asociacidn Agricola Local de Horticultores, for example). These 20 % are often referred 
to as the 'pollticos' by their fellow farmers. 
In order to characterise the way delegates deal with the commission, I examine their 
speaking attitudes during the September meeting (see chapter 6). During the discussions 
concerning the cropping plan and the water fees, there were a total of 88 spoken 
(verbal) interventions. In all, two engineers and 10 out of 17 delegates participated in 
the discussion, but of the delegates three clearly dominated the discussion (table 8.1). 
Some 40% of the delegates do not speak. The only opportunity they take to talk is 
during that point on the agenda designated as the 'participation of the delegates'. The 
silent people on the commission may seem apathetic in their attitude. However, many 
of the people who keep quiet in fact observe the proceedings in detail, and often have 
clear-cut opinions (frequently quite critical ones), but simply decide not to speak up. 
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Table 8.1 Verbal interventions during part of the September 1987 meeting of the water 
users' commission 
name of speaker farmer/engineer number of percentage 
interventions of total 
Leon Ruiz farmer 20 23 
Don Guco farmer 7 8 
Rodolfo farmer 7 8 
7 other farmers farmers 11 12 
Engineer Corona engineer 38 43 
Engineer Acosta engineer 5 6 
sum 88 100% 
Source: own observation 
idea or opinion, but only affirm the point of view of one of the engineers or another 
delegate. They invariably adhere to the invisible 'rule' of always hiding behind someone 
Then there are delegates (another 40 %) who, when speaking do not come up with a new 
else's back, and 'copy catting' the persons they have identified as their opinion leaders, 
but hardly ever openly attack the point of view of a District engineer. They avoid 
clashes. A third category is formed the remaining 20% of delegates who easily come 
up with their own opinion, or offer a new point of view. This category includes "the 
(experienced) pollticos", who talk in a political fashion: cautiously and diplomatically, 
frequently expressing themselves in a highly populist way. Among the speakers, 
however, there are also those farmers who simply speak their minds, often without 
considering the consequences this may have. They seem to lack the skills needed to 
express their thoughts more diplomatically. Thus they are often not taken seriously, and 
are unable to influence decisions decisively (cf. Heijdra 1989:76). However, to their 
advantage the straight-forward ones (so far) have kept their independent nature and, 
unlike the poUticos, have resisted cooptation by outside forces. The District engineers 
do not have control over them, and in some instances the engineers conclude that the 
attitudes of these straight-forward farmers is unbecoming and 'undisciplined'5. In 
extreme cases, people who do not stick to the rule of discipline will be removed from 
the commission, although formally speaking the District has no say in who represents 
a particular ejido.6. 
This classification of delegates according to speaking attitude is partly compatible 
with the categories many farmers use themselves, as they often distinguish between 
productores and politicos. The former being the common farmers, often seen in the 
field, being productive and independent. The latter are hardly ever seen in the field, and 
tend to live off their compafleros and the wider political and economic system. 
It would be too simple to conclude that the commission does not function properly 
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because the water users in the commission lack certain knowledge, or are too timid, and 
because others are too opportunistic. The majority do not speak up. But it is not because 
they are blind to the mechanisms at work. They know how conflict and cooptation work 
out. Although it is true that they do not always understand technical details, they are 
nevertheless very keen to know what is going on. Delegates have learned that speaking 
up in the commission either does not have any effect, or end up being counter-
productive. 
Metaphors and mechanisms of distrust 
When I talked with people informally about the general theme of farmer organisation, 
particularly members of the Water Users' Commission, I raised the issue of 
cooperation. All the farmers responded that in fact there was little cooperation among 
them, not even among farmers of the same ejido, or with adjoining plots, let alone 
between delegates of the Water Users' Commission. Most of them added that people 
tended to distrust each other (desconfiarse). Also, all of them clearly expressed that they 
considered concepts like cooperation and trust positively, and distrust negatively. The 
model these people have of how they think community life should be is opposite to how 
they experience community life in practice. I asked them the origin of such distrust. 
Why was it? Where did it come from? They answered that they had no satisfactory 
answer to this difficult question, or repeated what they had already said. But quite a few 
of the farmers interviewed responded by recounting a local saying. 
An organisation such as an ejido might be compared to a beehive (colmena), where 
industrious bees may work together and produce plenty of honey. Ejidatarios, however, 
indicated that beehives could be infested by male warrior bees (zdnganos), and then no 
honey is produced at all. Some people would emphasise, when interviewed, that 
although distrust among community members was widespread, it was not because they 
see themselves as distrustful by nature. Circumstances have made them so, much like 
how the donkey has been made intractable (la burra no siempre era arisca, la hicieron). 
Local (farmer) organisations face big problems, since people prefer to work individually 
rather than cooperatively. People easily recognise that they are like monkeys or spiders, 
each having their own rope or web (coda chango a su mecate, or cada arana por su 
hebrd). Most people realise however that not everybody has equal ability. The 
differentiation between human characters is reflected metaphorically in the different 
abilities of various species of a particular insect (the mayate). Some may have special 
qualities that others lack, and therefore within the community some people will have 
higher positions than others (no toda close de mayate harfa bold). For those who have 
successful careers, and get rich fast, people used to comment that they will not go very 
far, like the spiders who will only make it halfway when climbing the wall (no hay 
arana que pasa de media pared). In the community, there are some lazy members who 
mask their laziness by criticising others and making many allegations. These people are 
like sheep, easily aroused but lazy (eres como los borregos: pendejo y bufdn; and, 
consequently: que no hay pendejo que no sea bufdn).1 
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I was surprised, invariably these sayings were metaphors derived from the animal 
world, and were based on the meticulous observations of animal behaviour. I gather 
people also observe in the same detailed fashion what goes on in human interaction. 
People express their thoughts about such fundamental issues in a metaphorical way 
because the metaphors mimic closely their own experience. Perhaps people would have 
difficulty in finding words adequate to express their feelings. I noted that people felt 
embarrassed to discuss these 'negative' aspects of their community with a stranger, like 
myself. 
Ordinary people do not easily speak up in community affairs. Many people 
expressed their fears of being 'burned' in front of the community (quemarse uno ante 
la gente), and that they preferred to keep a 'low profile'. Their perception of the 
community is characterised by a fear of being subjected of gossip. Their fear of going 
against the 'common opinion' inhibited the course of many initiatives, they kept silent 
enabling those who did take initiatives to go on, without objections to their actions. I 
was told of the numerous 'cases' in which those persons who had taken initiatives 
become subject to severe gossip. From this perspective it appears that the moment you 
speak up or take an initiative you are left with only two options: you either betray your 
own people, by being co-opted by the people against whom you want to speak up, or 
you make yourself look ridiculous, becoming involved in some kind of 'Don Quijote 
fight' against 'the system', as one farmer put it, and in doing so you harm the case you 
want to settle. Either way, you may end up jeopardising your own standing with local 
people, who may loath you because you thought yourself better than them. One tragic 
outcome of people's fears is that of (apparent) apathy, or rather the suppression of 
initiatives (an active process!). I must emphasise that such an attitude originates from 
the close observation of and profound insights into community affairs, and not from a 
lack of awareness or ignorance. 
Most people will do anything in order to avoid either of the two positions mentioned 
above. This, then, is the 'silent' majority who tend to distrust anyone who takes the 
lead. That this is a 'social issue', a thing people think and talk about, is also reflected 
in the words they typically use in order to express their feelings. The words they 
employ are typical 'mexicanismos1 some are not Castellan in origin but derive from 
native Mexican languages.8 It seems that these words are used foremost in situations 
where community members cross the 'boundary' between the (local, peasant) 
community and the wider social environment. In using these words, local people seem 
to emphasise the existence of this boundary and contribute to the maintenance of the 
cultural identity of their community. 
Distrust seems an understandable reaction by local people against government 
involvement. It contributes to community moral, in that the use of special words and 
expressions recreate and reinforce cultural boundaries, boundaries which in normal 
course of events tend to be easily blurred. Thus, although it is clear that distrust among 
fellowmen contributes to the perpetuating paternalism on the part of government 
functionaries and the people's own leaders, and, at first sight, seems to function as an 
obstacle to any change, suspicion and distrust may also become shared by many people, 
and eventually result in joint action. Suspicion and distrust may be aired in gossip 
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Figure 8.1 The Water Users' Commission in El Operado's arena, with its four 
major domains. Note the missing link between the canals and the 
ejidos. 
(chismes) with trusted friends, which may start to circulate in extended networks. In the 
foregoing chapter we saw how an informal network emerged as the result of people's 
desire to form a water users' association. On that occasion such a gossip network 
became both positive and constructive in meaning: a new idea started to circulate and 
finally succeeded in linking certain water users, who formed a pressure group 
propagating a new organisation. 
The commission and the domains of El Operado 
We can sketch El Operado's arena, identifying four 'settings' or 'domains', and position 
the commission in this arena (figure 8.1). These four 'domains' we have already come 
across in this and preceding chapters. The field or canal domain, as described in 
chapters 4 and 5, is characterised by the heterogeneity of water users, with different 
soils and crops, with big and small canals etc. There is a District office domain, as 
described in chapter 6, with its hierarchical structure. In addition we have the valley's 
elite which has been touched upon in previous chapters, consisting of local politicians, 
rich entrepreneurs and higher officials of several (semi-) government institutions and 
banks. The valley's elite frequent very specific places which are often not accessible to 
other people, where they meet and interact. This then, is the domain of the valley's 
elite. Finally mere is the ejido domain, notably the monthly ejido meetings where the 
farmers' leaders are in charge. 
People's practices and their interactions emerge in particular physical settings which 
188 Chapter 8 
I have now labelled 'domains', in the very practical sense of territory. Yet from the 
material presented so far, it can be seen that domains are more than simply spatial or 
physical settings. In a particular domain, people behave in particular ways, and also, 
expect particular attitudes of others, and value particular things that in other domains 
might be quite irrelevant. Actors may also derive part of their identity and self-esteem 
from the domain to which they feel they belong (cf. Karp 1978:155). Farmers in the 
field, then, behave differently from farmers' leaders in an ejido meeting, and engineers 
in their offices have developed yet other practices. Engineers control much of what is 
going on in their offices, but on a field trip they often are not capable of exerting 
control over, say, farmers. Reversely, farmers take different poses in the field, in an 
ejido meeting, or in the District office. 
Figure 8.1 shows that the commission forms part of the ejido domain and is 
divorced from the canal situation (no direct link between the commission and the field). 
The District's top engineers mainly communicate with the valley's elite on a more or 
less equal basis, and maintain contact with the commission in a paternalistic fashion. 
The link between the District and the field is established through the canaleros who 
receive directives of a general nature which they have to adapt to the heterogeneity 
found in the field situation (characterised in the figure by the different symbols scattered 
around). 
8.2 The formal institution of the Water Users' Association 
As we already know, after the commission's gradual demise, in 1988 an initiative was 
taken to create another organisation, to be called Asociacidn de Usuarios, which would 
receive much more formal powers than the stripped commission. Initially there were 
only minor differences between the defunct commission and the newly formed 
Asociacidn. In mid 1989, however, the new Water Users' Association started to work, 
it began cleaning the canals of El Operado. By 1990, it also started to participate in 
water distribution. As we saw in the foregoing chapter, in 1988 the head of the El 
Grullo District launched the formation of the association. During March and April, 
meetings were organised in all ejidos, where the new project was explained, and 
delegates elected. 
After the last ejido meeting, in May 1988 the constitutive assembly of the association 
with the newly elected delegates was celebrated. During the meeting, Engineer Velazco, 
a senior official from SARH office in Guadalajara (involved from the outset in the El 
Grullo association), proposed to elect a working committee which would write up a 
draft of the association's charter. Only when the general assembly had accepted it, could 
an executive board be elected. The delegates agreed and the working committee was 
installed. The working committee met five times during May and June 1988, to draft 
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the charter of the water users' association. This was the first concrete activity in which 
farmer representatives were involved. The manner in which this committee found a way 
of working was to influence subsequent events for the Water Users' Association, since 
later three of its members were elected onto the association's board. I will not describe 
in detail how the five meetings developed. A short conclusion suffices. 
The working committee 
The committee consisted of six farmers; four are ejidatarios, two private landowners. 
The two youngest have attended university. Two others have much administrative and 
political experience (one having been, among other things, director of the local 
Agricultural Credit Bank, the other having been mayor of El Grullo). Another farmer 
owns several shops. Only one farmer seems to come closest to the average water users 
with simply 8 hectares of land and some experience on the board of bis ejido. Of the 
six committee members, two control (much) more than 30 hectares of irrigated lands. 
The five sessions of the committee were principally about definitions: not only to 
define the charter, but also, at first, to define what the meetings were about, and, how 
the relationship between water users and District officials would be reshaped. From the 
outset it became clear that the water users of the committee were at a disadvantage. 
They had to work out something for which they did not have the relevant detailed 
knowledge. This gave rise to a feeling of uncertainty. However, they soon grasped the 
only 'handle' they were offered, the charter of the El Agua water users' association. 
With it, they were able to do their work without having to question again and again 
what it was they were doing. The El Agua charter played such a prominent role in the 
meetings, that it in fact hindered a clear vision. The language used in the charter is 
formalistic and academic, this did not help matters. The charter induced a process of 
'distancing', the more the farmers got into the El Agua charter, the more they got away 
from El Grullo, and the practical question of how to get the association started. The fact 
that they used the El Agua charter as a blueprint created formalistic discussions, 
endlessly repeated, concerning the relationship between the association and the ejidos. 
These discussions were not clearly resolved. One may ask: was it necessary to discuss 
such formal rules so prematurely. 
Another problematic feature of the working committee was that the members 
maintained little contact with their constituencies: the other delegates and the common 
water users. No feedback discussions with groups of delegates or water users were held. 
The other delegates and water users were not consulted to help define criteria 
underlying the new charter. The committee members consequently tried to make the 
best of it on the basis of their own criteria. 
The meetings revealed that the District engineers, and especially Engineer Fuentes, 
were not willing to contribute positively to the association's formation. Their attitudes 
were in fact obstructive. The farmers were not well enough equipped to counteract these 
effectively, although they did display some cunningness in circumventing pressures 
exerted by the engineers. Forming the association implied a major shift in the existing 
relationships between the functionaries and the farmer leaders. Although the meetings 
were often tense, they did not adequately re-define this relationship. What can be said 
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is that the uncertainty the farmer-leaders experienced was to some extent also shared by 
the functionaries: their position was questioned by the very fact the meetings took place 
at all. The uncertainties created an ambiguous atmosphere at the meetings. Farmers 
tried to define in as much detail as possible their own positions, whilst the functionaries 
seemed eager to restore their status by creating confusion and vagueness. 
In this diffuse situation, the farmer representatives tended to work on their own 
initiative and in isolation from their constituencies. Later when the association's board 
was elected and began to work, they adopted similar attitudes: the link between the 
leaders and their followers remained problematic. In their zeal to work out a charter 
which was adequate for the new association, the committee members became involved 
in a tenacious struggle with the engineers, forgetting their own position of power 
derived from representing hundreds of water users. It was only at the end of the last 
meeting that they referred to this fact. Shifting the entrenched positions of the two major 
groups seemed impossible through formal rule making. Especially when one of the 
parties is simply not prepared to give in. 
The executive board elected 
In November 1988 the District engineers finally organised the association's second 
assembly of delegates. Not, however, until various farmer leaders and officials of 
government institutions put pressure on the District head to proceed with the 
association's formation. The District sent an invitation letter outlining the assembly's 
agenda to all the delegates. There were two points on it, first, the association's charter 
and second the election of the board. During the assembly, the drafted charter was read 
aloud and agreed upon without discussion. Then, after a very chaotic discussion on how 
to elect the board, it was decided to vote secretly and with ballot papers. Six delegates 
were elected onto the board, which consisted of an executive committee (mesa directive) 
with a president, secretary and a treasurer and a control council (consejo de vigilancid) 
with the same composition. Together they formed the executive board. 
Out of 31 possible candidates, only 9 names were offered to the vote. Of the six 
persons elected, four lived in El Grullo and two in Autlah; not one was from a rural 
village. Furthermore, although the private land holders only formed a small minority 
in the association (4 against 34), they had half of the seats on the board. Three of the 
elected board members belonged to the economic elite of the valley, and two of the 
remaining three are also quite 'well-to-do'. Don Teodoro, the favourite of Engineer 
Lopez Garcfa, head of the District, got elected president.9 It was of course the politicos 
who were elected onto the board. Not one of the board members could be considered 
a 'common' water user. This is hardly surprising. What is remarkable is that the board 
integrated an interesting range of poKticos with different power bases and qualities. The 
board appeared to be ideally composed and quite well-balanced as far as it was 
concerned with the political affluent. In retrospect, it is tempting to rationalise the 
board's composition in the following way (table 8.2). The president of the executive 
committee was chosen because of his close relations with the District head, but also 
because of his administrative and political experience. The executive's secretary was 
elected because of his dynamism, his administrative experience and his technical 
Decentralising irrigation management 191 
Table 8.2 Board members, their assets and administrative experience; it is indicated 
which members were also on the working committee that drafted the charter 
position name ejido? land committee group political or administrative experience 
mesa directiva 
president Teodora 
secretary Salvador 
treasurer Fidel 
yes 10 ha yes ldpez ex-bank director, head of traffic police 
no > 3 0 h a yes grullo secretary CNFP sugar cane growers association 
yes 8 ha no corrales secretary ejido, deputy mayor of El Grullo 
consejo de vigilancia 
president Angel no 
secretary Zacarias no 
treasurer Bernardo yes 
20 ha no grullo ex-canalero 
> 3 0 h a no 16pez several administrative positions 
8 ha yes corrales ex-mayor El Grullo, ex-pres. of ejido 
knowledge as an engineer. The president being from Autlah implied that another 
ejidatario from El Grullo would be elected onto the executive committee, in this case 
the treasurer. The president of the control council had much practical experience with 
canal maintenance and he knew El Operado's infrastructure better than anyone else, 
since he had worked for 26 years as a canalero. The secretary was chosen because of 
all water users he probably had the best contacts, with most easy access to both the 
Jalisco political centre and further afield. Finally the treasurer was chosen thanks to 
the powerful leader of the sugar cane growers. To reconstruct the board's election in 
this way suggests that everything was orchestrated beforehand. This is in fact not what 
happened; during the secret ballot several forces had secured allies and competed with 
others. Three alliances could be distinguished: two groups around Engineer Ldpez 
Garcfa and Jesus Corrales, respectively, and a grouping of 'independent' farmers, 
mainly El Grullo based. 
8.3 Changing practice through creating effective linkages 
Between November 1988 (when the board was elected) and February 1989 much 
happened but little to do with the association. Nobody had confidence in the 
organisation. Even Engineer Fuentes appeared to have some second thoughts when, 
coming out of die January assembly meeting, he exclaimed: 
T h e s e people don't know! Look here: we [the engineers] had to organise the assembly, invite them. 
We! They do not take initiatives. The ejido structure has become useless. We have to think of 
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another way of organising them." 
Would this organisation ever become a serious alternative for El Operado's 
management? 
In December the new Mexican president was inaugurated, and at the end of that 
month the new ministers are announced. Also in December 1988, municipal elections 
were held, and Engineer Lopez Garcia was elected mayor of Autlah. In January, the 
annual fiestas of Autlah took all the association's president's time in his capacity as head 
of traffic police. In February 1989, the new head engineer of the El Grullo District was 
appointed: Engineer Ochoa, who came from the El Agua District. As we observed 
earlier, Engineer Ochoa had formerly worked under Engineer Chavez in the El Grullo 
District and it was he who came up with the idea of the Water Users' Commission in 
1980. In 1989, he started to revive again the newly formed association. 
A new beginning 
The first thing the new head engineer does is to formalise the official organisational 
structure of the District, which meant that the heads of the operation and the 
maintenance department (Corona and Fuentes) were stripped of their powers. 
Responsibility for both water distribution and the maintenance of El Operado is 
transferred to the head of the Autlah area office, Engineer Acosta, an old friend and 
colleague of Engineer Ochoa. 
At the beginning of March, the association's board met with the new head engineer 
for the first time. During the following months, Engineer Ochoa put a lot of energy in 
to stimulating the board of the association to work. He urged them to visit the El Agua 
irrigation system. The association's charter was again revised (on the basis of the 
newest charter of El Agua association). Engineer Ochoa furthermore demanded that the 
distinction between executive committee and control council be removed and that the 
six board members work together on the executive board. He helped the board prepare 
the monthly assembly meetings. From then on, it was the board's president who 
presided over the assembly of delegates, and not a District official. 
On March 30th, an assembly of delegates was held. The association's president 
introduced Engineer Ochoa to the delegates. He also informed them about the actual 
changes within the District, and explained that subsequent requests for canal 
maintenance from a water user to the District, should only be considered if the delegate 
in the association supported the user's request. The written request must be signed and 
delivered to Engineer Acosta, head of the Autlah area office and not to Engineer 
Fuentes. Bernardo then informed the delegates about the board's excursion to the El 
Agua irrigation system, and how its association functioned: 
"The president o f the El Agua association insisted and kept on insisting telling us: 'when we received 
the irrigation system, SARH did not give us one screwdriver*. Thus, they made us understand that 
for them it was not a fancy nor an opportunity nor a present which they received from the 
government. Also they explained to us, senores, the needs they had: field ditches, canals, lateral 
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canals, all were totally silted up. There were canals normally carrying 20 irrigations which, they told 
us, hardly could bring two. [...] With these canals silted and lacking an adequate water distribution 
their crops were suffering. So , when they started organising, as I said, it was not because of an 
opportunity but it came from the need to survive. Either their irrigation system would be finished 
or they would take up the responsibility. They explained to us that after having organised ejido 
meetings, they agreed to make a plan of necessities. They made it, analysed it, saw what it would 
cost, and gathered their delegates and said: this it will cost to start working. But because they paid 
a water fee o f three thousand, three thousand!, pesos per hectare, they said: with that we stay as we 
are. Analysing this, I would Like us to really understand (compenetremos) this, because this is the 
heart of the matter: with the three thousand pesos the things will get even worse because everything 
has become much more expensive. And the first leap they agreed upon was to . . . , at how much 
engineer? It was ten thousand. Which means they multiplied it three times! Please correct me if I am 
wrong. For me, this impressed me much, and what I am telling you I bear not in my head but in my 
heart. They made this three-fold increase for the first time because they needed to buy trucks because 
they had bad roads, bad drains, bad canals, bad deep-wells. And so did they equip themselves. I 
want you to take it in your minds and talk at your [ejido] meetings about the situation these people 
are experiencing, they showed us their good intentions (buena voluntad), and it is worthwhile to 
think how we are going to equip ourselves. So, they started equipping themselves, and the next year 
they increased [the water fees] to over 40 thousand per hectare and at present they pay over 80 
thousand pesos." 
With this speech, Bernardo was able to capture the interest of his audience, colleague 
fanners, through translating an experience into a convincing discourse. He exaggerated 
where necessary. Bernardo was genuinely enthusiastic about the El Agua association, 
and convinced they could do it in El Operado. Energetically he tried to transmit this to 
his audience. After the speech, the assembly of delegates formally decided to take over 
the responsibility of canal maintenance of El Operado from the District. Only a month 
after his arrival in El Grullo, Engineer Ochoa seemed to have revived the association. 
With his enthusiasm he was able to inspire the board members. These members, in turn, 
tried to energise the delegates, as did Bernardo, in his colourful speech. 
During April and May 1988, the District engineers held tedious discussions with the 
association's board on how to get started with the maintenance task. One of the major 
problems concerned the existing financial arrangements. The water fees of the 1988/89 
irrigation season had already been paid by the majority of water users. However, the 
fees had not been adjusted in August 1988, so water users had paid the same fee as in 
the 1987/88 season. Due to the inflation Mexico experienced, in real terms the fees 
were very low, and they covered only some 30-40% of the running costs of El Operado 
for the 1988/89 season. By May 1989, the maintenance department had spent 50% of 
the collected fees. The remaining budget was just enough to cover the expenses of water 
distribution. Where was the money to come from with which the association could start 
cleaning the canals between July to December 1989; the period with expected highest 
maintenance needs? 
Engineer Ochoa came up with a practical solution: define an additional water fee on 
the basis of the required budget; the old water fee being used to cover operational costs 
(still executed by the District), and the new fees forming the association's maintenance 
budget. The water users would pay the additional water fees to the administration 
department of the District (as yet the association did not have a proper administration), 
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wad this department then would hand it over directly to the Water Users' Association. 
Ochoa's proposal was accepted by the board. New fees were calculated and die board 
expected to collect 300 million pesos (some US$ 110,000), which was envisaged to be 
enough to complete all the maintenance tasks for July through to December 1989. 
The association needed machinery and personnel for cleaning the canals. So in May 
1989 all machines of the District involved in El Operado's maintenance (2 draglines, 
2 bulldozers; 2 hydraulic excavators; 1 grader; 1 dumper and 1 pick-up) were officially 
handed over to the Water Users' Association, which were held for use on a permanent 
loan basis. The board decided to pay the District personnel operating the heavy 
machines an extra salary on top of the government salary which they still received. 
Moreover, the association got its own office, in one of the buildings of the District. 
With the Association having its own budget (by May 30th, the association had already 
collected 12,500,000 pesos out of the water fees), the machinery, and its own office, 
die conditions were created for existing practices to change. 
Cleaning canals: three practices change 
During May 1989, the maintenance needs were inventorised in detail. The board gave 
the association's delegates the responsibility to define maintenance needs along the 
canals of their constituencies. Then, the board, aided by the District engineers calculated 
the detailed costs of the required work. New water fees were fixed on the basis of the 
required budget. The required work, the budget and the proposed new water fees were 
presented to the assembly of delegates (they got photocopies). The delegates were 
informed how the money would be spent, and although they thought the new fees were 
high, they wanted all canals to be cleaned, and accepted the fees (for example, the fee 
for sugar cane was fixed on 70,000 pesos/ha; farmers had already paid the old water 
fee of 29,000 pesos, so they were then left to pay an additional 41,000 pesos). This 
change in the way the water fees are established, shows how practices change, 
compared to how the commission functioned: delegates establish the water fees on the 
basis of detailed cost estimates. If they want to lower the fees, they have to specify 
which canals or drains to leave outside the cleaning programme. Furthermore, the 
delegates now have information with which the association's expenditure can be checked 
at the end of the season. 
The water users who want maintenance work to be carried out on a particular canal 
have to report this to his/her delegate, who submits it to the association's board, by 
filling in a requisition form. Any water user going directly to the head of die 
maintenance department (as was the normal practice) is turned down, since this 
department no longer controls the maintenance machinery. Farmers going to the Autlah 
area office, in charge of managing El Operado, to request for maintenance services, are 
categorically turned down by Engineer Acosta, and are told to refer to their delegate. 
Apart from the six board members, who do the bulk of the management work, the 
ordinary delegates also have a clear-cut responsibility. The result is remarkable: the 
responsibility boosts the delegates' morale and puts them into a position whereby both 
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the association's board and the water users start to take them into account. The 
delegates not only take note of maintenance needs, but also monitor whether the work 
is done properly. By introducing a procedure for making requests and installing a 
(visible) control mechanism, the informal and ad hoc way of handling maintenance work 
(see chapter 5) is abandoned, and a second practice is altered. 
At the end of the year it was concluded that canal maintenance was performed 
satisfactorily according to both farmers and the canaleros. The association had cleaned 
more canals in less time, and with only half the budget when compared to how the 
maintenance department of the District did it the previous year. In January 1990 the 
association presented its balance sheet for the period between May to December 1989. 
It had collected over 300 million pesos. It spent 200 million (125 million on canal 
maintenance and 75 million on office equipment), and had built up an acquisition and 
machine maintenance fund of over 100 million (approx. US$ 36,000). Part of it was 
used to acquire two pick-up trucks and two second hand tippers. It appeared that 
through cleaning part of the canals by hand, a saving of 20 million pesos was achieved. 
The balance sheet furthermore revealed that the hiring out of machines beyond El 
Operado for private persons and institutions had generated some 50 million pesos of 
extra income (US$ 18,000). Here a third practice has changed: machines are no longer 
used solely as personal assets. 
In a short time some fundamental issues were settled: the new organisation was 
respected by District officials, it had its own office, and more important, its own budget 
and assets (such as heavy machinery). All of which are important preconditions for such 
an organisation to start functioning.10 Furthermore, important officials have visited the 
association; firstly the director of SARH Jalisco in August, and in October the Jalisco 
governor. This notwithstanding, the association was not able to change two other 
important practices. First, the association's board still depends on the District. Not only 
for technical and administrative support, but also financially. This dependency comes 
from two sides. The board still lacked the skills and experience to work independently, 
but the head engineer of the District did everything in his power to support the board. 
The Water Users' Association, he saw as his own personal project, which had to 
succeed. He used every opportunity to strengthen the organisation, and thus he also 
supported the association financially, by providing operators for the heavy machinery 
and their salaries, and by providing free repairs and fuel. This implied that the balance 
sheet of the association as presented in January 1990 did not reveal contributions from 
the District of over 200 million pesos, or 60%. 
The second practice that remained concerns the relationships both within the 
association (between board members and delegates) and between the association as such 
with the water users (i.e. the relationships between delegates and water users). These 
remained feeble. 
Weak linkages 
The two board members that remain crucial for the daily functioning of the association 
are the secretary of the executive board and the president of the control council. The 
former is a civil engineer by profession and has ample experience in managing 
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organisations, the latter, a retired canalero, knows El Operado as few others and has 
had much experience with executing and managing canal maintenance by hand (during 
the 1960s and early 1970s). Both board members have been able to learn fast and 
quickly. 
Farmers remained sceptical about the new organisation, although most were satisfied 
with the canal cleaning during 1989. Farmers, however, still feared that within a year 
or two the board, the delegates and the District would return to their former practices. 
The farmers' scepticism was strengthened by the way they were informed. The 
delegates hardly involved their water users in discussions concerned with basic 
decisions. Instead they informed the water users afterwards, if they informed them at 
all. This is much the same as how the defunct commission used to function. The 
delegates themselves were duly informed by the board but hardly any discussion took 
place during the assemblies. These assemblies continue to be a unidirectional 
information flow from the board and District engineers to the delegates with no clear 
decision making procedures to follow. The board members were energetically involved 
in getting the association started. In doing so they become close to some District 
engineers, while becoming more estranged from the delegates, who look on. 
During assembly meetings, board members still tended not to give reasons for 
certain decisions made, but rather played on the sentiments of the delegates. When 
during the February 1990 assembly new water fees were discussed one delegate was 
very persistent in asking for more detailed information on the estimates of the proposed 
budget. Neither the board nor District engineers answered the question satisfactorily, 
but the delegate insisted. Then, the board's president said: "We are only doing what the 
assembly agrees. We only pay those who are really working. And we need the 
confidence of you, the delegates, to go ahead."11 This was a power play: who of the 
delegates would openly dare to question the intentions of the board? 
The Water Users' Association had started to break with current practices of 
favouritism and personal gain, exemplified by new procedures to identify maintenance 
needs. Some moves were made to give the delegates a more prominent role in the 
organisation. This improved somewhat the delegates' involvement during assembly 
meetings, and it also stimulated contact with their water users. But these links remained 
most precarious. The association was a formal organisation, and as yet it did not appeal 
to, or connect up with another set of existing practices of farmer initiatives, and 
cooperation at field level. 
Putting new linkages in place 
In September 1989, the association having acquired some experience with maintenance, 
felt confident to participate also in water distribution. This was prompted by the water 
shortage which struck El Operado. The association decided to allow only the perennial 
crops to be irrigated, and these to only receive three irrigation turns (one in December, 
February and April). All annual crops were forbidden. To effectively control water 
distribution, Engineer Ochoa realised that intensive vigilance was needed, and that water 
users could be instrumental to this end. In discussions with the association's board, 
Engineer Ochoa and Engineer Acosta decided to post a District extension worker to 
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Figure 8.2 Through the jefes de toma the water users' association has established 
a strong link with the field domain. 
each canalero, and that along each canal, farmers were nominated to supervise water 
distribution, the so-called jefes de toma, or gate leaders. The extension workers should 
ensure that die gate leaders and canalero work together. A group of extension officers 
worked intensely during September through to November, organised ejido meetings and 
along each canal farmers were elected gate leaders. These gate leaders supervise areas 
which in most cases were a potrero (a group of adjoining fields of one ejido or in the 
hands of one or more private landowner). In some ejidos, the institution of the jefe de 
toma linked up with an already existing institution, that of jefe de potrero. The position 
of jefe de potrero thus becomes both concrete and practical with respect to water 
distribution. At the end of November this new organisational structure for water 
distribution was formally instituted in a general assembly of the association, whereby 
not only the delegates were present, but also all elected gate leaders, and, most 
significantly, the six canaleros. Each zone of El Operado had formed work teams 
(equipos de trabajo), each consisting of a canalero, an extension worker and two or 
three delegates representing the ejidatarios and/or private landowners for that zone. The 
gate leaders were entrusted to supervise water distribution at field level. The board's 
president explained why the work teams were formed: 
"The work teams are instituted in order to prevent corruption as much as possible in this year of 
water shortage, which is to say that we do not want anybody to use his position to his own benefit, 
but instead serve effectively those we represent." 
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At the end of this most important meeting, when everything seemed to be in place for 
farmers to actively participate in water distribution, a new engineer presents himself as 
the resident engineer of the new local CNA office (Comisidn National del Agua) and 
says mat from today it is not the District but the CNA who is in charge of El Operado. 
With some rains in December, it was decided to postpone the first irrigation turn 
until January. When the first irrigation turn was distributed, the delegates and gate 
leaders were left aside. During the association's assembly in February, the president and 
other delegates criticised severely the CNA resident engineer for not having allowed the 
delegates and gate leaders to be involved in water distribution, as had been decided in 
November. The CNA engineer reluctantly gave in, and during the next irrigation turn, 
the new organisational set-up was successfully implemented on the left bank of El 
Operado. 
Conclusion 
By establishing a new position (i.e., that of the gate leaders), the association seems to 
have established a crucial nexus with the field level. Apart from the formally elected 
delegates who link the board (and District engineers) with the ejido, the jefes de toma 
form the (so far missing) link between the association and the field. This second link 
makes monitoring the field situation possible (figure 8.2, compare with figure 8.1). 
Field staff (canaleros), board members and the delegates of the water users can be held 
responsible for their actions by the water users. Moreover, a canal-based form of 
farmer representation, for the first time makes is possible for the association's formal 
organisation to link up with other existing expressions of cooperation found at canal 
level. This is a fundamental change in the existing practice of water distribution: now 
water users at field level, canaleros, delegates and board members are no longer 
divorced from each other. The contribution of the first two actors to the organisation's 
work style and dynamic may be considerable, whereas the last two actors still have to 
come up with practical guidelines to implement water distribution at field level. This is 
what in fact happened during the first half of 1990. The association's president became 
less and less interested in his position, since the association gradually evolved into an 
institution implementing a practical task, making it less a politically important 
institution. The two members of the board with the most practical experience in 
administration and water management, the board's secretary and the president of the 
control council, do most, practical, work. 
The association is now also involved in water distribution, which may have a 
beneficial side-effect. Farmers are keen on water, and they will not easily accept the 
mis-management and abuse of such a crucial input. With more water users becoming 
involved, they now may as well take an interest in how canal maintenance is performed. 
Since canal maintenance concerns many more resources (money and machines), this is 
where eventually most problems are likely to occur. 
The success of the association depends heavily on its executive board. The water 
users see their leaders interact frequently with officials, and may question how far an 
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executive becomes absorbed by the District. The water users may doubt the 
association's real identity and where its boundaries lie. The executive may talk nicely 
during assembly meetings, but at the end of the day he simply has to perform in the 
field; cleaning canals, and ensuring just and reliable water distribution. Through 
establishing a strong link with the field, by means of the jefes de toma (gate leaders or 
gate keepers in more than one sense of the word: also in the sense of boundary 
managers, cf. Morgan, 1986:167), the association clarifies its mandate, reaffirms its 
identity and its boundaries and checks its executive. This strengthens die association, 
strength needed to cope with a new institution, the CNA. 
8.4 Decentralising irrigation: intervention and the practice of change 
In this chapter we have analysed the two water users' organisations of El Operado. In 
the first section our focus was on the Water Users' Commission and how it functioned. 
It provided us with a base-line from which we examined the Water Users' Association, 
which replaced the commission. It appeared that the formal set-up of the commission 
was inadequate, and that it lacked clearly defined responsibilities and a mandate. It 
furthermore appeared that the attitudes of most farmer delegates on the commission 
were congruent with the formal powers of the commission: the delegates did what 
District engineers expected them to do. 
In the second section we saw how water user representatives negotiated with District 
engineers about the association's regulations or charter, in a series of committee 
meetings. Compared to the now defunct commission, the association received substantial 
responsibilities, in particular with respect to canal maintenance. However, in these 
negotiations, water user representatives found themselves in a difficult position: not only 
because of the lack of cooperation displayed by the engineers, but also because they did 
not have a clear picture of what the association should become. The representatives did 
not consult other water users for advice. When they finally completed the draft of the 
regulations, it took five months before a second assembly of delegates meeting was 
held. In that November meeting, the draft was accepted without discussion, and the 
association's board elected. The board consisted mainly of politically influential farmers, 
all of whom lived in either El Grullo or Autlah. Not one of the six board members 
could be considered an 'ordinary' water user. Having said this, it nevertheless is 
remarkable that these six persons represent various 'currents' among the water users, 
and in this sense it is a rather well-balanced board. 
From this second section it emerged that putting a Water Users' Association in place 
with a similar organisational set-up to the commission, and entrusting it with some 
responsibilities with respect to maintenance was not enough to make it work. The 
association faced the same fate as the commission. However, in the third section we saw 
how a new District head came and set aside the existing power core of the District (the 
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'triangle'). Together with a more cooperative engineer, the head of the Autlah area 
office who was now in charge of both operation and maintenance of El Operado, the 
head of the District succeeded in reviving the association, and within a few months the 
association was in charge of canal maintenance, and they were given the tools to do so: 
a budget, machines, personnel, and an office. The elected delegates were also involved 
in defining maintenance needs, approving new additional water fees, and checking 
maintenance in the field. Although it successfully complied with its task, the association 
still faced two major dangers: it still depended heavily on the cooperation of District 
engineers, and internally, the relationships between board, delegates and water users 
was weak. 
The most recent step in the association's short history appeared to have tackled this 
last issue, through creating and installing a new position, that of the gate leader. The 
gate leader would supervise water distribution at field level, whereas delegates together 
with the canalero and an extension officer of the District would coordinate water 
distribution in each of El Operado's six zones. With this structure a crucial linkage 
between board and delegates on the one hand, and water users and canaleros on the 
other was put in place. One characteristic is that now water users who are involved in 
association affairs represent a stretch of canal rather than just an ejido. This provided 
an opportunity to break away from obsolete practices found within the ejidos, to re-
direct the association's lopsided/top-heavy organisational structure, and to concentrate 
on practical issues rather than on political wheeling and dealing. 
Another characteristic results from involvement in water distribution, and the process 
of defining more clearly the association's relationship with the majority of water users. 
The association, in this way, also gradually defined its relationship to its productive 
resource (El Operado's canal system) more precisely. Having reached canal level, it is 
to be expected that the association link up with the farmers' expressions of cooperation 
and their initiatives found at field level. At field level, these scattered experiences have 
already led to farmers appropriating their canals. The association is gradually 
establishing a firm property relation with El Operado's infrastructure.12 
Whether the new set-up of the association is viable for solving the other issue, that 
of the association's dependency on government institutions remains to be seen.1 3 With 
the new CNA office in El Grullo, the association now has to work with less cooperative 
engineers whom they know so well. 
The Association as an arena of negotiation 
The Autlah-El Grullo Water Users' Association is best described as an intermediate 
organisation as against a local organisation (Esman and Uphoff 1984; cf. Heijdra 1989), 
since it mediates between the water users and a wider (institutional) reality. This 
intermediate feature is further strengthened by the fact that the association has a two-
tiered organisational structure: it is not the water users themselves but their 
representatives that constitute the association. In Mexico, sociological and political 
discussions about the mediation between local and wider forces have essentially focused 
on local and regional elites who derive much of their power through connecting the 
rural population to the wider regional and national economy and polity, and vice versa. 
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Originally, analyses focused on the role of caciques (local and regional bosses). Later, 
farmer organisations such as the ejido came into the picture as having partly taken over 
this crucial role in the mediation process (cf. Bartra 1980; Fox and Gordillo 1989:136-
137). This, then, gives rise to the ambivalent nature of farmer organisations: they may 
defend the interests of the farmers, but they may also evolve in an instrument of 
manipulation for wider economic and political interests (Henao 1980:265). Fox and 
Gordillo (1989:137) conclude that 'the ejido is simultaneously a state apparatus of 
political control and an organ of peasant representation'. Facing this situation, farmer 
leaders themselves become a power factor to take into account. In the Mexican context 
at least, farmer organisations are often the arena in which different interests clash. This 
and the previous chapter leave little doubt about that. In the Water Users' Association 
of Autlah-El Grullo it appears that initially the wider institutional interests predominate 
over farmer interests, but that gradually a new equilibrium is found. 
Decentralising irrigation management: changing practice 
Getting farmers to clean their canals and administer their own funds necessarily implied 
a change of practice for the people involved: functionaries, farmers and their leaders 
alike. Shifting the burden of canal maintenance to farmers, was a fairly pragmatic 
government policy, because it faced a severe financial crisis. However, this 'shifting the 
burden' started a dynamic which in the end addressed the fundamental relationships 
between the major groups involved in El Operado. 
It seems that interventions aimed at changing the organisation of a practical activity, 
such as canal maintenance, necessarily entail changes in practice, or the intervention 
fails. In the case of the Association, it appeared crucial that changes in the 
organisational set-up articulated with existing (informal) practices of the common 
farmers, and thus bridging two domains found in El Operado: the field and the office. 
For the first time ordinary farmers got a proper place in El Operado's arena. 
Connecting the Association with existing initiatives, expressions, or covert actions 
of resistance provides a perspective. Because these farmer expressions are not in the 
first place political expressions (they might also be) but simply ways to survive and get 
enough water to their plots (cf. Scott 1985: 26; 30). For the Autlah-El Grullo Water 
User Association this implies a re-structuring of its organisation along canal lines, since 
for water users this is a more important 'practical' unit (the dimension along which 
most of their irrigation practices are organised) than the ejido. This has been partly 
attained through the institution of the gate leader. A further perspective could be to 
organise canal meetings in the potrero, shifting formalised interactions away from the 
playground of the happy few to the playground of the majority of the farmers, to an 
arena where they feel more self-confident. 
Chapter 9 
Irrigation, intervention and change: a conclusion 
9.1 Outline of the El Operado case 
This final chapter attempts to tie together the findings of the foregoing chapters, 
beginning with an overview of the empirical material presented so far. 
Three issues came into view from the account of agricultural and infrastructural 
development in the Autlah-El Grullo valley over the period 1850-1985 (chapter 2). 
First, throughout this period a marked inequality has persisted between entrepreneurs 
and small farmers. Despite the land reform, and despite the construction of El Operado 
irrigation system, which gave many small farmers access to irrigation water, most small 
farmers still see themselves as 'the poor' as against 'the rich' entrepreneurs, and indeed 
economic differences are still huge. Second, many people from the valley interpret the 
development of new infrastructure in terms of local control versus outside interference. 
This local - extra-local divide is intertwined with the first issue, the gap between the 
rich and the poor, since on various occasions outside actors formed a pact of 
convenience with particular factions of the local elite. Third, intermediaries and 
intermediate positions have been important throughout the agricultural development of 
the valley. This refers to the fact that often infrastructural development, and innovations 
or changes in agriculture coincided with the setting up of intermediate positions and of 
farmers' organisations, such as the ejidos and the Water Users' Association. These 
issues reveal a development dynamic, to which also the El Operado irrigation system 
is subjected. 
Chapter 3 found that in terms of agricultural production and water distribution 
efficiency El Operado compares favourably to other irrigation systems. This might be 
attributed to the relatively abundance of water. Its mfrastructure has some shortcomings 
which explains why each year many irrigation canals are silted up at the beginning of 
the irrigation season, which poses a problem both for water users and for District 
personnel. 
The canalero or water guard is the actor who ensures that water is distributed 
effectively (chapter 4), even though the District's organisational chart does not 
acknowledge his central role. Adequate salaries, together with checks and social control 
by the water users, have facilitated that most canaleros perform their job seriously. The 
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fact that they are 'small boys' and stand closer to most ordinary farmers than to their 
superiors in the District offices, helps to explain why most farmers tend to accept their 
decisions. But this is only so, because the canaleros are technically competent, and have 
been able to translate the broad guidelines they receive from the District engineers into 
far more complex actions which account for the diversity found in the field. It is not 
that water guards simply use the physical infrastructure. Water guards have become part 
of the structure, and the structures have taken a place in their minds. 
Farmers participate little in water distribution; they do not even feel the need to do 
so. In canal maintenance, this situation is quite different (chapter 5). Whereas in water 
distribution an effective link between the District and the field was established by the 
canalero, in canal maintenance a clear gap was found between the District's 
maintenance department and the reality that farmers encountered in the field. Farmers 
'participate' in cleaning the canals because they have no other option, thereby 
mobilising social networks present at canal level. This is not a self-evident affair, since 
among farmers distrust exist, and initiatives to undertake joint actions are often received 
with suspicion. The emerging practice of farmers' cooperation, however, has far-
reaching consequences for the way they perceive the irrigation system. Gradually, 
groups of cooperating farmers appropriate the canal infrastructure, thereby changing the 
relationship they maintain with fellow farmers, with District officials and with the 
canals. 
Within the operation department of the District a set of formal procedures are 
followed in order to produce the annual irrigation plan (chapter 6). The plan supposedly 
guides the decisions by District engineers concerning water distribution, and defines the 
water fees farmers have to pay. The plan, however, seems to have little relevance 
during the irrigation season, since water guards are simply not aware of it, and District 
engineers prefer to consult only the graph with planned water releases from the storage 
dam. Rather, the formal procedures rather function as cover ups for the discretionary 
power the chief engineer of the operation department has in deciding the level of the 
water fees, and for the actual negotiations that occur concerning access to sugar cane. 
A meeting where District engineers try to get the irrigation plan accepted by the 
water users' representatives revealed that farmer participation in management decisions 
concerning El Operado runs counter to the existing culture and practices of engineers, 
farmers and their leaders. The District engineers are in fact not willing to let farmers 
participate in management affairs, and neither are the farmers prepared for it. From the 
chapter it appeared that the physical setting within which people originating from 
different worlds negotiate with each other may highlight 'hidden' aspects of the 
relationships these groups maintain. 
Chapters 7 and 8 tried to capture the changes that took place in El Operado's 
management when faced with a series of interventions with respect to water users' 
participation. The three interventions reviewed in chapter 7 showed that actors at local, 
state and federal level were important in shaping the implementation of these 
interventions. The three interventions focused on the formal organisational set-up of El 
Operado's management, and were geared to the interests of particular factions within 
El Grullo District and SARH. Farmer participation in El Operado remained feeble, and 
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the interventions failed to bring about more fundamental changes in the practices of the 
various groups of people involved. The dynamic of each intervention could be described 
through the encounters and social interactions that emerged, but also by appreciating the 
fact that some groups of actors were excluded. 
A focus on the internal processes within the water users' organisations revealed that 
the now defunct Water Users' Commission did not function properly because it was in 
fact a lame organisation; but also that the new Water Users' Association experienced 
problems, even though it had a budget, an office, a written charter and a governing 
board (chapter 8). When farmer representatives and ordinary farmers acquired more 
practical roles to play in canal maintenance and water distribution, the stage was set for 
practices to change. 
The above forms the core of the case material on El Operado. On the basis of this 
material I now wish to explore how people's practices and their interactions relate to 
the physical infrastructure and the formal organisation of an irrigation system, and how 
the organising processes change over time in the face of outside interventions. 
9.2 Organising processes and the canal system 
Irrigation prompting social interactions to emerge 
Soon after its construction, El Operado became fully embedded in the valley's social 
reality, and in the antagonisms between small farmers and rich entrepreneurs, and 
between local people and outsiders. The issue of intermediate organisations appeared 
so important that I have dedicated a great part of the thesis to it. 
El Operado's lay-out has certain technical features which influence the way the 
system is operated. The design did not take into account the existing organisation of 
land tenure. Canals cross-cut ejido boundaries, and most secondary and tertiary canals 
feed plots belonging to different ejidos and private landowners. Moreover, the design 
lacks clearly defined and more or less uniform (in size and organisationally) hydraulic 
units or tertiary blocks. This implied that (informal) farmer organisation at tertiary level 
emerged only slowly. The incongruence between ejido and hydraulic units also affected 
the formal organisation of water users, in particular the Water Users' Commission. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the water distribution method adopted in El 
Operado left farmers relatively free to make their own farm decisions with regard to 
crop choice and irrigating, since the local elite would not have easily accepted rigid 
water distribution schedules fixed by District engineers who are conceived of as 
outsiders. The on-request delivery system, made possible by an irrigation infrastructure 
characterised by adjustable gates and orifices, had two implications: first, it enhanced 
the individualisation of farmers and inhibited farmer cooperation at canal level, and 
second, it put a burden on the field staff who had to operate these structures. The 
canaleros, however, have been able to provide a service well-tailored to the individual 
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needs of plots, crops and farmers. The canaleros developed practices that were 
prompted by the possibilities and constraints the infrastructure posed, and that had to 
operate at the centre of a social reality characterised by a District that was hierarchically 
organised, and by differences that existed among water users themselves. These 
differences are exemplified by the distinction between small and big farmers, a 
distinction which more or less follows the division between ejidatarios and private 
landowners, and the distinction between farmers growing sugar cane, who are strongly 
organised into two grower's organisations, the companies that grow and export 
horticultural crops, and the farmers producing traditional food crops, who are not 
organised at all. To make things more complex, some of the big landowners are closely 
related by family ties to some District engineers. 
Canal maintenance created more serious problems to the users than water 
distribution. Institutional rules inhibiting staff from providing an adequate maintenance 
service, and the heavy machinery of the maintenance department being an economically 
valuable resource, formed the background of the type of practices found in the 
maintenance department that differed from those in the operation department. A striking 
lack of accountability of District staff to their clients was identified. Farmers' initiatives 
to clean the silted canals themselves resulted gradually in them viewing the canal 
structures as their own. 
In conclusion, El Operado's irrigation system has prompted different groups of 
people to develop particular practices with respect to the system. These different 
practices emerged out of a need to coordinate actions in the system where different 
groups of people are knitted together through the use of one common resource, and in 
particular through the need to secure access to that resource. It emerged that many 
practices of people bore a tense relationship with the formal rules supposedly governing 
El Operado's management. 
The formal irrigation organisation 
The formal organisation of El Operado does little justice to the complexity of water 
distribution. Some District engineers have difficulty in acknowledging the role of the 
canaleros in it, and seem to think that they themselves are the ones defining the 
irrigation plan and eventually the way in which irrigation water is distributed in the 
field. The organisational set-up also fails to appreciate the canaleros' crucial role: it is 
assumed that they pertain to the lowest echelon of the District, merely receive orders, 
and simply do what they are told. 
Neither does the formal organisation do justice to the specific problematic of canal 
maintenance. The institutional arrangements made to cater for the peak demand of canal 
maintenance during August through November seem inadequate, but more importantly, 
the division of operation and maintenance into two separate departments, and the lack 
of an institutionalised feedback from the water users, make the department 
unaccountable for its performance. 
The formal organisation of El Operado, then, appears to be a neat model, but is 
inadequate for the actual management demands the system poses. In order to arrive at 
conclusions for an improved organisational set-up, it is necessary to consider the social 
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dynamic as encountered in El Operado, and to attribute agency to the persons involved 
in El Operado's management. 
Organisation and the social reality 
In El Operado, particular patterns of interaction and social practice are found in 
different settings or, as I called them, 'domains'. Domain is a concept which emerged 
from the empirical material, but also helped to bring some order to the field data and 
thereby assisted in the analysis. The concept of domain conveys the idea of a spatial 
territory, and this is how people themselves see it. However, people develop practices 
in their domain, and ideas on values and attitudes, that differ from those found in other 
domains. People then, may even derive their identity from the domain in which they 
operate. Hence, the existence of different realities in the field, in the District offices, 
and in the domain which I called the 'ejido domain', to be distinguished from the 
domain formed by rich entrepreneurs, which can be called 'the domain of the valley 
elite'. These are the four domains of the major groups of actors involved in El 
Operado. and they exist separately from one another. 
Farmers often seen working in the field view the field or potrero as their territory, 
they themselves or their fathers having fought for the land they work, which forms the 
cornerstone of their economy. It is also the realm of the burning sun, mud and muscles. 
The story of the silted canals most clearly shows a particular social dynamic at canal 
level. Farmers with plots along one canal are knitted together through multiple 
relationships, which enhances the possibilities for joint action. The initiatives by 
individuals to organise group actions are, however, often looked upon with reservation 
if not suspicion. In the canal I examined in detail, the emergent group initiative became 
lasting in character since later also other activities were undertaken, and gradually 
transcended formal boundaries between different ejidos. Through their own actions, 
farmers domesticated their canal, and even suggested that they would not allow the 
District officers to enter their potrero. The 'field', then, emerges as the territory of the 
water users, the domain where they and they alone determine the language they speak 
and the values that underlie their actions. 
The field's counterpart is the 'office'. The office is the domain of the District 
engineers. There, it is the engineers who determine what language is spoken, and how 
others are received. The engineers who may use the spatial organisation of the offices 
to their advantage (recall how the maintenance head let farmers wait in the corridor). 
Spatial arrangements in the District office reflect in part both the formal and actual 
relationships between officers. In the operation department we saw how some things are 
arranged openly, like the making of the irrigation plan. Other things are done more 
covertly, behind closed doors, for example, fixing the water fees. The differences in 
practice found in the operation and maintenance department are partly exemplified by 
the neat technical drawings hanging on the walls in the maintenance department. The 
operation department by comparison looks shabby and forgets to provide any display. 
It seems that, whereas the operation department works, the maintenance department is 
busy to show that it works. 
An examination of the attitudes of farmers' representatives in the Water Users' 
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Commission led to the definition of a third domain, which we might call the 'ejido 
domain'. The relationship between water users and their representatives or leaders 
appeared problematic, which is also a characteristic of the functioning of the ejido. 
Since the representation of water users in the commission follows ejido lines, the same 
problem surfaces in the commission. Leaders are viewed with suspicion, and we saw 
how ordinary farmers, by using a certain vocabulary tended to create boundaries 
between 'their' domain and that of the leaders. In the commission, there was no 
mechanism that made water users' representatives accountable to their constituencies. 
The relationship between members of the Water Users' Commission and the District 
engineers also appeared strained. The engineers were not willing to let the commission 
participate in decision-making. Since the commission did not have any formal powers, 
it could do little else than engage in petty discussions and benefit from the lavish parties 
and small favours of District engineers. 
9.3 Power effects in El Operado 
"que el poder era como una vara ardiendo, que habrla que soltarla a tiempo, 
si no corrta elpeligro de quemarse.." (Castanos 1987:81) 
One of the major problems of El Operado's organisation is the gap that exists between 
on the one hand, the field domain, and the domains of the ejido leaders and the District 
offices, on the other. Different realities coexist alongside each other, people have made 
images of others, and many of the actions people undertake are reinterpreted by people 
from other domains to fit these images. The story of the Water Users' Association 
revealed that it is possible to change the formal organisation through establishing new 
linkages between the domains, and that the new interactions that emerge may not only 
improve the effectiveness of the management (in terms of coordination of activities), but 
also help to change the actions and attitudes of people, which may lead to new 
practices. 
Before spelling out in more detail how this process of change developed, it is 
worthwhile to consider the issue of power in El Operado's management. The theme of 
power in irrigation has received the attention of authors, such as Wittfogel (1981) and 
Hunt and Hunt (1976). However, the concept of power is extremely difficult to define, 
and it is still more bothersome to pin it down in a practical manner. Here I am 
concerned with those irrigation situations which clearly have a 'power effect', however 
vague this term may be. In the foregoing sections it was argued that the canal 
infrastructure exerts some structuring influences on the way people act. This is one kind 
of power effect found in irrigation situations. Another is that people with different 
resource bases and often opposing interests also have an impact on the way El Operado 
is being managed. 
Some authors have argued that irrigation systems require discipline, and can even 
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result in despotism (e.g. Wittfogel 1981). Others maintain the opposite, holding that 
introducing irrigation is facilitative and likely to increase agricultural production. The 
truth, in my view, lies in the middle: irrigation water itself is not despotic but enables 
farmers to increase agricultural production. However, for it to become productive, the 
coordination of activities and a certain degree of discipline among people is required. 
Consider the following view on power in an institution: 
..the disposal of its space, the meticulous regulations which govern its internal life, the different 
activities which are organised there, the diverse persons who live there or meet one another, each 
with its own function, his well-defined character - all these things constitute a block of capacity -
communication - power (Foucault 1982: 218). 
Although this is not a text about irrigation, we may follow Foucault, and consider an 
irrigation system to be much like for example an educational institution. The 'capacity-
communication-power' block can be recognised in the case of the users of lateral 2 
(chapter 5). First, some farmers realised they had the capacity to do the job, i.e. to 
construct a new intake structure of their canal; then communication became important: 
not only meetings of farmers were organised but also a variety of institutions were 
approached; finally it resulted in an adequate new inlet structure, the problems of water 
shortage were solved, farmers were satisfied about their achievement and were thinking 
of denying District engineers access to their canal. Certainly some power effect was 
accomplished. In the case of canal lateral 2, farmers became actors. Here we see that 
'organisation' and 'agency' are interrelated (Clegg 1989:188). 
Controlling space: the power of management 
People act and interact in time-space settings (Giddens 1987). The setting partly 
contributes to these actions, and thus influences behaviour, as much as people construct 
those settings (cf. Bourdieu 1977:90-91, Miller 1987:101). An irrigation system 
provides such settings and in these settings different configurations of interaction arise, 
which led me to identify a number of domains present in El Operado. It was concluded 
that there is a distance between the office and the field, not only in cultural and social 
terms, but also simply physically. 
Much irrigation) management is concerned with harnessing a relatively extended 
space (the field with its canal system). The question is how office people succeed in 
this. This has to do with a typical activity performed in the office: the manufacture of 
a 'summary representation actively constructed and pursued within micro-situations' 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1988:39). In the operation department the most quintessential summary 
representation was the Tacotah graph, with planned and realised water releases from the 
dam. Summarising, however, implies simplifying, disregarding heterogeneity and, 
ultimately, making equivalent what is fundamentally different, sununing these up, and 
collapsing these into one datum. Engineer Corona generalises and simplifies, and in 
doing so he produces distance towards his field personnel. As was concluded in chapter 
4, through documents, devices and drilled people (Law 1986), the engineer effectively 
establishes a kind of remote control over his field personnel. j 
Through the dull compulsion of their work, most canaleros can do little else then 
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to comply as best as they can with their task. As Miguel put it: 'to not follow the rules 
would make my work much more complex'. Although the canaleros may seem to be 
the victims of this control system, they have possibilities to devise their own summary 
documents (see the example of the photograph, chapter 4), instruct people, and exercise 
some remote control over their superiors. Here we return to Foucault: to grasp fully the 
relationship the canalero maintains with his boss, we have to attribute agency also to 
the canalero (Foucault 1982:220). 
Power, patterns and images 
In different domains, different power effects are found. Whereas a peasant producer 
may feel quite comfortable in the field, he may lose this confidence in a formal meeting 
setting. Conversely, a farmer leader may feel uneasy when meeting compatleros in the 
potrero, where muscles rather than the mouth are respected and where locally specific 
knowledge about crops, soils and canals are more valued than detailed knowledge about 
how to survive in an institutional environment. 
In the field, forms of interaction were concerned with the practical problems that 
water users faced, which coincided with a failing bureaucracy. In this manner, water 
users built up experience of small successes of initiatives and joint actions, but also 
learned to know the District better. These experiences become important 'points of 
reference' for future initiatives. For instance, when a farmer succeeded in cleaning up 
a canal with some compatleros, the next year, when a new problem presented itself, the 
experience of the former year would be referred to and used as a model for new 
actions. In this manner, events and interaction in the field domain became structured, 
and acquire a pattern, such that people's practices are linked together (cf. Knorr-Cetina, 
1988:38). 
In the office, another pattern was found. In a meeting with the Water Users' 
Commission, the engineers dictated the agenda, monopolised information and in the end 
the farmers' leaders always consented. The content of discussions in the commission 
often had little to do with irrigation and the field. For the vast majority of the water 
users the commission had little relevance, and they viewed it with suspicion. Never did 
local forms of mobilisation or cooperation in the field articulate with this water users' 
organisation, because the delegates were too far removed from their compatleros. 
People anticipate the social patterns that exist. Engineers expect peasant fanners to 
behave in this or that way. Ejidatarios know how most engineers and their ejido leaders 
are likely to behave. Hence people construct images about other people. Some images 
are powerful, especially when such an image helps to structure new developments. As 
mentioned in chapter 7, farmers use an image to summarise their view on government 
functionaries: functionaries belong to la engorda (lit. the engorged one; as for fattened 
animals), a concept derived from the farmer's domain. With la engorda farmers define 
a (symbolic) boundary between the District engineers and themselves. When at one 
moment the engineers wanted to implement some change in El Operado's organisational 
set-up, they were forced to mirror themselves in the image that farmers had of them, 
before the latter would respond. Thus the power of the farmers lay in the fact that they 
defined the language that the engineers used to solve institutional problems. 
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Power and strategy 
Some people are more cunning at exerting power or can influence events more man 
others. This has something to do with the ability to design effective strategies. The 
strategic conception of power, which is heavily influenced by Machiavelli's writings, 
conceptualises power as 'the strategies and practices whereby, for instance, agents are 
recruited to views of their interests which align with the discursive field of force that 
me enroling agency is able to construct' (Clegg 1989:17). Callon (1986) has developed 
a method to uncover the power effects resulting from people's strategies. He calls his 
approach the 'sociology of translation'. It is easy to apply his approach to one major 
event in El Operado: the creation of the Water Users' Commission, which highlights 
the strategising capacities of the engineers involved (see appendix 5; and chapter 7).' 
Recall how in 1980 the District head found himself in a very awkward position when 
he faced the sugar cane lobby. The process of translation started the moment his friend 
and department head got the idea of displacing their struggle with the sugar cane lobby 
and treating it as a struggle between 'the water users' and the lobby. 
The story shows that the District engineers succeeded in inventing an actor (the 
commission), enroling it and finally making it the spokesman of the engineer's interests. 
Through all phases, displacements and transformations occur. The engineers redefine 
interests farmers are supposed to have and shift the struggle to a new platform. They 
also bring the farmer representatives to the District office where discussions take place. 
In the final stage, it is the farmer representatives who transform themselves into 
spokesmen of the engineers, and displace the sugar cane lobby from the central position 
they occupied. Later, the engineers copy the strategy in El Agua. The success of the El 
Agua water users' association is carefully recorded by the engineers in a document, 
which they present at the annual conference of irrigation engineers, thereby projecting 
the story on a national level. 
To translate is not only to displace but 'also to express in one's own language what 
others say and want' (Callon 1986:223). In this story there is a double translation, 
whereby the engineers first translate their problems into farmer terms, and then they let 
the farmers translate it, appointing their own spokesmen. (Ironically, some of these 
fanner delegates did not always understood what it was they were saying. 'We did not 
understand the engineers, and they did not understand us'.) Hence the engineers 
succeeded in bringing together quite separate worlds: that of the farmers, that of 
themselves, and finally also that of their colleagues scattered throughout the country. 
They provided one solution to this diversity of actors. 
Conclusion 
The above review of some of the power effects found in El Operado could be 
considered arbitrary, since no firm or encompassing theory underlies it. Apart from the 
fact that as yet no adequate theory on power in irrigation situations is available (at least 
I am not aware of any), the aim of this section has been to discuss several situations or 
aspects where power issues are at stake. The types of power effects reviewed differ 
from each other in many ways. One type attributes power to artefacts, another to people 
having differential access to resources, yet another to people being strategists. One view 
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on power is that there is a finite quantity of power available, and that the game of 
power boils down to a zero-sum game. Another view is that power should be considered 
a capacity. From this perhaps disappointing or confusing picture which seems to lack 
consistency, it can be derived that power is not a straightforward phenomenon. This is 
probably why it is so overwhelmingly important, and yet so difficult to pin down. We 
also learn that when considering social change in irrigation systems, (1) micro as well 
as macro- aspects have to be taken into account, (2) both the system's material and 
social dimension should be studied, and (3) the social dimension should include both 
social institutions and social actors. Otherwise, a one-sided picture emerges, suggesting 
one type of power to be all-encompassing. This, in turn, leading to a too 
straightforward and too simple an understanding of irrigation development. 
9.4 Diagnosing irrigation management and an intervention strategy 
The Water Users' Association that replaced the commission took over responsibility for 
maintenance from the District. This intervention restricted itself to the formal level 
(creating a formal organisation), and strengthened practices that already existed: in other 
words, engineers hardly involved water user representatives in decision-making, and, 
when they did, the latter did not bother to inform and consult their constituencies. When 
the association's board was offered adequate conditions (an office, a budget, machines, 
cooperative District engineers etc.) it got duly involved in canal maintenance. Although 
it successfully accomplished its task, there were two issues which remained problematic 
and endangered the association's future: its dependency on the District engineers, and 
the weak relationships between board members, delegates and water users. Hence the 
same old practices were still in place. The gap between the office domain and the field 
domain had not been bridged. As soon as the Association extended its activities to the 
domain of the field, ordinary water users were given a place in the organisation. Gate 
leaders were elected, who were to supervise water distribution along each (or part of 
a) canal. Ordinary water users are accorded a place in the Association, when that 
organisation extends its boundaries to include the field domain. Getting the farmers to 
clean their canals and administer their own funds necessarily implies a change in the 
practices of the people involved - farmers, their leaders and functionaries alike. 
This points to an intervention strategy that focuses on the creation of linkages 
between 'domains' that formerly remained separate, thus making room for certain 
practices that exist at field level, and giving these a formal status through incorporating 
them into the organisation's formal structure. In this way, groups of actors acquire new 
responsibilities which are defined more precisely. 
The Association's ultimate fate, however, is all but settled. Much depends on 
whether gate leaders and water users are able to exert pressure from below on the 
association's board, and whether water users keep a check on their gate leaders. Much 
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also depends on how the board and the delegates respond to this, and on how they are 
able to cope with the government institution now formally in charge of El Operado, the 
CNA (Comision National de Agua). 
Diagnostic tools for the analysis in irrigation organisation 
The study of El Operado provides a view of how social action and infrastructure are 
interrelated in one particular irrigation system. The results may be relevant to other 
irrigation situations, especially with respect to intervention strategies. In this study, 
interventions aimed at changing practical activities imply changes in social practice. 
This, in turn, implies changes in the irrigation system's organisational arena. In my 
opinion, the characteristics of the different domains present in irrigation systems and 
their interrelations are crucial not only for diagnosing the system's actual organising 
processes, but also for how possible improvements might be arrived at. I first want to 
derive some lessons for diagnosing irrigation organisations. 
Someone diagnosing an irrigation organisation will have a particular reason to do it: 
the irrigation system may experience problems with water distribution or canal 
maintenance, the system's management may be negatively affected by a conflict between 
certain parties, or someone may have launched the idea of turning over responsibilities 
from a government agency to the users. The different reasons for diagnosing an 
irrigation system's organisation will determine which aspects will be considered. The 
outline for a diagnosis that I present here should be adapted to the specific aims and 
needs of each case. In general, then, a diagnosis would include: 
1. A description of practices with respect to the main activities of the organisation; 
often these activities include water distribution, canal maintenance and strategic 
decisions concerning crop choice, irrigation applications and water fees. 
2. An assessment of the different domains which co-exist; domains can be identified 
through the practices and social interactions that have been identified in particular 
settings. 
3. An assessment of the irrigation system's arena and how it functions with respect to 
the main activities identified. The irrigation arena refers to the way in which actors 
from different domains come together with respect to the irrigation system, their relative 
positions, and the power resources they control. 
4. An assessment of the linkages that emerge between the different domains, to detect 
possible gaps or disjunctions between them, and to assess strengths and weaknesses in 
the irrigation organisation. 
If, for example, one makes a diagnosis concerning the practices of water distribution 
or canal maintenance, the practices can best be described through examining both 
routine acts and the problematic situations that emerge. Since these activities may cross-
cut different domains, it is important to describe practices as fully as possible. The 
foregoing chapters suggest that four factors are relevant to the analysis of problematic 
situations. These are as follows: 
- The context in which a problematic situation has emerged, which includes a 
description of the situation itself, the technical aspects that may be involved and a brief 
history of events related to that situation (compare chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis). 
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- The social interactions which occur. 
- How different groups of people interpret the problem. 
- What strategies people develop to overcome the problem. 
When the material on practice has been gathered, it can be analysed along two lines. 
First, the different possible domains or fields of activities present in the irrigation 
system's organisation can be distinguished vis-a-vis different types of practice. Second, 
linkages between these different domains have to be examined and the possible 
disjunctions highlighted. This second step can be called 'interface assessment', since 
these linkages refer to social interactions between actors stemming from different social 
worlds or belonging to different levels in the institutional hierarchy (see appendix 6). 
An intervention strategy for irrigation organisations 
Intervention in irrigation organisation, as I envisage it, develops from the idea that one 
continues and stresses certain practices which are already present. It should make use 
of, and appeal to, existing experiences and initiatives found in certain domains. Such 
a view of intervention breaks with the more conventional model of intervention, 
depicted as 
a discrete set of activities that take place within a defined time-space setting involving the interaction 
between so-called 'intervening' parties and 'target' or 'recipient' groups. Such an image (...) isolates 
'intervention' from the continuous flow of social life and ongoing relations that evolve between the 
various social actors (Long and Van der Ploeg, 1989:4). 
Since intervention, much like research activity, involves a learning process, it can never 
therefore be completely planned for from the outset (Breman 1983:31-32; Long and Van 
der Ploeg 1989). In this sense the notion of 'planned intervention' is misleading. This 
also implies that the process of change cannot be controlled by any one of the actors 
involved. The type of intervention, which I have in mind, aims at changing irrigation 
practices and social interactions, through strengthening certain activities already present 
in specific domains while breaking down others. This approach is both concerned with 
continuity and discontinuity. It also takes seriously existing practices and informal 
patterns of interaction, which in some instances may provide alternatives to existing 
modes of management. This can be done in various ways. (1) It may be necessary to 
change the formal irrigation organisation and adapt formal arrangements to informal 
initiatives and experiences. This will be elaborated below. (2) Another possibility might 
be to attempt to change social processes outside the immediate realm of the irrigation 
organisation. For the Mexican situation, it may be relevant to attempt to change certain 
practices found within the ejidos. (3) Another way would be to choose a technical 
instrument in order to take away particular practices which negatively affect the 
system's management. For instance, in large scale irrigation systems decentralisation 
of management to lateral systems might imply technical adjustments in the type of 
division structures at the lateral system's intake. With respect to canal maintenance, also 
many technical solutions may also be found to diminish the silting up of canals, or to 
upgrade the organisation's capacity to clean them. 
With respect to possible interventions on the level of the formal organisation, the 
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following adjustments might be considered: 
- Defining new, or re-defining more precisely, ownership relations with respect to the 
canal system, and to its crucial resources (i.e. irrigation water and funds). 
- Defining new, or re-defining more precisely, the responsibilities that groups of people 
have towards the system and towards each other. 
- Re-organising the system's arena, through re-positioning the different domains. 
- Establishing new linkages between the domains, or better, formalising informal links, 
while breaking with others. 
- Adapting the settings of interactions. 
If, for example, an intervention concerns canal maintenance, it is necessary to look 
in detail at how canal maintenance is undertaken in practice, to appreciate productive 
practices, while also detecting obstructive practices, and finally building a strategy upon 
the former (for instance through the type of diagnosis presented above). In this way an 
intervention can be defined in practical terms. 
Interventions aimed at change do not come about automatically and are likely to be 
received with reluctance or opposition by some actors. This points to the need for 
outsiders who have formal powers to implement changes in the organisational structure 
of an irrigation system. For example, being in the position to constitute and formalise 
a users' association. Outsiders seem necessary since change implies new ways of seeing 
things. They may be instrumental in guiding groups of people to appreciate those self-
evident practices that already exist, but may also provide perspectives for change. Such 
changes in practice may require new skills, which can be learned through training 
initiated by these outsiders. The outside interventionist, then, has an important role to 
play during a transition phase. In the end, however, it is the different local parties 
involved who have to adopt new practices and support institutional change. 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Some data on climate, soils and crops of £1 Operado 
Climate 
El Operado is located at 20 degrees North Latitude, and has an elevation of between 
900 and 950 metres above sea level. The hottest period is from April to September, 
with an average temperature of 26 °C (av. day temperature 32 °C; night: 20 °C), with 
absolute maximums exceeding 37 °C. January and February are the coldest months, with 
an average temperature of 20 °C, with warm days (just below 30 °C), and cool nights 
(11 °C). During one or two nights in January or February night-frost may occur. 
Average annual precipitation is 700 mm, of which 85% falls during June to October. 
The remainder, approximately 100 mm, falls during the irrigation season. Relative 
humidity fluctuates just below 90% during July-November, whereas in the months 
before the rains start (April and May), humidity drops below 70%. Wind-speed may 
build up in the afternoons during the months preceding the rains, April, May and part 
of June. Pan evaporation averages 1840 mm for the entire year, whereas for the 
irrigation season (November to June), evaporation amounts to 1320 mm. Only between 
July and September does precipitation surpass pan evaporation (figure A.l). 
water l a y e r (mm) 
2SO r — 1 
d e c Jan feb m a r a p r m a y Jan Jul a u g s e p oct n o v d e c 
month 
Figure A.1 Pan evaporation and precipitation in El Operado; 1980-1989. 
Source: Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo 
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Soils 
Half of all the soils of El Operado are clay (silty clay, clay, clay loam). Many of the 
heavy clays are badly drained and may be waterlogged during the rainy season for 
several days or even weeks. Some of these soils have developed high salinity levels and 
some have sodic characteristics. Along the Ayuquila, high lying sandy river banks 
(playas) are found, covering 10% of El Operado. The sandy loam soils have very good 
internal drainage, and irrigating these implies high percolation losses, with seepage 
water draining to the nearby river-bed. The remainder of the soils (40%) fall within the 
loam/silt loam class. These are very productive soils, which have been intensively 
cultivated for more than a century. Levels of organic matter in topsoil of this type are 
higher than in the other soils (up to 4%). 
Water availability 
El Operado receives water from the river basin of the Rio Ayuquila, a tributary of the 
Rio Armerfa. Thirty kilometres upstream of the head works lies Tacotah dam, which 
regulates the Rio Ayuquila waters for El Operado. The dam captures the water from a 
1,170 km 2 drainage basin. The volume of water that passes the dam in one year varies 
from 60 to 450 million m3, and averages 230 million m 3 (1958-1986). Of this volume, 
95% reaches Tacotah during June to November. With its effective storage capacity of 
140 millions m 3, the dam fills completely in 60% of the years. The actual water need 
of the irrigation system (126 million m 3 in 1987/88 season) is met in 2 out of 3 years. 
Through cautious operation of the dam, at the end of a normal irrigation season some 
15-20 million m 3 of water is left to the next season. This means that in fact only in 1 
out of 4 years are there real water shortages. Water shortages may be alleviated by 
rainfall and river discharges during December to March (which happened in the 1982/83 
and 1989/90 seasons). Extra discharges occur along the 30 km. separating Tacotah from 
El Operado (at head works, drainage basin is 2,530 km2). 
Crop water need 
The crop needs for irrigation water at the field inlet vary from 660 to 1,500 mm, 
depending on crops and on soil quality. Sugar cane takes the largest share of water 
consumed (68% of all the irrigation water during the 1987/88 season). On the basis of 
available pan evaporation data, net irrigation need of 1290 mm for sugar cane was 
calculated. However, the District tries to limit the water consumption by cane. 
According to District estimates, sugar cane only receives 800 mm, in 5-6 irrigation 
turns from October through June. Data used by the District are not based on 
measurements at field level, so they must be interpreted cautiously. In practice, the 
number of irrigation turns as used by the District is often higher than estimated. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the data of table A.l refer to the net available 
water at field inlet or the net available to crops. Since the irrigation efficiency as 
estimated by the District (55%) partly includes field application losses (chapter 3 
above), I assume that the data also partly include them. The net available irrigation 
water to crops is probably some 10-30% lower. 
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Table A. 1 Estimated crop water use; 1984-1988 
number of net water layer 
irrigation turns (mm) 
annual crops (figures refer to one crop) 
tomato; melon 7-9 9 2 0 - 1 1 3 0 
other horticultural crops 5-6 650 - 830 
maize 6-7 830 - 940 
sorghum; beans 3-5 380 - 650 
perennial crops (figures refer to entire irrigation season, October, 15-Iune,l) 
sugar cane 5-6 770 - 780 
fruit trees 5-7 510 - 900 
pasture 5-7 720 - 880 
alfalfa 9-12 1220 -1710 
Source: estimated data from Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grutlo 
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Appendix 2 
Discharge fluctuations in the main and secondary canals 
In order to assess how the canal infrastructure responds to flow fluctuations, the basic 
lay-out of an intake structure of a lateral canal branching off from the main canal will 
be discussed in some detail. First, some of the hydraulic properties of the main canal 
are given. At the head reaches of both main canals (right and left bank), the profile of 
these canals is as follows: 
right bank left bank 
first 1,850 metres first 700 metres 
slope (m/m) 0.0003 0.0003 
bottom width (m) 3.00 3.00 
side slope (vert./hor.) 1:0.80 1:0.95 
max. water level (m) 2.30 1.90 
design discharge (Q) (mVs) 14.1 8.6 
flow velocity (v) (m/s) 1.25 0.9 
apparent k-Manning value (-) 60 50 
The main system is currently working far below design capacity, which means that 
water levels are much less. Since the main system requires some minimum water levels 
in order to feed the lateral canals, radial gates in the main system are lowered so that 
water is backed up and water levels are maintained at an artificial level. This implies 
that real flow velocities are running around 0.5 m/s instead of 0.7 - 0.9 m/s when 
flowing freely. This also implies that water is stored in the main system. 
Lateral canals branching off from the main 
There are a few lateral canals branching off from the main canal without a radial-gate 
regulating the water level at intake. The rate of intake at the orifice fluctuates less than 
the discharge fluctuations in the feeder canal. This I will try to show below. 
During a period of 40 days (with 30 discharge measurements), mean daily discharge 
fluctuations were calculated to be 130 lps, with an average discharge of 4,000 lps. It 
appeared that in the main canal (bottom width 2.5 m, side slope 1:0.80, canal slope 
0.0003 m/m, kM= 60), an increase in discharge of 130 lps (+3.25%) resulted in an 
increase in water level from 1.285 to 1.308 m, or of 2.3 cm (+1.8%). Suppose that at 
this point in the canal there is an orifice which feeds a lateral canal. Assume further that 
the orifice is not submerged and completely opened, and that its centre is located 35 cm 
above canal bottom. A steady 500 lps is running into the lateral. When the water level 
in the main canal rises by 2.3 cm, the discharge will increase to 506 lps, or by a 
percentage of 0.5*(2.3/93.5)*100= 1.2%. So, in this case fluctuations in the main canal 
translate into smaller fluctuations in the off-taking secondaries, but result into even 
higher fluctuations further down the main canal (here +3.54%, namely [(3,624/3,500)-
1]*100). 
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Figure A.2 The typical hydraulic module of an off-take in the main canal 
Now we consider the situation which occurs most frequently: most lateral canals 
branch off the main canal near a radial gate, which serves as a cross regulator (without 
a sill). This is the hydraulic module (figure A.2). In one such situation, we measured 
15 times over a period of 40 days the discharge in the lateral, whereas there were 36 
discharge measurements taken for the main. The results show that whereas discharge 
in the main canal fluctuated by 130 lps per day, on average, or 3.25 %, discharge in the 
off-taking lateral fluctuated 14 lps with average discharge of 555 lps, or 2.55% (figure 
A.3). Also in this typical hydraulic situation with a radial gate in the on-going canal and 
an orifice (an 18" pipe, centre 30 cm above bottom level, water level in the main canal 
around 1.75 m) as an off-take, fluctuations in the main tend to be slightly flattened in 
the off-take, which inevitably results in bigger fluctuations in the ongoing main canal. 
Theoretically, these findings imply that the flexibility F of the hydraulic module is 
smaller than 1. I use the term flexibility (F) as defined by Bos (1978:94), the ratio of 
the rate of change of discharge in the off-take to the rate of change of discharge in the 
continuing supply canal, or, more simply, the sensitivity of the orifice (SOT) divided by 
the sensitivity of the radial gate (S,^. Sensitivity is defined as the rate of change of 
discharge of a canal structure as a result of a unit rise of the upstream water level. In 
formula: 
dh 
h,-h2 
S O T = — d h 
h,-d 
in which S r f is the sensitivity of the radial gate, SOT that of the orifice, iii is the upstream 
water level, hj is the water level downstream of the radial gate, dh the unit change in 
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upstream water level, and u die power of head, derived from the discharge formula of 
the canal structure. It is assumed that the orifice is operating freely, that is that the 
downstream water level in the off-taking lateral canal does not influence its discharge. 
Flexibility of the entire hydraulic unit, then, will be: 
F = sjs,,, = ( M O / M 
Since normally the depth of the downstream water level in the on-going canal (hj) will 
be much greater than the height of the orifice above canal bottom (d), it follows that: 
h 2 > d, hence F < 1 
In the submerged case, then, sensitivity of the radial gate is greater than that of the 
orifice. Thus, flexibility of the module would be smaller than unity. This would imply 
that, with unchanged settings, a change in incoming flow Qin results in only a slight 
change in discharge at the off-take (Qof), and a major change in the ongoing flow 
(Qon). Flow fluctuations in the supply canal, thus, translate into greater fluctuations 
further down the system. This theoretical finding is in accordance with our empirical 
data presented above. 
discharge (1000 lp») 
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Figure A. 3 Flow fluctuations in right main canal (at km. 0) and in off-taking 
lateral 5 (at km.5 in main canal). Source: Distrito de Desarrollo 
Rural, El Grullo. 
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Appendix 3 
The working routine of a water guard: one day in the life of Miguel 
At sun rise 
Miguel wakes up at 5:30 am, this 13th of November. Without losing any time, he kills 
7 chickens which his wife, Celia, will clean and sell in the hamlet where they live, La 
Chupadera. At 7 o'clock, Miguel goes into the field with his pick-up truck. He checks 
two irrigation turns for two tomato farmers who grow tomatoes near the hamlet. These 
farmers give him 20 nylon sacks which he will use for the harvest of the maize he 
share-crops. Forty minutes later he returns to his house, has breakfast and talks a while 
with his 3 children, who then go to school. 
When he leaves his house, there is a water user awaiting him, who asks for an 
irrigation turn. Without checking his notebook in which he has noted relevant data 
(crops, landowner, irrigation turns received) of all fields of his zone (500), Miguel tells 
him the day and the hour when he will get the irrigation water. When he finally leaves 
the hamlet, in the researcher's Volkswagen and not, as usual, on his wreck of a 
motorbike, he comes across another water user, the representative of his ejido in the 
Water Users' Commission. Miguel hands him the invitation letter for the next 
commission meeting. He asks the farmer to sign for the receipt, which he has to give 
to his superior. At 8:20 we arrive at a sugar cane plot. He calls the irrigator, who 
readily appears out of the sugar cane. This irrigator is a hired labourer. Another water 
user arrives in his pick-up. He is the owner of the neighbouring sugar cane plot, which 
is now under 'suspension of irrigation', which means that it may not receive any water 
as the crop will be harvested within 6 weeks. The three men talk. Miguel urges the 
irrigator to be careful while irrigating, in order not to water his neighbour's field. The 
irrigator informs them that during that night the tomato farmers (who have their plots 
upstream in the same tertiary canal), had cut off part of his irrigation water. Miguel 
says that this is better than the flow increasing, and leaves. He goes to the tomato 
farmers (who he had already visited that morning) and tells them that when they have 
finished irrigating, they should lower the intake of the tertiary and ensure that the water 
flow does not increase, because of the 'suspended' sugar cane plot. Both farmers tell 
the canalero that he may cut tomatoes whenever he wants. 
On our way to the first of two fixed meeting points (cita), we hear over the walkie 
talkie that the dam guard at Tacotah is transmitting climatological data to the District. 
We drive a further 5 kilometres, and pass through the hamlet of El Camaron. Here we 
meet Salome, a water user who was born in this hamlet but who now lives in El Grullo. 
He works his mother's plot who is ejidataria of the ejido El Guamiichil. Salome's plot 
is now receiving irrigation water. Miguel informs him that he will decrease the water 
flow a little, so that another farmer, a rentista (who is renting a nearby plot), may 
irrigate his field of green tomatoes. 
In time, we arrive at the cita where Miguel has to show up at 9 am each day. The 
farmers who want to request an irrigation turn await him there. Miguel has a second 
cita, at 11:30 am, at a place along another canal. Two youths are awaiting Miguel. One 
222 Appendices 
of them, the son of the rentista, asks him for an irrigation turn which Miguel had 
already programmed. Miguel fills in a form, writing down the name of the owner of 
the plot (not the rentista), the number of his plot, the crop, the day and hour of the 
beginning of the irrigation turn, and the name of the water user to whom he has to hand 
over the water when finished. Signing this 'irrigation order' becomes a problem, as the 
youngster hardly knows how to write. But Miguel says it is necessary for him to sign 
the paper to avoid problems. The boy's friend is laughing at him. Miguel urges the 
youngster to irrigate with care, in order not to wet die neighbouring sugar cane plot, 
which is 'suspended'. They then talk about the cleaning of a tertiary canal which has 
silted up. Miguel gives them his opinion on how and when to do it. Then, both youths 
criticise Miguel for giving preference to Salome: 'you let him irrigate his sugar cane 
every week', whereas the established norm for sugar cane is only one irrigation turn per 
month. Miguel is irritated and says this is not true. They ask him the actual price of the 
local maize varieties paid by the intermediaries. After giving the information, he says 
he will pass by tomorrow, greets them and leaves. 
The sun starts to burn 
Miguel goes on with his round. He checks Salome's plot, and passing the plot of a 
friend he tells me that he might share-crop this plot in the coming irrigation season. He 
checks another plot, but the irrigator is not present. He is irritated: 'you will never find 
him on his plot at this hour' (breakfast time). We arrive at another plot that receives a 
turn. Miguel talks with the irrigator (a labourer). Everything is OK. He asks the mozo 
what his boss is paying him for irrigating the sugar cane. He answers 5,000 pesos/ha 
(US$ 3). Miguel informs him that other farmers are actually paying 8,000 pesos. 
After having reviewed another irrigation turn (the seventh this day), we arrive at yet 
another plot. There is nobody present. In search of the irrigator we walk through the 
muddy field, and see that all the water is flowing directly into a drain. Miguel takes out 
the infraction booklet, and writes out the fine, specifying the day and hour, and an 
estimation of the discharge flowing into the drain. He talks to the neighbouring farmer, 
who has just harvested his maize crop. Miguel asks him to estimate the yield, data he 
has to collect and give to the District, which the engineers process for statistical ends. 
Soon we go, and Miguel locates another, very old, water user, to whom he gives the 
irrigation turn of the abandoned plot. Miguel consults his notebook and with some 
satisfaction he sees it has been exactly 30 days since its last irrigation turn. Miguel 
shows by his attitude to him, that he respects this old water user. He explains to me 
later that he has always been a very dedicated, hard-working farmer, whom you will 
find each day in the field. Later, Miguel confides in me that hard work is an important 
criterion: one gives preference to hard working farmers, as they finish their irrigation 
turns more quickly, and never cause problems. In contrast, the lazy farmers always 
create problems, and tend to irrigate much longer. This affects the irrigation 
programme, since he will 'fall behind schedule', creating problems for other farmers. 
Miguel looks down upon idle farmers. The old water user, his son and Miguel discuss 
a problem with a tertiary canal. The water user knows what he is talking about because 
he has been a farmers' leader of the area (jefe de potrero) during the greater part of his 
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life, and his son, who is a bricklayer, has rehabilitated the major part of all field canals 
in this potrero. Miguel gives his opinion about the problematic tertiary canal. The 
atmosphere is pleasant and one of mutual respect. 
It is already 10:30, so Miguel continues, arriving at another canal, about 5 
kilometres away. He finds the irrigator of the plot receiving the water. This particular 
agricultural labourer irrigates nearly all the plots on this tertiary canal, on behalf of the 
farmers. Therefore, Miguel takes 5 minutes to discusses with him how to proceed. This 
makes Miguel's work a lot easier. He need only to discuss with one person instead of 
6. Miguel then asks him about the situation of another nearby plot, which is apparently 
to be planted with sugar cane, although no official permission for it has been granted. 
He knows that the irrigator is related to the owner of the plot. He gets the information 
required, which he will need to give to his superior. Miguel needs a constant flow of 
information if he is to do his job properly. He says goodbye and follows the main canal. 
He slightly draws up two big radial gates in the main canal. He has to draw up all 7 
gates in his part of the main canal (18 kilometres), in order to pass on the cambio, that 
is the change in discharge, destined for both canaleros downstream: Gabriel and Pedro. 
Today, Miguel has to pass on 300 litres per second more than the day before (1700 bps 
as against 1400). 
He arrives at another plot, calls the irrigator, who after some 5 minutes finally 
appears. There is a problem here with a blockage in the canal, which the landowner has 
made in order to let his cattle drink. The blockage affects the irrigations. It appears that 
the landowner is a partner with Miguel in the other (second) maize crop he is growing. 
He is working at the Agricultural Bank, and so arranged a credit for Miguel. The night 
before, he had come to Miguel's house and asked for an irrigation turn. Miguel had 
agreed, but had said; 'you should fix that canal'. Now, in the field, Miguel sees he has 
done nothing, so he decides to postpone the irrigation turn until the following day. 
Between 10:55 and 11:30 he checks 3 other irrigation turns, moves three gates, visits 
a plot which has a new but illegal intake structure, and sees how a sugar cane plot, 
which only received an irrigation turn two weeks ago, has been burnt for the harvest 
that night without having observed the normal 4-6 weeks of suspension of irrigation (the 
longer the suspension, the lower the gross yield). Miguel comments that this water user 
has a position on the board of the sugar cane growers organisation. Miguel shows his 
disgust. 
The sun at its peak 
Whilst driving from one place to another Miguel explains many details of his work to 
me. Time and again, he expresses himself with the words 'here I have two irrigations', 
'that plot I am going to irrigate next week' etc. We arrive at another plot where the 
irrigator (labourer) complains about his neighbour who has robbed him of his water. He 
says he is afraid of this man, because he is 'a brute'. Therefore, he has not been able 
to finish his turn in the time agreed upon. Miguel tries to find a way to solve the 
conflict. 'I understand your point, I understand why you are angry. But if he robbed 
water from you, he will finish his turn sooner, is it not so? You are very tired because 
of this irrigating. Tomorrow it is Saturday and Sunday. And when he has finished then 
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there will be enough water for the two turns downstream.' Miguel shows his 
pragmatism, and promises to pass by the next day. After having checked two other 
irrigation turns, Miguel arrives at his second cita\ where he has to be at 11:30 am. It 
is already 12:15, and nobody is there. He waits 5 minutes. Then he continues. Until 
1:45 pm he checks 4 more irrigations. Then he returns to the main canal and checks the 
gates he had moved in the morning. At 2 o'clock he has his first break, and we drink 
a soda. Less then 10 minutes later, we drive to the District. 
Afternoon 
Some minutes before the canaleros' meeting starts at 2:30, Miguel arrives at the 
District, and he hastily goes to Mario's office, where the meeting is to be held. Mario 
is the agricultural extension supervisor or promotor of El Grullo. Miguel sits down, and 
starts writing his irrigation report (each Monday, Wednesday and Friday): the number 
of each plot which has finished its irrigation turn, the area and crops grown. 
At 2:40, the meeting starts. All 6 canaleros are present, also the two water gaugers 
(aforadores), the irrigation supervisor and the promotor. Mario writes down the water 
measurements for each of the 6 zones, collected by the water gaugers. He asks whether 
the canaleros want a cambio. In the meantime, Miguel finishes his report: there are 23 
plots that have finished their irrigation. He has to revise his notebook to check all the 
data. Then, he gives the report to Mario, with the fine he had written out this morning. 
The atmosphere is relaxed. The canaleros are not talking about work, but about the bull 
fights and fiestas in a particular hamlet. Some time later, Mario starts to read them a 
list that the sugar factory has sent to the District: a list of the sugar cane plots that now 
are suspended from irrigation. The canaleros take notes. Although in the meantime they 
go on talking and chatting, they are alert. 
At 3 o'clock, Engineer Corona, head of the operation department, and the senior 
engineer for the canaleros, enters the room. Mario informs him of what they are doing. 
Corona makes some comments, and emphasises the importance of carefully 
implementing the 'suspension' of the sugar cane plots mentioned. Various canaleros 
comment that the sugar factory's list has many errors. Corona then leaves the room. 
Mario goes on with the list, which seems endless. Miguel looks tired and I feel 
exhausted. Fifteen minutes later, Engineer Acosta, head of the Autlah-El Grullo area 
office, and immediate superior of the canaleros, enters the room. He tells Gabriel, a 
canalero, that finally the hydraulic excavator has arrived at one of his silted canals. 
Some canaleros then say to him that there are problems with the payment of their over-
time allowance. With this plea, they show they trust him more than Corona. Three 
canaleros leave the room. The room is very small, and they are simply a little irritated. 
Outside in the hall they go on chatting. After some other details have been discussed, 
me meeting ends at 3:50 pm. Outside, the group disperses, while one yells to the other 
that he has heard the rumour that the money for their salaries has arrived, and perhaps 
will be paid that same afternoon. 
Miguel returns directly to his house, where his wife serves him beans, meat, 
tortillas, water, coca cola and a pineapple. The children had already lunched. At 5 pm, 
Miguel goes to the maize mill in El Grullo, where he is to meet the ejidatario who is 
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his 'socio' or share-crop partner, in one of the two maize plots. This ejidatario had 
done the harvesting and now they settle their accounts. It appears that the harvest was 
good, and they have made a profit. Finally at 7 pm Miguel goes one last time to die 
field, revising the irrigation of export tomatoes nearby his village. The work day ends 
where it started. 
At the end of the day.. 
That day Miguel drove 80 km, checked 20 irrigation turns (one of which he checked 
three times), talked to 20 farmers and 10 irrigators, and met with 15 persons at the 
District. That day, there were 3,150 lps of water entering his zone, of which he used 
1,450 lps and let the remaining 1,700 lps pass to downstream zones. He worked from 
7 am till 4 pm (9 hours) for the District, of which 7 and a half hours were in the field. 
Also he spent some time on his wife's business (killing chickens) but he had little time 
for his own business (the maize plots). Miguel on various occasions urged farmers to 
irrigate carefully, because of the suspension of sugar cane plots. He discussed a varying 
range of items with the farmers. He explained to some of them the irrigation schedule, 
he issued irrigation orders, and fined one farmer. He had provided farmers with 
information on current crop prices, and one agricultural labourer with information 
concerning current wages for irrigators. Miguel also asked for information from these 
people. Information about particular plots and persons. Each encounter lasted between 
3 and 15 minutes. He also attended an exhausting meeting at the District. On top of all 
this, he conceded an extensive interview to the researcher. 
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Appendix 4 
Two documents of the Water Users' Association 
Document 1 
The participation of water users in operation, maintenance and administration of the 
irrigation unit Autlah-El Grullo. [Read by the board's president to the Jalisco Governor; 
August 1989 (Asociaci6n de Usuarios, 1989)] 
'Although there has been an experience of fanner participation in the operation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure during the period 1980-85, these activities were 
characterised by little involvement of the water users in the programming, supervision 
and evaluation of the works, over which SARH took responsibility. This unilateral way 
of tackling the said responsibilities did not forestall the water users, apart from paying 
the water fees which were imposed on them, having to undertake great quantities of 
work to get the water to their crops. Despite this extra financial burden [...] the 
maintenance works which the District realised were not on time, insufficient and often 
of poor quality, no doubt because of bureaucratic fetters and personal interests, which 
resulted in disrupting water distribution or the impossibility of the same in vast areas. 
Such obvious anomalies stimulated currents of opinion against the District, which 
proved to be a bad administrator and incompetent in improving the irrigation service 
and lowering the costs of operation and maintenance. The same currents of opinion 
became obstacles to fixing the water fees which would make the system financially self-
sufficient, as stipulated in the Public Works Law. [...] Therefore, it was proposed to 
let the water users participate in the responsibility for the execution of maintenance 
works, and to let them administer the water fees themselves, a measure based on the 
Planning Law, and the National Development Plan of 1989-94. 
The Water Users' Association was founded on November 11, 1988. [...] From 
December 1988 till May 1989, its regulations were revised, clearing up several doubts 
by organising a visit to the Water Users' Association of the El Agua irrigation unit. On 
May the 9th 1989, the new regulations were accepted and an agreement signed whereby 
SARH handed over heavy machinery [...] for operation and maintenance. This 
machinery, although in the present irrigation season is still financed by SARH, is 
administered by the Water Users' Association. Satisfactory results with respect to 
punctuality and low costs for the work have been obtained. Apart from this, the 
following has also been achieved: an increase in the water fees, which are now managed 
by the water users themselves; an agreement not to increase the area of sugar cane until 
the new storage dam is ready; the approval of a joint maintenance programme for the 
current year between the Association, SARH and CNA; [...] an agreement that water 
distribution will become the responsibility of the water users in the 1989-1990 irrigation 
season starting in October; the assignment of an office; [...] 
These achievements give us the confidence to attain financial self-sufficiency and 
administrative autonomy in the medium term, and thus to contribute to the objectives 
of our rulers: greater productivity and profitability of the rural areas, to the benefit of 
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our families and our state [...]. 
Faithfully, the Water Users' Association. [Signed by the Board members.] 
Document 2: 
The Autlâh-El Grullo irrigation unit, A.C. ; in coordination with the Comisiôn National 
del Agua, and the Jalisco State Government. [Text by video film, April 1990 (in: 
Asociaciôn de Usuarios, 1990)] 
'[...] In accordance with the federal government's policy of modernising rural Mexico, 
the president of the republic [name] has determined that operation, maintenance and 
administration of the Irrigation Districts shall be handed over to the water users, 
counting on the support of [...] the Constitutional Governor of Jalisco. In the irrigation 
unit Autlah-El Grullo, actions have been undertaken to attain this objective [...]. In this 
irrigation unit it is envisaged to hand over the operation, maintenance and administration 
to the water users themselves, which will be done by the CNA. To this end [name] the 
Director General of the CNA has sent instructions to [name] the National Director of 
Irrigation Districts, and [name] the CNA Director in Jalisco. In November 1989, a visit 
of CNA functionaries was received to agree on the guidelines to follow [...]. 
At present the Foundation (Asociaciôn Civil) has been constituted and is formalised. 
Since March it has participated with the CNA in water distribution and in canal 
maintenance since last year; it has a well-defined technical structure. Previously, water 
distribution was realised solely by government personnel without the participation of the 
water users. Presently, the Association executes water distribution on the left bank of 
the irrigation unit. It coordinates activities with the Irrigation District [i.e. CNA, not 
the Rural Development District] for the training of its personnel, with the objective of 
guaranteeing the CNA correct operation, and taking jointly the decisions which are best 
suited for making correct water use more efficient. The participation of water users 
through instituting auxiliary delegates at canal level and intake structure, jointly with 
personnel of the Irrigation District [i.e. CNA], realise the irrigation calendar, according 
to the tandeo (turn-taking) water distribution method. As a consequence, conflicts and 
disparities in turn-taking and timing of irrigation have been prevented. Similarly, it was 
agreed to permanently supervise and guard the infrastructure and the water in order to 
prevent misuse of these resources, achieving through these actions a better awareness 
in the participation and use of the irrigation unit on the part of the users. 
The Association coordinates the maintenance works of the irrigation unit jointly with 
die Irrigation District No.094, realising maintenance of the machinery and equipment 
in possession of the CNA, achieving in this way significant progress in the maintenance 
of the hydraulic infrastructure. Maintenance has been undertaken by the Association 
since May 1989, surpassing the programme as defined by the official sector by 200% 
[...]. "The modernisation of rural Mexico is based on a better use of resources, the 
most important being water" [...]. 
The Water Users Association of the irrigation unit Autlâh-El Grullo, A . C 
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Appendix 5 
Translations during the creation of the Water Users' Commission in 1980 
Gallon (1986) has developed a method to uncover the power effects resulting from 
strategising. He calls his approach the 'sociology of translation'. It is quite easy to apply 
his approach to one major event in El Operado: the creation of the Water Users' 
Commission (see chapter 7). His approach distinguishes four phases, starting with the 
problematisation of die issue at hand; followed by 'intéressement', 'enrolment' and 
finally 'mobilisation' of actors. 
1. problematisation: engineers defining groups, problems and solutions 
The engineers first perform a study and from it they identify which actors are involved 
in the struggle. The identity (including names of the crucial actors) of the sugar cane 
lobby is carefully recorded. The other actor is formed by the majority of peasant 
producers, which is pictured as having common interests only. They furthermore define 
the problem 'the water users' supposedly have, namely that their (annual) crops might 
be affected by water scarcity as a result of the expansion of (perennial) sugar cane by 
a handful of entrepreneurs. The engineers thus define the relationship between the 
majority of water users on the one hand, and a handful of entrepreneurs and the sugar 
cane factory on the other. They curiously do not define themselves as a party in the 
conflict. 
2. intéressement: getting the farmers accept the engineers solution 
During the next phase, engineers go down to the villages, organise ejido meetings, and 
try to interest the ejidatarios for the huge problem they are facing regarding the spread 
of sugar cane. The ejidatarios are told that their crops are being threatened by the 
actions of a small group of entrepreneurs, and that the ejidatarios have a common 
interest, which clashes with the interests of the sugar cane lobby. The engineers succeed 
in putting a wedge within the sugar cane growers' association, which is dominated by 
some members of the sugar cane lobby, but with a majority of small ejidatarios. The 
engineers thus re-define groups and interests along new lines, and postulate a breach 
between small and big farmers. The engineers tell the ejidatarios they are there to 
defend the interests of the majority of the producers, i.e. the small producers, and so 
they also define a link between them and the ejidatarios. Finally they say that the 
conflict can only be solved if the ejidatarios agree to form a water users commission. 
3. enrolment: getting the farmers displaced 
When the commission is finally formed, the engineers first displace the water user 
representatives to the district offices, where they meet and discuss. (Recall how one 
engineer put it: 'How could we control them to a certain degree? To have them gathered 
together at the district, that they would speak there. So that they would not walk around 
on other sides.') Then, at their own discretion, the engineers give water user 
representatives certain duties and powers. They furthermore set the agenda of the issues 
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to be discussed and solved, and provide them with (carefully selected) information and 
data. This all results in the engineers effectively enroling the delegates in their project. 
4. mobilisation: getting farmers enact solutions and colleagues impressed 
At first, within the commission tensions built up, since a large minority of delegates are 
small cane producers. But in the end the delegates perform exactly as the engineers have 
orchestrated, saddling these delegates up with responsibilities they had not asked for, 
and letting them decide that it is impossible to grant any water user the right to plant 
new sugar cane. The engineers, then, have succeeded in positing the commission at the 
centre of the conflict. Even the sugar cane factory and the big entrepreneurs grudgingly 
accept this new institution, and do not contest its conclusion to freeze the sugar cane 
expansion. Meanwhile, the engineers wash their hands in innocence (as one farmer 
said). 
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Appendix 6 
Rapid Irrigation Practice Identification 
Diagnosing management and organisational issues of irrigation systems does not require 
a huge investment in time. In this appendix, I will try to demonstrate that rapid 
identification is possible, through a focus on irrigation practice. Irrigation practice refers 
to the practices of people concerning three typical irrigation issues: (1) water 
distribution; (2) canal maintenance; and (3) management issues. Management issues here 
refer to: how conflicts between different groups are sorted out; how annual decisions 
concerning cropping patterns, volume of water used, level of water fees are arranged. 
These management issues will inevitably crop up when studying in detail problematic 
situations related to water distribution and canal maintenance, since these management 
issues provide the institutional context within which canals are maintained and water is 
distributed. 
Step 1 
Define which interest group you want to benefit from your investigation. Find out when 
both maintenance and water distribution tasks are most intensive (nearly any farmer will 
tell you directly). Probably these will fall in different periods. If so, follow steps two 
and three (below) both for maintenance and for water distribution. 
Step 2 
The issues of water distribution and canal maintenance can now be studied during one 
week of field work each. One tries to find concrete problems related to the issue under 
study. When identified, one tries to record: 1. context; 2. differential interactions; 3. 
shared values; 4. strategies. 
1. Context 
- Time: when does the problem happen, did it happen before? 
- Place: where does it happen; head- or tail-; crops etc.; technical reasons why this 
could happen? 
- Social groups: roughly sketch the groups that are involved in this problem, and/or 
who (hypothetically) are affected by it, or benefit from it 
2. Differential interactions 
- Who interacts with whom concerning the problem? Who takes the initiative? Who 
is left out? 
- How are these interactions connected to the wider environment (including the 
institutional environment)? Which networks are mobilised, and established? 
- What is the interaction about? How are certain groups excluded? What arguments 
are used and which negotiations take place? Are goods and favours exchanged; what 
is the final outcome? Who gains, and who looses? 
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3. Values which are shared or not 
- In which terms is the problem defined? Is there consensus about what the problem 
is actually about? How is it that some people are able to make others do what they 
do not like to do? 
- Do people refer to similar situations which occurred in the past? To which images 
do people appeal concerning the problem situation? For the different groups 
involved, which images and prejudices are reproduced by it? 
- How do the groups involved interpret the situation? Which solutions are suggested, 
and which constraints are anticipated? 
4. Strategies 
- What strategies do people develop in order to attain certain goals (including those 
people who do not openly interact/feature in the problem but who might be 
affected/might gain by it)? 
- What goals do people strive for? In what do they differ? 
- How are these strategies shaped by former experiences (with similar situations)? 
Step 3 
Then, after the week of field work, field notes are worked out in the office where 
management resides, and issues relating to the system's management are tackled/solved. 
One week spent in the management realm enables the researcher/interventionist to 
become familiar with this other field situation. It is important to socialise and accept any 
offer from the people who work there to accompany them to a specific 
meeting/situation, or help them with calculations, etc. 
Record context, differential interactions, values and strategies in this office context. 
Problematic situations in this office context may be multiple and not clearly defined. 
That is exactly what should be studied. For example, how are problematic situations 
emerging in the field welcomed/received in this office? And does problem definition in 
this office bear some (if any) relation to field problems? The relation inside-outside 
office, and linkages, should also become the focus here. 
Step 4 
When the material on practice has been gathered, it can be analysed along two lines. 
Firstly, different possible domains or fields of activities can be distinguished with 
markedly different types of practice present. Secondly, linkages between these different 
domains have to be examined, and possible disjunctions highlighted. This fourth step 
can be called interface assessment, since these linkages refer to social interactions 
between actors stemming from different social worlds or belonging to different levels 
in the institutional hierarchy. 
Having analysed in detail practice related to problematic situations, possible 
solutions, as forwarded by people involved, can be reviewed in the light of the result 
of the interface assessment. 
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Step 5 
The conclusions of this analysis can then be discussed with the different groups 
involved, which again may produce crucial new information, and may deepen the 
analysis. Thus, separate group discussions with main interest groups identified in steps 
2 and 3, are organised in their respective domains. The discussions focus on problem 
definition (what is the problem with this organisation). People are stimulated to give 
suggestions for solving the problem. The interventionist should be careful not to accept 
problem definitions and suggestions too easily, but rather to provoke elaborate 
discussions about them. Step 5 should be carefully recorded. 
Step 6 
First reporting findings of both water distribution, maintenance and management issues 
to the interest group defined as the target group. List possible solutions with 
constraining factors. See whether the target group agrees. Add if necessary any new 
insights. Discuss with them possible consequences of reporting findings to the other 
interests groups. Rewrite report if necessary. Report to remaining groups. Propose final 
version of possible solutions with clearly defined constraining factors, in accordance 
with interests of target group. Actions as defined in the report can now be undertaken. 
Later, these action in turn can be diagnosed, adapted or new actions developed. 
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Appendix 7 
Glossary of frequently used Spanish words and terms, in their local connotation 
aforador water gauger, a District employee who measures daily water flow in main canals 
agrarista peasant revolutionary 
aguas broncas 'wild waters', silt-laden brown coloured river water during and directly after the rains 
agua muerta 'dead water', standing water dammed by lowered gates in the irrigation canal 
asociacion 
-agricola local local producers organisation aimed at the production and marketing of a specific crop 
-caftera sugar cane producers' organisation 
-civil civil foundation or voluntary association 
-pequena propiedad local organisation of private landowners (pequenos propietarios) in one municipality 
-de usuarios water users' association; found in all unidades de riego/URDERAL in Mexico; and also 
in a few irrigation systems operated by the SARH ministry through the District 
brigada d.macheteo slashers brigade; group of workmen of maintenance department cleaning canals by hand 
cacique local or regional boss 
canalero water guard, or ditch tender, employee of the District 
cambio change; here often used to indicate a change in water flows in canals 
castigar cana under-irrigating sugar cane; litt. punishing cane 
C.N.C. Confederation National Campesina; national peasant union, affiliated to the PRI party 
C.N.P.P. Confederation National de la Pequena Propiedad; national union of private landowners, 
affiliated to PRI 
coamil traditional maize cultivation system, using the coa as a dibble; still practised in the hills 
comisiôn 
- del Sur de Jalisco important government commission during the 1970s, headed by José G. Zuno Arce 
- de usuarios water users' commission; here : the Autlan-El Grullo water users' organisation which was 
set up in 1980, but which lacked the legal recognition of the later association 
- nacional del agua national commission of water (C.N.A.) , created in January 1989 
comité 
- directivo governing board of the Rural Development District 
- de vigilancia control council in ejido, with a president, secretary and treasurer; normally composed 
of those ejido members who failed to get elected in the ejido's executive board (mesa) 
compadrazgo ritual kinship, co-parenthood 
compadre co-parent 
compuerta gate or intake in irrigation canal 
convivencia get-together, party 
cuota water fee (cuota del servicio de riego) 
delegado delegate; can be a farmer representative in an organisation; can also be the State 
representative of a Ministry (e.g. Delegado of SARH in Jalisco) 
distrito short-hand for Rural Development District; also for the irrigation system of El Operado 
- agropecuario district of agriculture and livestock production; the El Grullo District between 1983-86 
- d.desarrollo rural from 1986 onward the El Grullo District is called Rural Development District 
- de riego irrigation district; before 1977, there was one District in Jalisco, the El Grullo office was 
called Vnidad; in 1977, the Distrito de Riego no.094, EX Grullo was formed, which 
managed three irrigation systems; from 1979, the El Grullo District also supervised 
unidades de riego, and became Distrito y Unidades de Riego No.094 y 594, Sur de 
Jalisco; in 1983, it fiised with Autlân Rain-fed District to become Distrito Agropecuario 
- de temporal rain-fed Districts, which between 1976 and 1983 co-existed with the irrigation Districts; 
in the former mainly agronomists worked, in the latter mainly irrigation engineers 
ejidatario member of an ejido, who holds usufructuary rights on part of the ejido land 
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ejido agrarian community which corporately holds lands, received as a grant from the 
government; ejido lands may not be sold 
empaque packing plant for horticultural crops for export (Like tomatoes, melons) 
entrada inlet, intake structure, syn. toma 
extensionista agricultural extension worker, employee of the District 
faena work party 
gasto expenditure, expense; flow, discharge 
grande irrigacidn local office of the construction department of SARH 
hacienda large ranch or estate, owned by kacendado, mostly dispossessed during the land reforms 
Hacienda Ministry of Finance 
ingenio sugar mill, sugar factory or refinery 
jefe de potrero leader of a group of ejidatarios working the lands of one potrero 
jefe de toma leader of a group of fanners served by one canal inlet 
lateral secondary irrigation canal 
li'der (political) leader 
mesa directiva executive committee of ejido, with president, secretary and treasurer 
mezcal locally brewed and distilled alcoholic drink, made from the agave plant 
mozo agricultural labourer 
padrino godfather 
padrino politico political godfather, protector 
pequena propiedad private landownership, in contrast with the ejido type of landholding 
pequeno propietario private landowner, who can sell-off the land 
potrero group of adjoining fields (covering 10-100 ha); formerly fenced part o f a hacienda ranch 
P.R.I. Partido Revolucionario Institutional; political party in power virtually since the 1920s 
prestanombre name of relative, friend or trusted employee used to obscure real landownership 
promoter extension officer, District employee responsible for agricultural, live-stock and forestry 
extension services in one municipality, supervising the extensionistas 
ramal minor irrigation canal 
rebajo decrease of water flow 
recursos used to refer to the District; from Secretaria de Recursos HidrduUcos (SRH) 
regadera field canal 
rentista rents agricultural land 
represa check-structure in irrigation canal with which upstream water levels can be manipulated 
represo dammed up water immediately upstream of a represa that has been lowered 
SARH Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos HidrduUcos, Ministry of Agricultural and 
Hydraulic Resources; in charge of the Rural Development Districts; formed in 1977 
secretaria short-hand for the SARH ministry; also used to refer to the Rural Development District 
sex&iio presidential period of six years in Mexico (1971-1976; 1977-1982;1983-1988etc.) 
SRH Secretaria de Recursos HidrduUcos; Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (until 1977) 
sublateral tertiary canal 
suspension suspension; often used with respect to the temporary suspension of irrigation water 
service to sugar cane plots 4 to 8 weeks prior to harvesting 
toma intake; syn. entrada (de agua) 
tomate de cascara small tomato with a green skin; ingredient of salsa sauce in the Mexican cuisine 
trapiche sugar mill, normally oxen-driven, not found any more in the Autlan region 
unidad de riego irrigation unit; nowadays often used to refer to URDERAL 
union de ejidos second-tiered organisation of several ejidos, normally of one municipality; the unidn 
often provides inputs, like fertilizers, seeds, agrochemicals to its members 
URDERAL unidad de riego de desarrollo rural: small-scale irrigation system operated by water 
users organised in an association; during 1970s-1980s, many unidades were constructed 
yunta yoke, team of oxen; also: area measure of approx. 4 ha 
Summary 
Existing studies of irrigation systems show that technical elements influence social 
processes, and also, that certain social relationships may have technical implications. 
However, little has been said about the precise content of this interplay. A better insight 
seems important, as irrigation systems, when put into operation, often have unforeseen 
organisational and social consequences, and a disappointing performance. The present 
thesis aims to answer the question: How do the social practices of people relate to the 
physical infrastructure of an irrigation system and its organisation, and how do these 
practices change over time. To this end I studied the organising processes of an 
irrigation system, that of El Operado in the valley of Autlah-El Grullo, Western 
Mexico, from February 1987 through April 1989. To explore this theme I use the 
concepts of practice, social interaction and intervention. Through a focus on 
intervention I envisaged being able to single out the crucial factors for diagnosing 
irrigation organisation, and to assess viable intervention strategies. 
To capture the social dynamics that emerge around irrigation situations, I chose an 
actor-oriented research method, based on detailed observations (qualitative and 
quantitative), informal interviews, and (group) discussions. I also modestly participated 
in the stream of events concerning the El Operado's Water Users' Association. 
The present monograph on El Operado brings the system's social and technical 
dimensions under one common denominator, that of practice. To accomplish this, the 
diesis has the following structure. After an introduction to El Operado's historical and 
technical context, case studies follow on three irrigation activities. The focus then shifts 
to interventions in El Operado's management, and I analyse how, as a result of these 
interventions, people's practice changed. On the basis of this material I finally give an 
outline for an intervention perspective. 
The thesis is written for irrigation scholars and practitioners in the field. The study 
forms part of a multidisciplinary research project of Wageningen Agricultural University 
and the Colegio de Jalisco, Guadalajara, entitled 'Contrasting patterns of irrigation 
organisation, peasant strategies and planned intervention: comparative studies in 
Western Mexico'. 
The context 
The context of an irrigation system can be sketched through an appreciation of historical 
developments and the spatial-technical features of the system. An historical investigation 
of projects related to water and land development in the Autlah-El Grullo valley, from 
1850 to the present, shows that such projects faced three recurring themes: a strained 
relationship between insiders (from the valley) and outsiders; contradictions between 
small farmers and the local elite; and the awkward position of intermediary actors and 
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of farmer organisations, such as the ejidos. As we will see, the social dynamic found 
in the El Operado irrigation system, which was constructed in the 1950s, can also be 
characterised by these three sets of problematic relationships. 
Spatially, El Operado with its 9,000 hectares covers nearly half of the Autlah-El 
Grullo plain, and serves some 2,500 plots, 69% of which planted with sugar cane. The 
1,300 water users include a small number of entrepreneurs who control 40% of the 
land, and a majority of small farmers (1,100, mainly ejidatarios organised in 18 ejidos), 
who have less than 10 hectares. The third category of actors are the personnel of the 
Rural Development District (Distrito de Desarrollo Rural), a local office of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH). The District, among other things, 
manages El Operado, and is responsible for distributing water to the farm plots, for 
canal maintenance, and for decisions concerning water fees, crops and conflicts. 
An important technical feature of El Operado is that all division structures are 
adjustable, which allows water delivery to follow the 'on request' method. Farmers are 
free, within limits, to chose the crop they cultivate, and to chose when to plant and 
when to irrigate. 
Irrigation practice 
In getting to grips with irrigation practice in El Operado, I focused on water 
distribution, canal maintenance and the making of the irrigation plan. 
The actor-centred study of the water guard, or canalero, revealed how, through 
properly operating the structures, he succeeds in tailoring water delivery to a variety of 
local demands. He has internalised the physical properties of the canal system. Water 
guards do not strictly adhere to the technical guidelines from District engineers, which 
are too general, but interpret them while drawing on their technical competence. Water 
guards are 'interfacers', linking farmers to the District, the District to the sugar 
refinery, and creating linkages among farmers. 
In El Operado problematic situations occur every year at the end of the rainy season, 
when canals silt up, and the District's maintenance department is unable to duly clean 
them. When water shortages become serious because of the silted canals, groups of 
farmers organise their own solutions, this despite the fact that farmers often regard 
group efforts with scepticism. Joint undertakings vis-a-vis the physical infrastructure 
(e.g. investing labour, money, and social capital in cleaning a canal) have an impact on 
the participants' sense of ownership over it; it shifts from 'the government's' to 'ours'. 
Canal groups repeatedly engaged in joint activities that took on a lasting character. 
Paired with farmers' new sense of ownership this provided a perspective for future 
farmer involvement in El Operado's management. 
The irrigation plan which the District's operation department formulates every year, 
appeared not to be an important instrument of decision-making for El Operado's 
management. Crucial decisions, for example regarding the water fees or granting certain 
fanners permission to grow sugar cane, are negotiated by a few important actors behind 
closed doors. In a meeting with the water users commission, District engineers did not 
provide sufficient information, so that the farmers' leaders were unable to critically 
assess the irrigation plan and the proposed water fees, nor formulate alternatives. 
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In conclusion, the analysis of irrigation practice revealed that different groups of 
actors, such as water users, farmers' leaders, District engineers and field personnel, 
develop different practices. These practices occur in different domains: 'the field', the 
domain of the farmers; 'the office', the domain of the District engineers; and 'the 
ejido', the domain of farmers' leaders. In El Operado, it appeared that these domains 
of interaction co-existed alongside each other and were relatively autonomous. 
Intervention and change of practice 
The following step in the analysis dealt with intervention and change in El Operado's 
management. Of three interventions reviewed, one intervention concerned the formation 
of a new Water Users' Association, which took eventual charge of canal maintenance. 
The intervention resulted from power struggles within the intervening institutions, 
but its outcome was shaped by the interface encounters that unfolded during 
implementation: encounters and negotiations between actors stemming from different 
social worlds or holding different positions (e.g. engineer - farm leaders). Importantly, 
the intervention left particular actors out, namely the ordinary farmers, which is crucial 
to our understanding of what happened. Although the intervention had some immediate 
effects (improved canal maintenance for example), it remained confined to the formal 
level and did not change the practices of the people concerned. 
Practices finally started to change when the Water Users' Association also got 
involved in water distribution. The position of 'gate leader' was instituted, who 
supervised water distribution along one minor canal. On a higher level, farmer delegates 
of the Association together with the water guard coordinated water distribution in each 
of El Operado's six zones. With this structure a linkage between board and delegates 
on the one hand, and water users and water guards on the other, was established. Put 
differently, domains got interconnected, and farmers, for example, could now better 
check their delegates. 
This new organisational structure means that the basis of the Association not any 
longer is formed by ejido representatives but by water users who represent a canal. The 
Association can now discontinue obsolete practices originating from the ejidos, can re-
direct the Association's lop-sided organisation structure, and can concentrate on 
practical issues rather than on political wheeling and dealing. Having touched down at 
canal level, the Association links up with farmer practices found there. As we saw 
earlier, this has already led to farmers appropriating their canals. The association now 
follows suit. 
Perspective 
The analysis of El Operado, summarised above, describes the actions and interactions 
of people involved in the irrigation system, while taking seriously their material settings. 
Practice appeared a sensitising concept which helped to pin down the interplay between 
people and things in this micro-society. 
In answer to the research question, different groups relate to the canal system in 
specific ways: District engineers have the overall responsibility for it, field personnel 
have to work with it, and farmers depend on it. These groups develop particular 
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practices as people cope with the constraints put forward by the system. Practice 
articulates with physical infrastructure through the actions of people in specific domains. 
The irrigation system's arena is made up of different domains, but some domains are 
disconnected. This helps to explain some of the operational problems. Interventions 
aimed at solving these problems succeed if they change existing practice accordingly. 
Changes of practice occur when new settings of interactions are put in place, and when 
different domains formerly separated become interconnected. New linkages imply that 
practice at one level feeds practice at another. 
On the basis of these findings, I suggested a type of diagnosis of irrigation 
organisation which is based on a descriptive account of practice concerning key 
activities; of the different domains present, and of the existing linkages between 
domains. Practice can be described through examining the context in which an irrigation 
activity takes place, the social interactions it entails, the interpretations people give of 
this practice and the strategies the different groups involved develop. When the 
diagnosis detects problems, these can be discussed with the people concerned. With 
them possible solutions can be reviewed and intervention strategies designed. 
The type of interventions which I have in mind aims at changing irrigation practices, 
through strengthening some practices found in specific domains while breaking down 
others. The approach thus is both about continuity and discontinuity. This can be 
pursued through adapting formal organisational arrangements to informal initiatives and 
experiences. Adjustments on the formal level could include defining more precisely 
ownership relations with respect to the canal system, and to irrigation water; (re-) 
defining responsibilities that groups of people have towards the system and towards each 
other; re-organising the system's arena through establishing new linkages between 
domains while breaking down others; and adapting the settings of interactions. This 
approach to intervention starts from the idea that irrigation management implies 
'interfaces', that is, interactions between actors with structurally different positions, and 
it acknowledges that these interactions are of an emergent character, which means that 
their outcomes can never be wholly planned. The approach thus aims to carefully 
manage interfaces, but without the illusion of controlling them. 
Finally I turn to my own experience with the research methodology which centres 
around actors, and tries to understand people's actions and practices. Interviews with 
the 'research population' often resulted in interface situations, in which the attitudes and 
actions of both myself as well as of my discussion partners were questioned. This is a 
first small step in an intervention process. 
Samenvatting 
Bestaande studies van irrigatiesystemen laten zien dat technische faktoren sociale 
Processen beinvloeden en, omgekeerd, dat bepaalde sociale verhoudingen technische 
konsekwenties kunnen hebben. Er is echter weinig gedetailleerde kennis over de 
wisselwerking tussen techniek en sociale verhoudingen. Het is belangrijk daar meer 
inzicht in te krijgen omdat in de praktijk blijkt dat het opzetten en het veranderen van 
een irrigatiesysteem vaak andere organisatorische en sociale gevolgen hebben dan men 
verwacht, zodat beoogde doelstellingen dikwijls niet gerealiseerd worden. 
In dit proefschrift wordt de wisselwerking behandeld tussen de sociale en technische 
struktuur van een irrigatiesysteem en wordt gekeken hoe deze wisselwerking met de tijd 
verändert. Ik bestudeerde organisatie-processen in het irrigatiesysteem El Operado in 
de vallei Autläh-El Grullo, in West-Mexico, daarbij gebruikmakend van de 
sociologische begrippen: 'praktijken' (handelwijzen), 'sociale interaktie' (hoe mensen 
met elkaar omgaan) en 'interventie' (meestal: overheidsingrijpen). Het doel van het 
onderzoek is het opsporen van faktoren die organisatie-processen beinvloeden, om 
daarmee een irrigatiesysteem nauwkeurig te evalueren en, indien noodzakelijk, een 
geschikt verbeteringsplan op te stellen. 
Om de sociale dynamiek in de verschillende situaties rond het irrigatiesysteem te 
kunnen beschrijven, is gekozen voor een onderzoeksmethode waarbij personen, 
begrepen als bewust handelende mensen of aktoren, centraal staan. Het 
onderzoeksmateriaal is verzameld op basis van gedetailleerde waarnemingen, informele 
interviews, (groep)diskussies, maar ook door aktieve deelname aan de oprichting van 
een watergebruikers-organisatie. 
Deze monografie van El Operado probeert de sociale en technische kanten onder 66a 
noemer te brengen. Het proefschrift is daartoe als volgt opgebouwd. Na een inleiding 
over de historie en de technische opzet van El Operado volgen detail-studies van drie 
irrigatie-aktiviteiten. Daarna worden drie ingrepen in het beheer van El Operado 
beschreven, en nagegaan wordt hoe tengevolge van deze ingrepen de verhoudingen 
tussen groepen van mensen veranderen. Op basis van deze gegevens wordt tenslotte een 
model ontworpen dat gebruikt kan worden bij het stellen van een diagnose van het 
beheer van irrigatiesystemen en voor het bepalen van ingrepen die moeten leiden tot 
verbetering van het irrigatiesysteem in zijn geheel. 
Het proefschrift is geschreven voor beleidsmakers, deskundigen en veldwerkers. De 
Studie vormt een onderdeel van een multidisciplinair onderzoeksprojekt van de 
Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen en het Colegio de Jalisco, Guadalajara, getiteld 
'Contrasting patterns of irrigation organisation, peasant strategies and planned 
intervention: comparative studies in Western Mexico'. 
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Kontekst 
De kontekst van een irrigatiesysteem kan beschreven worden met behulp van een 
historische en een ruimtelijk-technische analyse. In de landbouwkundige ontwikkeling 
van de Autläh-El Grullo vallei in de periode 1850 tot heden blijken drie zaken een 
belangrijke rol te speien: een gespannen verhouding hissen lokale bewoners en 
buitenstaanders; de tegenstelling hissen kleine boeren en lokale eilte; en de moeilijke 
tussenpositie waarin bepaalde personen en boerenorganisaties, zoals de ejidos, zieh 
bevinden. Ook in het irrigatiesysteem El Operado dat in de jaren vijftig werd aangelegd, 
zijn deze maatschappelijke verhoudingen terug te vinden. 
Ruimtelijk beslaat El Operado 9.000 hectare, de helft van de Autläh-El Grullo vallei 
en het voorziet 2500 velden van water; twee-derde van deze velden is bebouwd met 
suikerriet. Een klein aantal ondernemers van de 1300 watergebruikers kontroleert 
ongeveer 40% van het areaal. De grote meerderheid van boeren (1100, voornamelijk 
ejidatarios georganiseerd in 18 boerenorganisaties of ejidos) heeft minder dan 10 
hectare. Een derde kategorie personen wordt gevormd door het personeel van het Rurale 
Ontwikkelings District van El Grullo (Distrito de Desarrollo Rurat) van het Ministerie 
van Landbouw en Waterstaat (SARH). Het District is verantwoordelijk voor de 
waterverdeling tot aan de veldinlaten, voor het kanaalonderhoud en voor de beslissingen 
inzake waterprijs, geteelde gewassen en voorkomende konflikten. 
Een technisch kenmerk van El Operado is dat alle verdeelwerken verstelbaar zijn, 
waardoor het mogelijk is de waterverdeling op verzoek van boeren aan te passen. 
Boeren kunnen, binnen bepaalde marges, beslissen over de keuze van hun gewassen, 
over het tijdstip van zaaien, planten en irrigeren. 
Irrigatie-praktijken 
Drie irrigatie-aktiviteiten zijn beschreven: de waterverdeling, het kanaalonderhoud en 
het formuleren van het irrigatie-plan. 
Door het werk van de zes waterverdelers, de canaleros, nauwkeurig te volgen, valt 
op hoe zij door het vakkundig bedienen van verdeelwerken, komplexe verdeelpatronen 
bewerkstelligen die aangepast zijn aan de (in tijd en mimte) sterk varierende vraag naar 
water. De waterverdelers hebben zieh de technische kwaliteiten van het stelsel eigen 
gemaakt. Ze volgen de algemene richtlijnen van hun superieuren, de District ingenieurs, 
niet exaet op, maar interpreteren ze en brengen ze in overeenstemming met lokale 
situaties, daarbij steunend op hun vakmanschap. In de praktijk zijn waterverdelers 
bemiddelaars (interfacers), die de verhoudingen hissen District en boeren, hissen 
District en suikerfabriek, maar ook hissen boeren onderling, helpen gestalte te geven. 
Elk jaar aan het eind van het regenseizoen slibben veel kanalen dicht. Uit de Studie 
naar het kanaalonderhoud bleek dat de onderhoudsafdeling van het District niet in Staat 
is de kanalen op tijd schoon te maken. In sommige kanalen was het watertekort zo 
nijpend, dat boeren de handen ineensloegen en zelf de problemen oplosten. Als gevolg 
van deze groep-akties raakten boeren nauwer betrokken bij de irrigatie, en kreeg het 
kanaal een nieuwe betekenis: van 'het kanaal van het District' verschuift het naar 'ons 
kanaal'. Deze informele kanaalgroepen kwamen regelmatig in aktie, en kregen zelfs een 
blijvend karakter. Samen met hun nieuwe eigendomsbesef vormde dit een belangrijke 
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basis voor een grotere participatie van boeren in het beheer van El Operado. 
Het irrigatie-plan, dat ieder jaar gemaakt wordt door de wateiverdeel-afdeling van 
het District, blijkt geen belangrijk beslissings-instrument te zijn in het beheer van El 
Operado. Belangrijke besluiten, bijvoorbeeld over de hoogte van de waterprijs of het 
verlenen van recht aan bepaalde boeren om suikerriet te telen, worden genomen op basis 
van onderhandelingen hissen een paar invlœdrijke personen (zowel functionarissen van 
het District en suikerfabriek als invlœdrijke boerenleiders). 
Uit het voorgaande blijkt dat verschillende groepen betrokkenen, zoals 
watergebruikers, boerenleiders, district-ingénieurs, en veldpersoneel, verschillende 
praktijken ontwikkelen. Deze praktijken bestaan in verschillende werkterreinen: het veld 
- domein van boeren; het kantoor - domein van District ingénieurs; de ejido - domein 
van de boerenleiders. In het onderzochte irrigatiesysteem blijken deze domeinen naast 
elkaar te bestaan en relatief autonoom. 
Intervenue en veranderende praktijken 
De volgende stap in de analyse was gericht op drie ingrepen in het beheer van El 
Operado. Eén van deze interventies betrof de oprichting van een watergebruikers-
associatie, die verantwoordelijk werd gesteld voor het onderhoud van kanalen. 
Het resultaat van dit initiatief werd sterk beïnvloed door de manier waarop de 
associatie werd gevormd, en door de kontakten en sociale interakties tijdens de 
oprichting. Deze interakties, bijvoorbeeld onderhandelingen tussen ingénieurs en 
boerenleiders, werden begrepen als 'interfaces' tussen aktoren met verschillende 
posities. De meeste watergebruikers kwamen echter in het verhaal niet voor. Ondanks 
dat de oprichting van de watergebruikers-associatie direkt resultaten afwierp, zoals een 
sterk verbeterd kanaalonderhoud, veranderden de praktijken van de betrokkenen 
nauwelijks, omdat de intervenue beperkt bleef tot het formele nivo. 
Toen de associatie ook betrokken raakte bij de waterverdeling begon de situatie te 
veranderen. Een nieuwe funktie werd gekreëerd, ni. die van inlaat-leider die toezicht 
kreeg op de waterverdeling in het betreffende tertiaire kanaal. Met deze nieuwe 
struktuur onstond er een formele link tussen het bestuur van de associatie en de 
boerenleiders aan de ene kant, en watergebruikers en waterverdelers aan de andere kant. 
Anders gezegd, nieuwe verbanden tussen domeinen werden gelegd, waardoor 
bijvoorbeeld de boeren hun formele leiders beter konden kontroleren. 
Omdat het laagste échelon van de associatie nu bestaat uit watergebruikers die een 
kanaal vertegenwoordigen, werden verouderde ejido praktijken doorbroken, werd de 
organisatie-struktuurvan de associatie minder top-zwaar, en ging men zieh koncentreren 
op praktische problemen. Nu de associatie op kanaal-nivo werkt, raakt het direkter 
betrokken bij de praktijken van de boeren. En daar, zoals we eerder zagen, zijn boeren 
verwikkeld in een procès van toeëigening van de kanalen. De associatie volgt hen nu 
in dit procès. 
Perspektief 
Een analyse van El Operado kon worden gemaakt door de akties en interakties van de 
betrokkenen in hun werksituatie of setting te bestuderen. Aan de hand van het begrip 
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'praktijken' kon ook de wisselwerking hissen mensen en nun fysieke omgeving worden 
beschreven. 
Verschiliende groepen mensen hebben op specifieke wijze te maken met het 
kanalenstelsel: district-ingenieurs zijn er verantwoordelijk voor, het veldpersoneel werkt 
eraan, en de boeren zijn er afhankelijk van. Deze groepen ontwikkelen verschillende 
praktijken omdat ze gekonfronteerd worden met bepaalde beperkingen die het systeem 
hen oplegt. Zo heeft iedere groep zijn eigen domein gekreeerd en uit de analyse blijkt 
dat sommige domeinen geTsoleerd zijn geraakt. Dat is een reden waarom er operationele 
Problemen in het beheer van El Operado zijn ontstaan. Ingrepen met de bedoeling deze 
Problemen op te lossen slagen alleen wanneer mensen hun werkwijzen of praktijken 
overeenkomstig veranderen. Praktijken veranderen niet vanzelf. Uit de Studie blijkt dat 
wanneer kontakten en interakties tussen mensen in nieuwe 'settings' plaatsvinden, en er 
zodoende nieuwe verbanden ontstaan tussen de verschillende werkterreinen of domeinen, 
ook de praktijken van mensen veranderen. 
Voortbouwend op deze konklusie is geprobeerd een model te maken dat gebruikt kan 
worden om een irrigatie-organisatie door te lichten (diagnose). Dit model is gebaseerd 
op beschrijvingen van (1) praktijken met betrekking tot irrigatie-aktiviteiten, (2) de 
domeinen van interaktie, en (3) de verbanden tussen de domeinen. Een beschrijving van 
de praktijken kan de volgende dementen bevatten: de (historische en ruimtelijke) 
kontekst waarin de aktiviteiten plaatsvinden, de sociale interakties die eruit voortkomen, 
de interpretaties die mensen geven aan deze praktijken, en de strategieen die door de 
betrokkenen worden gevolgd. Wanneer een dergelijke diagnose problemen identificeert, 
kunnen die met de betrokkenen besproken worden. Met hen kunnen mogelijke 
oplossingen geevalueerd worden en interventie-strategieen ontworpen. 
Het type interventie waar ik aan denk rieht zieh op het veranderen van irrigatie-
praktijken. Praktijken in specifieke domeinen kunnen versterkt worden ten opzichte van 
andere. Bijvoorbeeld door de formele organisatie aan te passen aan informele 
initiatieven; het opnieuw definieren van eigendomsrelaties ten aanzien van het stelsel, 
en van verantwoordelijkheden; het re-organiseren van de irrigatie-arena; en het 
aanpassen van de omgevingen van interakties. Dit type interventie gaat ervan uit dat 
irrigatiebeheer stoelt op de wisselwerking tussen mensen met verschillende posities. Het 
resultaat van ingrijpen in deze wisselwerking is echter nooit geheel te voorspellen. Deze 
benadering wil dus interface-situaties sturen, maar heeft niet de illusie ze te kontroleren. 
Tenslotte een woord over mijn ervaring met de gevolgde onderzoeksmethodologie. 
In het onderzoek stonden mensen centraal en getracht werd hun handelen te begrijpen. 
Gesprekken met 'onderzochten' mondden vaak uit in 'interface' situaties waarbij de 
houding en handelen van zowel mijzelf als van mijn diskussie-partners in geding werden 
gebracht. Dit is een eerste stapje in een interventie-proces. 
Resumen 
Estudios de sistemas de riego muestran que los elementos tecnicos afectan procesos 
sociales y que, tambieh, ciertas relaciones sociales pueden tener implicaciones tecnicas. 
Sin embargo, en terminos precisos, poco se ha dicho sobre la interaccidn de los 
elementos fisico, tecnico y social. Lograr una mejor perception de este proceso es 
importante, ya que en la gestioh de un sistema de riego, frecuentemente se tienen 
resultados inesperados tanto a nivel organizativo del sistema mismo como en 
consecuencias sociales, que conducen a una frustrante ineficacia. La intencidn de esta 
tesis es abordar la manera en que las practicas sociales de las personas involucradas en 
un sistema de riego se relacionan con la mfraestructura ffsica del mismo, y cdmo estas 
practicas cambian en el tiempo. Para ello he estudiado el proceso de organization de 
un sistema de riego, El Operado, ubicado en el valle de Autlah-El Grullo en el 
occidente de Mexico, durante el peribdo comprendido entre Febrero de 1987 a Abril de 
1989. Utilice' los conceptos de prdctica, interaccidn social e intervencidn. Este ultimo 
concepto me permitio identificar factores cruciales para el diagndstico de la gestion en 
los sistemas de riego asf como valorar estrategias viables de intervencidn. 
Para captar las dinamicas sociales que surgen alrededor de los sistemas de riego, 
escogf un metodo que concibe al actor como central para la investigacidn. Hice 
observaciones detalladas tanto cualitativas como cuantitativas; entrevistas informales; 
discusiones de grupo y tambieh, modestamente, participe' en algunos eventos cuyo fin 
era la formacidn de una organizacidn de usuarios del agua. 
La presente monograffa de El Operado intenta juntar las dimensiones tecnicas y 
sociales bajo un comuh denominador: las practicas. La tesis tiene la siguiente estructura: 
despues de una introduction del contexto histdrico y tecnico de El Operado, siguen tres 
estudios de caso de actividades de riego. Luego me enfoco a la intervencidn en la 
gestion de El Operado, y se analiza como en funcioh de estas intervenciones las 
practicas de la gente cambiaron. La parte final de esta tesis trata de delinear un perfil 
para una perspectiva de intervencidn. 
La tesis se dirige tanto a expertos en riego que trabajan en universidades, como en 
instituciones oficiales o en el campo. El estudio forma parte de un proyecto 
multidisciplinario de investigation de la Universidad Agricola de Wageningen, y el 
Colegio de Jalisco, Guadalajara, llamado Constrasting patterns of irrigation 
organisation, farmer strategies and planned intervention: comparative studies in Western 
Mexico. 
Contexto 
El contexto de un sistema de riego puede ser descrito considerando su desarrollo 
historico asf como las caracterfsticas en la organization de su espacio y tecnologfa. Un 
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reporte histörico de los proyectos relacionados con agua y tierra en el valle de Autlah-El 
Grullo, desde 1850 a la fecha, moströ que estos proyectos enfrentaron très récurrentes 
temas: una relacidn tensa entre los pobladores del valle y los forasteros; las 
contradicciones entre los pequenos campesinos y la eilte local; y la diffcil position de 
los actores intermediarios y organizaciones campesinas, como es el caso de los ejidos. 
Ahora bien, la dinâmica social encontrada en el sistema de riego de El Operado, el cual 
fue construfdo en 1950, puede ser caracterizada por este conjunto de relaciones 
problemâticas también. 
Referente a su espacio, con sus 9,000 hectareas El Operado cubre casi la mi tad del 
valle de Autlâh-El Grullo. Distribuye agua a 2,500 parcelas, que en sus dos terceras 
partes cultivan caria de azücar. Ahora bien, con respecte a los actores, se toma en 
consideration a los 1,300 usuarios, de los cuales un reducido numéro de empresarios 
contrôla el 40% de las tierras mientras que la mayorfa son agricultures pequenos con 
menos de 10 ha. cada uno (1,100, principalmente ejidatarios organizados en 18 ejidos). 
Un tercer grupo de actores son el personal del Distrito de Desarrollo Rural, El Grullo, 
dependencia de la Secretarfa de Agriculture y Recursos Hidrâulicos. Entre otras cosas, 
el Distrito administra El Operado, distribuyendo el agua a las parcelas, conservando los 
canales, y decidiendo sobre cultivos, cuotas asf como en conflictos. 
Una caracterfstica técnica de El Operado es que todas las estructuras hidrâulicas 
pueden operarse manualmente, lo cual permite un sistema de distribution muy flexible 
del agua que responde a la 'demanda semanal', como es llamado localmente. Eso 
implica que los usuarios, dentro de ciertos limites, son libres para escoger el cultivo que 
prefieran, asf como el tiempo para sembrarlo y cuando regar. 
Prâcticas de riego 
Para captar las prâcticas de riego, estudié la distribucién del agua, la conservation de 
canales y la formulation del plan de riego. El estudio del canalero reveld cömo este 
actor, operando ingeniosamente las estructuras hidrâulicas, logra una distribution del 
agua bien adaptada a la gran variedad de demandas locales. Al haber internalizado las 
estructuras ffsicas del sistema de canales, no siguen estrictamente las reglas que los 
ingénieras del Distrito les dan y que tienen un caracter demasiado general; las 
interpretan y aplican basândose en su habilidad técnica. Los canaleros aparecen como 
actores con interfaces multiples, que relacionan los agricultures con el Distrito, el 
Distrito con el Ingenio de Azücar y crean vmculos entre los mismos agricultures. 
Cada aho, al final de la temporada de lluvias se dan situaciones problemâticas en El 
Operado porque los canales se azolvan y el departamento de conservation de estos no 
puede limpiarlos a tiempo. La résultante escasez del agua forza a grupos de usuarios a 
buscar soluciones, aunque no es la solution preferida por los agricultures que ven con 
escepticismo los esfuerzos conjuntos. Sin embargo, al invertir trabajo, dinero, y capital 
social en la limpieza de un canal, la perception de propiedad con respecte a la 
infraestructura ffsica cambia: "del canal del gobierno" a "nuestro canal". Grupos de 
usuarios que repetidamente intervinieron en la limpieza del canal lograron este ultimo 
caracter como duradero. Este elemento aporta una perspectiva para el futuro 
involucramiento de los agricultures en la administration de El Operado. 
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El plan de riego, formulado anualmente por el departamento de operaciön del 
Distrito, no es el instromento con el cual se llegan a importantes decisiones para el 
manejo de El Operado. Las decisiones cruciales como son el fijar la cuota de riego o 
céder a ciertos usuarios el derecho de sembrar cana de azücar, son tomadas en 
negociaciones a puerta cerrada entre los actores concernientes. 
En suma, el anâlisis de las practicas de riego revelaron que los diferentes grupos de 
actores, los usuarios, sus 'lfderes', los ingenieros del Distrito y el personal de campo, 
desarrollan diferentes practicas. Estas se dan en diferentes esferas de interaction: el 
potrero', para los usuarios; 'la oficina', para los ingenieros del Distrito; y 'el ejido', 
para los lfderes ejidales. En El Operado estas esferas coexisten lado a lado, cada uno 
reteniendo su grado de autonomfa. 
Intervention y practicas cambiantes 
El siguiente paso en el argumente aborda el punto de las intervenciones en el manejo 
de El Operado, y de los cambios que allf aparecen. De las très intervenciones 
examinadas, una se refiere a la formation de una nueva asociaciön de usuarios que se 
encargarfa de la conservation de los canales. Esta intervention fue el resultado de las 
luchas de poder entre las instituciones interventoras, pero sus resultados fueron la 
conclusion de los encuentros de interface que se presentaron en el proceso de 
implementation, es decir: encuentros e interacciones entre actores con diferentes 
antécédentes sociales o diferentes posiciones (por ejemplo entre ingenieros y lfderes 
ejidales), donde al mismo tiempo, otros actores fueron exclufdos, como fue el caso de 
los agricultures comunes. A pesar de que la intervention tenfa un impacto inmediato, 
la mejor conservation de los canales, permaneciö confinada al nivel organizativo formal 
y no logrö cambiar las practicas de las personas interesadas. 
Las practicas finalmente empezaron a cambiar cuando la asociaciön de usuarios 
también fue involucrada en la distribution del agua. Se instald la position de "jefe de 
toma", un usuario quien ahora supervizaba la distribution de un canal lateral, mientras 
que los delegados ejidales de la asociaciön junto con los canaleros coordinaban la 
distribution del agua en las 6 zonas de El Operado. Con esta nueva estructura se 
establecieron vfnculos, por un lado, entre la mesa directiva de la asociaciön y los 
delegados, y por otro, entre los usuarios y canaleros. Dicho de diferente manera, las 
esferas se interconectaron y ahora los usuarios controlaron mas facilmente a sus 
delegados. 
La asociaciön basada en los usuarios, que ahora representaban un canal en vez de 
un ejido, ayudö a descontinuar algunas practicas anacrönicas originadas en los ejidos; 
balancée una estructura organizativa desequilibrada y la asociaciön se concentré mis en 
asuntos prâcticos que en tejemanejes polfticos. Por otra parte, al haber aterrizado en el 
nivel del canal la asociaciön se confronta con las practicas de los usuarios comunes, que 
como ya hemos visto, habfan estado involucrâhdose en un proceso de apropiaciön de 
sus canales. La asociaciön sigue todavfa. 
Perspectiva 
El anâlisis de El Operado, arriba resumido, ha descrito acciones e interacciones 
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sociales, tomando en cuenta su ambiente ffsico. El concepto de 'prâcticas' emergiö 
como un concepto sensible que facilité encontrar la interaction entre personas y cosas 
en esta micro-sociedad que es El Operado. 
En respuesta a la pregunta de investigaciön, los diferentes grupos se relacionan con 
el sistema de canales de manera muy especffica: los ingénieras tienen la responsabilidad 
de su funcionamiento; el personal de campo es quien lo opera; y los usuarios dependen 
de él. Enfrentados con restricciones del sistema, estos grupos ban desarrollado 
diferentes prâcticas que, a través de acciones, se articulan con la infraestructura ffsica 
en las diferentes esferas de acciön. Al ser un sistema de riego un espacio construfdo por 
estas diferentes esferas, el hecho de que algunas de ellas esteh desconectadas podrfa 
explicar parcialmente los problemas operativos que existen en El Operado. Las 
intervenciones que intenten solucionar estos problemas tendrfan éxito si lograran 
cambiar las prâcticas présentes en la forma deseada. Este cambio se facilita cuando se 
crean nuevos espacios de interaction, y cuando esferas anteriormente separadas son 
interconectadas. Asf, nuevos vmculos implican que prâcticas originadas en ciertas 
esferas alimenten la practica de otras. 
Partiendo de estos resultados, sugiero un método de diagnosticar la organization de 
riego basado en un registre descriptivo de las prâcticas relacionadas con el sistema; de 
las esferas de interaction présentes; y de los vmculos que existen entre estos. La 
description de las prâcticas de riego puede inclufr: el contexte de la actividad de riego; 
las interacciones sociales que ahf surgen; las interpretaciones que las personas dan a 
estas prâcticas; y las estrategias que diferentes grupos desarrollan. En el caso de que 
este diagnöstico révèle problemas operativos en la gestion de riego, estos pueden ser 
discutidos con la gente interesada. Con ellos se puede revisar posibles soluciones o 
disefiar estrategias de intervention. 
El tipo de intervention que tengo en mente prétende cambiar prâcticas de riego, 
donde al reforzarse unas, otras son debilitadas. Este implica tante continuidad, como 
discontinuidad. El cambio puede ser conseguido a través de adaptar acuerdos 
organizativos formales a las miciativas informales o a las experiencias dadas. Los 
ajustes del nivel formai incluyen: définir con mâs precision las relaciones de propiedad 
référante a la infraestructura ffsica; y re-ordenando las esferas de interaction. Este 
enfoque de intervention parte de la idea de que la gestion de riego, en esencia, consiste 
en situaciones de interface, es decir, de interacciones entre actores con posiciones 
diferentes, y reconoce que estos encuentros tienen un carâcter émergente cuyas 
procedimientos y resultados nunca podrân ser completamente planeados. Asf, este tipo 
de interveneiön trata de manejar cuidadosamente las interfaces, pero sin la iiusiôn de 
controlarlas. 
Dirigiéndome finalmente a mi experiencia con la metodologfa empleada, donde el 
actor fué el centra del anâlisis y el intente entender sus prâcticas y acciones, las 
entrevistas con las 'personas investigadas' a menudo resultaban en situaciones interface, 
en las cuales la gente cuestionaba mi position, y en las cuales yo podfa cuestionar a mis 
companeros. Este es un primer paso en un proceso de interveneiön. 
Notes 
Notes chapter 1 
1. This word has been used in a similar way by Handelman (1978). See also David Brown (1982). Later, 
interface was also used in irrigation contexts, see Freeman and Lowdermilk (1985), and Ubels (1989). 
2 . I use Sayer's definition of structure: a set of internally related objects or practices (1984:84). 
3 . These management issues include: defining and enforcing by-laws, water fees, procedures on conflict 
resolution, water rights, cropping plan etc. Although in the literature authors group irrigation activities 
somewhat differently (e.g. Coward 1980; Hunt and Hunt 1976), the above distinction into three major 
groups of activities is useful, in that it distinguishes between the different nature of these activities. 
4 . Data on technical characteristics of the irrigation system were often readily available in the El Grullo 
District. Other institutions also gave me access to their archives which provided important quantitative 
information. 
Notes chapter 2 
1. Project I use here in a broad sense: a planned undertaking by a group of actors, either private citizens, 
government agents or both. 
2 . It has been estimated, that at the time of the Spanish conquest of the region (around 1525), the total 
population of the valley could not have been less than 24,500 (Kelly 1945). Thereafter, the population 
declined rapidly, only to recover its original size in the first half of the 20th century (in 1900 around 
20,000; in 1910 around 23,000; Indice.. 1912). In 1990, a rough estimate of the population living in the 
valley was around 80,000, of which 75% lived in the main towns of Autlan and El Grullo. So , the 
population increased on average by 1.55% per year. The growth of the towns has been dramatic, 
especially due to a population flow into both towns from rural areas. Autlan grew from slightly over 
10,000 people in 1910, to 35,000 in 1990. Between 1970 and 1990, the annual population increase was 
3 % . El Grullo grew in the same period even more rapidly: from 2,300 in 1910 to 10,000 in 1970, and 
to some 25,000 people in 1990 (growing on average 5 % per year between 1970 and 1990). (1910 figures 
from Indice.. 1912; 1970 figures from Winnie 1982.) 
3 . Until the 20th century, the town of Autlan was known as Autlan de la Grana. 
4 . There is evidence that a gradual shift took place in the major commercial activities of the haciendas in 
the region, from cattle-raising during the 18th century towards sugar production in the 19th century. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 20th century this hacienda of Ahuacapan is said to have still herded 
1,500 cows. 
5 . Often, this name made some reference to the crops that were being cultivated or were said to have been 
cultivated there in former times (La Lima, Los Aguacatitos, El Arrozal), or to its soil quality (El Banco, 
Tierras Negras, Salitreras), type of enclosure (Corral de Piedra), or trees present (El Guamuchil, Las 
Higueras); its location (Playa de Enmedio), its shape or size (La Longaniza, Potrero Grande) or any 
other typical landscape feature of that potrero (Cruz de Piedra, Los Charcos), or historical event (El 
Milagro); the name of the owner (Lo de Leon), a saint (San Isidro) or simply the name of that location 
(Ixtldn, Tepocilama). 
6. Letter from Ricardo Zarate to the Secretario de Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, dated December7, 1903. 
Archivo del Estado de Jalisco, Guadalajara. File F-6-896 AUN/220. 
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7. In 1782, a project started to construct a new dam. In 1845, a new 'water project' was initiated which 
included the construction of a large feeder canal (id-, p.363). By 1866, the Autlan town council had 
approved the budget for the construction of an aqueduct for the town water supply. The budget amounted 
to 237 pesos (Archivo del Estado de Jalisco; file 1270 Afio 1866, Cajos F-64). 
8. In short, a full-fledged organisation had been built up for the administration of the Ayutita water, 
including employing afontanero, or water master. The regulations also defined 'that all the landowners 
who want to use water for their sugar plantations, vegetable gardens and other crops, pay this or that 
water-tax, and that these farmers follow several other rules with respect to the quantity of water to which 
they are entitled, the days of the week on which they can take water etc. etc.' (Coleccidn.. VI, p.296) 
9. Autlan is not unique in problems with domestic water supply. It is said that in Mexico nearly all villages 
and towns experience grave problems with town water supply. For example, the situation of the second 
village of the valley, El Grullo, is worse when compared to Autlan. My file on problems concerning El 
Grullo's domestic water supply contains at least 50 official documents and newspaper articles, apart from 
the three petitions an independent village committee held, one containing a list o f 1800 signatures. See 
below. 
10. The law must be seen as a result of a long-standing discussion on the position of the 'indigenous' 
population within the Mexican state, which started before Mexico's independence, at the end of the 18th 
century. Abad y Quiepo, for example, proposed in 1799 a new law, 'a law that establishes an absolute 
civil equity of the Indian class with the Spanish class* (Florescano 1976:138-139). Florescano concludes, 
however, that Abad y Quiepo, and with him the later liberals, failed to see the hacienda system as the 
cause of the Indians* poverty, and consequently did not propose a land reform affecting the hacienda 
lands. See also Gutelman (1974). 
11. The lawyer summarised the case as follows: "It is a fact that the land distribution commission of the 
indigenous population was established in accordance with government decree no.121, and that the Autlan 
town council recognised this commission as being composed of individuals of the primitive race, to which 
the law is favourable. The town council decided and met to give them the land or lands which it owned, 
and in spite of the lack of will of this institution and her alderman (sindicd) to give up these lands which 
it administered, and after having requested the stndico many times to do so, the latter together with the 
administrators o f these lands (mayordomos), Don Nicolas Mardueiio and Don Epifanio Meza, presented 
himself, and handed over the terrains, of which the land taxes had been received by the municipality. In 
the act of handing over the land, that is to say, when the extension of the land was indicated by the 
mayordomos, Don Pedro Michel and Don Jesus Corona opposed, saying one that he owned part of the 
land, and the other that he had claimed another part of the land, without presenting land titles nor basing 
their opposition on arguments, with the result that it seemed better to come to an agreement between the 
members of the town council and the ones who opposed in order to evade the rights o f the Indians 
(indios). (...) With this simple opposition, the town council decided not to execute the said decree, 
sending from 1850 onwards requests to the government not to take the land which it owned, and which 
the government ordered to be distributed (repartir), recurring to different arguments which, in different 
forms, always were the same, and we deduce from it a very tenacious opposition in order not to execute 
the decree no.121, and to not obey the resolutions of the government." (Coleccidn.. VI, p.4-5) 
12. Archival materials consulted provide no more information after these entries. 
13. The Mexican revolution (also called Madero revolution, 1910-1917); the first agrarian movement (1918-
1924); and the Cristero counter-revolution (1926-1929), respectively. 
14. An ejido is an organised agrarian community that corporately holds lands, in accordance with the land 
reform laws. These lands are received as a grant from the government, which legally remains the owner. 
The beneficiaries o f this right to farm land are called ejidatarios. Usufructuary rights are inheritable but 
cannot be divided (Heijdra 1989:99). An ejido is often village based, although only a (small) part o f the 
villagers are ejidatarios. In the Autlan-El Grullo valley, an ejido has between 2 0 and 400 ejidatarios. 
15. All ejidos in the Autlan-El Grullo valley handed out their ejido land to the individual ejidatarios. Fields 
were not held communally, with the exception of the poor lands on the hills, which were used for the 
communal herding of the cattle which was individually owned. 
16. Until 1935, the valley was in fact quite isolated from the rest of Mexico; the only way to get in or out 
was on horse-back, following the trails which were called herraduras. It would take seven days from 
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Autlan to reach Guadalajara (180 km), and five to Cd. Guzman (100 km). The main town linking the 
valley with wider Mexico was Sayula where the railway to Mexico City ended. It would take the 
marraneros 15 days of walking their herd of pigs (marranos) to Sayula, where they were shipped to 
Mexico City. The pigs were equipped with leather shoes, without which they would not make it to 
Sayula. When in 1935 the all-weather road Guadalajara-Autlan was inaugurated, and in 1937 the bridge 
over the Rio Ayuquila was constructed, this opened up the valley for outsiders, and conversely, for the 
inhabitants o f the valley this meant a widening of their horizon which ended only in El Norte (U.S.A.) . 
It is said that the rich of the valley at this time started to buy their first Ford 'pick-ups'. Furthermore, 
Autlan was also linked to the coast (Kelly 1945:3). The new road infrastructure would have an 
irreversible effect on the orientation of valley entrepreneurs towards commercial activities. 
17. I know of the ejidos Ahuacapan, Ayuquila, El Cacalote, and El Grullo, where during 1933-1937 the 
ejido's president sold part of the recently acquired ejido lands. 
18. After the Guadalajara-Autlan road had been inaugurated in February, in June 1935 the Autlan town 
council organised an agricultural fair. According to a brochure dated February 1937, thousands of visitors 
attended the fair, not only people from the region, but also visitors from Guadalajara and Mexico City. 
'Autlan is known through this event for its promising agricultural and cattle-raising potential', stated the 
brochure. 
19. This policy has a striking resemblance to the policy adopted by the Salinas de Gortari federal government 
in 1989 to the so-called responsabittdad compartida, shared responsibility. 
20 . For example, the construction of the electricity line to the valley cost an estimated 12.5 million pesos (1 
million US dollars); of which 6 was paid by the Chapala electricity company; 3.6 by the federal 
government; and 2.9 million by individuals; of the latter figure 2 million was paid by the San Francisco 
manganese mine near Autlan, the remainder by the villagers of both Autlan and El Grullo. For the 
asphalting of the Autlan-Barra de Navidad road, as well as for the telephone connection, a similar 
approach was followed (Alvarez 1959). 
2 1 . From the official information provided by the SRH ministry, a curious picture emerges. Whereas from 
the Informe Laboral 1954 it appears that the construction works on the Tacotan dam had advanced to 
60%, the next year's Informe stated that some changes in the project were made: 'the designs for the 
location of the general plant and the retaining wall of the Tacotan dam were revised and modified' (SRH: 
Informe Laboral 1955). 
22 . The rehabilitation and extension project which started in 1979 was supposed to install the pumping 
stations, but to date no attempts have been made to start with the construction works. See below. 
23 . The total cost of the project was calculated as follows: the Tacotan dam cost 51.45 million pesos; the 
diversion dam at El Corcovado 3.80, and the canal infrastructure 33.45 million pesos (SRH: Informe 
Laboral 1950,1951,1952,1954-1959,and 1961;andSRH: Presa derivadoraEl Corcovado.. 1960).This 
seems inexpensive when compared to the market value of crops. The irrigation infrastructure enabled 
farmers to grow a second crop. Suppose they would grow maize with yields of, say, 3 tons/ha, then the 
export value of this crop would range around US$ 200 or representing 25 % of construction cost (between 
1960 and 1965, Mexico exported maize at a price of US$ 58 per ton on average (FAO 1963, 1966). 
24 . This relationship dates from the time that the Mexican president in 1951 visited El Grullo to Inform the 
farmers of the construction of the irrigation system. Apparently, Nacho Diaz had already studied the plans 
and he was the only local person who dared to raise a question during the meeting with the president. 
He asked why the project did not include a drainage system, the lack of which made meant at least 2,000 
hectares of the most fertile lands would never be irrigated, because these were marsh lands. (Nacho Diaz 
himself owned most of these lands.) The president immediately turned to the Jalisco SRH representative, 
asked for an explanation, and ordered him to send a team of engineers to El Grullo who would study the 
drainage problem. The team indeed did arrive in the valley, and they paid a visit to Nacho Dfaz. 
25 . Bonanza means prosperity. It is also the name of one of the Autlan-based tomato companies. 
26 . The first Americans to get involved in agriculture in the valley arrived a few years earlier. They grew 
chickpeas for export with two rich El Grullo landowners (Nacho Diaz was one of the two). 
Unfortunately, the Americans left with all the produce without paying these farmers their share. 
27 . The tomato boom has been particularly important in Autlan, which is documented at length by Humberto 
Gonzalez (1990, 1991). 
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28 . The fall o f Walter Holm seems to be caused by a coincidence of (1) bad luck with the transport o f the 
melons to the U.S .A. , since various loads of melons that were transported by train were affected by a 
railway strike in the U.S.A. and all melons rotted; (2) various farmers did not respect the contract they 
had signed with Walter Holm, so Holm is said to have lost various tractors and implements to El Grullo 
farmers who simply did not return these to him. Furthermore some farmers sold their melons to other 
buyers, not paying back the money invested by Holm; (3) Holm was defrauded by his own local 
representative. 
29 . There have been frauds reported in El Grullo, Autlan, and the Tuxcacuesco area, involving a handful o f 
U .S . companies and various brokers of both American and Mexican nationality. The total value of these 
frauds committed during 1970-1990 amounts to several hundred thousands US dollars. 
30 . The frauds committed followed a clear pattern. 'In the Costa region there were many American 
companies active, and all worked like this: the first two years they worked properly, and in the third and 
fourth year they made a run for it, with all and all [the profits]'. Interview with the first president of the 
El Grullo melon growers' association, 24/2/89. 
3 1 . Simultaneously, the packing plant o f nearby El Lim6n, 50 % owned by the El Lim6n growers association 
and the rest by yet another U.S. company (Valley Union), ran into problems related to mismanagement. 
Some years later ( around 1983), the same would happen with the fanner owned packing plant in San 
Juan, along the Rio Tuxcacuesco which had been founded in 1981. This packing plant marketed their 
produce of melons and cherry tomatoes through the regional Griffin & Brand representative. In both the 
El Lim6n and San Juan cases, and similar to the situation in El Grullo, management problems have been 
attributed to a gradual build-up of close relationships between the local farmer leaders and the local 
representatives of U .S . companies, to the effect that the majority of farmers were estranged to the daily 
management of marketing, the signing of marketing contracts, and the fixing of prices, which to many 
seemed quite arbitrary. For a fascinating study of the San Juan 'drama', see Heijdra 1988 and 1989. 
32 . Melon is a low-growing trailing herb, cane is over 2 metres high. Sugar cane does not flower and is a 
perennial crop, whereas melons you sow every season, and they flower. Many different melon varieties 
exist, and it is polymorphic, whereas different sugar cane varieties look much the same. Melon you have 
to treat with devotion and care, whereas cane normally is treated more roughly (for instance, irrigating 
a melon crop has to be done meticulously, and it requires many hands; a sugar cane plot, in contrast, you 
can easily irrigate by yourself and not much care is required). Finally, for fanners the melon fruit is 
beautiful, and something to be admired, tasted and compared among them, whereas sugar cane farmers 
never see the final product o f their crop, except the black burnt cane stalks carelessly piled up in the 
lorries. 
33 . As a result, ground water extraction in the Autlan region increased from 3 .4 million m* to 79 million 
nrVyear. Since the annual recharge of the ground water system was estimated at 78 million n f in a 1973 
study, the ground water table started to fall. A Presidential Decree of February 10, 1978, declared a ban 
on new drillings in the Autlan area for an indefinite period. Notwithstanding, in subsequent years another 
60 or so deep-wells were drilled. The first deep-wells in Autlan were drilled to a depth of 40 metres, the 
latest deep-wells, however, are said to be drilled to 120 metres or more. The oldest deep-wells ran dry. 
34 . I only know of two deep-wells in the hands of ejidatarios that are mainly, and very intensively, used for 
vegetable production. Both deep-wells, which are situated near the town of Autlan, were constructed by 
the ejidatarios themselves. 
35 . His ownership of these lands, however, was not that clear. These lands had been claimed by an ejido-in-
formation. However, in its 20 year long struggle this ejido never succeeded in getting the land. 
36. Gonzalez (1988) presented some evidence of the General's hostility towards the entrepreneurial 
companies. The General especially was disturbed by the formation of the various growers' associations 
in the region. These farmer organisations were not directly affiliated to the CNC and CNPP farmer 
unions, and hence were not firmly rooted in the Mexican 'institutional' political system, and, in his view, 
might become a threat to it. 
37 . Brunt (1989) estimates that over 15% of all ejidatarios in the valley are female, the majority being 
widows of male ejidatarios. 
38. It is striking that many of the large farmers who during the seventies were heavily involved in melon 
production, and who made the shift to sugar cane during the early 1980s, were the initiators in breaking 
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away from the CNC association, and founding the growers' association affiliated to the CNPP. 
3 9 . In contrast, the labour force of the sugar cane refinery stay permanently in the valley, and many live in 
quite comfortable houses owned by the refinery. The labourers from the refinery do not mix whatsoever 
with the cane cutters. 
40 . One employee is said to have controlled over 300 hectares, through semi-legal and illegal practices. 
According to the then head of the irrigation District, a study undertaken by the District concluded that 
as much as 40% of all sugar cane was controlled by refinery employees, through share-cropping, the use 
of prestanombres, and simply by demanding a percentage of the harvest value whenever an ejldatario 
applied for the right to grow sugar cane. 
4 1 . Some local observers have analysed this hegemonic struggle over sugar cane development in the valley 
in terms of two antagonistic groups, one identified with general Garcia Barragan who had asserted direct 
influence over the sugar refinery's management, and the other identified with Jose' Guadalupe Zuno Arce, 
who headed the Comision del Sur. The new ambitious leader of the CNC cane growers association was 
recruited from among the ranks of Zuno. (See below.) 
42 . This is partly attributed to these pests and diseases, and partly due to limiting irrigation applications, 
enforced by the District. 
4 3 . In the Mexican political system, until recently to be nominated as the PRI candidate for any election 
normally implied that you would be 'elected'. 
44 . These unidades de riego have been studied by Michael de Bont (1989), Wilma van Esch (1989), and 
Hans Heijdra (1988). 
45 . The political relevance of the Comisidn del Sur for the Autlan-El Grullo valley mainly lies in the fact that 
Zuno represented a Jalisco based political group which competed with the group around Garcia Barragan 
over political dominance. Apart from antagonistic relations that existed between Garcia Barragan and Jos£ 
Guadalupe Zuno's father (who had been state governor in the 1920s), Zuno Arce had been a left activist, 
who during his student years at the University of Guadalajara had been one of the radical student leaders, 
and had supported several militant grass-roots movements which during the 1960s experienced increased 
repression (Alcantara Ferrer 1979). There is little imagination needed to see what, in 1968, Zuno Arce 
must have thought about the student killings at the Plaza de las Tres Cuburas, and about the persons 
responsible for that act, among whom was General Garcia Barragan in his capacity of Minister of 
Defence. See for a lively account of Zuno's life and ideas Loret de Mola, 1979. 
46 . This is not so surprising as it may seem, since it is well-known that some officials in the Grande 
Irrigacidn department of SARH, where projects are conceived, elaborated and decided upon, are 
themselves connected to engineering and construction firms (cf. Greenberg 1970:73). 
47. It may have been that the project calculated a considerable rise in irrigation efficiency once rehabilitation 
had been completed, and the existing earthen canals would be replaced by lined concrete canals. With 
it, gross water demand per hectare would be reduced, partly offsetting the need for extra storage capacity. 
However, comparing water distribution efficiencies as calculated (not empirically measured!) by the 
irrigation District, we learn that before rehabilitating El Operado, this efficiency was assumed to be 49 %, 
and in 1987/88, when rehabilitation was nearly completed, it had risen to 57%, thereby offsetting the 
need for extra storage capacity for only 1,400 ha extra irrigated lands ([57/49]x8,700 ha), assuming that 
water availability before rehabilitation was adequate. 
48 . Loan conditions were: an amortisation period of 20 years, at an interest rate of 7.5 %, with a credit fee 
of 1.25% on undisbursed balance; and a disbursement period of 3.5 years (id., p.5.) . The Autlan-El 
Grullo project formed part of a wider IDB loan, including the rehabilitation and expansion of the 
Xicotencatl irrigation system in Tamaulipas. Both projects were selected by IDB out o f 5 projects 
presented by SARH. IDB chose these two projects because their studies had been completed; the presence 
of organisations of beneficiaries (here, for Autlan-El Grullo probably the sugar cane and melon growers' 
associations were meant) and of organisations of the 'interested public sector'; their agricultural potential; 
and because of the positive estimated time of return of investment (Contrato de Garantfa.. 1979, Annex: 
Mexico, Irrigation system rehabilitation and expansion project, p.2-3). The project was considered 
economically feasible, with a cost-benefit ratio of 1.3, and an IRR of 14.9%. For the individual water 
users, an increase of income of 3,700 US$ at the year of consolidation of the project was expected. 
However, its impact would vary according to farm size. The loan agreement itself acknowledged the 
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existing wide disparity in farm size, and thus in income, between ejidatarios (88% of all water users, 
with an average farm size of 6.5 ha); private landowners with less than 20 hectares (representing 7% of 
the water users, with an average farm size o f 10.9 ha); and the large landowners (5 % of the water users, 
with farms of 49 .2 ha on average). It was estimated that incomes varied from US$ 2,200/year for 
ejidatarios; US$ 7,000 for small landowners with less than 20 hectare; to over TJS$ 15,700/year for the 
large land owners (for some even more than US$ 50,000). (Contrato.. 1979:15) 
49 . When he took office in December 1982, the peso stood at approx. 100 to the dollar. When he left office 
in December 1988, mis figure had increased to 2,500. 
Notes chapter 3 
1. Cf. Finkler (1978) for a discussion on share-cropping practices of ejidatarios in irrigated agriculture in 
Mexico. 
2 . The case of the farm of the family Gonzalez is illustrative. It cultivates in total 106 hectares of sugar 
cane. In the factory's records, sugar cane is registered in 10 different names (father, mother, father's 
sister, and 7 children). However, one son administers the farm and dedicates all of his time to it. The 
other family members have other activities and are not seen on the farm. My two informants agreed that 
this was clearly a case of one enterprise. 
3 . The canals were constructed next to the existing earthen canals, in order not to disrupt irrigation. El 
Operado's infrastructure includes 311 km of irrigation canals, 136 km of drains and 295 km of field 
roads. Of all irrigation canals, 235 km are lined (80 kms. main canals, 87 km of lateral canals and 68 
km of sublaterals) and 76 km are earthen field canals. 
4 . Before the irrigation season starts, farmers have to formally request the crops they want to grow. These 
requests are considered by the District, and normally granted. Some crops are however prohibited, such 
as rice, as well as a second irrigation crop. Also sugar cane is subject to certain restrictions. 
5. This statement does not wholly apply to El Operado, since water is not in short supply in most years. The 
following discussion on water losses does show some of the weaknesses of the system's operation. 
6. I made small corrections due to some sewage water coming from the towns, and some pump irrigations 
along the river. The efficiency was calculated as follows: (7,100-3,300)*100/7,100 = 55%. Of all the 
water drained into the river 10% or 7.2 million m 3 were re-used in 1987/88 by a pumping station serving 
some 600 hectares within El Operado (zone 2b; see figure 3 .6 , below). Overall water efficiency would 
rise to some 58% if we included this re-used water in our calculations. 
7. 'Dictimen tecnico por el Ing. Sos& Luis Santana y el aforador Francisco Garcia los dias 22 y 25 de marzo 
de 1988.' 
8. Based on a sample of 40 plots (20 on sandy soils, 20 on clay), covering in total 162 ha. 
9. Before rehabilitation, it could take weeks before the water reached the tail ends of the main canals Cits 
profile had been gradually enlarged because of annual excavation of silt). 
10. Compare this with the Gezira Scheme of Sudan. There, storage in canals appears important for easy water 
management, especially storage in tertiary canals. See Plusquellec, 1990. 
11. Sandy soils receive 25 to 30% more water than loamy soils, and clay soils receive approx. 30% less 
water than the loamy soils, given current practices. With these figures I estimated a soil correction factor 
with respect to irrigation water use: for silly clay/clay/clay loam 0.85; loam/silt loam 1.10; sandy loam 
1.40. This correction implies that e.g. sandy soils receive 65% more water than clay soils (1.4/ .85). This 
is a reasonable figure, since maize farmers use to give up to 8 or 9 irrigation turns on sandy soils, 
whereas on clay soils only some 4 or 5 turns are given. There is no evidence to believe that farmers on 
sandy soils give smaller irrigation applications per irrigation turn. For sugar cane a similar practice has 
been identified (see above). 
12. Cropping patterns were virtually identical. Climate was very similar. Pan evaporation was 10% higher 
in 1989 than in 1988, but this is attributed to a rainstorm during the reviewed period in 1988 of 20 mm, 
whereas during that period in 1989 precipitation was zero. Hence, the irrigation water need in the 1989 
period was 4 % higher than in the 1988 period. Gross water flow into El Operado between January-March 
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in both years are comparable (5,830 and 6,090 Ips), and become nearly identical when correcting the 
1988 figure for the 20 mm rain storm. 
13. Gross returns of 1 ha sugar cane, with a yield of 90 ton/ha, ranges around 3.5 million pesos or USS 
3,500; 1987 prices. According to the irrigation District, water fees vary for different crops depending 
on irrigation water need. The District also says it takes differences in market value of the crops into 
account, when the height o f the fees are reviewed (annually). We were not able to assess the exact criteria 
upon which the water fees are defined. 
14. During the drought of 1982/83, each registered water user was allowed to irrigate a maximum area of 
6 ha. This measure, which appears in the Federal Water Law, is 'progressive' in the sense that it favours 
small producers (those with less than 6 ha could irrigate all), and affects those water users with more 
land. In practice the implementation of this measure is difficult. Not only because the larger producers 
see their interests severely affected, but especially because it is difficult to decrease the area with 
established sugar cane. It is also unlawful, since an already established crop may not be denied water. 
So, during the water shortage which occurred in the 1989/90 season, a very different measure was taken: 
only the perennial crops were allowed, and all remaining plots were denied water. 
Notes chapter 4 
1. We have to note that the extent of the canaleros' work unit, both in terms of area, number of plots, and 
in number of farmers served, seems quite normal for Mexican irrigation systems managed by SARH (cf. 
Mares 1980:476; Haissman 1971). When compared to irrigation systems found in Asia, the work unit 
of the canakro in Mexico seems vast indeed (cf. Bottrall 1981; Bos and Storsbergen 1978). However, 
the area served seems an inadequate criterion for comparing Asian and Mexican irrigation systems. Better 
criteria would be: number of plots served, number of farmers served, or number of canal structures 
operated per water guard (cf. Hunt 1988). 
2 . I find the canalero's routine important as it reflects many aspects of his work. In Appendix 3 a 
description is given of one working day of Miguel. 
3 . From the description of Miguel's work day (see Appendix 3) it can be seen how frequently problems 
related to the suspension of sugar cane plots emerge. 
4 . The material upon which this analysis is based is limited: I use 5 encounters between Miguel and farmers 
that I observed and recorded on tape. Compared to the numerous other routine encounters I witnessed, 
these 5 are not atypical. 
5 . In the following section we will see that in encounters that are more potentially conflictive, Miguel's 
tactic is to try to explain thoroughly to water users whatever technical reason may have caused certain 
problems. During these interactions, again Miguel makes many openings towards the water users. 
6 . Although these encounters follow a pattern, and thereby have a structure, they are not automated, but 
have meaning. This has perhaps something to do with the discussion process itself. The moment Miguel 
feels that a certain subject is becoming sensitive (when he has to force a measure to be taken, or criticise 
the farmer etc.), he readily finds a temporary exit option, which relaxes the atmosphere but at the same 
time elicits useful information. 
7 . Cf. 'the headman's dilemma' used by Fallers (1967:175). 
8. Through his close relationship with Engineer Corona, Luis is able to secure relatively more water for his 
zone. See what happened when Luis was transferred from zone 2 to zone 1, in August 1988. The rather 
high water consumption he had been able to secure in zone 2 in the 1987/88 season, fell in the next 
season by 14 %, whereas his new zone experienced a sudden increase in water consumption by 50 % over 
the period January-March 1989. See chapter 3 . 
9 . Here I refer to the documents, devices and drilled people, mentioned by Law (1986) as particularly 
important for (long-distance) control mechanisms. 
10. This is not to say that the higher ranked are more 'aware' or so. I would rather argue the opposite: the 
lower placed actors have to think twice (and frontline workers perhaps even three times) before doing 
something: "what ought I do in order to please (or frustrate!) my boss, and what do I want myse l f . See 
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Jos van der Klei (1990); stalling 11. 
11. In their recent book on farmer developed irrigation systems in the valley of Tehuacan, Mexico, Enge and 
Whiteford (1989:174-175) make mention of apisadores or canaleros who play a key role in the water 
distribution process. In these farmer managed systems, characterised by the galertas filtrantes, some 
people own specific shares of the irrigation water. There is a water market where shares are bought and 
sold. The canaleros operate on these markets and emerge as true water brokers. This is similar to some 
cases found in Eastern Spain, where regadores (in Campo de Lorca) and celadores (in Campo de 
Cartagena) both distribute the water and buy and sell shares on behalf o f farmers and water-owners 
(Broeshart 1989; WiUemsen 1990). 
12. In any institution concerned with the implementation of policies, you will find this kind of 'frontline 
worker'. Examples are shop stewards in England (Gluckman 1953), policemen and social workers 
(Lipsky 1980), unit managers in the Mahaweli Scheme, Sri Lanka (Siriwardena 1989), and managers in 
the CONASUPO food programme in Mexico (Grindle 1980). 
13. There is one particular factor which induces canaleros to engage in 'free-entrepreneurship': as canaleros, 
they see a lot and they know of most of the 'personal projects' of their superiors in the District. They 
have experienced throughout the years how these engineers use the field personnel to distribute favours 
to water users, without giving the personnel their 'share', even though it complicates the work of the 
canalero considerably. The canaleros know that in comparison to the bonuses the engineers receive, their 
own projects are 'peanuts', only a small percentage of their income. This has of course created a lot of 
resentment among canaleros and has worked as a stimulus to enhance their own projects. 
Notes chapter 5 
1. Some 80% of all management costs of El Operado are destined for maintenance. In 1987, maintenance 
costs for El Operado represented around 50% of the entire budget of the District. 
2 . A recent literature survey on irrigation water management (JurriSns and De Jong 1989) does not dedicate 
one paragraph specifically to canal maintenance. The same holds for Robert Chambers' work on canal 
irrigation in South Asia (Chambers, 1988), or Uphoffs work on irrigation bureaucracies (Uphoff et al. 
1988). Welcome exceptions are Bottrall (1981) who includes maintenance in his survey of four irrigation 
systems; and Merrey (1986) who presents a case study of water course improvement (a special case of 
canal maintenance) to reveal cultural patterns which underlie irrigation practice in a village in Pakistan. 
3 . Martin (1986) found for several farmer managed irrigation systems in Nepal that joint canal maintenance 
forestalled conflicts in water distribution. 
4 . Including canal maintenance as a topic in so-called rapid appraisal missions seems self-evident. Chambers 
and Carruthers (1986), however, do not refer to maintenance as an important diagnosing indicator. Yoder 
and Martin (1985), however, do include maintenance in rapid appraisal surveys. 
5 . Such was the case in both 1987 and 1988. Maintenance works in El Operado include taking care of the 
storage dam, the irrigation canals, drains and road infrastructure. Canal maintenance is perceived as most 
critical, since a lack of it directly affects water distribution. It thus has to be executed in a relatively short 
period. In this chapter I will limit the argument to canal maintenance only. 
6 . During two months in 1987,1 recorded over 40 major events directly related to 5 severely silted canals. 
7 . I am indebted to Piet for letting me share his valuable research findings. I do not hesitate to use his 
material since his work bears some of my own finger prints as well: I initiated him both into the valley 
and into social interaction research, although he alone has given his research its own unique form. 
8. The control structure in the on-going lateral 5 had backed up the water so that water could enter the high-
lying Limoncito canal. Lifting the plate would imply cutting the water flow to the Limoncito canal. See 
figure 4 .5 , chapter 4 . 
9 . Only later did I find out that they had never taken the photograph. Still later, I found out that it was not 
the farmers but Miguel who invented the story. Don Alonso really played his part convincingly! 
10. Chico's half brothers are cousins of Abraham. 
11. You see this kind of village 'norm' at work when you fail to greet a friend or acquaintance. He may 
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remind you of it on a next occasion, and ask: y>or qui te pones orgullosol (why are you so arrogant?). 
12. Chico distrusted his own father in the share-crop arrangement he had with him. 'When it comes to 
dividing the harvest, I am sure he will take it all and give me some small money for the work', he told 
me. This was in fact what finally happened. 
13. This discussion on norms underlying village life resembles somewhat Foster's model of 'limited good' 
(Foster 1967, see Long 1977:41-52 for a discussion). I do not want to take this normative aspect rigidly. 
1 merely try to show that before Chico took action, he had to weigh up the social consequences of his 
initiative. 
14. See Long 1989:228-231, on the importance of emergent structures. 
15. The work party or faena involving the cleaning of the canal has some parallels with the ayttu organisation 
found in Peru (Skar 1982). The ayllu is described as an extremely flexible grouping of individuals 
normally brought together in the form of an ego-centred network which comes into being for a specific 
purpose and lasts for a limited duration (Long 1982:16). The faena also can be understood as an action-
set: a set of persons who have coordinated their actions to achieve a particular goal (Boissevain 
1974:186). Chico mobilised part o f an already existing network, a mix of kin, neighbours, and friends. 
This network existed already for quite some time, and the people of that network might be considered 
to form a quasi-group. This quasi-group exists through a series of contexts of activity without any formal 
basis of membership (Mayer 1966). It may be that the subgroup performing the faena may become a 
quasi-group itself, after they engage in more such activities. 
16. Or, in Bourdieu's words, their acting upon a physical artefact, enacting the faena in an essentially 
material setting, has contributed to their dispositions or habitus (Bourdieu 1977). 
17. As Miller (1987:106) has argued, the physical and external presence ensures that artefacts lend themselves 
to becoming symbols. For Miguel, the canalero, the faena took an extra dimension with the invention 
of the photograph, another artefact which became the symbol of the maintenance department neglecting 
its task and farmers taking action (see chapter 4). 
18. Moreover, Engineer Corona, head of the operation department, in earlier years worked in this village as 
an extension worker and had his own agro-chemicals shop, and advised farmers on horticulture. 
Everybody in the village knows him, and vice versa, he knows everybody, which makes it more easy to 
go and see him. 
19. Officially the Autlan-El Grullo area office should be in charge of both tasks. It is not so. See chapter 3 . 
20. For the total maintenance task the department has at its disposition: 2 draglines, 2 bulldozers, 1 grader, 
2 hydraulic excavators and 1 industrial tractor equipped with a small-size excavator. 
2 1 . The discrepancy in financial years of both departments also reflects how different departments within the 
District in some respect are more vertically linked to their 'mother' departments at SARH offices in 
Guadalajara and Mexico City, than to each other at District level. 
2 2 . The accountability issue is compounded by the fact that no direct relationship exists between water fees 
paid by farmers and the department's product, namely clean canals. The water fees paid by water users 
are not readily available to the department, but instead make an enormous detour (Engineer Corona uses 
the nice understatement of vueltecita) via Mexico City. 
2 3 . The word triangulacion, derived from topographical jargon, refers to triangle, but it subtly conveys an 
affinity with estrangulacidn (strangulation). The word thus suggests that this triangle relationship holds 
the District strangled, and frustrates the efforts of others. 
24 . The supervisor drives through El Operado to check farmers irrigating. He is able to observe maintenance 
works as well. Moreover, he knows the maintenance department and its personnel, since he used to work 
there before Fuentes became head. 
25 . This superior, in turn, finds himself in a similar position, but probably much more awkward, since the 
institutional resources controlled at State level are much greater and more important to his superiors (both 
the delegado heading the State office, and superiors at the Ministry in Mexico City). Consequently, 
higher engineers are still better controlled and tightly bound to their superiors. As a detailed (but dated) 
study of the (then) SRH ministry concluded: 'Ironically, the higher one goes in the ministry the more one 
must worry about the future, and the more insecure one becomes' (Greenberg 1970:120). 
26. Greenberg (1970) found that within the then SRH ministry, engineers are most loyal to the ones who 
appointed them. Consequently, the relationships of superior-subordinate in the ministry's hierarchy are 
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highly personalised (cf. Grindle 1977). 
27 . Power relations within the institution being highly personalised, raises the question of how the ministry's 
centre is able to exert control over its subordinates. It is generally accepted, at least by SARH personnel 
themselves, that the basic control mechanism is information management. Apart from the formalised 
vertical flows of Information, more informal flows are characteristically channelled through the 
personalised vertical relationships already mentioned. Another institutionalised form of information 
management is through audit commissions, which may be sent to any District by a higher authority. 
These commissions are especially interested in finance. Evidence found on financial gaps is directly sent 
to the higher authority. The commission will let the implicated official know that they can prove the case. 
The official by now knows that his superiors can make or break him, and he will normally respond to 
any demand put forward by them. Then, nothing is heard any more of the audit report, which is 
discretely filed. Very rarely does auditing have 'visible' results (like dismissal). (Cf. Greenberg 1970:128-
130.) 
28 . However, later I found out that high SARH officials at the Guadalajara office were informed over the 
actual critical situation with respect to maintenance. They have their own vertical chains of trusted 
subordinates, through which they have access to this type of local information. See chapter 7. 
29 . This was important to Corona because in the 1988/89 irrigation season the area cultivated attained an all-
time high, while at the end of the 1987/88 irrigation season, the storage dam had been almost depleted. 
30 . This is government owned land, which can be leased to farmers. However, farmers can be evicted from 
it when this is in public interest, e.g. when the river changes its riverbed. All zona federal lands by 
definition lie outside El Operado, and are officially not entitled to receive irrigation water. 
3 1 . The new field intake would serve especially Enrique's recently acquired lease of 10 hectares of zona 
federal at the very tail of the canal. Apart from this, Enrique has his regular 8 ha plot with sugar cane, 
and 80 cows (along the Llano canal). 
3 2 . The intake was constructed without permission. When Fuentes discovered it he became angry. Alonso 
told him to stop nagging, because anybody could see that it was functioning well. (Sijbrandij 1989b:68) 
33 . Farmers are well aware of this, but to elect another leader is difficult (1) because as yet the canal 
organisation has no formal structure, nor are regular meetings held; the position of jefe de potrero is only 
formally recognised in the ejido, which is quite a different setting; (2) someone who proposes that 
Enrique has to resign, himself risks becoming the subject of back-biting ('he wants the position' etc.). 
34 . "The problematic situations [...] are not capricious or randomly generated, but rather reflect both past 
and current nooks in the social and material world' (Van Maanen and Barley 1985:34). 
35 . As has been stated earlier, the official organisational set-up of the District is such that the head of the 
Autlan-El Grullo office should be in charge of both operation and maintenance of El Operado. 
Notes chapter 6 
1. In 1984, the name was again changed to distrito agropecuario (agricultural district) and in 1986 to distrilo 
de desarroUo rural (rural development district). The term secretarta refers to the ministry in charge of 
the District: the Secretarta de Recursos Hidrdulicos, and since 1976, the Secretarta de Agricultura and 
Recursos Hidrdulicos. The term 'recursos' is used as a synonym. 
2 . The report upon which the actual figures of table 6.2 are based is not reliable. The figures are estimated 
data, especially the figures on water volumes. I made several adjustments in order to make the figures 
more in line with the actual field situation. So I estimated the area served by the El Relicario pumping 
plant at 600 ha. The 'Informe del desarrollo del plan de riego, mes de junio, 1988' however took this 
area to be 241 ha (whereas the irrigation plan still uses 800 hectares). To under-estimate the area of sugar 
cane served by the El Relicario pumping station implies that the area with 'regular' sugar cane increases 
in the books, and consequently, the gross water layer applied to the regular cane apparently diminishes. 
It seems in the interest of the District to diminish the apparent water use of sugar cane. Another figure, 
namely the total volume of water used as appears in table 6.1 (119 million m 3) is not in accordance with 
other data I consulted. More likely, is the figure of 124 million m 3 which I use in chapter 3 . However, 
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I did not include this figure in the table, otherwise I would have had to adjust all other figures 
accordingly. Gross water layer applied would become 1536 mm. 
3 . On the board sit representatives o f all the local offices o f the government institutions involved in 
agriculture and rural development in the entire region covered by the El Grullo District (like rural credit 
bank, ministry of land reform, the parastatal which gives crop insurances, and of course the District), 
as well as representatives o f farmer organisations (CNC and CNPP farmers unions, uniones de ejldos 
etc.). The farmer representatives are normally a minority on the board. The board is presided over by 
the head of the District. 
4 . On December 22nd, farmers started to cultivate 100 ha of melons. Initially there were some problems 
with the canals and structures, which had never been used, and much water was lost because of the 
isolated position of this area (outside EI Operado). The farmers finally had good yields, and although they 
faced many problems with respect to the marketing of their crops and with respect to their own formal 
organisation, most of them realised high profits with the 4-5 hectares of melons. 
5. The District worked out this 'flexible response', as it would have been practically impossible to deny 
water to already established sugar cane crops on such a vast scale (in the order of 1,000 ha or more): it 
would be against the water law, and obviously it would create a lot of opposition by the big (often 
influential) sugar cane growers. Moreover, cane can be under-irrigated (castigado) without resulting in 
total crop failure. 
6. The irrigation plan envisaged allocating 62% of all water to sugar cane. Due to rains in December, water 
demand decreased. Sugar cane was irrigated on average only 2.5 times (as against 3 .4 times planned in 
October) and only received 50% of all irrigation water. In total 5,700 ha of crops could be irrigated of 
the 7,900 ha irrigated the previous year, but only some 300 ha of sugar cane got lost. Actual water 
consumption during the 1982/83 irrigation season amounted to 76 million m J . 
Notes chapter 7 
1. Since it is analytically difficult to draw a line between outside and other types of interventions, for the 
moment I will concentrate on initiatives and actions which are clearly identifiable as intervening in the 
local state of affairs. 
2 . In 1976, Echeverria was still President of the Republic, and political influence of this CNIA was still 
growing. Shortly afterwards, Lopez Portillo was inaugurated as the new Mexican president. In his 
agricultural policy he stressed food self-sufficiency, a policy which finally culminated in the ambitious 
SAM programme launched in 1980 (Sistema AUmentario Mexicand) (Grindle 1981:20.). Sugar cane was 
not considered a basic food crop. However, political influence of the sugar cane lobby forced Lopez 
Portillo to negotiate and at the end of 1979 he decided to raise the guaranteed price for sugar cane 
(Guzman 1989:6). 
3 . To plant new sugar cane farmers need access to credit, as buying the seed material, transporting it and 
sowing the sugar cane (and often levelling the land) is capital intensive. To a great extent credit was 
controlled by a few bank employees and sugar cane factory personnel. Hence the latter's crucial role in 
the lobby. 
4 . Engineer Ochoa knew of a group of young engineers in the agricultural department of the Jalisco state 
government who had actively started to promote farmer organisations. He was also aware of a recently 
launched government programme of creating rural outlets for basic food products, in the hands of the 
consumers (Coplamar/Conasupo). This programme had some impact on grass roots organisations in rural 
Mexico. See Fox and Gordillo 1989, and Barkin 1988:150. 
5 . Fox and Gordillo (1988:150) mention a similar tactic adopted by a manager of the Coplamar programme. 
6. Jalisco was one of the pilot states in Mexico where the reorganisation process was tested. Engineer 
Chavez worked together with his former teacher, Velazco. In December 1983, the integration o f both 
types of Districts was implemented, and Chavez was busy restructuring his own District. 
7 . It is illustrative to mention that Chavez was the only District head in Jalisco who was not forced to 
another District during the coming and going of four SARH Directors over the period 1977-1989. When 
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in 198S all District heads were replaced to other Districts, Chavez was the only one who could choose. 
8. When Chavez left El Grullo, he took with him the experience of the Water Users' Commission. On 
arriving in El Agua (October 1985) he was confronted with an irrigation system (13,000 ha) with two 
pressing problems: a badly maintained infrastructure (canals, drains, structures and roads), and a 
ridiculously low water fee. Chavez knew he personally would never succeed in raising the water fee 
(which was a prerequisite to rehabilitate the infrastructure), because this would create big opposition. It 
was not by chance that the former head of the El Agua District had not dared to increase the fee, since 
among the El Agua water users you find very powerful industrialists and political people with direct 
connections with Mexico City. Chavez' decision to create here a farmer organisation which would decide 
on the level of the water fees and be responsible for maintaining the infrastructure within one month after 
his arrival in El Agua, was a rather big step. He was helped again by his trusted friend, Engineer Ochoa. 
With the formation of the association, the first of its kind in Mexico (cf. Hunt 1987), they succeeded in 
arousing the interest of SARH engineers at federal level, who came all the way down to Jalisco to visit 
El Agua. This coincided with the return of Engineer Velazco, Chavez' teacher, to Guadalajara, who was 
promoted to an important position at the Jalisco SARH offices. He was charmed by the successes of his 
pupil in forming a fully-fledged water users' association. One reason why Velazco appreciated water users 
taking charge of the maintenance task was that it would reduce the subsidies the government channelled 
every year to these irrigation systems, an amount which was never equalled by the collected water fees. 
This is an important argument in the last year of a sexenio, when government budgets tend to get reduced 
to the minimum. By forming water users organisations in other irrigation systems, Velazco could gain 
political prestige. Not unimportant at the beginning of a new sexenio. 
9. From 1987 until the presidential elections in July 1988, this opposition coalition steadily grew in 
importance, and became the central concern of political and government persons in Mexican society. 
10. Although in most ejidos the elections seemed an internal ejido affair, in some ejidos District engineers 
heavily influenced the elections of delegates. 
11. Cf.Grindle (1977:69): T h e various trajectories of [public administrators] have all been determined by 
the palancas, the equipos, and the camarillas they have formed or mobilised. Their careers have been 
built upon the exchanges of loyalty, obedience, and job performance which cement vertical alliances in 
Mexican public life.' 
12. As we have observed earlier, chains of alliances within SARH partly follow departmental lines. 
Differences between departments within one District might therefore be considerable. 
13. Typically for Mexico, an institutional alliance tends to see former equipos as inefficient, corrupt and 
favouring certain elites. As Grindle observed for a case she studied, the alliance which was on the rise 
did not seriously consider 'that previous equipos might have shared their concerns and motivations and 
still have failed to achieve positive results.' (1977:167) She argues that therefore the institutional memory 
is confined to the sexenio time horizon, which greatly affects performance of programmes. 
14. With the Rural Development Districts covering the entire rural area of Mexico, the federal government 
has put in place an important logistical infrastructure, which it controls from the country's capital. One 
important task of the Rural Development Districts is to logistically support federal elections, which was 
marked during the July 1988 presidential elections. The District's heads, however, were also briefed to 
politically support the elections. The Districts became an important federal device for exercising pressure 
on the District personnel to vote for the PRI candidate, who in turn had to pressure the peasant population 
in all the hamlets and villages to vote PRI. In some instances, Rural Development Districts were 
instrumental to the federal government through organising ballot rigging. 
15. Some indicators to highlight this dramatic situation are: Public investment in the agricultural sector 
dropped from 19% in 1980 to 5% in 1989 (De la Vega 1989); the area cultivated decreased dramatically 
(from 1983 to 1989 some 22%, Auping 1991), and resulted in an even sharper drop in marketed produce. 
Consequently huge quantities of food stuffs had to be imported. Nevertheless per capita consumption of 
e.g. maize (the basic staple food in Mexico) decreased 6% in 4 years (1981/82-1985/86)(Calva 1988:47). 
Auping (1991) arrives at a more dramatic figure of a 27% decrease during 1980-1988. Per capita meat 
consumption dropped by 45% during 1981-1987 (Calva 1988:48). These overall figures still mask the 
even more critical situation of the poorer families. The official minimum wage decreased in real terms 
by some 37% over 1981-1986 (EIU 1987). But also farm gate prices dropped (e.g. the guarantee farm-
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gate price for maize nearly halved in real terms between April 1987 and April 1988; Calva 1988:191). 
Farm gate prices of most (if not all) crops lagged much behind price increases of inputs, like diesel and 
fertilizers (Calva 1988:24). Government expenditure for rural development and on the agricultural sector 
dropped around 45% (in real terms) over the period 1980-1986, whereas government expenditure to 
service foreign debt in the same period doubled (Calva 1988:41). 
16. See Fox and Gordillo (1989:159): 'Perhaps autonomous forces will become increasingly drawn into a 
government process o f "concertacidn social", winning political or economic changes for a few well-
endowed and/or well organised producers.' 
17. The mandate of the CNA included the supervision of all types of water use in the country: not only 
agricultural, but also domestic and industrial use. The CNA was created because of a growing concern 
about water pollution by industries and the dramatic consequences this had on the water supply of urban 
areas, specially Mexico City. So far, different ministries had administered water use. The C N A would 
become the umbrella commission to coordinate and supervise all the different water uses. Officially the 
CNA is a decentralised body of SARH with the capacity to decide over use of the national waters in 
quantity and quality. The CNA's priorities include: to rationalise the use of water according to its 
availability; to propose and execute national policies which take into account 'sectoral interests* and 
regional public opinion; to give congruence to and authorise programmes and budget in an integrated 
way; to facilitate coordination between institutions at federal level, and between states at river basin level; 
and to strengthen decentralisation policies (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1989:78). It in no way is mentioned 
that the CNA would also be in charge of directly managing water use, nor operating irrigation systems. 
18. The intervening engineers thus played an ambiguous role. Their interventions were aimed at involving 
farmers in the management of El Operado, and thereby in fact decreasing their own influence. But quite 
contradictorily, the engineers hardly let the farmers participate in these interventions. This is nicely 
displayed in the second document of the Water Users' Association (Appendix 4) which was edited by the 
CNA. The CNA engineers have to ascertain their effectiveness through stressing the success of the 
association, while not neglecting their own role. 
Notes chapter 8 
1. For instance, the District did not put the annual problem of the sugar cane increase on the Commission's 
agenda, which is remarkable since the Commission thanks its existence to the sugar struggle. By 1986, 
this was entirely controlled by the District head. Through banning any increase he engaged in what Wade 
has called 'rumour mongering' (Wade 1982:300). Of course sugar cane acreage did increase; however 
at some cost to the farmers involved, and without water users having any say in it. 
2 . It is here that some participation of fanners came in. On the board some representatives of the ejidos and 
other farmer organisations participate. Farmer representatives formed only a small minority. In practice, 
however, the decisions taken in the Comité Directivo were planned by local SRH personnel, and the 
central SRH (later SARH) offices at State (Guadalajara) and Federal (Mexico City) level could always 
veto its decisions. Greenberg wrote in 1970 on the functioning of these boards: T h e Committees [boards] 
actually functioned as rubber stamps for the Agricultural Ministry and the SRH' (Greenberg 1970:29). 
Others have argued that government officials often acted in collusion with the region's elite through their 
membership of such boards (Mares 1980:478,492; see also Lopez Zamora 1977:249-250). 
3 . However, given the presence of the ejido power structure, the Commission is an organisation where ejido 
forces and District forces are somehow mediated. In this sense, the Commission has similarities with 
other such 'institutionalised' organisations found in Mexico, such as for instance the 'official* ejidatarios' 
union (CNC). Few people would maintain that such an organisation serves the interests of the majority 
of small farmers. 
4 . The Commission is a men's world. This is not only how I understood it, it is also explicitly mentioned 
by water users. One (unwritten) requisite for an ejidatario to be elected delegate in the Commission is 
to be male. 
5. As mentioned earlier, in the Mexican political context to be called 'undisciplined' is one of the most 
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severe criticisms you can get. 
6 . This happened to one delegate in 1987; he accused the District o f corrupt practices. A District engineer 
went to see the ejido president of this delegate and demanded his withdrawal, which the president did. 
Ejido leaders tend to give in to demands of government functionaries. This shows the ambiguous nature 
of the ejido: as part of the state apparatus as a means of political control, and as an organ of peasant 
representation (cf. Fox and Gordillo 1989:137, and note 13). 
7. District officers also use images from the animal world to express the problems they face. For instance, 
one engineer trying (without success) to mobilise farmers to attend an ejido meeting, says cynically: 
nomas San Isidro arrea bueyes (only Saint Isidro drives oxen; Saint Isidro is the patron of the farmers, 
or rather of the plough), comparing peasants with oxen. 
8. Mexicanisms like metiche (someone meddlesome), grilla (someone who likes gossiping and politicking) 
and mitote (someone who is always intriguing, plotting). 
9. This is not so improbable as it may seem. Don Teodoro himself is said to control at least 7 delegates, 
but perhaps a few more. (It is interesting to note that all these delegates come from neighbouring ejidos 
in one corner of the valley.) Furthermore, Engineer Lopez Garcia could mobilise the votes of the 
delegates of one particular ejido (whom he designated himself), but perhaps others as well. So , Don 
Teodoro could count on 10 votes (his own vote included). He got 16 votes. His next rival got only 6 
votes (out o f a total of 31) . 
10. Comparing the new Association with the defunct Commission, the Association is not a lame organisation 
because it has an elected board, a functioning secretariat and its own financial resources. Second, the 
association has legal recognition, as defined by the Federal Water Law. Third, a serious start is made 
to hand over responsibility for maintenance, including its machinery, which means a change in the 
original set up of El Operado, designed to be managed entirely by the District. Also, the Association has 
a decisive say in the level of the water fees. 
11. Taken from Michiel Kuijk, Field notes El Grullo, December 1989-March 1990. 
12. I want to follow here Henao (1980:268) who concluded for a particular type of water users' organisation 
in Mexico, that their importance and consistency derives from the degree to which these organisations 
have been able to clearly define the relationship between their organisation and the productive resources 
they manage. See also Coward 1986a and 1986b. 
13. Since I could not study the Association's performance much after its foundation (my last visit to the 
research area was in April-May 1990), to assess the association's viability at this premature moment is 
impossible. 
Notes chapter 9 
1. The engineers themselves understood their strategy as that of 'the scissors'. What also can be considered 
an important power-effect is the way both engineers, the head engineer and a trusted department head, 
developed a work style with the District head facing the outside world, that is outside the District, and 
the department head facing inward, he managing the internal affairs of the District. They thus can be 
considered a tandem, backing each others back. The District head protected his faithful subordinate from 
the higher institutional side, as he played the diplomat, maintaining all contacts with higher level offices. 
The department head controlled the situation within the District, did most thinking, developed new 
strategies and policies and protected his boss from getting involved in intra-district fights. Some close 
friends to the department head once referred to him as the tlacaelel, the man behind the District head, 
and the one who effectively exercised power. Tlacaelel (1398-C.1480) was the most influential advisor 
to the fourth, fifth and sixth king of Tenochtitlan (Itzcoatl, Motecuhzoma, Axayacatl, respectively). When 
he was offered the kingdom after Motecuhzoma had died, Tlacaelel refused, saying: 'what more king 
would you like me to be' . And the Cddice Ramirez comments: 'And he did not lack reason, because with 
his industriousness, while not being king, accomplished more than when he would have been.. . because 
nothing else was done in the entire kingdom than what he ordered.' As the man behind the throne, he 
was able to influence the kingdom during 1428-1480, much longer than any individual king (Leon-Portilla 
1983: 87-102). 
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